The battle of Chickamauga 19-20 Sept. 63

The bloodiest 2 days of the Civil War. Rosecrans' planning was flawed, but Thomas saved the Union army.
Bragg planned well enough, but some of his subordinate generals (Polk and Hindman) betrayed him.
.

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.....
The much maligned
Braxton Bragg  (1817-76)

Everyone "knows" Bragg was
a fool, right? Think again.

Nothing is as it first seems.


General H.V. Boynton in Piatt and Boynton, p. 384: "The failure to give Rosecrans effective flanking supports was inexcusable. The only explanation for it is found in the irritation and dislike which his straightforward and independent dealings had aroused in Washington, and a failure to understand the natural obstacles of the position and the contemplated advance. Meade was in a state of enforced inactivity before Lee. Grant's army was doing nothing to occupy Johnston in Mississippi, and there was no such Union activity in front of Mobile and Charleston as prevented troops being spared to Bragg from those points. And so, while the Washington authorities were finding fault with Rosecrans while he was pushing some of the most brilliant and effectual moves of the war, and were not even lifting a finger to encourage or even to protect him, the Richmond government was neglecting no means to strengthen Bragg to the extent of its powers. As a result, in one week from the date of Halleck's telegram inquiring whether Bragg was reinforcing Lee, Longtreet and Johnston and Walker and Buckner had reached Bragg from the extremes of the Confederacy, and he had moved to attack Rosecrans with 70,000 men.”

Boynton to Gen.
William W. Loring (CSA): "But, general, there are people in the North who regard the Chickamauga campaign as a failure for the Union cause."
Loring to Boynton: "Ah, we would gladly have exchanged a dozen of our previous victories for that one failure."

General D.H. Hill (CSA) wrote years later about the battle:
"A breathing space was allowed him [Rosecrans]; The panic among his troops subsided, and Chattanooga - the objective point of the campaign - was held. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga - that brillant dash which had distinguished him on a hundred fields was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. " To read the rest of the passage click here.

Abraham Lincoln:
"It is doubtful whether his [Thomas'] heroism and skill exhibited last Sunday afternoon, has ever been surpassed in the world."

G. Moxley Sorel, CSA: "He [Thomas] was one of the ablest of their soldiers, perhaps noone equaled him, and I heartily wish he had been anywhere else but at Chickamauga."

James A. Garfield:
"It was not a defeat, but a great victory, only we at headquarters did not know it."

Dana about Thomas after the battle: "On the other hand, General Thomas has risen to the highest point in their [the soldiers'] esteem, as he has in that of every one who witnessed his conduct on that unfortunate and glorious day; and should there be a change in the chief command, there is no other man whose appointment would be so welcome to this army. I would earnestly recommend that in such an event his merits be considered. He is certainly an officer of the very highest qualities, soldierly and personal. He refused before because a battle was imminent and he unacquainted with the combinations. No such reason now exists, and I presume that he would accept.
"

Major James Connolly ("Three years in the Army of the Cumberland," pg. 123) wrote on 22 Sept. to his wife: "We are somewhat whipped but will get over it."

Map of Mclemore's Cove  --  Maps 1 & 2  --  Map 3, afternoon 2nd day (see thumbnail below)


To view this map enlarged go to NOAA website, click on "Historical Map & Chart Project View or Download," click on "Select a Type" drop down box, click on "Civil War,"  and scroll to:
Chickamauga Battle, 1901 Ed., Noon to Nite, Sept 20, 1863 TN CIVIL WAR     1901
Click on CWCK2 11 to view the map. You can also download it, but the file is huge and requires the Mr. Sid viewer, which you can also download.

After the Tullahoma Campaign (23 June - 3 July 63), Rosecrans prepared his movement toward and around Chattanooga very carefully, all the while exchanging acrimonious telegrams with Halleck who demanded that he get moving. His simple explanation that he had to wait for the corn crop to ripen, so that he wouldn't have to carry with him the fodder for his animals, found no hearing with generals insulated in Washington. As soon as his preparations were complete he crossed the Cumberland mountains and sent Minty's cavalry part way to Knoxville and had Wilder demonstrate opposite Chattanooga (thus binding two of Bragg's divisions) in order to give the impression that he intended to cross the Tennessee upstream. The impression was reinforced by Burnside's occupation of Knoxville on 6 Sept. 63. As Rosecrans would then have been able to link up with Burnside, this was the crossing which Bragg expected and was preparing for. However, on 29 Aug. 63 Rosecrans' main force crossed the Tennessee downstream from Chattanooga at 4 points in the vicinity of Bridgeport, Ala. He then sent the AotC in 3 groups on a 50 mile wide front around Chattanooga. McCook was to the south of Lookout Mountain, Thomas occupied Cooper's and Stevens' Gaps in the middle of Lookout Mountain (with the help of a local Union sympathizer), and Crittenden was to occupy Chattanooga. He moved into it without opposition on 9 Sept. 63 after Bragg had left upon learning that the Union troops were in control of Lookout mountain. However, all reports that Bragg was fleeing in disorder toward Atlanta or Rome, Ga. were false and/or planted. Thomas warned Rosecrans that Bragg was not far away and dangerous to Rosecrans' widely dispersed forces, and that it was much safer to first concentrate and consolidate the Union hold on Lookout Valley and Chattanooga before going further.

However, Rosecrans was under ceaseless pressure from Stanton and Halleck to pursue and "destroy" Bragg, and Rosecrans decided to go after him. He was also upset because he had received practically no recognition for his brilliantly concieved and executed Tullahoma campaign and Tennesse River crossing, and he wanted advancement as much as many another general.

Guided by his assumption that Bragg was in full retreat, Rosecrans had ordered McCook at the southern end of Lookout Mountain to descend into Broomtown Valley and move toward Summerville in order to attack Bragg's army in the flank. When McCook got as far as Alpine and discovered that Bragg was not at all retreating, but rather was concentrated just to his north, he stopped, sent his trains back up the mountain, requested instructions, and waited. On the 13th he received orders from Thomas to bring his command to McLemore's Cove and unite with the 14th Corps "as rapidly as possible." However, even after having spent a week in the Alpine area, he was still poorly informed of the roads. Instead of taking the most direct road via Dougherty Gap into the cove, or the parallel road along the ridge to Steven's Gap, he passed by both roads on his right, descended into Lookout Valley, and recrossed Lookout Mountain further north at Steven's Gap. This almost doubled his marching distance and, more importantly, added a second mountain crossing. True, it was the safest route, but it cost him 5 days to cover what he could have done in 1 or 2 days. McCook's report throws little light on his reasons for his choice of route, but if Rosecrans had heeded Thomas' warnings, McCook wouldn't have been sent to Alpine in the first place. The map below shows the route he took and the two shorter ones he could have taken:

 


  
To see entire map, go to NOAA website, click on "Historical Map & Chart Project View or Download," click on "Select a Type" drop down box, click on "Civil War," and scroll to:
Chickamauga Battle, Basic Topographic map of Theater of Operations, 10 of 10 TN CIVIL WAR     1896
Click on CWCK10 to view the map. You can also download it, but the file is large and requires the Mr. Sid viewer, which you can also download.
McCook's travail
The red dots show the route McCook actually took, and the blue line passing through Dougherty Gap shows the shortest route he could have taken into McClemore's Cove. There was also the parallel road along the ridge to Steven's Gap (the blue dots), but it wasn't indicated on some of the period maps, and it appears that neither McCook nor Thomas knew about it.

Driving Tour of McLemore's Cove
To better understand the events in and around McLemore's Cove (which set up the battle of Chickamauga),  I suggest the following 2 hour driving tour. Start at Point Park on Lookout Mountain and take highway 157 south along the ridge for 15 miles. Turn left on Dougherty Gap Road and descend through hairpin turns into McClemore's Cove.  Notice how narrow the valley is at that point. Go left at the first fork and pass through Cedar Grove. While driving look up to see the ridge above you on the left. When you reach highway 193 you are where Bailey's Crosscroads was. Turn right and drive 2 miles east to Davis Crossroads which was Thomas' and Negley's forward position on 10-11 Sept. Then drive 2 more miles east to Dug Gap, a climb with switchbacks, Bragg's forward position. Turn around and return to Davis Crossroads, continue on highway 193 until you reach highway 138. Turn left, and drive up to Steven's Gap. At the top you will have rejoined highway 157 which, if you turn right, will take you back to Point Park. If you have time, drive back down to Davis Crossroads and turn left toward the Chickamauga visitors' center. As you drive,  notice how this end of the valley opens out. This tour will give you a good idea of what the commanders of those times had to face. Remember, they had to carry most of their supplies with them in horse-drawn wagons.

As a result of McCook's wrong turn, the rest of Rosecrans' army, instead of retiring in an orderly manner into the fortifications of Chattanooga or at least Rossville, had to wait for McCook in a position of extreme vulnerability. Fortunately for the Federals, Bragg had decided to wait for the arrival of Longstreet before making any more attacks. The head of McCook's column reached Thomas on the 17th, but the tail didn't reach Rosecran's right wing until the morning of the 20th (Col. Jonathan R. Miles of the Twenty-seventh Illinois Infantry who joined Wilder). In chapter 12 of his 1894 "History of the Army of the Cumberland," Henry M. Cist sums up this situation as follows:

The delay attending McCook's movements was almost fatal to the Army of the Cumberland. Had Bragg received his promised reinforcements at the date he expected them, our army would in all probability have been completely annihilated in detail...The battle for Chattanooga would never have been fought at Chickamauga had not the safety of McCook's corps demanded it.

A more gifted commander might have done better in McCook's position, but Rosecrans had chosen him for the task and put him in that spot. McCook emerged from the experience utterly exhausted. This was to show itself two days later when Wood would ask McCook's advice concerning a flawed order from Rosecrans, but we'll get to that part of the story presently.


We have to ask what else Rosecrans could have done. He had feinted at a crossing north of Chattanooga, but a real crossing there would have worsened considerably his supply problems as no railroad under his control served that area. A frontal attack on Chattanooga from across the river would have been extraordinarily costly at best. That left the daunting crossing south of Chattanooga and the left wheel over two intervening mountains - Sand Mountain and Lookout - which, however, were fairly close to the railroads which Rosecrans could count on most of the time. To force Bragg out of Chattanooga without a battle on Bragg's terms, Rosecrans had to put a convincing number of troops over Lookout Mountain south of Chattanooga, and for practical reaons, this couldn't be done in just 1 or 2 places. This dictated a dispersal of his troops. Once over he had to somehow trick Bragg into retreating still further,and then race Bragg back to Chattanooga - the real prize as both commanders and their presidents knew - with the mountain barrier to his left. But Bragg was tired of being tricked and had caught on that the action was where Thomas was. It was no accident that Bragg was waiting right where Thomas came out. A battle would have to be fought somewhere, and Bragg in any case would have been able to concentrate his army sooner than Rosecrans could. In addition, his wagon train, some of which had been dragged over two mountains, though enormous, contained supplies for only 25 days of campaigning. Meanwhile Bragg had backed up closer to his storehouses in Dalton and Atlanta. Rosecrans certainly shouldn't have placed McCook so far away from someone who could tell him what to do, and Rosecrans could perhaps have crossed Lookout Mountain more cautiously, but, as has been explained, he was under extreme pressure from without and within to finally pin down and decisively defeat the elusive Army of Tennessee, and he let his previous string of successes go to his head.  The following quote from a talk given on 22 Feb. 1907 by Smith Aktins, a colonel in charge of a regiment in Wilder's brigade, gives us insight into Rosecrans' state of mind just before the battle:

"Early on the morning of September 19th, 1863, the Army of the Cumberland began its race for Chattanooga, where that army might have been and should have been safely placed ten days before that time. In that race the Army of the Cumber-land was attacked in flank by Bragg's army. The Army of the Cumberland would repulse the enemy at some point and immediately move on toward Chattanooga. All day long it was a continuous race. At about 10 a.m. my regiment was ordered by General Rosecrans to take position and rest in a field southeast of Widow Glenn's house, and putting my regiment in the field, I sent out a skirmish line into the woods in my front, and captured a prisoner from the Confederate skirmish line that was found west of the La Fayette road. The prisoner was brought immediately to me. He was a Virginia boy, badly frightened at first, but he soon told me that he belonged to Longstreet's corps from the Virginia Army, and detailed to me how he came by cars, where they disembarked, and how they marched to the battlefield. I took the prisoner, the first one captured from Longstreet's corps, to General Rosecrans at his then headquarters at Widow Glenn's house, and told him that I had a prisoner from Longstreet's corps, when Rosecrans flew into a passion, denounced the little boy as a liar, declared that Longstreet's corps was not there. The little boy prisoner was so frightened that he would not speak a word. In sorrow I turned away, and joined my regiment. Rosecrans found out that Longstreet's corps was there" (Chickamauga - Useless, Disastrous Battle, pg. 10).


This was not the behavior of a commander in control of himself or of the situation, and is compelling evidence for the assertion that Rosecrans was breaking down under the weight of his reponsibility. It is normal for people to refuse unwelcome information, but he had been entrusted with the lives of 60,000 soldiers and an enormous amount of his government's resources, and he could not afford himself this luxury, especially since he had already received intelligence of troops being sent west from the Army of Northern Virginia, according to his own battle report (ar50_54). The correct response would have been to order a night march of his right wing to bring it up to the Dry Valley Road, a couple of miles closer to Chattanooga, as Thomas had suggested to him by the way. For this failure alone Rosecrans deserved to be replaced, if men's lives count for anything.

After withdrawing from Chattanooga (without destroying bridges or other facilities), Bragg waited at La Fayette. He knew that Rosecrans was widely dispersed and saw the opportunity this presented him. To be sure, this was also a source of uncertainty to him because of his lack of precise information about the location and strength of Rosecrans' scattered units. Bragg nevertheless prepared several attempts to defeat Rosecrans in detail before he could concentrate. However, every one of these attempts was vitiated by dissension among Bragg's subordinate commanders and their disobedience of orders. One such attempt took place at McClemore's Cove directly east of Stevens' Gap. It was a strange valley with few easy exits on 3 sides and located just west of La Fayette, Ga. (accent on the 2nd syllable). A portion of Thomas' command under Negley had advanced into the cove by Stevens' Gap, the main entrance from the west in the middle of Lookout Montain. Negley was supposed to continue on to La Fayette, but he and Thomas, disturbed by sightings and reports of large masses of Confederate troops a few miles away, finding suspiciously stiff resistance at Dug Gap (a narrow pass through the considerable obstacle of Pigeon Mountain), and also warned by the local Union sympathizers, stopped and waited for 2 days (10-11 Sept. 63), despite Rosecrans' remonstrances to push forward. Scouts were send out to reconnoitre and reported that most of Bragg's army was at La Fayette and had been reinforced from Mississippi (Breckenridge). Thomas listened to a pair of deserters recount a story of Bragg's demoralization and how he was fleeing toward Atlanta. He dismissed them before they finished, commenting to his staff: "Those men are lying. And if they're lying, so have a lot of others been lying. It's remarkable that every deserter tells exactly the same story in almost exactly the same words. Instead of retreating, it is likely that Bragg's whole army is ahead of us" (O'Connor, pg. 21).
It also helped Thomas that his secret service had cracked Bragg's signal code (the Union not only had better cannon, it also had the better mathematicians).

Bragg had prepared a trap. Hindman was to attack Negley from the wide open valley opening to the north, and Daniel. H. Hill was to attack from Dug Gap in the East upon the signal of the sound of Hindman's attack. Negley might have been caught in a bottle if Hindman, fearing himself an attack against his right flank, hadn't perceived discretion in his orders and delayed. Bragg, waiting with Hill at Dug Gap and listening for gunfire from the north side of the Cove, hesitated also. His "resolution weakened during the day as he imagined Crittenden and McCook were closing in on his flanks" (Cozzens, This Terrible Sound, p. 74-75). Moreover, his experience of the last couple of months must have made him suspect some sort of ruse on Rosecrans' part, not knowing that, this time, Rosecrans hadn't drawn the card to fill his straight flush. While Bragg attempted to get Hindman to move, which would have firmed up his own indecision, his intended prey pulled part-way back west out of the Cove, Baird came down and reinforced Negley's flank, and Bragg's moment passed.


McLemore's Cove

Highway 157 on the left follows the top of Lookout Mountain (see Driving Tour above). The original road (blue dots) between Steven's Gap and Bailey's Crossroads no longer goes through, and the connecting road to Cooper's Gap (green splotch) also no longer exists. The squiggle near Estelle at the right is Dug Gap where the Confederates' advanced position was located. The main part of Bragg's army was at La Fayette, about 5 miles to the east. On 9 Sept. Negley got as far as the red star at Davis Crossroads and stopped. His scouts told him there were a lot of enemy soldiers in front of him. They were right.

Bragg then ordered Polk to attack the isolated corps of Crittenden near Chattanooga, but Polk fumbled it. On 13 Sept., when his skimishers encountered those of Crittenden, Polk overestimated the size of the force facing him, perhaps thanks to Wilder's firepower, and had his men fortify.  He called for reinforcements, but only Bragg came to find out what had happened. The shouted invective of the two generals was easily heard by the troops outside the tent.  By the way, until the 20th Wilder had practically an independent command and was called to reinforce threatened points all along Rosecrans' six-mile long line.

During the next week Bragg undertook nothing while he waited for Longstreet who's arrival would give him numerical superiority. This was perhaps the only major battle of the war in which the Confederate forces (about 70,000) outnumbered the Federal forces (about 58,000). To the Confederate total should be added several thousand men of the Georgia militia which had taken over guard duties in the rear "in order to give Bragg every available fighting man" (Coppée, General Thomas, 1893, pg. 131). Rosecrans had received a report that troops from the Army of Northern Virginia had been spotted traveling south, so he must have at least suspected where they were headed. In the weeks preceding the battle he made repeated requests to the War Department, which was hounding him to destroy Bragg, to send him more men. Burnside at Knoxville was repeatedly ordered to go to Rosecrans, but he also felt shorthanded, had ambiguous instructions from Halleck (connect with Rosecrans but do not, repeat, do not relinquish East Tennessee), and was under pressure from Governer Johnson in Nashville to not abandon East Tennessee. At first Burnside stayed put. Finally he did move but, when the battle began at Chickamauga, he had got no further than Kingston, 25 miles outside of Knoxville. He turned back when he learned the outcome of the battle. Grant at Vicksburg was not shorthanded and his troops were not seriously engaged or threatened anywhere. On 13 Sept. he also had been ordered to send Rosecrans reinforcements, but he was absent from his command (partying in New Orleans), his second in command Sherman undertook nothing, and the reinforcements weren't sent until 27 Sept., after the battle had been fought. Read or reread my summary of the battles of Iuka and Corinth to find out what may have motivated Grant to act like that.

According to Ambrose Bierce, topographical engineer under Hazen during the battle of Chickamauga, the battle was about "control of a road," namely La Fayette Road. There were actually three roads leading from the Union lines back toward Rossville, namely Dry Valley Rd. (the escape route of Rosecrans' right wing on the 20th, McFarland Road (Thomas' route of retreat the evening of the 20th), and La Fayette or State Rd. (the main road to Rossville Gap which Bragg wanted to cut).

The first large scale contact actually took place on the 18th between the respective cavalries as Bragg prepared to put his army across the Chickamauga. The terrain was utterly unsuited for a coordinated attack or defense as most of the area was virgin forest. Steele writes: "Neither army knew the exact positions of the other...It is probable that division commanders on either side hardly knew where their own commands were, in the thick woods, let alone the other troops of their own army, or the troops of the hostile army. The lines were at this time about six miles long." Add to this the arrival of Longstreet's corps on the same day and the arrival of Longstreet himself the next night, and it is easy to imagine the confusion in the dispositions on both sides.

All of Thomas' intelligence indicated that Bragg intended to aim his heaviest blow at the Union left. During the night of the 18th Thomas therefore moved his corps north from the Union center, around and behind Crittenden, and to the Union left, thus placing his corps on the roads leading back to Rossville Gap and Chattanooga. At dawn Baird had reached Kelly Field. It was this shift which thwarted Bragg's plan of attack and made the saving of the Union army possible. At this point Bragg would have been very surprised to hear anyone describe Thomas as being slow. Thomas made this risky move, albeit screened by forest and Chickamauga Creek, in the face of Confederate units under Polk less than a mile away. Neither force was aware of the presence of the other, but the Confederates camped while Thomas rode back and forth along his columns moving north. "Why, it's old Pap hisself," a surprised soldier would exclaim when Thomas in person appeared to clear a traffic jam. In the morning Thomas' unrested troops prepared breastworks*, and Croxton attacked Forrest. This brought on the general engagement which turned into an all day melee in which neither side could claim any advantage. Neither Rosecrans nor Bragg could exercise meaningful command, and brigades fought brigades independently, as both armies sidled north. That evening after dark Cleburne attacked the Union left, but was beaten off.

For the next day Bragg made his usual complicated battle plan which dictated a dawn attack in Polk against the Union left which would then ripple down the line, but there was no early attack. Polk either did not pass the order on to Hill, or he did pass on the order, but Hill received it too late to get an early start. The truth is buried in the murk of accusation and counter-accusation, but in any case Polk adhered to his pattern of not taking  Bragg's battlefield directives seriously. Longstreet, having arrived the previous evening and been given command of Bragg's left, was to attack upon hearing the battle begin on the other end of the line, but when there was no attack at either end, Bragg sent orders to move forward directly to the division commanders. Thomas on the left began to feel heavy pressure from Confederates trying to get around his left and called for reinforcements. This led Rosecrans to shift some units in his direction, which resulted in a hole being created inadvertently on the Union right when Rosecrans sent the following order to Wood:

<ar50_103>
HEADQUARTERS, September 20--10.45 a.m.
Brigadier-General WOOD, Commanding Division:
The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him.
Respectfully, FRANK S. BOND, Major, and Aide-de-Camp.

Rosecrans' order presupposed a gap between Wood and Reynolds, but there was none, but rather the division of Brannan was there. There was a small space between Brannan and Reynolds which a courrier had noticed and reported to Rosecrans. Brannan had been ordered to Thomas, but he hesitated to leave while in the face of imminent attack. To obey the letter of at least part of the order and close up on Reynolds, Wood therefore had to pull out of line and move behind Brannan.

The oft repeated tale that Wood willfully, on his own, and out of spite carried out an order he knew to be ill-advised is probably exagerated. Most commentators fault Wood because he certainly knew that to move just then was risky, as Longstreet's skirmishers were already advancing. However, he had already been twice upbraided by Rosecrans for not rigidly following orders, most recently earlier that same morning for failing to promptly carry out, you guessed it, an ambiguous order. He had been ordered to fill Negley's place in line who had been ordered to join Thomas. But Negley didn't move, and Wood could not relieve him. Rosecrans, overwrought and unable to control his emotions, blamed Wood for Negley's tardiness and said so in public using insulting and threatening language. Now Wood was handed a poorly written order, and McCook, exhausted and confused, his superior in rank although not his direct commander, told him to try and carry it out, and that he would fill the gap with other troops. McCook made this offer after having received information from his skirmishers that a large Confederate force was heading in his direction. However, at that point there wasn't much McCook could have done. He was stretched to the breaking point by the troops taken from him and sent to Thomas, and Sheridan and Davis were in motion when Longstreet's column of 20,000 men struck the gap left by Wood. Glen Tucker summed up the other point of view when he wrote: "There can be little doubt that Wood acted in good faith" ("Chickamauga," pg. 258). Regardless of McCook's ability or lack of it in a crisis, Rosecrans was at fault for again having put McCook in that spot. Rosecrans had not followed Thomas' advice, proferred at the council of war in Widow Glen's house the previous evening, to move the entire right wing up to the Dry Valley Road. Perhaps Rosecrans was reluctant to impose yet another night march, even of a couple of miles, on an overworked army. This is what can happen when an abstract plan is rigidly carried through in spite of unforseen exigencies. Rosecrans had let himself be seduced by the beauty of his plan.

McCook, Negley and Crittenden were later brought before a court of inquiry, but not convicted for leaving the field of battle. They were found to have committed no more than an "error of judgment" (ar50_1053), but their active roles in the war ceased nevertheless. Judging from McCook's performances at Perryville and Murfreesboro it should have ended earlier, but the McCook family was influential. He was genial and personally courageous, but incompetent as a corps commander. Wood was not tried, perhaps because he was felt to be not at fault, or because later that day he played an essential role in stabilizing Thomas' position on Snodgrass Hill. In a message dated 15 Oct. 63 Rosecrans praised Wood's performance and even recommended him for promotion (ar53_387). However, he was censured by the Negley court of inquiry for "severe reflections upon the conduct of Major General Negley, applying to him coarse and offensive epithets" (ar50_1044). Sheridan also plied Negley with offensive language, but was not censured. The whole question of responsibility for opening the gap is moot because Rosecrans, by initially misreading Bragg's intentions, by disregarding on repeated occasions sound advice from Thomas, and by shrugging off intelligence that Bragg was being reinforced, had already created a chaotic command situation in which any error would have dire consequences, and there are always errors. Under such circumstances, Longstreet's attack may have overwhelmed the Union right anyway.

In any case a hole was made, and the massed column under Hood happened to find it while making one of his all-or-nothing attacks, and the Federal right, already in a state of confusion, collapsed. Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, Davis, Negley (taking with him most of the Union artillery), and Sheridan left the field. When Rosecrans arrived at Rossville he met his chief of staff, Garfield, and debated what to do. According to Henry Cist, another of Rosecrans' staff who may actually have been a witness, Garfield advised Rosecrans to go back to Chattanooga while he, Garfield, would report to Thomas (Cist, "History of the Army of the Cumberland," chapt. 12). This was bad advice from a man who before the crossing of the Tennessee had been sending back secret reports to Chase unfavorable to Rosecrans, so Garfield left the field that evening, when Thomas withdrew, with something on his conscience.

After the collapse, the only unit remaining on the Union right was Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry armed with Spencer repeaters which made so much noise that Longstreet hesitated to order his men forward, thinking that Wilder represented a large force on his flank. This at least bought some time for Thomas to get set on Snodgrass Hill. Wilder sent an aid to ask Sheridan, who was retreating, for help, and Sheridan told him, "to get out of there" (Samuel C. Williams, "General John T. Wilder," 1936, pg. 33, quoted also in Tucker, pg. 316). The day before at the other end of the line, and that morning on the Union far right, Wilder had stopped Confederate attacks cold. Now, after the collapse of the Union right, he was about to attack Longstreet in the flank and cut his way through to Thomas, because anyone with ears and a clear mind knew that Thomas hadn't quit. Then a panicked Charles Dana, Assistant Secretary of War and Stanton's very capable but not battle-tested informant, was riding in the wrong direction toward Confederate lines and, luckily for him, ran into Wilder. He told Wilder that the entire army was routed and Rosecrans killed or captured. He positively ordered Col. Wilder to escort him back to Chattanooga, and to fall back to Lookout Mountain in order to "hold it at all hazards" (Tucker, pg. 317).  Being only a colonel and not knowing that Dana did not have the authority to give such orders, Wilder stopped his preparations, sent Dana back to Chattanooga with some scouts, and began to restore order in his sector. His brigade remained on the field until the next morning and, along with Dan McCook's brigade on the other wing, was the last to retire.

All of the commanders on the division level and above who left the field on the 20th were sidelined for the rest of the war, except Davis and Sheridan. Davis saved himself later that afternoon by the gesture of promptly or fairly promptly reversing direction when so ordered, but Sheridan decided that his battle was over and marched away, allegedly with the intention of returning via Rossville to support Thomas's northern flank. Col. Thruston, chief of staff of McCook's XX Corps (to which Davis and Sheridan belonged) had reported to Thomas that Sheridan, along with Negley and Davis with about 7000 men were still close by. Thomas sent Thruston to direct the three division commanders to come back to "aid his right," something which they should have done anyway, without orders. Forcing his way through along a road clogged with retreating men and equipment, Thruston found them still at McFarland's Gap and conveyed Thomas' order. Davis allowed his soldiers get water, and then headed back toward Thomas' right, taking some of Negley's troops with him, albeit without getting very far. But Sheridan and Negley kept on toward Rossville. As Thruston wrote in his article The Crisis at Chickamauga in "Battles and Leaders" (Vol III, pg. 665):

"Sheridan was still without faith. He may have thought there was danger at Rossville, or that his troops had not regained their fighting spirit. He insisted on going to Rossville. Darkness would catch him before he reached the field from that direction. Negley was vacilating; he finally went to Rossville."

Piatt ("Life of Thomas," pg. 430-31) writes the following about this encounter:

"General Thruston, in making his statement, omitted from the writing precisely what General Sheridan did say, and this language the gallant young chief of staff omitted from a mistaken sense of propriety. The fact is, the insubordinate subordinate, in a sentence glaring with profanity, swore he would obey no such orders and take his men into a slaughter organized by fools....A braver man never trod the field of danger. His mind was clear and his nerves calm, and he knew that in that roar that rose behind him as he marched away brave men were being done to death, while heroic officers were looking eagerly to the right and left for aid in this hour of death-tainted anxiety."

Sheridan played no further role in the battle, but for some reason he got a pass while Negley lost his command, as did Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, and Van Cleve, regardless of the pressing reasons they put forth in defense of their decisions. It is possible that the War Department had been waiting for an opportunity to get rid of these commanders anyway. Rosecrans' abrasiveness and perhaps his ambition had long grated on Halleck, and the government wanted to deflect criticism that it hadn't properly supported Rosecrans, so he would do as a scapegoat. McCook had struck out a third time in a major battle, and nobody wanted to serve under him any more. Crittenden had apparently lost heart, perhaps because the war was taking a direction he hadn't predicted, perhaps the family plantation back in Kentucky was not doing well as restive slaves slipped away. Dana could not have been far off the mark when wrote the following about the two:

<ar50_202>
"The feeling in the case of McCook is deepened by the recollection of his faults at Perryville and Murfreesborough, and of the great waste of life which they caused; while toward Crittenden it is relieved somewhat by consideration for his excellent heart, general good sense, and charming social qualities. Against these, however, is balanced the fact, which I can testify to from my own observation, that he is constantly wanting in attention to the duties of his command, never rides his lines, or exercises any special care for the well-being and safety of his troops, and, in fact, discharges no other function than that of a medium for the transmission of orders."

Consider this exchange reported by Parkhurst who had been collecting stragglers and fugitives fleeing from the field:

<ar50_264>
"The troops from the front continued to rush on toward my line in great confusion, and at this moment I discovered Major-General Crittenden, of the Twenty-first Army Corps, with some of his staff. I immediately rode up to him and respectfully asked him to stop and take command of the forces I was collecting and had then collected, and place them in a position to resist an attack or take them back to the battle-field, which I then supposed and now believe could have been successfully accomplished. Major-General Crittenden declined to take command, saying, "This," meaning the forces there collected, 'is no command for me.' I remarked to the general that the force I then had collected and should succeed in collecting was too much of a command for me. General Crittenden replied, 'You have done marvelously well and you had better keep command.'"


No high ranking officer who displayed such an attitude in such a situation could remain in his position. Negley also had some explaining to do. Well before Longstreet's attack Thomas had ordered him to place his artillery (about 50 guns) on the far Union left in order to cover the main road. However, when Longstreet's attack developed he was still a mile from his objective and got involved with the rout of McCook's corps, taking with him those 50 guns which had not fired a shot. Thomas put it kindly in his report when he wrote that Negley "must have misunderstood my order" (ar50_251). He had performed well at Murfreesboro, but he had a terrible day at Chickamauga. True, he was suffering from dysentery, which was no laughing matter as it could be fatal in those days before the role of bacteria in causing disease had been discovered. Perhaps the fact that he hadn't attended West Point, was, as he later maintained, a factor in the decision to sideline him. More importantly, when he had the chance to redeem himself, he kept on going to Rossville. True, he made himself quite useful there by gathering and organizing stragglers, but he didn't have Sheridan's robust p.r. instincts and effrontery to fake a return to the field. Van Cleve, 53 years old and already graying, lost his composure on the 2nd day of Chickamauga, was entirely separated from his command, and let himself be swept along to Chattanooga. In memorium to an unsung hero of the battle of Murfreesboro, I quote here from Hazen's memoirs ("A Narrative of Military Service," 1885, pg. 127-28):

"As I hastened forward to learn the condition of affairs, I met General Van Cleve, a division commander of Crittenden's corps, riding wildly up the road, with tears running down his cheeks, who asked if I had any troops as they were wanted badly 'just down there,' - pointing in the direction I was going, - saying he had not a man he could control....His distress was not feigned."

Sheridan had not had much of a day either. Even if we accept his report as being partly true, he still disregarded Thomas' order to return to Snodgrass Hill, and he contributed nothing to solve the dilemma in which the Union army found itself that afternoon, without consequences for his subsequent career. Did Sherman's friendship and Halleck's protection have anything to do with it? The matter would be of little interest if this man hadn't risen later to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Army (1884-1888) and four star general (1888). My essay Sherman's Ride at Chickamauga contains a more detailed analysis of Sherman's movements the afternoon and evening of 20 September.

By noon or thereabouts, Thomas was alone with about 25,000 men on the field against about 60,000 Confederates. As his situation became clear to him, Thomas concentrated troops around Snodgrass Hill, left those in Kelly Field where they were, and resolved to stay and fight until nightfall, which he did. He was helped by the relative passivity of Polk, whose troops were apparently fought out. The keys, however, to Thomas' survival that afternoon were the lack of coordination of the mainly frontal attacks which an overconfident Longstreet (who sat down at 2 PM for lunch) carried out from the southern end of the Confederate line, and the arrival on Thomas' left of Granger and Steedman in the afternoon with the reserve corps. They brought with them about 4000 men (a bit more than 2 brigades), some artillery, and much needed ammunition. Thomas is supposed to have said, "General Steedman, I have always been glad to see you, but never so glad as now." Steedman brought his men behind the Union position and personally led the charge which drove off a contingent of Longstreet's troops who were threatening to envelope Thomas' right. At one point Steedman even carried the colors in order to rally a unit of wavering soldiers. Steedman's 2 brigades alone suffered about 1000 casualties that afternoon.

Thomas constantly rode back and forth along his perimeter stretching from Snodgrass Hill to the end of Horseshoe Ridge, placing his units, encouraging his men: "Steady, there, steady. Shoot low and pick your man." Plugging gaps as they opened and readjusting the lines as new threats appeared, "he issued orders to restore the line in the quiet conversational tone that politeness prescribes for a ladies' drawing room. It was the discipline of a lifetime concentrated in a moment" (Wilbur Thomas, pg. 392). At least once he got as far as La Fayette Road, because, according to Reynold's report, Thomas personally directed Turchin's final attack which stabilized the left flank for the withdrawal to McFarland's Gap. I quote the entire passage here because it perfectly illustrates Thomas' command presence and style when he was in the thick of battle:

<ar50_442>
"Arriving at the Rossville road, the command was met by the corps commander in person, and I was directed to form line perpendicular to the Rossville road. This done General Thomas pointed in the direction of Rossville and said, "There they are; clear them out." The division was faced about and a charge ordered and executed in two lines at double-quick, through the rebel lines, dispersing them and capturing more than 200 prisoners under a fire of infantry in front and artillery in flank.

I understood that this movement was intended to open the way to Rossville for the army, and did not then know of any other road to that point. I therefore pressed right on in the charge, expecting the whole division to do the same until the rebel lines and batteries were cleared and the road opened, and found myself with only about 150 of the Third Brigade, under Colonel Lane, Eleventh Ohio, near the field hospital [Cloud's] of the Fourteenth Corps.

The remainder of the division proceeded to the high ground on the left by order of General Thomas. The Third Brigade was reformed by Brigadier-General Turchin, who had his horse shot under him in the charge. The Second Brigade was reformed by Col. M. S. Robinson, who succeeded to the command of that brigade after the death of Col. E. A. King. The advanced party rejoined the division on the ridge to the west of the road, and the whole division marched to Rossville by the Valley road
."

Thomas said that his opponents that day "fought without system." It helped also that Thomas' men were the best prepared soldiers in either or any army, and that Thomas had the knack of getting extraordinary performances from subordinate officers, some of whom on this day were from other commands and had found him by following the sound of battle. They did fight with system, and Thomas had trained them, soldiers and officers, to do just that by sending them out constantly on sorties (to the detriment of parade ground drill). The performance and personal heroism of Granger, Brannan, Richard W. Johnson, Reynolds, Steedman, Palmer, Cruft, Hazen, Grose, Baird, Turchin, Opdycke, Willich, Stanley, Barnes, Van Derveer, Harker, Robinson, Whitaker, Mitchell, and Wood on this day deserve special mention. Brigade commanders fought in the line like privates, among them Sirwell, Stoughton, and John Beatty. Thomas himself thanked mostly his ordinary soldiers. In fact, during the final withdrawal he got down from his horse to shake the hand of a nameless private.

Although some commentators like to speculate that Rosecrans and Thomas could have counter-attacked a weakened Bragg on the 21st, most write of Thomas' precarious situation at the end of that day. However, it is apparently not widely understood just how precarious it was. Of modern authors only Tucker ("Chickamauga," pg. 353) deals with this problem. There was namely, as the following map shows, a gap between Kelly Field on the right, and Snodgrass Hill on the left.:


Snodgrass Hill and, to the left, Horseshoe Ridge. Thomas' HQ was at the star. Separated by a stretch of woods was the fortified position of Kelly Field. Willich had a brigade with which to make a lot of noise if the Confederates moved in force in his direction.

The space was wooded, and Thomas had posted there only a brigade under Willich (circled in red) in the hopes that the trees would mask the weakness. Moreover, Willich** was once drawn away to aid Baird (ar50_535), during which time the gap was empty.

Thomas was bluffing the entire afternoon of the 20th, or, to put it more kindly, was forced to speculate on Confederate errors. We get an idea of one of these errors from Humphreys, the Confederate brigade commander adjacent to Willich, who stated the following in his report:

<ar51_509>
"I immediately informed General Longstreet of the enemy's position and strength, and received orders from him to hold my position without advancing, while he sent a division to attack him on the right and left. The attack on my left was first made with doubtful success; the attack on my right was successful, driving the enemy from his position in great confusion. It was now dark and no farther pursuit was made." 


In fact, Longstreet carried out one frontal attack after another against Snodgrass Hill until very late in the day. Longstreet himself counted 25 of them. Humphreys does not state what he related to Longstreet, nor does Longstreet mention Humphreys' intelligence in his own report, but Humphreys had five hours to reconnoitre his left flank. If he did discover Willich's weakness and reported it, then Longstreet did not react quickly enough. Of Polk's division commanders Stewart was the closest to the gap, but he was receiving conflicting orders from Bragg, Longstreet, and Buckner (ar51_364). His report doesn't mention any attempt to reconnoiter his left flank. In any case, if one of the many Confederate divisions in that area had brushed Willich aside at any time that afternoon, or if Preston had been informed of the gap when he was brought in, Thomas would have been quickly driven from the field in disorder, and that would have been that. Those 7000 men under Davis, Negley and Sheridan would have done nicely to help Thomas fill that gap and reinforce a flank, and from about 2 to 4 PM that afternoon, they were only a couple of miles away. With that gap filled, Thomas would have had a least a choice to withdraw or not to withdraw. Sheridan, occasionally a man of energy, could have got them to Thomas. You be the judge.

When the day ended the attacks gradually ceased. Thomas was able to withdraw through McFarland Gap to Rossville in stages and in a fairly orderly manner, and he thus saved the Union army. However, the withdrawal from Kelly field was contested, as the following extract from Baird's report shows:

<ar50_279>
"As my men fell back the enemy pressed after them, and in crossing the open field very many were struck down. They reached the woods, west of the road, in as good order as could be expected, but then, uncertain which direction to take, and having no landmark to guide them, many became separated from their regiments, and in groups joined other commands, with which they fell back to Rossville, where all were united during the night. A number, doubtless, became confused at this time and marched into the lines of the rebels. We had, during the day, been fired into from every point of the compass, and when we fell back, no other portions of our troops being in sight, it was impossible to tell where they could be found or when we would encounter the enemy. My loss, up to the time of falling back, was small compared with the punishment in-dieted on the rebels. In retiring, it was great.
"

This is confirmed by Palmer's report:

<ar50_715>
"At about 5 o'clock I received an order from Major-General Thomas, by a staff officer, to retire. Under the impression that it was intended that I should, after retiring toward the rear of the center, form to resist the attacks which were coming on both flanks, I sent my orders to my brigade commanders, and rode to the Rossville road to await the head of the column. I reached the road and looked back across the field some 400 yards; my men were half way across. The enemy had already discovered the movement, and were crossing the barricades and firing. Batteries opened on us from the left and right, sweeping the road and field from opposite directions. It seemed impossible to bring men across the field in anything like good order. Grose was thrown into confusion, but Cruft came off in good style, and both with little loss. Cruft's brigade was retired slowly after leaving the field, frequently halting to serve as a nucleus for the reformation of our scattered troops. These brigades were conducted to the top of the ridge, formed and held until large crowds of stragglers passed, and, as I received no orders from any quarter, at late dusk I gave orders to the brigades to descend into the valley, throw out strong guards in the rear and front to resist any possible attack, and march to Rossville. The head of the column reached there at 8.40 p.m.
"

Longstreet was content with the day's work, as this sentence from his report shows:

<ar51_289>
"A simultaneous and continuous shout from the two wings announced our success complete. The enemy had fought every man that he had, and every one had been in turn beaten."

This is echoed in this passage from Ambrose Bierce:

"At last it grew too dark to fight. Then away to our left and rear some of Bragg's people set up the 'Rebel yell.' It was taken up successively and passed around to our front, along our right and in behind us again, until it seemed almost to have got to the point where it started. It was the ugliest sound that any mortal ever heard - even a mortal exhausted and unnerved by two days of hard fighting, without sleep, without rest, without food and without hope. There was, however, a space somewhere at the back of us across which that horrible yell did not prolong itself; and through that we finally retired in profound silence and dejection, unmolested."

However, it can be said that, in the military sense, Thomas advanced to Rossville and Chattanooga. For this exploits he became known as the Rock of Chickamauga, perhaps in reference to Dana's report of the afternoon of the 20th which stated that, "Our troops were as immovable as the rocks they stood on" (ar50_194). It is often asserted that a message of that afternoon from Garfield to Rosecrans contained the phrase: "Thomas standing like a rock." However, such a message is not contained in the Official Records. There is, however, a message of 15 Oct. 63 from Rosecrans to Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas in which he stated that Brannan with his division "stood like a rock" (ar53_387). Another of the Civil War's mysteries.

More than a year later, in recognition of his stunning victory at the battle of Nashville, Thomas was promoted to major general of the regular army. Upon learning of this Thomas, in a departure from his usual reticence, said, "I suppose it is better late than never, but it is too late to be appreciated; I earned this at Chickamauga." His reaction would perhaps have been stronger had he known then that Grant had caused the promotation to be delayed for a few weeks so that Meade's, Sherman's and Sheridan's promotion to the same rank would predate Thomas'.  

The casualty statistics are eloquent. Out of 58,000 Union effectives there were around 16,000 casualties (27%), and out about 70,000 Confederate effectives there were more than 18,000 casualties (around 26 %). This battle has been called the bloodiest two days of the war. Bragg had won a victory of sorts, but his army was as bad off as Rosecrans'. Bragg was not willing, and his army was probably not able to pursue, so Rosecrans held onto Chattanooga. Bragg's victory was barren, while Rosecrans's loss was, in the long run, inconsequential.

Even today many commentators fault Bragg for not having vigorously pursued on the following day. They overlook the fact that every victorious Civil War army on either side, after having sustained such high losses, required days or even weeks to recover some degree of organization, repair damaged equipment and transport, and to replace horses, of which hundreds or even thousands died in every major battle. The victors generally recognized the advantages of a successful pursuit, but their armies were not capable of it. The commentators also leave the Thomas factor out of their calculations. On 20 Sept. 1863 Thomas had not been defeated, and on the following day his corps was still a powerful force to be reckoned with. Bragg and other Western Theater commanders on both sides knew what that meant after having either faced Thomas or fought beside him, or otherwise observed Thomas' career up to that point. 

At Chickamauga Thomas' contribution was unique and decisive. The reluctance of many to accord him his rightful place in history has various reasons. Some of his fellow Union officers could not advance their careers unless they checked his and tarnished his reputation. Even today some Southern commentators regard him as a traitor to their cause, discounting the possibility that he acted also in the South's long-term interest (see my Essay Bring Thomas Home). Northern commentators, even today, perhaps would rather not admit that the Union victory was largely the work of a Virginian.

So what's your excuse?

* From "Chickamauga - The Great Battle of the West" in "Battles and Leaders", essay by D.H. Hill, editors' note: "General Thomas had wisely taken the precaution to make rude works about breast-high along his whole front, using rails and logs for the purpose. The logs and rails ran at right angles to each other, the logs keeping parallel to the proposed line of battle and lying, upon the rails until the proper height was reached. The spaces between these logs were filled with rails, which served to add to their security and strength. The spade had not been used." 


** 
Willich, a refugee from the 1848 revolution in Germany, performed amazingly well that afternoon, according to Johnson's report:
<ar50_536>
"By having Willich in reserve he was enabled to engage the enemy in four different directions, and by his prompt movements he saved the troops from annihilation and capture....Brig. Gen. A. Willich, commanding First Brigade, was always in the right place, and by his individual daring rendered the country great service. This gallant old veteran deserves promotion, and I hope he may receive it."

Willich did not receive his promotion until after the war, and then only to brevet Maj. Gen. USV, a meaningless rank in peacetime. A possible reason for this may have been his politics, as he was an avowed socialist. Consider, for example, what "der rote Willich" wrote toward the end of his Chickamauga report:
<ar50_541>
"I do not feel competent to bestow praise on the officers and men of my command; for their bravery and self-denial they are above praise. They have again and again proven that they are true sons of the Republic, who value life only so long as it is the life of freemen, and who are determined to make the neck of every power, slaveratic [sic] or monarchical, bend before the commonwealth of the freemen of the United States of America."

To some of his fellow and superior officers, such sentiments must have seemed as frightening as those of the Confederate opponents.

Thomas van Horne in Major General George H. Thomas, 1882, p. 143: "Seldom in war has such a burden of responsibility fallen upon a subordinate, as upon General Thomas at Chickamauga. The battle was left to him before noon on the 20th. He received no instructions from the commanding general. He was ignorant of the disaster on the right until the on-coming left wing of Bragg's army revealed it. Uninformed as to the general situation, he could not anticipate emergencies, but he was strong and versatile to master them as they were developed. It was not a light matter to command the Army of the Cumberland, as a whole, against a vast army that had been gathered from the East and West to crush it; an army superior in numbers, and inspired by the hope that in winning a decisive victory the general contest would be decided also. But, to take command of half of the Army of the Cumberland, with no supporting cavalry, with exposed flanks, and unconnected lines - to be supreme on the field by the demands of the situation rather than by the orders of a superior, and under such circumstances to contend successfully against Bragg's whole army, infantry and cavalry, was an achievement that transcends the higher successes of generals."

Battle reports:
1. Rosecrans US
2. Thomas US
3. Wood US
4. Parkhurst US provost marshall
5. Dana US dispatches
6. Bragg CS plus correspondence
7. Longstreet CS
8. Polk CS
9. Cleburne CS

Other articles on this battle:

1. Thomas van Horne on the battle of Chickamauga and background

2. excerpt from The Crisis at Chickamauga by Gates P. Thruston, brevet Brig.-Gen. USV

3. excerpt from Reenforcing Thomas at Chickamauga by  J. S. Fullerton, brevet Brig. Gen. USV

4. excerpt from Notes on the Chickamauga Campaign by Emerson Opdycke, brevet Maj.-Gen., USV

5. Chickamauga by Arthur R. Stone ©1999 The Cincinnati Civil War Round Table

6. The Lightning Brigade Saves the Day by Hubert M. Jordan

7. Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga by officers of the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas




Thomas Van Horne on the battle of Chickamauga, taken from his 1882 biography "Life of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas"

Page 102

CHAPTER VI
THE ARMY CROSSES THE TENNESSEE RIVER - GENERAL BRAGG EVACUATES
CHATTANOOGA - PURSUIT IS OPPOSED BY THOMAS, BUT NEVERTHELESS
ORDERED - THE THREE CORPS WIDELY SEPARATED - THOMAS' TROOPS
MEET THE ENEMY AT DUG GAP - BRAGG'S ARMY CONCENTRATED BUT
FAILS TO STRIKE EITHER OF THE ISOLATED CORPS - ARMY OF THE
CUMBERLAND CONCENTRATED ON THE l8TH - FIRST DAY OF BATTLE
AT CHICKAMAUGA.

Late in August, in compliance with peremptory orders from Washington, the army again moved forward, crossed the Cumberland Mountains, the Tennessee River, and the mountains immediately south of that river, and on the 8th of September, was encamped in Lookout Valley, near the western base of Lookout Mountain. Here General Rosecrans had his army in hand, except four brigades that had advanced directly towards Chattanooga from the north. The position of the army in Lookout Valley threatened General Bragg's communications south from Chattanooga. The Twenty-first corps was near the northern base of Lookout Mountain, on the direct road to Chattanooga, the Fourteenth corps was before Stevens' Gap, with its advance on the summit of the mountain, and the Twentieth corps was at Winston's with its foremost troops also upon the summit. The mountain then separated the two armies. General Bragg had been withdrawing his army for two days on the road leading to Lafayette, Georgia, and late on the 8th his rear guard retired from Chattanooga. Very early the next morning General Rosecrans was informed of the evacuation of the town.
 
 

Page 103 - BRAGG EVACUATES CHATTANOOGA

General Bragg abandoned Chattanooga in expectation of soon regaining it. His supplies were not sufficient for a siege, and his army was not large enough to hold Chattanooga and cover his communications. He consequently moved south a few miles to save his communications and meet expected reenforcements, where his army might face the mountain passes and strike unsupported corps, as they should debouch from different mountain gaps into the eastern valley. At this time the Confederate authorities were making efforts to give Bragg such an army as, in their judgment, would enable him to vanquish the Army of the Cumberland, to carry the war again to the north, and in the farthest reach of hope to end the war with the independence of the Southern States. But to give strategic force to a retreat that was imperative. General Bragg used various stratagems to conceal his purposes. He sent men into the National army to induce the belief that his army was retreating far to the south, and moved his forces as far as practicable to manifest such a purpose.

The strategy which had compelled the evacuation of Chattanooga was consummate. The forces sent by General Rosecrans first to Pikeville and afterwards directly towards Chattanooga, had effectually covered the movement of the army towards General Bragg's communications with Georgia, and had, at the same time, so threatened his communications with Knoxville, and the forces holding East Tennessee, that Buckner's little army had been withdrawn, and the easy possession of that region by General Burnside had been thereby assured. The only effect of this strategy which had not been favorable to the ultimate success of Rosecrans, had been the reenforcement of Bragg's army before Rosecrans by Buckner's command.

To gain Chattanooga the strategy was perfect, but for immediate offensive operations south from that important point it was radically defective. When Rosecrans' army was in Lookout Valley, and his detached forces - four brigades - on the north bank of the Tennessee, with open ways into Chattanooga from
 
 

Page 104 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

the north and the south, he had gained the objective of his campaign, and the concentration of his army in that town could have been effected without resistance by the enemy. But the pursuit of the enemy, not the occupation of Chattanooga in force, became his object as soon as he was informed that the town had been abandoned.

On the morning of the 9th, General Rosecrans sent the following message to General Thomas:

HEADQ'RS DEP'T OF THE CUMBERLAND, Trenton, September 9th, 3.30 A. M.

MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS, Commanding Fourteenth Corps :
A despatch is just received from General Wagner, dated 8.30 P. M. yesterday, stating that Chattanooga is evacuated by the rebels and he will occupy it in the morning. The general commanding desires you to call on him at once to consult in regard to arrangements for the pursuit.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.
P. S. - The order sending the Ninety-Second Indiana to reconnoitre the mountain is revoked. The General commanding directs you to order your whole command in readiness to move at once.
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.
Thus before General Thomas was invited to consult with General Rosecrans it had been decided to pursue the enemy, and he was invited to consult only in reference to the pursuit. But when the two generals met, Thomas opposed the pursuit altogether and presented military considerations of palpable weight against the measure.

At the time of the abandonment of Chattanooga by the enemy, two corps of the Army of the Cumberland were within a day's march of that place ; one of these being very near, since Wood's division of the Twenty-first corps occupied Chattanooga at noon of the 9th. The Twentieth corps was about
 
 

Page 105 - URGES CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY

forty miles distant, and could have marched to Chattanooga by noon on the 10th. By that time the main army could have been concentrated in the town with strong detachments on the road to Bridgeport. The mountain would have covered the movement of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps down Lookout Valley, and Crittenden's corps could have held the town and covered the approaches from the south and east, aided by the brigades from the north bank of the Tennessee. The concentration could have been effected, if it had been the purpose of General Bragg to oppose; but that it was not his intention is expressly stated in his official report, and was evinced at the time by his retreat far towards Lafayette, Georgia. Bragg was not ready for battle in proximity to Chattanooga, and his army was not in a position to prevent the concentration of the Army of the Cumberland in the town, had that been General Rosecrans' object. But the situation gave room for an easy, unrestricted occupation by the whole army. All the roads on the west side of Lookout Mountain were held by the National army, and all converged upon the one which passes over the 'nose' of Lookout, where that mountain abuts the Tennessee River, three miles from Chattanooga, and there was no enemy near to prevent, or even contest, the use of that road. There was not, therefore, a single obstacle to the concentration, and this fact taken in connection with the actual movement of a division into the place from the south, the crossing of troops into it from the north bank of the river, and the march of two divisions in front of it from Lookout Mountain to Rossville on the 10th, proves beyond question that General Rosecrans had gained his objective before he ordered the pursuit of the enemy. He must have thought so himself, or he would not have established his headquarters at Chattanooga behind his army.

In view of the manifest practicability of the concentration of the army at Chattanooga, Thomas urged Rosecrans to abandon his scheme of pursuit and establish his army at that
 
 

Page 106 -  LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.

point and perfect communications with Bridgeport and Nashville. After this had been done, the offensive could have been taken from Chattanooga as a base. General Thomas did not know how far Bragg intended to retreat, but independently of the enemy's plans he was urgent that what had been gained should be made secure. He was opposed to a movement that might bring on a battle when the army having nearly exhausted its supplies, transported from Bridgeport, could not follow up a victory, in the event of winning one; and where, if defeat should be the issue, the problem of supplies would be difficult of solution.

But believing that Bragg was retreating on Rome, Rosecrans rejected Thomas' advice, and in doing so entered upon a series of mistakes which culminated, when, by his orders, movements were made on the second day of the battle of Chickamauga, which gave the enemy the opportunity to break and rout the right of his army.

The views of the commanding generals in regard to the situation before the battle of Chickamauga, and in reference to the supposed possibilities to each, are clearly given in their official reports.

These extracts from General Bragg's report reveal his views, purposes and movements.

"Immediately after crossing the mountains to the Tennessee, the enemy threw a corps by way of Sequatchie Valley to strike the rear of General Buckner's command, while Burnside occupied him in front. * * * As soon as this change was made, the corps threatening his rear was withdrawn; and the enemy commenced a movement in force against our left and rear. On the last of August it became known that he had crossed his main force over the Tennessee River at and near Caperton's Ferry, the most accessible point from Stevenson. By a direct route he was now as near our main depot of supplies as we were, and our whole line of communication was exposed, whilst his was partially secured by mountains and the river. * * * The nature of the country and
 
 

Page 107 - R0SECRANS (ORDERS PURSUIT)

the want of supplies in it, with the presence of Burnside's force on our right, rendered a movement on the enemy's rear with our inferior force impracticable. It was therefore, determined to meet him in front whenever he should emerge from the mountain gorges. To do this and hold Chattanooga was impossible, without such a division of our small force as to endanger both parts. Accordingly our troops were put in position on the 7th and 8th of September, and took position from Lee and Gordon's mill to Lafayette, on the road leading south from Chattanooga and fronting the slope of Lookout Mountain."

General Rosecrans thus referred to the situation and the pursuit in his report :

"The weight of evidence gathered from all sources was, that Bragg was moving on Rome and that his movement commenced on the sixth of September. General Crittenden was therefore directed to hold Chattanooga with one brigade, calling all the forces on the north side of the Tennessee across, and to follow the enemy's retreat vigorously, anticipating that the main body had retired by Ringgold and Dalton."

After his consultation with General Thomas, General Rosecrans issued the following order:

TRENTON, GA., September 9, 1863, 10 A. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps :
The General commanding has ordered a general pursuit of the enemy by the whole army. General Crittenden has started to occupy Chattanooga and pursue the line of Bragg's retreat. Our forces across the river from Chattanooga have been ordered to cross and join General Crittenden in the pursuit. General McCook has been ordered to move at once on Alpine and Summerville. The General commanding directs you to move your command as rapidly as possible to Lafayette and make every exertion to strike the enemy in flank, and If possible cut off his escape. Colonel Wilder's brigade * has been ordered to join you at Lafayette.
Very respectfully your obedient servant,
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.

 
 

Page 108 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Nothing but the certainty that the enemy was retreating with scattered forces to some remote point, could have warranted such a separation of the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland, as resulted from obedience to this order. The movements in compliance gave General Bragg the advantage for maneuver and battle. He had his army in hand behind the mountains, with short lines to each of the three corps of the National army in their complete isolation.

General Rosecrans had been bold to cross the Tennessee River without assured support on right, or left. But when he had gained his objective it was more than bold to send one corps to the rear of General Bragg's concentrated army, another towards its centre, and a third to its left, and each of the three in perilous isolation. And it was one of the most wonderful series of operations of the war, which brought these corps from isolation into union in front of the enemy, in time for battle.

Bragg had a large army when he left Chattanooga. The five divisions that fought the battle of Stone River were with him, two divisions had joined him from Mississippi, and Buckner's two divisions from East Tennessee joined immediately south of Chattanooga. He had then an army of nine divisions of infantry immediately after leaving that town.

General Thomas was nearest this large army, and his designated line of advance was directly towards its centre. He was therefore the first in peril. Besides no general would forget that the overthrow of the central corps of an army would doubly expose the other two. It was well, therefore, that the conduct of the perilous advance of this corps was committed to as prudent a general as Thomas.
 

* Reynolds' division Fourteenth corps.
 
 

Page 109 - CROSSES LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

On the 9th Negley's division moved over Lookout Mountain and debouched into McLemore's Cove, and threw forward skirmishers to Bailey's cross-roads. In the evening Baird's division crossed the mountain to the eastern base. Reports reached Thomas that the enemy's cavalry was drawn up in line in front of Negley, and that a heavy force consisting of infantry, cavalry and artillery, was concentrated at Dug Gap, beyond Negley's position.

Bragg was apprised of this advance, and promptly prepared to meet it. The following extract from his report gives his general plan of operations as well as his purpose in respect to Thomas' movement: "During the ninth it was ascertained that a column, estimated at from four to eight thousand, had crossed Lookout Mountain into the cove, by way of Stevens' and Cooper's Gap. Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement - apparently in retreat, when, in reality, we had concentrated opposite his centre and deceived by the information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us, and thus exposed himself in detail." That night Bragg formed a combination of three divisions and a cavalry force to move against Negley the next day.

Early on the 10th it was ascertained that Dug Gap had been obstructed and occupied by the enemy's pickets. If this was a device to invite the advance of Thomas it failed of its object, since he was the more cautious in consequence of an equivocal precaution on the part of the enemy. General Bragg made effort during the day to move his forces against Negley, but twice, his subordinates failed to carry out his orders. He did not however abandon the project and at night gave orders for a far heavier combination for the 11th. Negley's division was exposed in three directions, through Dug Gap, farther to the left, through Catlett's Gap, both in Pigeon Mountain, and on the low ground
 
 

Page 110 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

to the north. That evening Baird's division moved towards Negley's position, and Reynolds and Brannan were ordered to move forward early in the morning. The caution evinced by General Thomas called forth the following despatch from General Rosecrans:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga, September 10, 1863 - 9:45 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Commanding Fourteenth Corps:
The General commanding directs me to say General Negley's despatch, forwarded to you at 10 A. M. is received. He is disappointed to learn from it that his forces move to-morrow morning instead of having moved this morning, as they should have done, this delay imperiling both extremes of the army.
Your movement upon Lafayette should be made with the utmost promptness.
You ought not to incumber yourself with your main supply train. A brigade or two will be sufficient to protect it.
Your advance ought to have threatened Lafayette yesterday evening.
I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. P. DROUILLARD. A. D. C. Captain
Later he added:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 10, 1863 -- 10 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS
Commanding Fourteenth Corps:
In addition to the accompanying despatch the General commanding further directs that you open direct communication with General McCook and take care to hurt the enemy as much as possible.
It is important to know whether he retreats on Rome or Cedar Bluffs.
If the enemy has passed Lafayette, toward Rome, he will threaten McCook ; if he has not passed this point, he will endanger Crittenden.
Much depends on the promptitude of your movements.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. P. DROUILLARD.

 
 

Page 111 - BRAGG ORDERS ATTACK

These instructions exhibited an utter misapprehension of the situation. Rosecrans still believed that Bragg was retreating and his plans had reference to pursuit. And Thomas' slow advance under the circumstances did not imperil either McCook or Crittenden, since the longer Bragg was induced to operate against Thomas, the longer would the other two corps be safe. Bragg had choice of corps, as each in isolation was exposed to attack, and it was not in the power of Thomas, McCook or Crittenden to give aid to each other except as each could hold the enemy to the offensive against himself. To be slow therefore under the semblance of offense was the best policy. But at the time that Rosecrans was framing his instructions to Thomas to hasten his movements on Lafayette, Bragg had just moved his headquarters to that place from Lee and Gordon's mill, and was planning to move seven or eight divisions of infantry and a force of cavalry against the foremost divisions of the Fourteenth corps in McLemore's Cove, as the following order and extract from his official report plainly show:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE, Lafayette, Ga., 12 p. M., September io, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL HINDMAN, Commanding, etc.
GENERAL: - Headquarters are here and the following is the information :
Crittenden's corps is advancing on us from Chattanooga. A large force from the south has advanced to within seven miles of this point. Polk is left at Anderson's to cover your rear. General Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to this point at the earliest hour you can see him in the morning, Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard.
I am, General, etc.,
GEORGE W. BRENT, Assistant Adjutant-General.
"Orders were also given for Walker's reserve corps to move promptly to join Cleburne's division at Dug Gap to unite in the attack. At the same time Cleburne was directed to remove all obstructions in the road in his front, which was
 
 

Page 112 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

promptly done, and by daylight he was ready to move. The obstructions in Catlett's Gap were also ordered to be removed to clear the road in Hindman's rear. Breckinridge's division, Hill's corps, was kept in position south of Lafayette to check any movement the enemy might make from that direction. At daylight I proceeded to join Cleburne at Dug Gap and found him waiting the opening of Hindman's guns, to move on the enemy's flanks and rear."

General Hindman had been joined by Buckner's corps the day before, so that Buckner's, Folk's and Walker's corps and one division of Hill's corps, and a cavalry force, under General Bragg in person, were included in the combination against the two advanced division of the Fourteenth corps. And yet these divisions and the other two behind them, escaped overthrow because they had not advanced in compliance with the orders of General Rosecrans.

At 8 A. M., on the 11th, Baird's division was formed on the right of Negley's. By this time it was known that the enemy had removed the obstructions from Catlett's and Dug Gap. Later in the day the enemy advanced through them in heavy force, while another column approached from the north. By skilful maneuvers and gallant fighting Negley's and Baird's divisions, step by step, withdrew from the midst of the three converging columns, and falling back towards Lookout Mountain, were soon within supporting distance of the other divisions of the corps. The strength of the enemy's columns developed the fact that there was a large army before the Fourteenth corps. And yet General Rosecrans was so far from apprehending the actual situation that he sent the following despatch to General Thomas :

CHATTANOOGA, Sept. 12, 1863, 11.15 A. M.

MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps.
GENERAL:- Your despatch of 10.30 last night and of 4 o'clock this morning, have been received. After maturely weighing the notes the General commanding is induced to think that General Negley

 
 

Page 113 - THE ENEMY AT LEE AND GORDON'S MILL

withdrew more through prudence than compulsion. He trusts that our loss is not serious, and that there will be no difficulty in holding the gap. He despatched you last night to communicate with General McCook and call him up if you thought necessary. He trusts this has been done, if not, no time should be lost. * * * * It is very important, at this time, for you to communicate promptly, that the General commanding may know how to manage General Crittenden's corps, which will attack the enemy as soon as it can be gotten in position.

When a battle does begin it is desirable that every command should do its best, and push hard, using the bayonet wherever possible.
I am, Sir, very respectfully your obedient servant.
C. GODDARD, Assistant Adjutant General.
General Thomas mentioned subsequently that he thought that the army should have been withdrawn to Chattanooga as soon as he had developed the fact of Bragg's concentration in his front, and he claimed that a safe retreat could have been effected by forced marches. At this time the situation gave no promise that the expectations entertained by the commanding general, when he ordered the pursuit of the enemy by his entire army, would be realized. In obedience to orders of the 9th, Crittenden had occupied Chattanooga with Wood's division, had called over the troops from the north bank of the Tennessee, and had put Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions in motion on the road to Ringgold. These divisions had passed on the 11th beyond Ringgold, and beyond the right flank of Bragg's army, Wilder's brigade having advanced to Tunnel Hill. The enemy had been developed on the 10th on the road to Lee and Gordon's mill, and two brigades of Wood's division - Barker's and Buell's - had been moved from the Ringgold road to the one leading to Lafayette, in consequence of information sent by Wood to General Rosecrans, to the effect that General Bragg, with the bulk of his army, was at Lee and Gordon's mill. This fact was also indicated by the resistance offered to Harker's
 
 

Page 114 -  LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.

advance north of the mill. General McCook had crossed Lookout Mountain to Alpine, and General R. B. Mitchell's cavalry - Crook's and McCook's divisions - had reconnoitred far toward Rome and Summerville without finding the enemy. This fact, and the capture of prisoners of Longstreet's corps from Virginia, indicated the presence of Bragg's army north of Alpine. McCook had thereupon thrown his trains back upon the mountain, and having sent a cavalry force towards Lafayette to develop the facts, was, on the 12th, holding his troops in readiness to recross the mountain upon receipt of orders to do so, or in the event of the return of the cavalry with positive knowledge of the concentration of Bragg's army at Lafayette. On the 12th Crittenden's corps took position on the line of the Chickamauga, with Van Cleve's division thrown across that stream on the direct road to Lafayette, in the immediate front of the enemy. And on the day that General Rosecrans proposed that "Crittenden's corps should attack the enemy as soon as it could be gotten into position," General Bragg turned from Thomas to direct Folk's corps and other forces against Crittenden, first to crush his corps, and then to turn again against the Fourteenth. Fortunately for the National army this plan also miscarried, through the default of subordinate commanders. Bragg's order for the movement against Crittenden is subjoined:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE. Lafayette, Ga., 6 p. M., September 12.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL POLK.,
GENERAL :- I enclose you a dispatch from General Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed and the others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.
Very truly yours,
BRAXTON BRAGG.

 

Page 115 - ENEMY CONCENTRATED FOR BATTLE

Afterwards, Buckner's corps was moved in support. General Bragg thus refers to the movement and its failure: "Early on the thirteenth I proceeded to the front, ahead Buckner's command, to find that no advance had been made on the enemy, and that his forces had formed a Junction and recrossed the Chickamauga. Again disappointed, immediate measures were taken to place our trains and limited supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated along the Chickamauga, threatening the enemy in front."

Lafayette was five miles distant from Dug Gap, ten miles from Lee and Gordon's mill, eighteen from Alpine, and fifteen from Ringgold. Bragg's army was mainly between Lafayette and Dug Gap on his left, and Lee and Gordon's mill in his front, and hence he held interior lines of extreme shortness for operations against an army divided into three parts.

It is, therefore, demonstrable that had General Thomas moved rapidly on the direct road to Lafayette, through Dug Gap, as ordered, the defeat of his corps, or its capture would have been inevitable, and the fate of that corps would have been the fate of the army. It is accordingly not surprising, that when General Rosecrans had full knowledge of the facts, he frankly stated in his official report that "It was, therefore, a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of the army."

When it was evident that General Bragg's army was concentrated north of Lafayette, McCook's corps was forty miles distant from Crittenden's by the nearest road, and the distance from Lee and Gordon's mill, and from McLemore's Cove to Bragg's army, was less than between the positions of Thomas and Crittenden, while McCook's corps was much farther from Thomas' position than from the enemy before Lafayette. But, notwithstanding the wide separation of the corps, the intervening mountains, and the concentrated forces of the enemy in' proximity to Crittenden, the Army of the
 
 

Page 116 -  LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGES H. THOMAS

Cumberland was united in time for battle. In abandoning the offensive from the 13th to the 18th, Bragg lost his best opportunity to overwhelm a single corps. During this time Crittenden's corps stood before his army on the opposite bank of the Chickamauga. Had he moved his army forward, he would have forced this single unsupported corps back upon Chattanooga, or westward upon Lookout Mountain, and while doing this he could have covered his communications through Ringgold to Dalton.

At midnight on the 13th McCook received orders to move two of his divisions to Thomas' support, and guard his trains with the third. On the following day the corps moved up the mountain, and on the 17th it was concentrated in McLemore's Cove. In the meantime the Fourteenth corps had moved gradually towards Lee and Gordon's mill, to be in readiness to connect in one direction with Crittenden and in the other with McCook. The enemy's forces were lying along the line of march on the right, but not in such strength, at any time, as to arrest the movement of Rosecrans' forces to the left. In the evening of the 18th General Thomas' head of column reached Crawfish Springs, and there he received orders to move to the Chattanooga and Lafayette road, at Kelley's farm, and to connect his right with Crittenden's left, at Lee and Gordon's mill. This night march was rendered necessary by the movement of General Bragg's forces to his right, down the right bank of the Chickamauga, on the l8th. He had intended to cross that stream and attack General Crittenden on that day, but he had been disappointed by the unexpected slowness of his forces in moving to position across the stream, in part resulting from Wilder's resistance. Bragg had been reenforced until he had ten divisions of infantry, comprised in five corps of two divisions each. The divisions comprised from three to five brigades each. He had four divisions of cavalry, two on his right covering the movement of his forces by that flank, and two on his left,
 
 

Page 117 - ROSECRANS' ARMY CONCENTRATED

to hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, and if possible, to direct attention from the real movement on the other flank. General Bragg had failed in three distinct efforts to strike the Fourteenth and Twenty-first corps in their isolation, and it was his purpose in moving his army down the Chickamauga and across it, to envelop Crittenden's corps, as the left of the National army. Had Bragg made the attack on the 18th he could have done this, but losing a day he lost the opportunity altogether, although his plan of operations for the 18th was based upon the belief that it was still practicable to move his forces upon General Rosecrans' left flank, at Lee and Gordon's mill, and interposing between the National army and Chattanooga, to drive it back in rout upon the mountain passes.

When the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland were united on the evening of the 18th it was then practicable to withdraw to Chattanooga, had General Rosecrans been averse to fighting a battle on the left bank of the Chickamauga. That stream divided the two armies, and General Bragg had no thought of crossing where there were opposing forces. A part of his army had already moved down the stream, and was across far below Lee and Gordon's mill, and his plan of battle was such as to give Rosecrans on the night of the l8th the best possible opportunity to withdraw his army without harm. Rosecrans had command of three roads to Chattanooga, the Lafayette road, the Dry Valley road, and the one leading along the eastern base of Lockout Mountain. The two most easterly roads passed through gaps in Missionary Ridge, and the third passed most of the way between Lookout Mountain and high hills. These main roads and intersecting roads would have afforded facilities for rapid movement and easy defense. By a forced march, on three roads practicable for the movement of troops in column, the army could have reached Chattanooga by the morning of the 19th, since the most distant brigade was not more than fifteen
 
 

Page 118 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

miles from that place. It was not unusual during the war for armies to retreat from the presence of other armies under circumstances less favorable for quick movement than in this case. Had, therefore, General Rosecrans elected to withdraw, he might have lost some of his wagons, but it is highly probable that he could have saved them all. It is certain that withdrawal was practicable, and he accepted battle on the field of Chickamauga from choice, and not from compulsion.

General Thomas reached Kelley's farm with Baird's division about daylight, and having been informed by Colonel Wilder that the enemy had crossed the Chickamauga in force the evening before at Reid's and Alexander's bridges, faced his troops towards these bridges across the roads leading to them. Wilder's brigade of Reynolds' division had taken position on the west of the Lafayette road, about half way from Kelley's farm to General Crittenden's position. General Thomas intended to place the other two brigades of that division on the right of Baird to connect his right with Wilder's left. When Brannan's division arrived at Kelley's farm, Thomas posted it on the left of Baird. Soon after it was reported that there was a brigade of Bragg's army in proximity, which had been cut off the night before by the burning of Reid's bridge by Colonel Daniel McCook of the Reserve corps. In hope of capturing this isolated brigade General Brannan was directed to move forward on the road to the burnt bridge, to capture the brigade or drive it back across the Chickamauga. This movement developed the enemy and opened the battle, at a point far north of the one where General Bragg expected to take the initiative against General Rosecrans' left flank. Brannan soon encountered Forrest's cavalry, which was covering the right of Walker's corps, as that corps, Hood's and Buckner's, and Cheatham's division of Folk's were moving with a left wheel upon Crittenden. The cavalry having, after a sharp conflict, given way before Brannan,
 
 

Page 119 - CHICKAMAUGA

Bragg moved Walker's corps to Forrest's support. This corps, after a temporary success against Baird's division was driven back, when other forces of the enemy were turned to the right. In the meantime the first divisions engaged on the left of the National army were reenforced, and from Brannan's initiative both armies extended their lines towards Lee and Gordon's mill. Early in the day Crittenden had sent a brigade to his left to develop the enemy, if coming against his position. Soon after, the battle having opened far to his left, while no enemy was threatening his position, he sent Palmer's division to General Thomas. This division went into position to the right of Baird. In the meantime General Rosecrans had placed General McCook in command of all the troops on the right of Crittenden, and directed him to send his own divisions to the left as they should come upon the field. Negley's division at the time was in position on the Chickamauga and was included with the cavalry in McCook's command. The first division sent from the right to Thomas was Johnson's division of McCook's corps, and this division went into line on the left of Palmer. Soon after, General Reynolds' division extended the line to the right. Thus five divisions were thrown before the enemy as his line was extended to his left. The lines of neither army were able to maintain continuity, and each at times was broken. The battle-field for the most part was thickly planted with forest trees, which were a barrier to regularity in the movement of troops and the maintenance of connected lines, in the alternations of aggression and defense. Gradually, however, with the oft repeated repulse of the enemy, General Thomas' line of five divisions became continuous and stable. Having failed to drive Thomas from position. General Bragg advanced fresh troops - Buckner's corps - towards the unoccupied space on the right of Reynolds. To meet this effort to divide his army, General Rosecrans directed Jeff. C. Davis' division of McCook's corps, and
 
 

Page 120 -  LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps, to the right of Thomas' line. These divisions were soon heavily engaged, and Sheridan's division from McCook's corps, and Wood's of Crittenden's were also sent to their support. Later in the day Negley's division of Thomas' corps was also sent to this part of the field. Early in the afternoon General Thomas sent Brannan's division from his extreme left to drive back the enemy who had penetrated the line of battle on Reynolds' right. The enemy's success at this point was the most threatening of the day, but Brannan's timely support restored the connection of Reynolds with the troops on his right.

In this action General Bragg's plan entirely miscarried. Expecting to move seven divisions of infantry and two of cavalry upon the left flank of Rosecrans' army at Lee and Gordon's mill, and then unite his entire army on that flank, the battle was forced upon him so far to the north that one of Crittenden's divisions had been posted opposite Bragg's centre and the other two had moved at least a mile to confront the left of his line of battle. And instead of using the remainder of his infantry against the front of Crittenden's corps near Lee and Gordon's mill he was compelled to send it down the Chickamauga to cross in the rear of his other forces. To the defeat of this plan General Thomas contributed largely. He was sent to the left by General Rosecrans but, except in compliance with this order, he was virtually in independent command of more than half of the infantry divisions of the army. Thomas disposed five divisions for battle, and the troops under his command formed about five-sevenths of the connected line of battle, and in transferring Brannan's division from his left to the right of Reynolds he drove back the enemy after the line of battle had been pierced. No general, in chief or subordinate command, was ever more quick or judicious in his dispositions, or more forceful in fighting an enemy.
 
 

Page 121 - NIGHT OF THE NINETEENTH

Late in the evening Thomas retired the left of his line a short distance to better ground, and directed the division commanders to construct barricades of logs in front of their troops. It was so evident that the battle had been indecisive in general issue, that both armies were conscious that the renewal of the conflict was inevitable.

During the night the corps commanders were called together for consultation at the headquarters of the commanding general. At this conference General Thomas was urgent that the right and right centre of the army should be withdrawn to Missionary Ridge and the transverse hills to the right and rear of the centre. The ridge and these hills commanded the Dry Valley road and much of the ground between that road and the one leading to Lafayette by Lee and Gordon's mill. Had this suggestion been adopted the defensive strength of the right would at least have been doubled. The strength of the transverse hills was proved on the following day, when Thomas with a part of the army saved the whole of it. But had the entire right of the army been where he would have placed it on the second day of the battle, neither that part nor any other would have been defeated.

The general trend of Missionary Ridge is north and south, but this ridge is cut into separate hills and series of hills by deep depressions or gaps. A long depression stretches from McFarland's house, first to the south and then to the south-east, and cuts the ridge to its base. Through this depression runs the Dry Valley road. At McFarland's another gap running to the east is equally deep. These two gaps isolate a series of hills, which trend south from McFarland's to Villetoe's house on the Dry Valley road, and, making nearly a right angle at the latter house, stretch to the east. On the south of the hills there is first low ground and then other hills, lower than the main ridge, extending nearly to Widow Glen's house. On the right side of this road, to one moving south, is Missionary
 
 

Page 122 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Ridge; and on the left are the hills which connect themselves almost to Widow Glen's. The right of the army, if it had been withdrawn as General Thomas advised, would have rested on the main ridge and upon the detached hills.

The ridge trending north from the Dry Valley road at Villetoe's, was the position taken by Steedman's, Brannan's and Wood's divisions in the afternoon of the 20th, whose strength was then fully tested. It should be mentioned in this connection that had the right of the army, cavalry included, been retired to these defensive positions, most of the field hospitals would have been entirely uncovered. These hospitals had been established on the 19th, near Crawfish Springs, far in the rear and far to the right of the line of battle on that day. They would have fallen into the hands of the enemy had the right of the army been withdrawn the night of the 19th, but had this been done, they would have been speedily regained as one of the fruits of victory.

In seeming deference to General Thomas' suggestion, General Rosecrans ordered Generals McCook and Crittenden, to withdraw their troops. The former was to establish a new line for the right, and the latter was to place his troops to the left of the new line in reserve. At 11.45 P. M., the following order was given to McCook:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

Widow Glen's, September 19, 11.45 P. M.
MAJOR GENERAL McCooK, Commanding the Twentieth Army Corps.
The General commanding directs you, as soon as practicable after the receipt of this order, to post your command so as to form the right of the new battle-front, and hold the same. Leave your outposts and grand guard where they now are till they are driven in by the enemy, when they will fall back upon the main body of your command, contesting the ground inch by inch.
Very respectfully,
J. A. GARFIELD, Chief of Staff.

 

Page 123 - THE ORDERS FOR THE TWENTIETH

Crittenden was ordered to place his two divisions in reserve to support McCook or Thomas:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

Widow Glen's House, Sept. 19, 1863 - 11.20 P. M.
GENERAL :
The General commanding directs me to inform you that General McCook has been ordered to hold this gap to-morrow, covering the Dry Valley road, his right resting near this place, his left connecting with General Thomas' right. The General places your corps in reserve to-morrow, and directs you to post it on the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge to support McCook or Thomas. Leave the grand guard from your command out, with instructions to hold their ground until driven in, and then to retire slowly, contesting the ground stubbornly.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

 

Page 124

CHAPTER VII
THE BATTLE OPENS ON THE LEFT - ENEMY REPULSED - CHANGES IN POSITIONS
OF TROOPS ON THE RIGHT - THAT WING ROUTED - THOMAS FORMS A NEW
LINE AND REPULSES THE ENEMY - THE WITHDRAWAL TO CHATTANOOGA.

All the movements required by General Rosecrans' orders were made during the night. General McCook posted Sheridan's division on the slope of Missionary Ridge to the right and rear of Widow Glen's with Davis' division to the left of Sheridan, while General Crittenden placed Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions still further to the left on the eastern slope of the ridge. Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry of Reynolds' division, by direction of the commanding general, reported to McCook for orders, and this brigade was placed on the right of Sheridan. McCook, in compliance with orders, made his dispositions to command the Dry Valley road, and to hold the gap near Widow Glen's house. Defenses were constructed during the night and early morning which, with the natural strength of the position, gave great firmness to the right flank of the army. But, although four divisions had then been withdrawn nearly a mile, there had been no corresponding recession of Negley's and Brannan's divisions and the right flank of the former was in air and far from supporting forces.

Very early in the morning of the 20th - 6 A. M. - General Thomas requested that Negley's division should be sent to him to take the position on the left of Baird which Brannan's division had occupied at the opening of the battle. Brannan's division was then in line on the right of Reynolds, where it was needed, and Thomas desired to strengthen his left flank with Negley's division, anticipating that the battle of the 20th would open at that point.
 

Page 125 - HE ASKS FOR NEGLEY

At 6 A. M., General Thomas sent the following message to General Rosecrans:

H'DQ'RS FOURTEENTH A. C. DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND, Near McDaniels’ House, Sept. 20, 1863 - 6 A. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS, Commanding Department Cumberland:
Since my return this morning, I have found it necessary to concentrate my line more. My left does not now extend to the road that branches off at McDaniels' to Reid's bridge. I earnestly request that Negley's division be placed on my left immediately. The enemy's skirmishers have been discovered about three quarters of a mile in front of our left and picket line, proceeding towards the Rossville road. A division on my left would be exactly in their front.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS, Maj .-Gen'l U. S. V. Com'd'g.
Upon receipt of the foregoing note General Rosecrans issued the following conditional order:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, September 20, 1863 - 6.35 A. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCooK, Commanding Twentieth Army Corps :
General Negley's division has been ordered to General Thomas' left. The General commanding directs you to fill the space left vacant by his removal, if practicable. The enemy appears to be moving toward our left.
Very respectfully,
J. A. GARFIELD, Chief of Staff.
This order was not positive in its requirement, and in view of all the facts the reason is not apparent, for directing General McCook to fill the space to be vacated by Negley's division.
 

Page 126 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

His two divisions were required by a previous order to extend the line of battle from General Thomas' right to Missionary Ridge, in rear of Widow Glen's, - General Rosecrans' headquarters. General Davis had only two brigades on the field, and had lost about forty per cent. of his men on the 19th. McCook's troops could not form a strong line from Negley's right to the point designated for the right flank, much less from Brannan's right to that point. This order then required that General McCook should move his forces to the left, or use the discretion so plainly given. If this order had been given to General Crittenden, who had Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions in reserve on the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge in readiness to support Thomas or McCook, Negley might have been relieved early in the day and been in position on the left of Baird when the battle opened.

The following extract from the report of General Thomas, in relation to the removal of Negley's division to the left, is subjoined:

"After my return from department headquarters, and about 2 A. M., on the 20th, I received a report from General Baird that the left of his division did not rest on the Reid's Bridge road as I had intended, and that he could not reach it without weakening his line too much. I immediately addressed a note to the commanding general, requesting that General Negley be sent to take position on General Baird's left and rear, and thus secure our left from assault. During the night the troops threw up temporary breastworks of logs, and prepared for the encounter which all anticipated would come off the next day. Although informed by note from General Rosecrans headquarters that Negley's division would be sent immediately to take post on my left, it had not arrived at 7 A. M. on the 20th, and I sent Captain Willard of my staff to General Negley to urge him forward as rapidly as possible, and to point out his position to him."

Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding the right wing of the Confederate army, was ordered by General Bragg to assault General Rosecrans' extreme left at dawn on the 20th and his divisions were directed to attack in turn to
 

Page 127 - AWAITING ATTACK

the left. Lieutenant-General Longstreet, commanding the left wing, was to attack in the same order as soon as Folk's left division was in motion, "and the whole line was then to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the enemy throughout its extent." But the commander of the right wing was not prompt in compliance and, during his absence from his command, Bragg ordered a reconnoissance, which developed the fact that the road to Chattanooga to the left of Rosecrans' army was open, and this knowledge intensified the eagerness of the enemy to attack and turn Thomas' left flank. The reconnoissance reported by Bragg, and the advance of the enemy on his left mentioned by Thomas, were doubtless identical.

General Thomas had done all in his power to strengthen the point selected by Bragg for his initial attack. Thomas' plan was to place the artillery of Negley's division on the eastern base of Missionary Ridge to the left and rear of Baird's division, so as to sweep the space accessible for a flank movement, and to place Negley's three brigades on the left and in close connection with Baird. With an entire division supported by three batteries of artillery, he believed that the left flank of the army could be held against the attacks of the enemy. But Negley was not permitted by the commanding general to leave position until relieved by other troops. The division at one time was actuall