It is time to begin to wind down our story, as the Civil War began to wind down. The outcome had been sealed by the final battle for Chattanooga on 25 Nov. 1863. The South, gripped by the Götterdämmerung psychosis which befalls most losing sides of a war, struggled on for while.

After the battle of Chattanooga Thomas built up the supplies and supply system which would underly and make possible the coming drive to Atlanta. Sheridan went off for a while to Meridian, Miss. (3 Feb. - 5 March 64) where he rehearsed for his cakewalk to the sea, neglecting, however, to keep regular contact with Grant who, in typical fashion, panicked. He ordered Thomas, in eery anticipation of Nashville, to make an improvised attack on Johnston's fortifications at Dalton in order to keep Johnston from sending reinforcements to Mississippi. Grant sent Thomas a flurry of messages, such as this one of 27 Feb.:

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"It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be held in full belief that an advance into the heart of the South is intended until the fate of General Sherman is fully known. The difficulties of supplies can be overcome by keeping your trains running between Chattanooga and your position. Take the depot trains at Chattanooga, yours, and General Howard's wagons. These can be replaced temporarily by returning. Veterans are returning daily. This will enable you to draw re-enforcements constantly to your front. Can you not also take a division from Howard's corps? General Schofield is instructed to send General Granger to you the moment it is safe to be without him."

Thomas conducted some reconnaissance and sent Grant the results. Johnston hadn't sent any troops anywhere and wasn't about to. On this occasion Thomas first suggested the possibility of outflanking the Dalton fortifications by sending troops through Snake Creek Gap. Grant calmed down, at least publically, and called off the frontal attack while rejecting the flanking manoeuver. In private he slandered the "lethargic" Virginian and wished he had Sherman there to promptly obey his orders, no matter how chimerical.

1) "The Atlanta campaign began early in May and would have ended in a week if Sherman had listened to Thomas"(Thomas Buell, "The Warrior Generals," pg. 361). On 7 May 64 Sherman kicked off his spring offensive against Johnston at Rocky Face Ridge (within sight of today's battle park Tunnel Hill Georgia). Long before this, Thomas' scouts had reported that the low pass Snake Creek Gap about 15 miles to the southwest of Dalton was not or only lightly defended. Thomas proposed that he go through this pass with his entire army of 60,000 men and put them behind Johnston astride the railroad at Resaca and attack Johnston from behind. Instead, Sherman (perhaps following orders from Grant) watered the plan down, called it his own for a while, and sent McPherson with 25,000 men, more than enough to do the job if McPherson hadn't gotten cold feet. After breezing through the gap McPherson encountered minor entrenchments at Resaca manned by 4000 Confederates, whereupon he withdrew back to Snake Creek Gap and called for reinforcements. Meanwhile Sherman ordered a fruitless and fairly costly frontal demonstration at Rocky Face Ridge. Later he sent most of his forces through Snake Creek Gap anyway, but Johnston had prudently retired to Resaca, out of the bag. McPherson's instructions had been explicit enough, but afterward Sherman made them even more explicit in his search for a scapegoat. Is it possible that Thomas's original plan, if successful, would have reflected too well on Thomas to suit Grant's taste? Sherman didn't report his casualties.

2) On 13 May 64 Sherman "felt" Johnston at Resaca who had been reinforced by Polk, bringing his strength up to about 60,000. Sherman still had twice the manpower, even without counting the enormous support services at Sherman's disposal. The next day there was a general engagement (with Hooker fighting well), but the Confederates held, except on their right flank, where Sherman did not exploit his advantage and thus wasted yet another opportunity to decisively defeat Johnston. On the 15th Sherman began a large scale flanking movement toward the railroad, and Johnston withdrew to Cassville and intrenched. Estimated casualties: 5,547 total (US 2,747; CS 2,800)

2 ½)  In a series of partial engagements at New Hope Church on 25-26  May, Pickett' Mill on 27 May, and Dallas on 28 May Sherman attempted a flanking movement to the southwest in order to avoid the last of the mountains between him and Atlanta and reach the railroad at Marietta. On the 26th Sherman mistakenly surmised that Johnston had a token force on his right and ordered Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s corps to attack there at a point which was later called "Hell's Hole." Hooker's troops were severely mauled, and later Sherman blamed Hooker for not attacking soon enough. Johnston retired to positions on and in front of Kennesaw Mountain. Estimated casualties: US 1,600; CS unknown.

3) Once upon a time on 27 June 1864, after weeks of rain and relative inactivity, a battle in Sherman's style was fought at Kennesaw Mountain. Actually it was fought mainly on the flatlands south of the mountain. Sherman, morose and insecure, ordered a frontal attack against sophisticated breastworks and intrenchments. 

Wilbur Thomas (no relation) writes on pg. 476 of his "Thomas" biography that Thomas, upon receving Sherman's order, said to Whipple, his chief of staff, "This is too bad." Thus began the only battle of this sort the Army of the Cumberland ever fought.

McPherson demonstrated starting at around 8:30 AM at Pigeon Hill (#2). The heaviest fighting took place under Thomas at Cheatham Hill (#3). Schofield east of Kolb's Farm (#4) did almost nothing. The main roads Burnt Hickory Rd., Dallas Highway and Powder Springs Rd. are also shown on the military map to the right.

Schofield writes in his memoirs that he and all of the other top commanders including Thomas protested against Sherman's plan. When Schofield, again according to his memoirs, intimated privately to Sherman that he did not feel that he could succeed in piercing the Confederate defenses, Sherman replied that "it was not intended that I should attack in front, but to make a strong demonstration..." (Forty-Six Years in the Army, pg. 144). His role in the battle was minimal, and he did not report his losses for that day because an exact return would have made this fact all too evident.  His division commander Gen. Hascall made only an approximate return (also an indication of dishonesty and lack of respect for his men's sacrifice), reporting "total losses of about 100, including several valuable officers" suffered in "demonstrations" against the works in front of him (ar73_570).

But Schofield was not entirely passive at Kennessaw. We learn from his exchanges of the 26th and 27th with Sherman that he, in accordance with Sherman's directive of the 25th (ar75_592), extended his line to the south by pushing one division under Cox across Olley's Creek, with "little loss" (ar75_620) as Cox reports. In doing so, Schofield checked with Sherman every step of the way via telegraph to make sure that he exposed the division neither too little nor too much. In one such dispatch to Sherman, sent at noon on the 27th, we find excuses for not doing more to relieve the pressure on Thomas to his left:

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"General Cox has just reported in person. He has advanced to the crest of the main ridge, a mile or so beyond Olley's Creek, and within a mile of the main road running to the mill on Nickajack Creek. The ridge is extremely rough and densely wooded. There is no hope of moving a force along it so as to reach the flank of the enemy's main line to-day. To go by the road would throw Cox three or four miles from Hascall's right, much too far for a single division. The enemy's works can be distinctly seen, running up the slope of the ridge at least a mile beyond Hascall's right. I cannot hope to reach the enemy's flank without separating my division much farther than I deem at all prudent."

It is odd that he felt compelled to justify his conduct when he had positive instructions to do what he did and no more. Perhaps he was aware that some observers might fault his lack of initiative. The ridge he referred to was lightly defended by cavalry and could not have been very high, as the land in that area is gently rolling. One might ask, where were their axes? Cox had sent one brigade accross the creek the evening before, and his other brigades crossed very early in the morning of the 27th, so Schofield had hours to make some gesture around Johnston's flank or make a threatening advance toward Marietta in order to relieve the pressure on Thomas to his left, but he stayed put. Here, as earlier during the approach to Altanta, as well as later at the battles of Peachtree Creek, Atlanta,  Jonesboro, and  Nashville, he either kept himself out of major operations or was kept out of them. As the result of his error at Columbia he got into his one real scrape at Franklin, and even there he left the management of the defense to Stanley. However, his circumspection in the field didn't make him timid when it came to claiming credit, as we can see in his dispatch of the evening of the 27th to Stoneman:

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"Thomas and McPherson have failed in their attack and have suffered heavy losses. Our little success on the right is all that has been gained anywhere. This may be very important to us as the first step toward the next important movement."

He neglects to mention that his "little success" was achieved against almost no opposition.

On the Union left wing McPherson carried out some feints toward the northern end of the mountain, which resulted in 210 casualties (ar75_631), and an attack at Pigeon Hill (# 2 on the maps above) which made little progress and was not pressed, judging from the fact that it cost him only 317 casualties out of about 5500 men engaged (see Gen. Morgan Smith's report, ar74_179). Thomas made the main effort at two points in the center with about 8000 men. The result was a failure with 1580 casualties (see Thomas' report, ar72_151). The Confederate line there was heavily fortified and manned by 2 divisions under Cheatham and Cleburne, Johnston's two best generals. Not satisfied with Thomas' effort, Sherman ordered Thomas to attack again late in the afternoon, and Thomas responded as follows:

"The Army of the Cumberland has already made two desperate, bloody and unsuccessful assaults on this mountain. If a third is ordered, it will, in my opinion, result in demoralizing this army and will, if made, be against my best judgment, and most earnest protest." ( Piatt, Life of Thomas,  p. 545)

The third assault was not made. Sherman's first report to Halleck was sent the evening after the battle:

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"Pursuant to my orders of the 24th, a diversion was made on each flank of the enemy, especially on the Sandtown road, and at 8 a.m. General McPherson attacked at the southwest end of Kenesaw, and General Thomas at a point about a mile farther south. At the same, time the skirmishers and artillery along the whole line kept up a sharp fire. Neither attack succeeded, though both columns reached the enemy's works, which are very strong. General McPherson reports his loss about 500, and General Thomas about 2,000; the loss particularly heavy in general and field officers. General Harker is reported mortally wounded, also Col. Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade; Colonel Rice, Fifty-seventh Ohio, very seriously. Colonel Barnhill, Fortieth Illinois, and Captain Augustin, Fifty-fifth Illinois, are killed. The facility with which defensive works of timber and earth are constructed gives the party on the defensive great advantage [italics added]. I cannot well turn the position of the enemy without abandoning my railroad, and we are already so far from our supplies that it is as much as the road can do to feed and supply the army. There are no supplies of any kind here. I can press Johnston and keep him from re-enforcing Lee, but to assault him in position will cost us more lives than we can spare. McPherson took to-day 100 prisoners, and Thomas about as many, but I do not suppose we inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, as he kept close behind his parapets."

One could conclude from this dispatch, that Sherman, after 2 and a half years of war, was just learning how effective fortifications can be. Better late than never, as they say. However, on 9 July 64 Sherman resorted to blaming others in order to explain away his failure:

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"The assault I made was no mistake; I had to do it. The enemy and our own army and officers had settled down into the conviction that the assault of lines formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy was found behind anything like a parapet, why everybody would deploy, throw up counter-works and take it easy, leaving it to the 'old man' to turn the position. Had the assault been made with one-fourth more vigor, mathematically, I would have put the head of George Thomas' whole army right through Johnston's deployed lines on the best ground for go-ahead, while my entire forces were well in hand on roads converging to my then object, Marietta. Had Harker and McCook not been struck down so early the assault would have succeeded, and then the battle would have all been in our favor on account of our superiority of numbers, position, and initiative."

In other words, Sherman ordered a play up the middle in order to show Johnston that Sherman didn't make only end runs, and if the attempt was a bloody failure, it was Thomas' fault for not having assaulted "with one-fourth more vigor." So what if about 500 Union soldiers died that day for no military purpose? No other passage taken from Sherman's writings displays his moral corruption better than this one, unless it's the following passage about Kennesaw from his Memoirs:

"An army to be efficient must not settle down to a single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I wanted, therefore, for the moral effect [italics mine], to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory."

Boatner states that overall Union losses on the 27th were 2051 out of estimated 16,226 engaged, against 442 Confederate losses out of estimated 17,733 engaged. The numbers alone demonstrate the futility of this battle, but the following dispatch from Sherman to McPherson of the 28th puts a sinister cast on the entire proceedings:

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"Is there any news on your flank? How long will it take you to load up and be ready to move for ten days, independent of the railroad?"

Sherman had thus, on the very next day at the latest, arrived at the solution which had apparently eluded him for weeks, namely bring McPherson down from the Union left flank and send him south and east past Schofield and around Johnston's left flank. Did he have a sudden inspiration, or had he decided upon this before the battle? The facts that he ordered Schofield to put a division accross Olley's Creek the day before the battle, then micromanaged the crossing, and wrote the above dispatch to McPherson, indicate that he already had his flanking maneuver in mind before the battle was fought. On 2 July Johnston, at the first hint of this movment, began his withdrawal from Kennesaw to positions at the Chattahoochee river, just 10 miles away. It was the last natural barrier protecting Atlanta.

Since every frontal attack which Sherman had ordered during the Civil War had failed, why did he attempt it again here? McKinney writes on page 338: "It is possible that Sherman's jealousy of Grant drove him to the assault." Two years before his death, Gen. Logan told Gen. Boynton a story under the condition that it be kept secret until he died. He and McPherson had tried to talk Sherman out of the attack, but Sherman was obsessed with all the coverage Grant's army was getting in the newspapers while his army was stalled before Atlanta. Sherman felt that "it was necessary to show the country that his troops could fight as well as Grant's" (Piatt and Boynton, pg. 548). Sherman may well have had and expressed such feelings, as he was ambivalent towards everyone, but this does not exclude the possibility that Sherman attacked with Grant's approval. The question arises: How might Grant have given Sherman advice without leaving record of it in the official communications? We get a hint from Schofield's memoirs "Forty-Six Years in the Army" which came out in 1894 while he was Commander in Chief of the Army. On page 223 he writes that, during the Vicksburg campaign, he received in his headquarters in St. Louis a dispatch from Grant, but Schofield's telegrapher couldn't decipher it. The commander of the Army of the Frontier and former physics instructor then rolled up his sleeves:

"My staff officer at once informed me that it was in some key different from that we had in use. So, I took the thing in hand myself...Commencing about 3 P.M., I reached the desired result at three in the morning."

So, Grant had his own code, and perhaps in the person of Schofield his messenger to Sherman. How many other such dispatches from Grant to Schofield were sent in the following years? When was Halleck's hand hovering over Schofield's head replaced by Grant's? How is the rise within a few months of an obscure staff officer avoiding battle in Missouri to army command under Sherman to be explained? Later during the battle of Nashville, Schofield would endeavor to make himself very useful to Grant, and again after the war during the dispute between Johnson and Stanton (whom Schofield would replace as Secretary of War).

Sherman's battle demonstrated yet again the futility of frontal attacks against prepared positions, let alone those against "breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised" (Thomas to Sherman, ar75_612), without prior destruction of at least one of the flanks. It also demonstrated who was not the boss in that army. Yes, I am suggesting that one of Sherman's motives may have been to put Thomas in his place. Consider the following passage from Sherman's letter of 18 June 1864 to "Dear General" Grant:

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"My chief source of trouble is with the Army of the Cumberland, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a plowed field will stop the whole column, and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried to impress on Thomas that we must assail and not defend; we are the offensive, and yet it seems the whole Army of the Cumberland is so habituated to be on the defensive that, from its commander down to the lowest private, I cannot get it out of their heads. I came out without tents and ordered all to do likewise, yet Thomas has a headquarters camp on the style of Halleck at Corinth; every aide and orderly with a wall-tent, and a baggage train big enough for a division. He promised to send it all back, but the truth is everybody there is allowed to do as he pleases, and they still think and act as though the railroad and all its facilities were theirs. This slowness has cost me the loss of two splendid opportunities which never recur in war."

If you are inclined to discount such intemperate language as being the expression of momentary ill humor by man under the pressure of campaigning, then consider the festering resentment demonstrated in the following quote. In November 1863, Sherman encountered Rosecrans in Cincinatti and, according to Rosecrans, said to him:

"I think Grant had no hand in it [Rosecrans' replacement], for on the arrival of my corps I said to him, 'Why in the devil did you have Rosecrans relieved and Thomas placed in command of the Army of the Cumberland? Rosecrans is a better soldier than Thomas could ever be.'" (Lamers, pg. 406; Rosecrans Papers, Document B)

If you think that Sherman was just attempting to ingratiate himself with Rosecrans, then consider this passage from a letter which Sherman wrote half a year later, on 27 April 1864, to former U.S. Senator Thomas Ewing - his adoptive father and father-in-law and early backer of Lincoln:

According to this letter, Sherman would have gotten rid of Thomas if he had he the power he attributed to Napoleon to "make & unmake on the spot." If Sherman could be honest to anyone, it was to Ewing, so we can accept this passage as being an exposition of his deepest feelings toward Thomas. How it must have rankled Sherman that the honors reserved for him at Chattanooga had been carried off by Thomas, and with a frontal charge no less. Worse still, Thomas kept on offering him sound advice when he wanted only subservience. Not even his bogus Thanks of Congress, awarded to him on 19 Feb. 1864 with the help of Senator John Sherman (his younger brother), could erase the knowledge that he had made a fool of himself at Chattanooga. I do not think Sherman was above letting Thomas have another go at a frontal attack which wouldn't end so gloriously for him.

If either theory about Sherman's motivation for ordering the attack - i.e. out of jealousy of Grant and/or resentment of Thomas - is correct, then Sherman did not value the lives of the soldiers very highly, and we have plenty of evidence for that already from other battles which Sherman fought. To those who object that I am too hard on Sherman, I reply that, in the light of the evidence presented here, "it is hard to overstate the case against him" (Meiser). The general then, now, or any time who does not consider the lives of the least of his soldiers as being as precious as his own is a criminal. He is also short-sighted, because that is the only path to true military greatness, the path which Thomas took.

In other battle summaries I have tried to build a case for Thomas' uncommon professionalism and military talent. This battle illustrates another essential element of Thomas' character, namely his ability to subordinate his feelings to the goal of winning the war as quickly as possible. He knew that Sherman could not take Atlanta without him, and he also knew that Sherman, in his sickness, would get rid of him if sufficiently provoked. So Thomas obeyed the order, albeit with only 2 divisions. His suffering as he watched his men die in front of impregnable fortifications, at least suspecting why he had been sent on this mission impossible, must have been beyond measure. For this reason, our debt to him is also beyond measure.

4) On 4-9 July 64 Sherman outflanked Johnston's position behind the Chattahoochie River and Johnston withdrew into Atlanta. And so the siege of Atlanta began.

Battle reports:
1. Thomas US
2. Grant US
3. Sherman US
4. Howard US
5. J. Johnston CS
7. Cleburne CS

Other articles on this battle:

1.  Resaca by Don Plezia

2. Thomas Van Horne on the Dalton to Atlanta campaign

3. Excerpt from Opposing Sherman's Advance to Atlanta by Joseph E. Johnston, General, CS.

Page 220

GENERAL SHERMAN'S armies moved forward from their respective positions on converging roads towards Tunnel Hill and Snake Creek Gap, on the 5th of May. The Army of the Cumberland advanced on the direct roads, the Army of the Ohio on the road from Cleveland to Dalton, and the Army of the Tennessee by Lee and Gordon's mill through Villanow to the northern entrance to Snake Creek Gap, a route that the enemy was not observing.

The tenacious adherence of General Thomas to his plan of turning Dalton, first suggested to General Grant for execution by the Army of the Cumberland alone, is evinced by the following extract from the report of General Thomas to the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

Shortly after his assignment to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi General Sherman came to see me at Chattanooga to consult as to the position of affairs, and adopt a plan for a spring campaign. At that interview I proposed to General Sherman that if he would use McPherson's and Schofield's armies to demonstrate on the enemy's position at Dalton by the direct roads through Buzzard Roost Gap, and from the direction of Cleveland, I would throw my whole force through Snake Creek Gap, which I knew to be unguarded; fall upon the enemy's communications between Dalton and Resaca, thereby turning his position completely, and force him either to retreat towards the east through a difficult country,
 
 

Page 221 - SHERMAN'S LOST OPPORTUNITY

poorly supplied with provisions and forage, with a strong probability of total disorganization of his force, or attack me, in which latter event I felt confident that my army was sufficiently strong to beat him, especially as I hoped to gain a position on his communications before he could be made aware of my movement. General Sherman objected to this plan for the reason that he desired my army to form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying point for the two wings, the Army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee, to operate from. *

In rejecting General Thomas' suggestions General Sherman lost the supreme opportunity of the Atlanta campaign. He adopted Thomas' plan so far as to send a smaller army through Snake Creek Gap, but with a different object from that proposed to him. His policy of holding the great army as a reserve for the smaller ones, might have been effective in a region which gave freedom of motion to his forces, but was not suited to the mountain region of Northern Georgia. In a direct advance the main army would necessarily encounter the enemy's strongest positions, while the smaller armies in independent movement could produce no decisive results.

General Sherman made provision for about eighty thousand men to move directly against Johnston's position in the mountains before Dalton, in feint or positive attack, as circumstances might determine, and for twenty-three thousand to pass through Snake Creek Gap to frighten the enemy into retreat, and then to strike him in flank and rear as he should run from Dalton to Resaca to save his communications. Thomas would have led his army of more than sixty thousand men through that Gap to seize and hold Resaca or the railroad north of that place, while leaving fifty thousand men to cover the more important movement by feigning a direct attack at Buzzard's Roost.
 
 

* Report to Corn. on Conduct of War, pp. 201-2.
 
 

Page 222 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Seldom have mountains and a long, secluded gap offered such aid to generalship. But the topography prescribed only one plan, a feint upon the enemy's position before Dalton, and the movement of an army strong enough to plant itself firmly on his communications. The practicability of this plan was demonstrated by the operations of the combined armies on the 8th, 9th and 10th of May.

The views of General Sherman as to his plan of operations were expressed in his communications to General Halleck and his army commanders. On the 8th he said to Halleck:

I have been all day reconnoitering the mountain range through whose gap the railroad and common road pass. By to-night McPherson will be in Snake Creek Gap, threatening Resaca, and to-morrow all will move to the attack. Army in good spirits and condition. I hope Johnston will fight here, instead of drawing me far down in Georgia.

On the 9th he telegraphed to Washington:

We have been fighting all day against precipices and mountain gaps to keep Johnston's army busy whilst McPherson could march to Resaca to destroy the railroad behind him. I heard from McPherson up to 2 P. M., when he was within a mile and a half of the railroad. After breaking the road good, his orders are to retire to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and be ready to work on Johnston's flank in case he retreats south. I will pitch in again early in the morning. Fighting has been mostly skirmishing, and casualties small. McPherson has the Army of the Tennessee, twenty-three thousand, and only encountered cavalry, so that Johnston did not measure his strength at all.

The day following, at 7 A. M., he telegraphed to General Halleck:

I am starting for the extreme front in Buzzard Roost Gap, and make this despatch that you may understand that Johnston acts purely on the defensive. I am attacking him on his strongest points, viz., west and north, till McPherson breaks his line at Resaca, when I will swing round through Snake Creek Gap and interfere between him and Georgia. * * * Yesterday I pressed hard to prevent Johnston detaching against McPherson; to-day I will be more easy, as I believe believe McPherson has destroyed Resaca, when he is ordered to fall back to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and act against Johnston's flank when he does start.
 
 

Page 223 - McPHERSON FAILS TO TAKE RESACA

But General McPherson did not take Resaca, nor destroy the railroad north of that place. He advanced to the vicinity of the town, posted his army on the south and west for a little time, and then withdrew to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap and fortified. In the advance from the gap a small force of cavalry was brushed away, but no other resistance was offered by the enemy.

At this time Resaca was held by two brigades, comprising about three thousand men, and there were no supporting forces nearer than Dalton. These facts demonstrate the practicability of the march of the Army of the Cumberland through Snake Creek Gap before the enemy " could become aware of the movement." And had General Thomas been permitted to execute his own plan, his army would have been firmly planted on Johnston's communications at Resaca, before either the whole or a part of his army could have marched from Dalton. General Thomas was as sanguine that he could have whipped Johnston's entire army with his own as that he could have moved through Snake Creek Gap without his knowledge.

In the afternoon of the 9^th, General Johnston was informed by General Canty, commanding at Resaca, that the Army of the Tennessee had passed through Snake Creek Gap, and thereupon he sent Hood with three divisions to Resaca. But on the l0th General Hood reported that the enemy had retired, and he was then ordered to leave two divisions at Tilton, one on each road, and to return to Dalton with the third. Tilton is nearly half-way from Resaca to Dalton, and these two divisions were disposed for a quick movement to either place, as circumstances should require.

The reasons which have been assigned for the fruitless advance of the Army of the Tennessee through Snake Creek Gap on the 9th, are that Resaca was strongly fortified
 
 

Page 224 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

fied and manned, and that the valley north of that place was a forest. General Sherman stated, in his official report, that "nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca, but the impracticable nature of the country which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible." When at the time General Thomas heard that the woods north of Resaca were considered a barrier to an advance upon the railroad, he simply asked: "Where were their axes?" On the 13th his own army and Schofield's moved through these woods to form a line of battle before Resaca. When Sherman learned that McPherson had not broken the railroad at Resaca, he sent the following letter to Thomas:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

In the field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864.

GENERAL :--I think you are satisfied that your troops cannot take Rocky Face Ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the jaws of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us.

Two plans of action suggest themselves :

1st. By night to replace Schofield's present command by Stoneman's cavalry which, should be near at hand and rapidly move your entire army, the men along the base of John's Mountain by the Mill Creek road to Snake Creek Gap, and join McPherson while the wagons are moved to Villanow. When we are joined to McPherson to move from Sugar Valley on Resaca, interposing ourselves between that place and Dalton. Could your army and McPherson's surely whip Joe Johnston?

2nd. I cast loose from the railroad altogether and move the whole army on the same objective point leaving Johnston to choose his course.

Give orders for all your troops to be ready with three days' provisions and to be prepared to march to-night. I expect to hear from McPherson and Schofield as to their situation, also as to the near approach of Stoneman. He was at Charleston yesterday, and is apprized of the necessity for haste. Do you think any danger to McPherson should make us delay one day?

Please give me the benefit of your opinion on these points.

Yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major General Commanding

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Present.
 
 

Page 225 - PROPOSES TO SUPPORT MCPHERSON

But on the same day General Sherman said to Halleck:

I must feign on Buzzard Roost but pass through Snake Creek Gap, and place myself between Johnston and Resaca, where we will have to fight it out. I am making the preliminary move. Certain that Johnston can make no detachments, I will be in no hurry.

This modification of plan did not bring the two generals into much nearer accord. The appearance of the Army of the Tennessee at Resaca on the 9th, and its quick retirement to Snake Creek Gap, had given intricacy to General Sherman's problem. As the town had not been attacked nor a demand made for the surrender of the troops holding it, and as no attempt had been made to seize or break the railroad north of the place, McPherson's movement was equivocal in Johnston's view, indicating danger to his communications, or a feint to cover direct operations against Dalton. While, therefore, in doubt as to the real significance of this movement Johnston was more watchful against the advance of Sherman's forces on the direct road to his position as well as on 'the one to his rear through Snake Creek Gap.

On the 10th, General Thomas addressed the following letter to General Sherman:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND. In the Field, May 10, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of Mississippi.

"How do you like the idea of leaving General Schofield where he is, placing General Howard in front of the gap to entrench himself to hold the gap: Palmer's corps in reserve, with ten days provisions and full supply of ammunition, to reenforce General McPherson, if necessary, and send General Hooker's corps at once to support General McPherson? I make this proposition simply because I think General Hooker's corps will be sufficient to enable General McPherson to whip any force that Johnston can bring against him. Not knowing what your plans may be I submit this for your consideration.

" I am General very respectfully your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. S. V. Commanding
 
 

Page 226 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

This letter is seemingly a reply to General Sherman's of the same day, and yet the last sentence warrants the inference that it was independently suggestive. It answers directly or indirectly, the questions proposed by Sherman, and yet at the time Thomas was evidently ignorant of the plans of the former which were to follow the failure of McPherson to change the situation. This letter, therefore, as anticipating General Sherman's questions, evinces a persistent thoughtfulness and a wonderfully clear apprehension of possibilities. The practicability of his original plan had been demonstrated by McPherson's movements, although the great object proposed by Thomas had not been attained. The instructions of Sherman to McPherson named a different object, and yet the situation at Resaca demonstrated so plainly the practicability of achieving all that Thomas had promised, had he been permitted to lead his army through Snake Creek Gap, that General McPherson was subsequently censured for not departing from the course prescribed by his orders.

Some of General Sherman's questions were indirectly answered by General Thomas whether his letter was an answer to Sherman's or written before that letter was received. He had previously asserted that with his own army he could whip Johnston, and in his letter he assumed that reenforced by Hooker's corps, McPherson could whip any force that Johnston could "bring against him;" and he did not express his conviction that it was useless to attempt to carry Johnston's mountain fortress, because he had previously asserted that that position if well defended could not be carried by assault.

In this letter of the 10th, General Thomas virtually made a re-statement of his original plan, with this difference however, that General McPherson was to be given the vital movement with Hooker's corps added to his army. His suggestions, if adopted, would have divided Sherman's forces into two nearly equal parts, one-half to
 
 

Page 227 - SNAKE CREEK GAP

advance on Resaca or on the railroad north of that place, and the other to maintain the feint on the north of Dalton. He was not in favor of withdrawing any of the forces from Buzzard Roost under the observation of the enemy. But as Hooker had already moved towards Snake Creek Gap, that corps could have joined McPherson unnoticed by the enemy. Thomas suggested the fortification of Howard's position to strengthen the feint rather than to neutralize it altogether by the withdrawal of the forces from Buzzard's Roost. And had his second plan been promptly tried with troops disposed as he recommended all the circumstances gave assurance of success. From the return of General Hood to Dalton on the 10th, to the evening of the 11th, Resaca was held by Canty's troops. McPherson could have moved against Resaca or to the railroad between that place and Dalton, with a larger army than General Johnston had at hand and at the same time he could have cut off from the enemy the two divisions of Folk's corps, one of which arrived at Resaca from the south on the evening of the 11^th. This coincidence of plan with circumstances assuring successful execution, is one of the marvelous, oft-recurring proofs of the generalship of Thomas. And seldom has a general been so generous and patriotic. He had been forbidden to carry out a plan of his own devising, and yet he offered a corps of twenty thousand men to another commander to execute that plan.

But General Sherman decided to move his entire force through Snake Creek Gap on the 12th, except Howard's corps and McCook's and Stoneman's cavalry, and gave orders accordingly. On the 12th,all his infantry except Howard's corps moved through Snake Creek Gap. Early on that day General Johnston reconnoitred his front before Dalton to ascertain the number of troops at Buzzard's Roost and other points, and early on the following morning he retired his army to Resaca, General Folk's corps covering the
 
 

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formation of Hardee's and Hood's corps in line of battle before the town. A large army could have advanced to the railroad north of Resaca, at any time between the 9^th, and evening of the 12^th.

During this period Johnston had no forces there, or near there, that could not have been shut up in the town or driven back to Dalton. But when on the 13^th, Sherman's armies debouched from the southern opening of Snake Creek Gap, Johnston had at least fifty thousand infantry and artillery, in part behind defenses, but all in front of his communications. But had the Army of the Cumberland instead of the Army of the Tennessee -- sixty thousand men in room of twenty three thousand -- passed through Snake Creek Gap on the 9^th, or had the latter army strengthened by Hooker's corps advanced on Resaca on the 11^th , General Johnston in all probability would have lost his communications if not his army.

Sherman's armies were put in array before Resaca on the 13^th, and on the next day there was an indecisive battle. On the night of the 15^th, to avoid being shut up in Resaca, and a retreat with exposed flanks, General Johnston retired with his army and his material. In shunning a general engagement he gave up Rome and Kingston and the railroad to the Etowah River. Here General Sherman halted for three days to give rest to his troops, repair the railroad and accumulate supplies.

Despairing of bringing on a battle by direct pursuit, he resolved to cut loose from his communications and move past Johnston's left flank, and if possible reach his line of supply at Marietta or the Chattahoochee River. His forces having supplies for twenty days in wagon crossed the Etowah on the 23^rd , and moved upon various railroads leading to the southwest. In this movement the Army of the Cumberland was in the centre, the Army of the Tennessee on the right and the Army of the Ohio, on the left. McCook's cavalry, in front of the central army, skirmished
 
 

Page 229 - NEW HOPE CHURCH

with cavalry and infantry at Stilesboro’ on the 23^rd. The day following indications multiplied that General Johnston had discovered the movement of Sherman's armies to his left and was making efforts to defeat it.

On the 25^th, the Army of the Cumberland advanced upon four roads under orders to converge on Dallas. As it progressed, resistance was offered by the enemy on the road leading to New Hope Church. And it soon became evident that Johnston had thrown his army across Sherman's line of march, in a strong position about four miles from Dallas. As soon as General Geary's division in advance began to meet strong resistance, General Thomas apprehended the situation and sent from him all the members of his staff, bearing messages, looking to the quick concentration of his army before the enemy.

In emergencies no general was more prompt, or wise, in his dispositions. At the time, his own army was scattered, and the other two armies were not near for quick support. The purpose of the enemy was not known, and an offensive blow was not improbable. Sherman believed that he had struck Johnston's right flank and proposed to turn it. Thomas perceiving the danger to his scattered forces, should Johnston take the offensive with his concentrated army, addressed himself to supporting the troops that first engaged the enemy, so as to hide the condition of his army and ward off offense until his troops should be gathered together.

The operations near Dallas were very much like those at Resaca in form and issue. General Sherman made effort to break Johnston's line and turn his flank, and finally after heavy loss solved the problem, by moving his army by the left flank to the railroad at Ackworth, leaving his foe free to take position on his communications further south.
 
 

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The operations of the month of May cost the Army of the Cumberland nearly nine thousand men, of whom eleven hundred and fifty-six were killed, and six thousand seven hundred and fifty-two wounded. And there had been no general engagement, and no success beyond pressing the enemy back by turning movements.

From the 10^th of June to the 21^st , the combined armies advanced slowly towards Marietta, by attacking entrenchments and turning the enemy's flanks. Incessant rain greatly retarded operations, and gave great discomfort to officers and men.

At the beginning of the campaign General Sherman had prescribed shelter tents for his armies and had taken one for himself. But General Thomas had been so far insubordinate as to provide better appointments for himself and his staff Suffering from the injury to his spine, received in 1863, he deemed it necessary to make himself as comfortable as might be in such a campaign. One evening he observed that General Sherman, who had stopped for the night was seemingly in destitution of the usual comforts of a commanding general, and almost without attendants. He thereupon sent a company of sharp-shooters* from his own headquarters, to pitch tents, and devote themselves in other ways, to the comfort of the commander-in-chief. This company and their service were accepted by General Sherman for the remainder of the campaign, and the shelter tents and other self-imposed privations were thrown aside.

On the 21^st of June, Johnston's army was covering Marietta, with his lines upon the two Kenesaw Mountains, and the ground on the east of the greater the approach to the town from the north. The day following Sherman made effort to advance the right of his line, so as to threaten the enemy's communications between Marietta and the Chattahoochee River. The forces making this advance, were Hooker's corps, and the Army of the Ohio. This movement caused Johnston to transfer Hood's
 
 

* 7^th Independent Co. Ohio sharp-shooters, Lieut, McCrory commanding.
 
 

Page 231 - KULP’S HOUSE

corps from his right to his left. In the afternoon, Hood attacked Hooker, when the latter had advanced to the vicinity of Kulp's house. The conflict resulted in the enemy's repulse.

At this juncture the Army of the Tennessee, recently reenforced by nine thousand men, under General Blair, was in line of battle on the east of the railroad, touching the left flank of the Army of the Cumberland near the base of the greater Kenesaw. As shown by the following despatch from Sherman to McPherson, Thomas suggested the advance of the Army of the Tennessee, to attack Marietta from the north.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.in the field. Big Shanty, June 22nd, 1864

GENERAL :-General Hooker, this p.m. advanced to Kulp's house two and a half miles southwest of Marietta, and reports finding three corps. He was attacked twice and successfully repulsed the enemy. General Thomas thinks that that will be the enemy's tactics, and that you ought to attack Marietta from that side of Kenesaw, but I judge the safer and better plan to be the one, I indicated, viz: for you to leave a light force and cover that flank, and throw the remainder rapidly and as much out of view as possible to your right.

You may make the necessary orders and be prepared for rapid action to-morrow. So dispose matters that the big guns of Kenesaw will do you as little mischief as possible.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major General

MAJOR-GENERAL MCPHERSON, Commanding the Army of the Tennessee.

General Sherman had the alternative of a turning movement on right or left, or a direct attack on the enemy's strong position on the mountains. General Thomas expressed a decided preference for a movement on Marietta from the north. And when he made the suggestion the approach in that direction had just been uncovered by the transfer of Hood's corps to Johnston's left flank. General
 
 

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Johnston thus mentions this transfer in his official report:

"On the 21^st , Hood's corps was transferred from right to left, Wheeler's cavalry taking charge of the position which it left." It was manifestly impracticable for Johnston to cover his communications securely and protect Marietta on the north with a corps or any strong force of infantry."

There was danger in uncovering the rear of his troops on the mountains, but it was not so great as in leaving his communications open to the advancing right of Sherman's armies. And Johnston hoped that this movement would be maintained, and that his exposure on the north would not be observed. But had Thomas' plan been adopted and carried out, the enemy would have been taken at great disadvantage.

Had the Army of the Tennessee advanced on Marietta on the 23^rd , the confused flight of Johnston's army, or a battle for which he was in no way prepared, would certainly have resulted. McPherson, with more than thirty thousand men, would have been in rear of the mountains, and Johnston could have made no dispositions to meet him that would not have exposed his left flank and his communications to the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio. General Johnston acted upon a probability that would not have become actual if General Thomas had been in supreme command. He would have thrown an army upon the enemy's most vulnerable point, and this would have precipitated a general engagement where Johnston had no defenses, or necessitated his retreat in daylight, involving a peril that he most strenuously guarded against throughout the campaign. If he had retreated, the Army of the Tennessee would have been upon his rear and the

two other armies upon his flank. When, however, Hood's corps was taken from the front of the Army of the Tennessee, the attitude of Wheeler's cavalry induced General McPherson to believe that the enemy was massing against him. This belief, or other reasons, caused General Sherman
 
 

Page 233 - KENESAW MOUNTAIN

to order his armies to move by the right flank until the Army of the Tennessee confronted the mountains. This movement was followed by the disastrous effort to break through Johnston's line, where nature and art had rendered his position exceedingly strong. If Thomas had been in command Johnston would not have been on the mountain.

In his Memoirs General Sherman makes the following statements:

During the 24^th and 25^th of June General Schofield extended his right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults at points where success would give us the greatest advantage. I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson and Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more, and there was no alternative but to attack "fortified lines," a thing carefully avoided up to that time. I reasoned, if he could make a breach anywhere near the rebel centre, and thrust in a strong head of column, that with the one moiety of our army we could hold in check the corresponding wing of the enemy, and with the other sweep in flank and overwhelm the other half. *

It is explicitly stated in this extract that General Sherman and his army commanders agreed that it would not be prudent to attenuate the line any further, but is not made clear whether the conclusion that "there was no alternative but to attack ' fortified lines' " was drawn by General Sherman alone, or with the concurrence of the other generals. It is certain that a flank movement was not precluded by the situation before the assault of the 27^th, since such a movement was successful afterwards. The testimony of several of General Thomas' staff officers is explicit as to his opposition to attacking the fortified lines before Marietta. Five days before the assault he had suggested the advance of the Army of the Tennessee on that town from the northeast. He opposed a second assault most positively, and was quick to approve the movement of the armies by the
 
 

* Memoirs, Vol. II,, page 60.
 
 

Page 234 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

right flank when it was first proposed by General Sherman. It is clear, therefore, that General Thomas did not deem it wise to attempt to carry the enemy's strong positions.

On the 24^th, General Sherman directed the army commanders to make preparations to attack the enemy in force on the 27^th. Thomas was instructed to attack a point of his own selection near his centre, and McPherson, after feigning a movement on Marietta from the north, to make his real attack south and west from Kenesaw. Each attacking column was to endeavor to break a single point and make a secure lodgment beyond, and to follow it up toward Marietta and the railroad, in the event of success.

The required assault was made early on the 27^th, and the following despatch tells the result:

Thomas to Sherman, June 27, 10.45 A.M.:-

Yours received. Harker's brigade advanced to within twenty paces of the enemy's breast-works, and was repulsed with canister at short range, General Harker losing an arm. General Wagner's brigade of Newton's division, supporting General Harker, was so severely handled that it is compelled to reorganize. Col Mitchell's brigade of Davis' division captured one line of the rebel breastworks. which they still hold. McCook's brigade was also severely handled, nearly every colonel being killed or wounded. It is compelled to fall back and reorganize. The troops are all too much exhausted to advance, but we hold all that we have gained.

The failure of the assault rendered imperative the consideration of some other movement. The views of General Thomas appear in the following despatches.

At 10.30 P. M. General Sherman asked Thomas,

"Do you think you can carry any of the enemy's line?

In answer the latter telegraphed:

From Thomas to Sherman, June 27:-

Your dispatches of 11.45 A.M. and 1:30 P.M. received. Davis' two brigades are now within sixty yards of the enemy's entrenchments. Davis reports that he does not think he can carry the works by assault on account of the steepness of the hill, but he can hold his
 
 

Page 235 - KENESAW MOUNTAIN

position, put in one or two batteries to-night, and probably drive them out to-morrow morning. General Howard reports the same. Their works are from six to seven feet high, and nine feet thick. In front of Howard they have a strong abattis. Davis' loss in officers has been very heavy. Nearly all the field officers of McCook's brigade, with McCook, have been killed or wounded. From what the officers tell me, I do not think we can carry the works by assault at this point to-day, but they can be approached by saps and the enemy driven out.

Thomas to Sherman, June 27:-

Your despatch of 2.25 received. We still hold all the ground we have gained, and the division report their ability to hold. They also report the enemy's works exceedingly strong, in fact, so strong that they cannot be carried by assault, except by an immense sacrifice, even if they can be carried at all. I think, therefore, the best chance is to approach them by regular saps if we can find a favorable approach to batter them down. We have already lost heavily today, without gaining any material advantage. One or two more such assaults would use up this army.

Thomas to Sherman, June 27 - 6 P.M.:-

"The assault of the enemy's works in my front was well arranged, and the officers and men went to their work with the greatest coolness and gallantry. The failure to carry them is due only to the strength of the works, and to the fact that they were well manned, thereby enabling the enemy to hold them securely against the assault. We have lost nearly two thousand officers and men, among them two brigade commanders, General Harker, commanding a brigade in Newton's division, and Colonel Dan McCook, commanding a brigade in Jeff. Davis' division, both reported to be mortally wounded, besides some six or eight field officers killed. Both General Harker and Colonel McCook were wounded on the enemy's breastworks, and all say had they not been wounded we would have driven the enemy from his works. Both Generals Howard and Palmer think that they can find favorable positions on their lines for placing batteries for enfilading the enemy's works. We took between ninety and one hundred prisoners.

His proposition to approach the enemy's fortifications by saps, was simply a substitute for a second assault, but he undoubtedly preferred a flank movement.
 
 

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In the evening Sherman suggested a flank movement, and to this Thomas eagerly acceded.

Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 1864.--9 P. M.:-

Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our railroad ? It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has secured the way.

Thomas to Sherman, June 27: -

What force do you think of moving with ? If with the greater part of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised.

Thomas to Sherman, June 27:-

How far is Fulton from the crossing of Oiley's Creek ? Will we have to cross any other streams of much size ? When do you wish to start ?

On the 1^st of July, General Sherman ordered his armies to move by the right flank to compel Johnston to abandon the mountains before Marietta. Thomas was required to hold his position while McPherson should march his array to the right to threaten the enemy's communications at the Chattahoochee River. When this general movement was fully developed on the 2^nd of July, Johnston availed himself of the darkness of the following night, and covering his rear with defenses at Ruff's Station, and afterwards in front of the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee, retreated in safety to the fortifications before Atlanta.

During the first two months of the campaign Sherman's operations had a specific relation to General Grant's movements in Virginia, but on the 28^th of June he was freed from the obligation to maneuver his armies with reference to the retention of all Johnston's forces in Georgia. Hitherto the great army in the East and the combined armies in the
 
 

Page 237 - THOMAS' INDIFFERENCE TO DANGER

west had been so far cooperative that they were in turn to prevent Lee from sending troops to Georgia, and Johnston from detaching troops to Virginia.

The temerity of General Thomas in exposing himself to danger was illustrated on two occasions during the advance to the Chattahoochee River. At one time with General Davis and other officers, he went to the picket line to ascertain whether the enemy was in force in his front. On the line there was a vacant log cabin, and to this house the officers repaired, after leaving their horses in a depression in the rear. The cabin proved to be a poor protection, as there were openings between the logs, and a volley from the enemy caused all except General Thomas to beat a hasty retreat to their horses. The general, however, walked slowly back, although he was plainly a mark for the enemy's sharp-shooters. At a gate in the rear he stopped and faced the enemy, and then walked slowly to his horse. He seemed unwilling to retreat when alone, and consciously a target for the enemy.

At another time he was invited by General Davis to ride in the rear of Colonel J. G. Mitchell's brigade which was sent on a reconnoissance. As the two generals rode in the rear of the column they observed ripe blackberries by the roadside, and dismounted to pick them. While thus engaged bullets began to fall thickly around them, from the enemy's cavalry that had come round the flank of the reconnoitring column, then out of sight. General Thomas did not even look up, but continued to pick the berries, remarking playfully, "Davis, this is eating blackberries under difficulties." General Davis, however, became anxious, lest his commander should be killed or captured, and urged an immediate retreat.

While halting his troops on the north bank of the Chattahoochee River, that his construction corps might bring the cars to his camp, General Sherman received the following despatches which hastened his advance on Atlanta:
 
 

Page 238 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, July 16, 1864, l0 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN :
The attempted invasion of Maryland having failed to give the enemy a firm foothold north, they are now returning with possibly twenty-five thousand troops. All the men they have here, beyond a sufficiency to hold their string of fortifications, will be an element of weakness by eating up their supplies. It is not improbable, therefore, that you will find in the next fortnight reenforcements on your front to the number indicated above. I advise, therefore, that if you get Atlanta, you set about destroying the railroad as far to the east and south of you as possible. Collect all the stores of the country for your own use, and select a point that you can hold until help can be had. I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men. If successful I can detach from here for other enterprises; looking much to your assistance or anything elsewhere.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1864--4.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN :
Lieutenant-General Grant wishes me to call your attention to the possibility of Johnston's being reenforced from Richmond, and the importance of your having prepared a good line of defense against such an increase of rebel force. Also, the importance of getting as large an amount of supplies collected at Chattanooga as possible.
H. W. HALLECK, Major- General, Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., In the Field, Chattahoochee, July 16, 1864
GENERALS THOMAS AND MCPHERSON :
Despatches from Generals Grant and Halleck to-day, speak of the enemy having failed in his designs in Maryland, and cautioning me that Lee may in the next fortnight reenforce Johnson by twenty thousand men. It behooves us therefore to hurry, so all will move tomorrow as far as Nancy's Creek.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General Commanding

[scanned, reformatted and corrected; maps and illustrations omitted]

Page 260

excerpt from OPPOSING SHERMAN'S ADVANCE TO ATLANTA.
BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, GENERAL, C. S. A.

PRESIDENT DAVIS transferred me from the Department of Mississippi to the command of the Army of Tennessee by a telegram received December 18th, 1863, in the camp of Ross's brigade of cavalry near Bolton. I assumed that command at Dalton on the 27th, and received there, on the 1st of January, a letter from the President dated December 23d, purporting to be "instructions".

In it he, in Richmond, informed me of the encouraging condition of the army, which w induced him to hope that I would soon be able to commence active operations against the enemy, "the men being "tolerably" well clothed, with a large reserve of small-arms, the morning reports exhibiting an effective total that exceeded in number "that actually engaged on the Confederate side in any battle of the war." Yet this army itself had lost in the recent campaign at least 25,000 men in action, while 17,000 had been transferred from it in Longstreet's corps, and the two brigades (Quarles's and Baldwin's) that had been sent to Mississippi; so that it was then weaker by 40,000 men than it had been when "engaged on the Confederate side" in the battle of Chickamauga, in the September preceding.

In the inspections, which were made as soon as practicable, the appearance of the army was very far from being "matter of much congratulation." Instead of a reserve of muskets there was a deficiency of six thousand and as great a one of blankets, while the number of bare feet was painful to see. The artillery horses were too feeble to draw the guns in fields, or on a march, and the mules were in similar condition; while the supplies of forage were then very irregular, and did not include hay. In consequence of this, it was necessary to send all of these animals not needed for camp service to the valley of the Etowah, where long forage could be found, to restore their health and strength.

The last return of the army was of December 20th, and exhibited an effective total of less than 36,000, of whom 6000 were without arms and as many without shoes. The President impressed upon me the importance of recovering Tennessee with an army in such numbers and condition. On pages 548-9, Vol. II. of his work, "The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," he dwells, upon his successful efforts to increase its numbers and means adequately. After the strange assertions and suggestions of December 23d, he did not resume the subject of military operations until, in a letter of February 27th to him through his staff-officer General Bragg, I pointed out the

Page 261

necessity of great preparations to take the offensive, such as large additions to the number of troops, an ample supply of field transportation, subsistence stores, and forage, a bridge equipage, and fresh artillery horses. This letter was acknowledged on the 4th of March, but not really replied to until the 12th, when General Bragg [see note, Vol. III., p. 711] wrote a plan of campaign which was delivered to me on the 18th by his secretary, Colonel Sale. It prescribed my invasion of Tennessee with an army of 75,000 men, including Longstreet's corps, then near Morristown Tennessee. When necessary, supplies and transportation were collected at Dalton, the additional troops, except Longstreet's, would be sent there; and this army and Longstreet's corps would march to meet at Kingston, on the Tennessee River, and thence into the valley of Duck River.

Being invited to give my views, I suggested that the enemy could defeat the plan, either by attacking one of our two bodies of troops on the march, with their united forces, or by advancing against Dalton before our forces there should be equipped for the field; for it was certain that they would be able to take the field before we could be ready. I proposed, therefore, that the additional troops should be sent to Dalton in time to give us the means to beat the Federal army there, and then pursue it into Tennessee, which would be a more favorable mode of invasion than the other.

General Bragg replied that my answer did not indicate acceptance of the plan proposed, and that troops could be drawn from other points only to advance. As the idea of advancing had been accepted by me, it was evidently his strategy that was the ultimatum.

I telegraphed again (and also sent a confidential officer to say) that I was anxious to take the offensive with adequate means, and to represent to the President the actual disparity of forces, but without result. The above is the substance of all said, written, or done on the subject of Mr. Davis's pages 548-9, before the armies were actually in contact, with odds of ten to four against us.

The instruction, discipline, and spirit of the army were much improved between the 1st of January and the end of April, and its numbers were increased. The efforts for the latter object brought back to the ranks about five thousand of the men who had left them in the rout of Missionary Ridge. On the morning report of April 30th the totals were: 37,652 infantry, 2812 artillery with 112 guns, and 2392 cavalry. This is the report as corrected by Major Kinloch Falconer assistant adjutant-general, from official records in, his office.* Sherman had assembled at that time an army of 98,797 men and 254 guns; but before the armies actually met, three divisions of cavalry under Generals Stoneman, Garrard, and McCook added 10,000 or 12,000 men to the number. The object prescribed to him by General Grant was " to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could inflicting all the damage possible on their war resources."

The occupation of Dalton by General Bragg had been accidental. He had encamped there for a night in his retreat from Missionary Ridge, and had

-----------------------------------------------
* See another estimate, p. 281.-EDITORS.
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Page 262

remained because it was ascertained next morning that the pursuit had ceased. Dalton is in a valley so broad as to give ample room for the deployment of the largest American army. Rocky-face, which bounds it on the west, terminates as an obstacle three miles north of the railroad gap, and the distance from Chattanooga to Dalton around the north end exceeds that through the railroad gap less than a mile; and a general with a large army, coming from Chattanooga to attack an inferior one near Dalton, would follow that route and find in the broad valley a very favorable field.

Mr. Davis descants on the advantages I had in mountains, ravines, and streams, and General Sherman claims that those features of the country were equal to the numerical difference between our forces. I would gladly have given all the mountains, ravines, rivers, and woods of Georgia for such a supply of artillery ammunition, proportionally, as he had. Thinking as he did, it is strange that he did not give himself a decided superiority of actual strength, by drawing troops from ments of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, where, according to Secretary Stanton's report of 1865, he had 139,000 men, fit for duty. The country in which the two armies operated is not rugged; there is nothing in its character that gave advantage to the Confederates. Between Dalton and Atlanta the only mountain in sight of the railroad is Rocky-face, which aided the Federals. The small military value of mountains is indicated by the fact that in the Federal attack on June 27th our troops on Kenesaw suffered more than those on the plain.

During the previous winter Major-General Gilmer, chief engineer, had wisely made an admirable base for our army by intrenching Atlanta.

As a road leads from Chattanooga through Snake Creek Gap to the railroad bridge at Resaca, a light intrenchment to cover 3000 or 4000 men was made there; and to make quick communication between that point and Dalton, two rough country roads were so improved as to serve that purpose.*

On the 1st of May I reported to the Administration that the enemy was about to advance, suggesting the transfer of at least a par t of General Polk's troops to my command. Then the cavalry with convalescent horses was ordered to the front,--Martin's division to observe the Oostenaula from Resaca to Rome, and Kelly's little brigade to join the cavalry on the Cleveland road.

On the 4th the Federal army, including the troops from Knoxville, was at Ringgold. Next day it skirmished until dark with our advanced guard of cavalry. This was repeated on the 6th. On the 7th it moved forward, driving our cavalry from Tunnel Hill, and taking a position in the afternoon in front of the railroad gap, and parallel to Rocky-face -- the right a mile south of the gap, and the left near the Cleveland road.

Until that day I had regarded a battle in the broad valley in which Dalton stands as inevitable. The greatly superior strength of the Federal army made the chances of battle altogether in its favor. It had also places of refuge in case of defeat, in the intrenched pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga; while we, if beaten, had none nearer than Atlanta,

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* For maps of the campaign see p. 251 and the paper by General Howard, to follow.--Editors.
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100 miles off, with three rivers intervening. General Sherman's course indicating no intention of giving battle east of Rocky-face, we prepared to fight on either side of the ridge. For that object A. P. Stewart's division was placed in the gap, Cheatham's on the crest of the hill, extending a mile north of Stewart's, and Bate's also on the crest of the hill, and extending a mile south of the gap. Stevenson's was formed across the valley east of the ridge, his left meeting Cheatham's right; Hindman in line with Stevenson and on his right; Cleburne behind Mill Creek and in front of Dalton. Walker's division was in reserve.

Cantey with his division arrived at Resaca that evening (7th) and was charged with the defense of the place. During the day our cavalry was driven from the ground west of Rocky-face through the gap. Grigsby's brigade was placed near Dug Gap,--the remainder in front of our right. About 4 o'clock P. M. of the 8th, Geary's division of Hooker's corps attacked two regiments of Reynolds's Arkansas brigade who were guarding Dug Gap, and who were soon joined by Grigsby's brigade on foot. The increased sound of musketry indicated so sharp a conflict that Lieutenant-General Hardee was requested to send Granbury's Texan brigade to the help of our people, and to take command there himself. These accessions soon decided the contest, and the enemy was driven down the hill. A sharp engagement was occurring at the same time on the crest of the mountain, where our right and center joined, between Pettus's brigade holding that point and troops of the Fourth Corps attacking it. The assailants were repulsed, however. The vigor of this attack suggested the addition of Brown's brigade to Pettus's.

On the 9th a much larger force assailed the troops at the angle, and with great determination,.but the Federal troops were defeated with a loss proportionate to their courage. Assaults as vigorous and resolute were made at the same time on Stewart and on Bate, and were handsomely repulsed. The Confederates, who fought under cover, had but trifling losses in these combats, but the Federal troops, fully exposed, must have lost heavily--the more because American soldiers are not to be driven back without severe losses. General Wheeler had a very handsome affair of cavalry near Varnell's Station the same day, in which he captured 100 prisoners, including a colonel, three captains, five lieutenants, and a standard. General Sherman regarded these actions as amounting to a battle.

Information had been received of the arrival of the Army of the Tennessee in Snake Creek Gap, on the 8th. At night on the 9th General Cantey reported that he had been engaged with those troops until dark. Lieutenant General Hood was dispatched to Resaca with three divisions immediately. The next morning he reported the enemy retiring, and was recalled, with orders to leave two divisions midway between the two places. Spirited fighting was renewed in and near the gap as well as on the northern front. The most vigorous of them was made late in the day, on Bate's division and, repulsed. At night information was received from our scouts near the south end of Rocky-face, that the Army of the Tennessee was intrenching in Snake Creek Gap, and next morning reports were received which indicated a general

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illustration

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movement of the Federal army to its right, and one report that General McPherson's troops were moving from Snake Creek Gap toward Resaca. General Polk, who had Just reached that place with Loring's division, was charged with its defense.

General Wheeler was directed to move next morning with all the available cavalry around the north end of Rocky-face, to learn if a general movement of the enemy was in progress. He was to be supported by Hindman's division. In this reconnaissance General Stoneman's division of cavalry was encountered and driven back. The information gained confirmed the reports of the day before.

About 10 o'clock A. M. of the 13th the Confederate army moved from Dalton and reached Resaca just as the Federal troops approaching from Snake Creek Gap were encountering Loring's division a mile from the station. Their approach was delayed long enough by Loring's opposition to give me time to select the ground to be occupied by our troops. And while they were taking this ground the Federal army was forming in front of them. The left of Polk's corps occupied the west face of the intrenchment of Resaca. Hardee's corps, also facing to the west, formed the center. Hood's its left division facing to the west and the two others to the north-west, was on the right, and, crossing the railroad, reached the Connasauga. The enemy skirmished briskly with the left half of our line all the afternoon.

On the 14th spirited fighting was maintained by the enemy on the whole front, a very vigorous attack being made on Hindman's division of Hood's corps, which was handsomely repulsed. In the meantime General Wheeler was directed to ascertain the position and formation of the Federal left. His report indicating that these were not unfavorable to an attack, Lieutenant-General Hood was directed to make one with Stewart's and Stevenson's divisions, strengthened by four brigades from the center and left. He was instructed to make a half change of front to the left to drive the enemy from the railroad, the object of the operation being to prevent them from. using it. The attack was extremely well conducted and executed, and before dark (it was begun at 6 P. M.) the enemy was driven from his ground. This encouraged me to hope for a more important success; so General Hood was directed to renew the fight next morning. His troops were greatly elated by this announcement, made to them that evening.

On riding from the right to the left after nightfall, I was informed that the extreme left of our line of skirmishers, forty or fifty men, had been driven from their ground,--an elevation near the river --and received a report from Major-General Martin that Federal troops were crossing the Oostenaula near Lay's Ferry on a pontoon-bridge -- two divisions having already crossed. In consequence of this Walker's division was sent to Lay's Ferry immediately,, and the order to General Hood was revoked; also, Lieutenant-Colonel S. W. Presstman, chief engineer, was directed to lay a pontoon-bridge a mile above the railroad and to have the necessary roadway made.

Sharp fighting commenced early on the 15th, and continued until night, with so much vigor that many of the assailants pressed up to our

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intrenchments. All these attacks were repelled, however. In General Sherman's language, the sounds of musketry and cannon rose all day to the dignity of a battle.

Soon after noon intelligence was received from Major-General Walker, that the report that the enemy had crossed the Oostenaula was untrue. Lieutenant-General Hood was therefore again ordered to assail the enemy with the troops he had commanded the day before. When he was about to move forward, positive intelligence was received from General Walker that the Federal right was actually crossing the Oostenaula. This made it necessary to abandon the thought of fighting north of the river, and the orders to Lieutenant-General Hood were countermanded, but the order from corps headquarters was not sent to Stewart promptly, and consequently he made the attack unsustained, and suffered before being recalled.

The occupation of Resaca being exceedingly hazardous, I determined to abandon the place. So the army was ordered to cross the Estanislao about midnight,-- Hardee's and Polk's corps by the railroad and trestle bridges, and Hood's by that above, on the pontoons.

General Sherman claims to have surprised us by McPherson's appearance in Snake Creek Gap on the 9th, forgetting that we discovered his march on the 8th. He blames McPherson for not seizing the place. That officer tried the works and found them too strong to be seized. General Sherman says that if McPherson had placed his whole force astride the railroad, he could have there easily withstood the attack of all Johnston's army. Had he done so, "all Johnston's army" would have been upon him at the dawn of the next day, the cannon giving General Sherman intelligence of the movement of that army. About twice his force in front and three thousand men in his immediate r ear would have overwhelmed him, making a most auspicious beginning of the campaign for the Confederates.

General Sherman has a very exaggerated idea of our field-works. They were slighter than his own, because we had most inadequate supplies of intrenching tools. Two events at Resaca were greatly magnified to him. He says that toward evening on the 15th [14th] McPherson "moved his whole line of battle forward till he had gained a ridge overlooking the town" [there was no town.-- J. E. J.], and that several attempts to drive him away were repulsed with bloody loss. The fact is, near night of the 14th, forty or fifty skirmishers in front of our extreme left were driven from the slight elevation they occupied,* but no attempt was made to retake it. Sherman also says that "Hooker's corps had also some handsome fighting on the left,...capturing a 4-gun intrenched battery."... From our view in the morning

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* In his published "Narrative" General Johnston says: "On riding from the right to the left, after nightfall, I learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's advanced troops had been driven from a hill in front of his left, which commanded our bridges at short range."

And General J. D. Cox, in his volume "Atlanta" (Charles Scribner's Sons), says:

"Between 5 and 6 o'clock Logan [of McPherson] ordered forward the brigades of Generals Giles A. Smith and C. R. Woods, supported by Veatch's division from Dodge's corps. The height held by Polk was carried, and the position intrenched under a galling artillery and musketry fire from the enemy's principal lines. During the evening Polk made a vigorous effort to retake the position, but was repulsed, McPherson sending forward Lightburn's brigade to the support of the troops already engaged. The hill thus carried commanded the railroad and wagon bridges crossing the Oostenaula." (See also p. 282.) EDITORS.
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of the 15th, Major-General Stevenson advanced four guns some eighty yards and began to intrench them. General Hood had their fire opened at once. A ravine leading from the Federal line within easy musket-range enabled the Federal troops to drive away the gunners; but their attempt to take off the guns was frustrated by the Confederate musketry. So the pieces remained in place, and fell into the possession of Hooker's corps on the 16th, after we abandoned the position.

The Confederate army was compelled to abandon its position in front of Dalton by General Sherman's flank movement through Snake Creek Gap, and was forced from the second position by the movement toward Calhoun. Each of these movements would have made the destruction of the Confederate army inevitable in case of defeat. In the first case the flank march was protected completely by Rocky-face Ridge; in the second, as completely by the Oostenaula. A numerical superiority of more than two to one made those manoeuvres free from risk. General Sherman thinks that the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of the troops across the valley almost impossible, saved the Confederate army. The Confederate army remained in its position, near Dalton until May 13th, because I knew the time that would be required for the march of 100,000 men through the long defile between their right flank near Mill Creek Gap and the outlet of Snake Creek Gap; and the shortness of the time in which 43,000 men could march by two good roads direct from Dalton to Resaca; and the further fact that our post at Resaca could hold out a longer time than our march to that point would require.

Mr. Davis and General Sherman exhibit a strange ignorance of the country between Dalton and Atlanta. Mr. Davis describes mountain ridges offering positions neither to be taken nor turned, and a natural fortress eighteen miles in extent, forgetting, apparently, that a for tress is strong only when it has a garrison strong enough for its extent; and both for get that, except Rocky-face, no mountain is visible from the road between Dalton and Atlanta. That country is intersected by numerous practicable roads, and is not more rugged than that near Baltimore and Washington, or Atlanta and Macon. When the armies confronted each other the advantages of ground were equal and unimportant, both parties depending for protection on earth-works, not on ridges and ravines.

In leaving Resaca I hoped to find a favorable position near Calhoun, but there was none; and the army, after resting 18 or 20 hours near that place, early in the morning of the 17th moved on seven or eight miles to Adairsville -- where we were joined by the cavalry of General Polk's command, a division of 3700 men under General W. H. Jackson. Our map represented the valley in which the railroad lies as narrow enough for our army formed across it to occupy the heights on each side with its flanks, and therefore I intended to await the enemy's attack there; but the breadth of the valley far exceeded the front of our army in order of battle. So another plan was devised. Two roads lead southward from Adairsville,-- one directly through Cassville; the other follows the railroad through Kingston, turns to the left there, and rejoins

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the other at Cassville. The interval between them is widest opposite Kingston, where it is about seven miles by the farm roads. In the expectation that a part of the Federal army would follow each road, it was arranged that Polk's corps should engage the column on the direct road when it should arrive opposite Kingston,-- Hood's, in position for the purpose, falling upon its left Hank during the deployment. Next morning, when our cavalry on that road reported the right Federal column near Kingston, General Hood was instructed to move to and follow northwardly a country road a mile east of that from Adairsville, to be in position to fall upon the flank of the Federal column when it should be engaged with Polk. An or deat we were about to give battle was read to each regiment, and heard with exultation. After going some three miles, General Hood marched back about two, and formed his corps facing to our right and rear. Being asked for an explanation, he replied that an aide-de-camp had told him that the Federal army was approaching on that road. Our whole army knew that to be impossible. It had been viewing the enemy in the opposite direction every day for two weeks. General Hood did not report his extraordinary disobedience--as he must have done had he believed the story upon which he professed to have acted. The time lost frustrated the design, for success depended on timing the attack properly.

Mr. Davis conceals the facts to impute this failure to me, thus: "The battle, for causes which were the subject of dispute, did not take place....Instead of his attacking the divided columns of the enemy, the united Federal columns were preparing to attack him." There was no dispute as to facts.

An attack, except under very unfavorable circumstances, being impossible, the troops were formed in an excellent position along the ridge immediately south of Cassville, an elevated and open valley in front, and a deep one in rear of it. Its length was equal to the front of Hood's and Polk's and half of Hardee's corps. They were placed in that order from right to left.

As I rode along the line while the troops were forming, General Shoup, chief of artillery, pointed out to me a space of 150 or 200 yards, which he thought might be enfiladed by artillery on a hill a half mile beyond Hood's right and in front of the prolongation of our line, if the enemy should clear away the thick wood that covered it and establish batteries. He was desired to point out to the officer who might command there some narrow ravines vet y near, in which his men could be sheltered from such artillery fire, and to remind him that while artillery was playing upon his position no attack would be made upon it by infantry. to position soon after our troops were formed and skirmished until dark, using their field-pieces freely. During the evening Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood, the latter being spokesman, asserted that a part of the line of each would be so enfiladed next morning by the Federal batteries established on the hill above mentioned, that they would be unable to hold their ground an hour; and therefore urged me to abandon the position at once. They expressed the conviction that early the next morning batteries would open upon them from a hill then thickly covered with wood and out of range of brass field

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pieces. The matter was discussed perhaps an hour, in which time I became apprehensive that as the commanders of two-thirds of the army thought the position untenable, the opinion would be adopted by their troops, which would make it so. Therefore I yielded. Lieutenant-General Hardee, whose ground was the least strong, was full of confidence. Mr. Davis says ("Rise and Fall," Vol. II., p. 533) that General Hood asserts, in his report and in a book, that the two corps were on ground commanded and enfiladed by the enemy's batteries. On the contrary, they were on a hill, and the enemy were in a valley where their batteries were completely commanded by ours.

The army abandoned the ground before daybreak and crossed the Etowah after noon, and encamped near the railroad. Wheeler's cavalry was placed in observation above, and Jackson's below our main body.

No movement of the enemy was discovered until the 22d, when General Jackson reported their army moving toward Stilesboro', as if to cross the Etowah near that place; they crossed on the 23d. On the 24th Hardee's and Polk's corps encamped on the road from Stilesboro' to Atlanta south-east of Dallas, and Hood's four miles from New Hope Church, on the road from Allatoona. On the 25th the Federal army was a little east of Dallas, and Hood's corps was placed with its center at New k's on his left, and Hardee's prolonging the line to the Atlanta road, which was held by its left. A little before 6 o'clock in the afternoon Stewart's division in front of New Hope Church was fiercely attacked by Hooker's corps, and the action continued two hours without lull or pause, when the assailants fell back. The canister shot of the sixteen Confederate field-pieces and the musketry of five thousand infantry at short range must have inflicted heavy loss upon General Hooker's corps, as is proved by the name "Hell Hole," which, General Sherman says, was given the place by the Federal soldiers. Next day the Federal troops worked so vigorously, extending their intrenchments toward the railroad, that they skirmished very little. The Confederates labored strenuously to keep abreast of their work, but in vain, owing to greatly interior numbers and an insignificant supply of intrenching tools. On the 27th, however, the fighting rose above the grade of skirmishing, especially in the afternoon, when at half-past 5 o'clock the Fourth Corps (Howard) and a division of the Fourteenth (Palmer) attempted to turn our right, but the movement, after being impeded by the cavalry, was met by two regiments of our right division (Cleburne's), and the two brigades of his second line br ought up on the right of the first. The Federal formation was so deep that its front did not equal that of our two brigades; consequently those troops were greatly exposed to our musketry--all but the leading troops being on a hillside facing us. They advanced until their first line was within 25 or 30 paces of ours, and fell back only after at least 700 men had fallen dead in their places. When the leading Federal troops paused in their advance, a color-bearer came on and planted his colors eight or ten feet in front of his regiment, but was killed in the act. A soldier who sprang forward to hold up or bear off the colors was shot dead as he seized the staff. Two others who followed successively fourth bore back the noble emblem. Some time after

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nightfall the Confederates captured above two hundred prisoners in the hollow before them.

General Sherman does not refer to this combat in his "Memoirs," although he dwells with some exultation upon a very small affair of the next day at Dallas, in which the Confederates lost about three hundred killed and wounded, and in which he must have lost more than ten times as many.

In the afternoon of the 28th Lieutenant-General Hood was instructed to draw his corps to the rear of our line in the early part of the night, march around our right flank, and form it facing the left flank of the Federal line and obliquely to it, and attack at dawn -- Hardee and Polk to join in the battle successively as the success on the right of each might enable him to do so. We waited next morning for the signal -- the sound of Hood's musketry -- from the appointed time until 10 o'clock, when a message from that officer was brought by an aide-de-camp to the effect that he had found R. W. Johnson's division intrenching on the left of the Federal line and almost at right angles to it, and asked for instructions. The message proved that there could be no surprise, which was necessary to success, and that the enemy's intrenchments would be completed before we could attack. The corps was therefore recalled. It was ascertained afterward that after marching eight or ten hours Hood's corps was then at least six miles from the Federal left, which was little more than a musket-shot from his starting-point.

The extension of the Federal intrenchments toward the railroad was continued industriously to cut us off from it or to cover their own approach to it. We tried to keep pace with them, but the labor did not prevent the desultory fighting, which was kept up while daylight lasted. In this the gr eat inequality of force compelled us to employ dismounted cavalry. On the 4th or 5th of June the Federal arailroad between Ackworth and Allatoona. The Confederate forces then moved to a position carefully marked out by Colonel Presstman, its left on Lost Mountain, and its right, of cavalry, beyond the railroad and somewhat covered by Noonday Creek, a line much too long for our strength.

On the 8th the Federal army seemed to be near Ackworth, and our position was contracted to cover the roads leading thence to Atlanta. This brought the left of Hardee's corps to Gilgal Church, Polk's right near the Marietta and Ackworth road and Hood's corps massed beyond that road. Pine Mountain, a detached hill, was held by a division. On the 11th of June the left of the Federal army was on the high ground beyond Noonday Creek, its center a third of a mile in front of Pine Mountain and its
right beyond the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road.

In the morning of the 14th General Hardee and I rode to the summit of Pine Mountain to decide if the outpost there should be maintained. General Polk accompanied us. After we had concluded our examination and the abandonment of the hill that night had been decided upon, a few shots were fired at us from a battery of Parrott guns a quarter of a mile in our front; the third of these passed through General Polk's chest, from left to right, killing him instantly. This event produced deep sorrow in the army, in

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every battle of which he had been distinguished. Major-General W. W. Loring succeeded to the command of the corps.

A division of Georgia militia under Major or-General G. W. Smith, transfer r ed to the Confederate service by (Governor Brown, was charged with the defense of the bridges and ferries of the Chattahoochee, for the safety of Atlanta. On the 16th Hardee's corps was placed on the high ground east of Mud Creek, facing to the west. The right of the Federal army made a corresponding change of front by which it faced to the east. It was opposed in this manoeuvre by Jackson's cavalry as well as 2500 men can resist 30,000. The angle where Hardee's right Joined Loring's left was soon found to be a very weak point, and on the 17th another position was chosen, including the crest of Kenesaw, which Colonel Presstman prepared for occupation by the 19th, when it was assumed by the army. In this position two divisions of Loring's corps occupied the crest of Kenesaw from end to end, the other division being on its right, and Hood's corps on the right of it, Hardee's extending from Loring's left across the Lost Mountain and Marietta road. The enemy approached as usual, under cover of successive lines of intrenchments. In these positions of the two armies there were sharp and incessant partial engagements until the 3d of July. On the 21st of June the extension of the Federal line to the south which had been protected by the swollen condition of Noses Creek, compelled the transfer of Hood's corps to our left, Wheeler's troops occupying the ground it had left. On the 22d General Hood reported that Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of his corps, having been attacked, had driven back the Federal troops and had taken a line of breastworks, from which they had been driven by the artillery of the enemy's main position.

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Subsequent detailed the advanced line of' against the enemy's accounts rove that after the capture of breastworks General Hood directed his two divisions main line. The slow operation of a change of front under the fire of the artillery of this main line subjected the Confederates to a loss of one thousand men --Whereupon the attempt was abandoned, either by the general's orders or by the discretion of the troops.

On the 24th Hardee's skirmishers were attacked in their rifle-pits by a Federal line of battle, and on the 25th a similar assault was made upon those of Steven son's division. Both " were repulsed, with heavy proportionate losses to the assailants.

In the morning of the 27th, after a cannonade by all its artillery, the Federal army assailed the ' Confederate position, especially the center and right-- the Army of the Cumberland advancing against the first, and that of the Tennessee against the other. Although suffering losses out of all proportion to those they inflicted, the Federal troops pressed up to the Confederate intrenchments in many places, maintaining the unequal conflict for two hours and a half, with the persevering courage of American soldiers. At 11: 30 A. M. the attack had failed. In General Sherman's words:

"About 9 o'clock A. M. of the day appointed [June the 27th], the troops moved to the assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fire of artillery and musketry was kept up. At all points the enemy met us with determined courage and in great force.... By 11: 30 the assault was over, and had failed. We had not broken the line at either point, but our assaulting columns held their ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches and there covered themselves with parapet. McPherson lost about 500 men and several valuable officers, and Thomas lost nearly 2000 men." *

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* In his " Memoirs" Sherman says, in continuation of the quotation made by Johnston:  "This was the hardest fight of the campaign up to date, and it is well described by Johnston in his Narrative [pp. 342, 343], Where he admits his loss in killed and wounded as: Hood's corps (not reported); Hardee's corps, 286; Loring's (Polk's), 522,--total, 808. This, no doubt, is a true and fair statement; but, as usual, Johnston over-estimates our loss, putting it at that entire loss was about 2500 killed and wounded." EDITORS.
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Such statements of losses are incredible. The Northern troops fought very bravely, as usual. Many fell against our parapets, some were killed in our trenches. Most of this battle of' two hours and a half was at very short range. It is not to be believed that Southern veterans struck but 3 percent of Thomas's troops in mass at short range, or 1 2/3 percent of McPherson's-- and, if possible, still less so that Northern soldiers, inured to battle, should have been defeated by losses so trifling as never to have discouraged the meanest soldiers on record. I have seen American soldiers (Northern men) win a field with losses ten times greater proportionally. But, argument apart, there is a witness against the estimates of Northern: losses in this campaign, in the 10,126 graves in the Military Cemetery at Marietta, of soldiers killed south of the Etowah.*  Moreover, the Federal dead nearest to Hardee's line lay there two days, during which they were frequently counted -- at least 1000; and as there were seven lines within some 300 yards, exposed two hours and a half to the musketry of two divisions and the canister-shot of 32 field pieces, there must have been many uncounted dead; the counted would alone indicate a loss of at least 6000.

As to the "assaulting columns holding their ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches and there covering themselves with parapet," it was utterly impossible. There would have been much more exposure in that than in mounting and crossing the little rebel "parapet "; but at one point, seventy-five yards in front of Cheatham's line, a party of Federal soldiers, finding themselves sheltered from his missiles by the form of the ground, made a "parapet " there which became connected with the main work.**

As the extension of the Federal intrenched line to their right had brought it nearer to Atlanta than was our left, and had made our position otherwise very dangerous, two new positions for the army were chosen, one nine or ten miles south of Marietta, and the other on the high ground near the Chattahoochee. Colonel Presstman was desired to prepare the first for occupation, and Brigadier-General Shoup, commander of the artillery, was instructed to strengthen the other with a line of redoubts devised by himself.

The troops took the first position in the morning of the 3d, and as General Sherman was strengthening his right greatly, they were transferred to the second in the morning of the 5th. The cavalry of our left had been supported in the previous few days by a division of State troops commanded by Major General G. W. Smith.

As General Sherman says, " it was really a continuous battle lasting

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* Many of the burials at Marietta were of soldiers who died of disease before and after the battle of Kenesaw Mountain, and the following extract from the report, in 1874, of Colonel Oscar A. Mack, Inspector of National Cemeteries, shows that Marietta Cemetery includes dead from widely separated fields, and of other dates:

"The interments [Marietta Cemetery] are as follows: White Union soldiers and sailors (known, 6906; unknown, 2974),--total, 9880; colored Union soldiers (known, 158; unknown, 67); total, 225; citizens, etc., 21;--total interments, 10,126.

"The bodies were removed from the National Cemetery at Montgomery, Ala. (which was discontinued), and from Rome, Dalton, Atlanta, and from many other places in Georgia. Several burials have been made, since my last inspection, from the garrison at Atlanta." EDITORS.

** Surgeon Joseph A. Still well, 22d Indiana Volunteers,ditors that the point referred to was in front of General Daniel McCook's brigade, and was seventy-five feet from the enemy, and commanded by half a mile of the Confederate works.
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from June 10th to July 3d." The army occupied positions about Marietta twenty-six days, in which the want of artillery ammunition was especially felt; in all those days we were exposed to an almost incessant fire of artillery as well as musketry--the former being the more harassing, because it could not be returned; for our supply of artillery ammunition was so small that we were compelled to reserve it for battles and serious assaults.

In the new position each corps had two pontoon-bridges laid. Above the railroad bridge the Chattahoochee had numerous good fords. General Sherman, therefore, directed his troops to that part of the river, ten or fifteen miles above our camp. On the 8th of July two of his corps had crossed the Chattahoochee and intrenched themselves. Therefore the Confederate army also crossed the river on the 9th.

About the middle of June Captain Grant of the engineers was instructed to strengthen the fortifications of Atlanta materially, on the side toward Peach Tree Creek, by the addition of redoubts and by converting barbette into embrasure batteries. I also obtained a promise of seven sea-coast rifles from General D. H. Maury [at Mobile], to be mounted on that front. Colonel Presstman was instructed to join Captain Grant with his subordinates, in this work of strengthening the defenses of Atlanta, especially between the Augusta and Marietta roads, as the enemy was approaching ' that side. For the same reason a position on the high ground looking down into the valley of Peach Tree Creek was selected for the army, from which it might engage the enemy if he should expose himself in the passage of the stream. The position of each division was marked and pointed out to its staff-officers.

On the 17th we learned that the whole Fcrossed the Chattahoochee; and late in the evening, while Colonel Presstman was receiving from me instructions for the next day, I received the following telegram of that date:

"Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of general under the late law of Congress. I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that, as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which yon will immediately turn over to General Hood.
S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector-General."

Orders transferring the command of the army* to General Hood were written and published immediately, and next morning I replied to the telegram of the Secretary of War:

"Your dispatch of yesterday received and obeyed-command of the Army and Department of Tennessee has been transferred to General Hood. As to the alleged cause of my removal, I assert that Sherman's army is much stronger, compared with that of Tennessee, than Grant's compared with that of Northern Virginia. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance much

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* I have two reports of the strength of the army besides that of April 30th, already given:1. Of July 1st, 39,746 infantry, 3855 artillery, and 10,484 cavalry,--total; 54,085. 2. Of July 10th, 36,901 infantry, 3755 artillery, and 10,270 cavalry,--total, 50,926.--J. E. J.
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more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta than to that of Richmond and Petersburg, and penetrated much deeper into Virginia than into Georgia. Confident language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evidence of competence."

General Hood came to my quarters early in the morning of the 18th, and remained there until nightfall. Intelligence was soon received that the Federal army was marching toward Atlanta, and at his urgent request I gave all necessary orders during the day. The most important one placed the troops in the position already chosen, which covered the roads by which the enemy was approaching. After transferring the command to General Hood, I described to him the course of action I had arranged in my mind. If the enemy should give us a good opportunity in the passage of Peach Tree Creek, I expected to attack him. If successful we should obtain important, results, for the enemy's retreat would be on two sides of a triangle and our march on one. If we should not succeed, our intrenchments would give us a

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sate refuge, where we could hold back the enemy until the promised State troops should Join us; then, placing them on the nearest defenses of the place (where there were, or ought to be, seven sea-coast rifles, sent us from Mobile by General Maury), I would attack the Federals in flank with the three Confederate corps. If we were successful, they would be driven against the Chattahoochee below the railroad, where there are no fords, or away from their supplies, as we might fall on their left or right flank. If unsuccessful, we could take refuge in Atlanta, which we could hold indefinitely; for it was too strong to be taken by assault, and too extensive to be invested. This would win the campaign, the object of which the country supposed Atlanta to be.

At Dalton, the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the chances of battle much against us, and even if beaten they had a safe refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga. Our refuge, in case of defeat, was in Atlanta, 100 miles off, with three rivers intervening. Therefore victory for us could not have been decisive while defeat would have been utterly disastrous. Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee we could have given battle only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that the only result of success to us would have been his falling back into them, while d been our ruin.

In the course pursued our troops, always fighting under cover, had very trifling losses compared with those they inflicted, so that the enemy's numerical superiority was reduced daily and rapidly; and we could reasonably have expected to cope with them on equal ground by the time the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on the south side of that river would have been their destruction. We, if beaten, had a place of refuge in Atlanta -- too strong to be assaulted, and too extensive to be invested. I had also hopes that by the breaking of the railroad in its rear the Federal army might be compelled to attack us in a position of our own choosing, or forced into a retreat easily converted into a rout. After we crossed the Etowah, five detachments of cavalry were successively sent with instructions to destroy as much as they could of the railroad between Chattanooga and the Etowah. All failed, because they were too weak, Captain James B. Harvey, an officer of great courage and sagacity, was detached on this service on the 11th of June and remained near the railroad several weeks, frequently interrupting, but not strong enough to prevent, its use. Early in the campaign the impressions of the strength of the cavalry in Mississippi and east Louisiana given me by Lieutenant-General Polk, just from the command of that department, gave me reason to hope that an adequate force commanded by the most competent officer in America for such service (General N. B. Forrest) could be sent from it for the purpose of breaking the railroad in Sherman's rear. I therefore made the suggestion direct to the President, June 13th and July 16th, and through General Bragg on the 3d, 12th, 16th, and 26th of June. I did so in the confidence that this cavalry would serve the Confederacy far better by insuring the defeat of a great invasion than by repelling a mere raid.

In his telegram of the 17th Mr. Davis gave his reasons for removing me, but in Vol. II., pp. 556 to 561, of the " Rise and Fall " he gives many others,

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most of which depend on misrepresentations of the strength of the positions I occupied. They were not stronger than General Lee's; indeed, my course was as like his as the dissimilarity of the two Federal commanders permitted. As his had increased his great fame, it is not probable that the people, who admired his course, condemned another similar one. As to Georgia, the State most interested, its two most influential citizens, Governor Joseph E. Brown and General Howell Cobb, remonstrated against my removal.

The assertions in Mr. B. H. Hill's letter [of October 12th, 1878] quoted by Mr. Davis [" R. and F.," Vol. II., p. 557 ] do not agree with those in his oration delivered in Atlanta in 1875. Mr. Hill said in the oration: "I know that he (Mr. Davis) consulted General Lee fully, earnestly, and anxiously before this perhaps unfortunate removal." That assertion is contradicted by one whose testimony is above question--for in Southern estimation he has no superior as gentleman, soldier, and civilian--General Hampton. General Lee had a conversation with him on the subject, of which he wrote to me:

"On that occasion he expressed great regret that you had been removed, and said that he had done all in his power to prevent it. The Secretary of War had recently been at his headquarters near Petersburg to consult as to this matter, and General Lee assured me that he had urged Mr. Seddon not to remove you from command, and had said to him that if you could not command the army we had no one who could. He was earnest in expressing not only his regret at your removal, but his entire confidence in yourself."

Everything seen about Atlanta proved that it was to be defended. We had been strengthening it a month, and had made it, under the circumstances, impregnable. We had defended Marietta, which had not a tenth of its strength, twenty-six days. General Sherman appreciated its strength, for he made no attack, although he was before it about six weeks.

I was a party to no such conversations as those given by Mr. Hill. No soldier above idiocy could express the opinions he ascribes to me.

Mr. Davis condemned me for not fighting. General Sherman's testimony and that of the Military Cemetery at Marietta refute the charge. I assert that had one of the other lieutenant-generals of the army (Hardee or Stewart) succeeded me, Atlanta would have been held by the Army of Tennessee.

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THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.May 3d-September 8th, 1864.

THE UNION ARMY.

Major-General William T. Sherman.

Headquarters Guard: 7th Co. Ohio Sharp-shooters, (1) Lieut. William McCrory.

Artillery:2 Brig.-Gen. William F. Barry (chief-of-artillery).

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas.

Escort, I, 1st Ohio Cav., Lieut. Henry C. Reppert.  Artillery: (2) Brig.-Gen. John M. Brannan (chief-of-artillery).

FOURTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard, Maj.-Gen. David S. Stanley

FIRST DIVISION Maj.-Gen. David S. Stanley, Brig.-Gen. William Grose, Brig.-Gen. Nathan Kimball. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft, Col. Isaac M. Kirby: 21st Ill. (,3) Maj. James E. Calloway, Capt. William H. Jamison; 38th Ill.,3 Lieut.-Col. William T. Chapman; 31st Ind., Col. John T. Smith; 81st Ind., Lieut. Col.William C. Wheeler; 1st Ky.,4 Col. David A. Enyart; 2d Ky.,(4) Lieut.-Col. John R. Hurd; 90th Ohio, Col. Samuel N. Yeoman; 101st Ohio, Col. Isaac M. Kirby, Lieut. Col. Bedan B. MBrigade, Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whitaker, Col. Jacob E. Taylor: 96th Ill., Col.Thomas E. Champion, Maj. George Hicks; 115th Ill., Col. Jesse H. Moore; 35th Ind., Maj. John P. Dufficy, Capt. James A. Gavisk, Lieut.-Col. A. G. Tassin; 84th Ind.,(5) Lieut.-Col. Andrew J. Newf., Capt. John C. Taylor, Capt. Martin B. Miller; 21st Ky., Col. Samuel W. Price, Lieut.-Col. James C. Evans; 40th Ohio, Col. Jacob E. Taylor, Capt. Chas. G. Matchett, Capt. Milton Kemper; 51st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. C. H. Wood. Col. Richard W. McClain; 99th Ohio,(6) Lieut.-Col. John E. Cummins, Capt. Jas. A. Bope, Lieut.-Col. J. E. Cummins. Third Brigade, Col. Wm. Grose, Col. P. Sidney Post, Brig.-Gen. Wm. Grose, Col. John E. Bennett: 59th Ill"(7) Col. P. Sidney Post, Lieut.-Col. Clayton Hale, Col. P. Sidney Post, Capt. Samuel West; 75th Ill., Col. John E. Bennett, Lieut.-Col. William M. Kilgour; 80th Ill., Lieut.-Col. William M. Kilgour, Maj. James M. Stookey; 84th Ill., Col. Louis H. Waters; 9th Ind., Col. Isaac C. B. Suman; 30th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Orrin D. Hurd, Capt. William Dawson, Lieut. Col. Orrin D. Hurd; 36th Ind., Lieut.-Col. O. H. P. Carey; 77th Pa., Capt. Joseph J. Lawson, Col. Thomas E. Rose. Artillery (8) Capt. Peter Simonson, Capt. Samuel M. McDowell, Capt. Theodore S. Thomasson: 5th Ind., Lieut. Alfred Morrison; B, Pa., Capt. Samuel M. McDowell, Lieut. Jacob Ziegler.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John Newton.

First Brigade, Col. Francis T. Sherman, Brig.-Gen. Nathan Kimball, Col. Emerson Opdycke: 36th Ill., Col. Silas Miller, Capt. James B. McNeal, Lieut.-Col. Porter C. Olson; 44th Ill., Col. Wallace W. Barrett, Lieut.-Col. John Russell, Maj. Luther M. Sabin, Lieut.-Col. John Russell; 73d Ill. Maj. Thomas W. Motherspaw; 74th Ill., Col. Jason Marsh, Lieut.-Col. John B. Kerr, Capt. Thomas J. Bryan; 88th Ill. Lieut.-Col. George W. Chandler, Lieut. Col. George W. Smith; 28th Ky.,(9) Lieut.-Col. J. Rowan Boone, Maj. George W. Barth; 2d Mo.,(10) Lieut.-Col. Arnold Beck, Col. Bernard Laiboldt; 15th