Rosecrans to Ord on 20 Sept. 1862: Why did you leave me in the lurch?
According to Captain William Stewart of the 11th Missouri: "General Grant was dead drunk and couldn't bring up his army. I was so mad when I first learned the facts that I could have shot Grant if I would have hung for it the next minute."
The advance column of Sterling Price’s Army of the West (about 8000 troops) marched into Iuka, Miss. on 14 Sept. 1862. Price’s superior Bragg, who was leading an offensive into Kentucky, ordered him to prevent William S. Rosecrans’s Army of the Mississippi troops from moving into Middle Tennessee.
Grant, commanding the Army of the
Tennessee, feared that Price intended to go north to join Bragg against
Buell. Grant devised a plan for his left
commander Ord and his men to advance on Iuka from the west. Rosecrans’s
troops were to march from the southwest, arrive at Iuka on the
and make a coordinated attack the next day. Ord arrived on time and
stopped 6 miles to the north of Iuka. According to his orders from
Grant he was to
attack when he heard the noise from Roscrans beginning the battle.
Rosecrans had further to march, was hindered by bad weather, and did
arrive until late the afternoon of the next day, whereupon he prepared
attack Price immediately. Price didn't wait, but attacked first. The
battle was desperate, lasted about 3 hours, and ended in the dark as
or less a draw.
Grant, keeping his command post 8 miles due west away from Iuka in Burnsville, was not doing a very good job of coordinating the two forces, and he had not informed Roscrans of Ord's specific order, i.e. to await the sound of fighting between Rosecrans and Price before engaging the Confederates himself. As a result, Ord did nothing, later claiming that he never heard any fighting, although he had to within 3 1/3 miles of Iuka (Battles of Iuka and Corinth, Cozzens, pg. 129). Grant also remarked that he had heard no sounds of battle. He wrote in his Memoirs: "Neither he [Ord] nor I nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field." According to Grant and Ord this was an instance of acoustic shadow (as at Perryville) due to wind blowing from the direction of the battle. However, at Perryville the sound of the battle was only muffled, not completely inaudible due to this effect. In addition, the reports of several lower-ranking officers state that at Iuka there was no wind at all the evening of 19 Sept. (Battles of Iuka and Corinth, Cozzens, pg. 130). There is a mystery here, because other reporting officers did hear hear the noise of the battle, including Col. John Du Bois who was 15 miles away. Still others reported seeing the clouds of smoke above the raging battle. But there is more - the evening of the battle Rosecans had sent messengers to Grant requesting an attack by Ord the next morning. Grant neither acknowledged receipt of the message, nor did he order the attack, and Price, instead of being driven east away from Van Dorn, escaped south along a road Rosecrans could not block with the forces at his disposal. Is it possible that Grant was unhappy about Rosecrans grabbing the limelight and just generally getting too big for his breeches as it were, and decided to let him stew a little bit? There is another, more prosaic explanation which, however, does not necessarily exclude the first. Namely, according to many soldiers and officers in Grant's army, he was incapacitated the day of the battle. Among several of them, I quote Captain William Stewart of the 11th Missouri:
"General Grant was dead drunk and couldn't bring up his army. I was so mad when I first learned the facts that I could have shot Grant if I would have hung for it the next minute."
In any case, without Grant's and Ord's help, Rosecrans put
a difficult position, albeit at the price of heavy casualties on both
and Price’s subordinates convinced him to withdraw from Iuka and join
Rosecrans’s army then occupied Iuka and then pursued Price, but
Confederate rearguard and difficult terrain saved him. Later, much
Grant maintained that Rosecrans should have destroyed or captured
army (something which was almost impossible under Civil War
Too bad Grant wasn't able to be there to show Rosecrans how to do it.
US 782; CS estimated 1500.
Grant wrote two reports about Iuka (ar24_64) - one dated 20
Sept. 1862 which praised Rosecrans' performance, and one dated 22
Oct. 1862 which gave the entire credit to one of Rosecrans'
(General Hamilton). Halleck suppressed the second report for 18 months
that Rosecrans could not respond to it. There are so many discrepencies
the two reports, the version of events recounted in Grant's Memoirs,
the reports of a multitude of other officers, that for this reason
Grant can be dismissed as a credible witness.
On 3-4 Oct. 62 Van Dorn as senior officer took command of the combined force numbering about 22,000 men, although his force was much smaller than that of Price. They hoped to seize Corinth and then move into Middle Tennessee, but a certain lack of cooperation between the two of them reduced their chances of success. Since the Siege of Corinth in the spring, Union forces had erected fortifications to protect Corinth, an important transportation hub. With the Confederate approach, the Federals under Rosecrans numbering about 23,000 occupied the outer line of fortifications. Van Dorn arrived at about at 10:00 AM and attacked shortly thereafter. The Confederates steadily pushed the Federals rearward. Price then attacked and drove the Federals back further to their inner line. By evening, Van Dorn was sure that he could finish the Federals off during the next day. However, Rosecrans regrouped his men in the fortifications to be ready for the coming attack. The next morning, as the Confederates moved forward, Union artillery swept the field causing heavy casualties. A few Confederates fought their way into Corinth, but the Federals drove them out after house to house fighting, one of the rare times in the Civil War when such combat took place. The Federals then counter-attacked and forced Van Dorn into a general retreat. Rosecrans, with Grant's approval, postponed any pursuit until the next day.
Later, much later, Grant maintained that Rosecrans had not pursued vigorously enough, then that Rosecrans pursued too far after he had been ordered to stop. There was just no pleasing that stickler Grant who surely would have done better had he been there. Rosecrans complained that Grant had delayed sending reinforcements (Sherman and McPherson) which, in fact, began arriving in Corinth from several points of the compass after the battle. Rosecrans and many of his officers were convinced they could have pursued as far as Vicksburg, but Grant was suddenly assailed with doubt about the condition of Rosecrans's army. I believe that the problem stemmed mainly from Grant's desire to cut the legs out from under a potential rival. Rosecrans was too competent, too ambitious, and too caustic to suit the little man who wanted the plum of Vicksburg for himself, and he made sure, with a little help Halleck, that Rosecrans didn't even get a shot at it. After the battle of Corinth, the shattered armies of Price and Dorn holed up in Tupelo and, by Price's own admission, could have done nothing to stop Rosecrans. So Grant stopped him and was saved from having to relieve him when Rosecrans was appointed to replace Buell in Kentucky. Casualties: US 2520; CS 4233.
For those who have ears to hear, eyes to see and a brain to think with, there follows Grant's telegram to Lincoln about this battle. Rosecrans is not mentioned with one word:
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XVII/1 [S# 24]
OCTOBER 3--12, 1862
JACKSON, TENN., October 9, 1862.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States.
Your dispatch received. Cannot answer it so fully as I would wish. Paroled now 813 enlisted men and 43 commissioned officers in good <ar24_157> health; 700 Confederate wounded already sent to Iuka paroled; 350 wounded paroled still at Corinth. Cannot tell the number of dead yet. About 800 rebels already buried. Their loss in killed about nine to one of ours. The ground is not yet cleared of their unburied dead. Prisoners yet arriving by every road and train. This does not include casualties where Ord attacked in the rear. He has 350 well prisoners, besides two batteries and small-arms in large numbers. Our loss there was between 400 and 500. Rebel loss about the same. General Oglesby is shot through the breast and the ball lodged in the spine. Hopes for his recovery. Our killed and wounded at Corinth will not exceed 900, many of them slightly.
U. S. GRANT, Major-General.
The battles of Iuka and Corinth materially effected the outcome of the battle of Perryville (8 Oct. 1862) by protecting Buell's rear during his race with Bragg to get to Louisville, Ky. Bragg lost the race and didn't win at Perryville either, and Confederate toops never again seriously menaced Kentucky.
Other articles on these battles:
1. Excerpt from The Battle of Iuka by C. S. Hamilton, Maj.-Gen. USV
2. Excerpt from The Battle of Corinth
by William S. Rosecrans, brevet Maj.-Gen. USA
Originally published in 1887 by Robert Underwood Johnson and
Clarence Clough Buell, editors of the "The Century Magazine".
[scanned, reformatted and corrected; maps and illustrations are ommitted]
excerpt from THE BATTLE OF IUKA by C. S. Hamilton, Major General, U.S.V.
IUKA is a little village on the Memphis and Charleston railway, in northern Mississippi, about thirty miles east of Corinth. In September, 1862, the Confederate authorities, to prevent reenforcements being sent by the Federal commander in Mississippi to Buell in Kentucky, sent General Sterling Price with his army corps to Iuka. A regiment of Union troops stationed at Iuka evacuated the place, leaving a considerable quantity of army stores, as also quits an amount of cotton. The latter was destroyed, the former made use of, and Price settled down, apparently at his leisure, under the nose of Grant's force, were at Corinth. As soon as definite information was had of this position of Price, Grant took immediate steps to beat him up. A combined attack was planned, by which Rosecrans with his two divisions (Hamilton's and Stanley's) was to move on Iuka from the south, while Ord, with a similar column, was to approach Iuka from the west. This he did, taking position within about six miles of the village, where he was to await Rosecrans's attack.
From Iuka southward ran two parallel roads, some two miles distant from each other--the most eastern known as the Fulton road, the western as the Tuscumbia. Grant's plan contemplated an approach on Iuka by way of the Fulton road, at least in part, with a view of cutting off the escape of Price by that road. Rosecrans, however, for reasons of his own, decided on taking the Tuscumbia road with his whole force, thus leaving the Fulton road open.
A rapid march from Jacinto (Hamilton's division leading, Sanborn's brigade in the advance) brought Rosecrans's column to Barnett's by noon. Hamilton, who had expected to march upon the Fulton road from that point, was furnished with a guide, and directed to continue his march on the Tuscumbia road without further instructions.
About 4 P. M. the guide gave notice that the column was within about two miles of Iuka. In fact, we were on the eve of a battle, and it is well here to note the strength and position of the opposing forces. On the Union side was Hamilton's division of 2 brigades (Sanborn's and Sullivan's) of 5 regiments and a battery each. Stanley's division was following along the same road, but as yet was some distance in the rear. It also had 2 brigades of 5 regiments each, but only 3 of these regiments reached the field in time to take any part in the conflict.
At the moment the guide gave notice of our nearness to Iuka, the whole of the leading division was halted in the road in exactly the order they had been marching. The head of the column had just finished ascending a long hill, from the top of sloped in undulations toward the front. A few hundred yards ahead, in line of battle, the enemy lay concealed in the woods. Hébert's brigade of 6 regiments lay athwart the road by which we were approaching; Martin's brigade of 4 regiments had been divided, and 2 of these regiments were thrown on the right of the Confederate line and 2 on the left, making 10 regiments in line of battle. At the commencement of the conflict,
the other 2 brigades which had been ordered up had arrived on the field, making the whole strength of Little's division, 18 regiments, ready for action before a gun had been fired.
On the halting of my troops, the battalion of skirmishers was pushed rapidly forward in the direction of Iuka. An advance of four hundred yards brought them in the immediate presence of the enemy. I was immediately in rear of the skirmishers, and taking in the situation at a glance dashed back to the head of the column. If this should become enveloped by the enemy, a rout was inevitable, and our force would be doubled back on itself. I threw the leading regiment, the 5th Iowa, across the road, moving it a short distance to the right, and ordered up the nearest battery, which was placed in position on the road, and to the left of the first regiment in position. Colonel Sanborn was active in bringing up other regiments, and getting them into line. Just as the first regiment was placed, the enemy opened one of his batteries with canister. The charge passed over our heads, doing no damage beyond bringing down a shower of twigs and leaves. The Confederates were in line ready for action. Why they did not move forward and attack us at once is not understood. Their delay, which enabled us to form the nearest three regiments in line of battle before the attack began, was our salvation. An earlier attack would have enveloped the head of the column, and brought a disastrous rout.
Meantime not a moment was lost. A second regiment, and a third, with all the rapidity that men could exercise, added to our little line; and while the Confederates were moving to the front, we had managed to get a battle line of three regiments into position. It was then the storm of battle opened. The opposing infantry lines were within close musketry shot. Our battery was handled with energy, and dealt death to the enemy. The Confederate batteries had ceased firing, their line of fire having been covered by the advance of their infantry. Our own infantry held their ground nobly against the overwhelming force moving against them, and we were enabled to add another regiment to the line of battle. At the first musketry fire of the enemy, most of the horses of our battery were killed, and the pieces could not be moved from the field. The fight became an infantry duel. I never saw a hotter or more destructive engagement. General Price says in his official report, "The fight began, and was waged with a severity I have never seen surpassed."
The regiments of Sanborn's brigade were in the front line. Sullivan's brigade was divided--a regiment thrown to the right flank, and one to the left--the remaining two being placed in rear of Sanborn's center as a reenforcement. Thus was every regiment of my command doing duty on the field. Stanley's division seemed long in coming up. The Confederate lines had moved forward, concentrating their fire on our little front, and stretching out their wings to the right and left, as though we were to be taken in at once. Our men stood their ground bravely, yielding nothing for a long time; but the pressure began to grow severe, and I feared we might be driven from our ground. Thinking General Rosecrans was in the rear, where he could hurry up the troops of Stanley's division, I dispatched an aide with the request that General Rosecrans would come forward far enough to confer with me. All the while the battle waxed hotter and more furious. The dead lay in lines along the regiments, while some of our troops gave signs of yielding. I dispatched another officer, the only one in reach, for General Rosecrans. He happened to be one of General Rosecrans's staff, and at my request he started to bear the message to his general. Our troops, as yet, had not given way. The battery under Sears was doing noble service, but had lost nearly half its men. Sanborn's brigade was held by him to their work like Roman veterans, but without help we could not much longer hold out. I dispatched my adjutant-general, Captain Sawyer, and a short time later another aide, Lieutenant Wheeler, with messages for General Rosecrans, saying that I considered it imperative he should come forward to see me, and should hurry forward fresh troops. (1)
Stanley's division had now reached the vicinity of the battle-field, and General Stanley came instantly to the front, directing the division to follow as rapidly as possible. It was time, for our line had begun to give way slowly. It had been formed on the crest of the hill (up which we had come, and which sloped to our rear), and in falling back had been arrested just below the brow of the hill, where it maintained the fight. Other regiments were yielding ground slowly, but were readily stopped by the united exertions of Stanley, Sanborn, and myself. The falling back of the troops had exposed the battery, into which the Confederates had entered. A short time later, however, a desperate rally was made, and they were driven back from the battery; but returning with renewed strength, our troops were again forced below the brow of the hill. Here three of Stanley's regiments reached the field, and were pushed to the right of the line, where they made good the places of troops that had fallen to the rear. They fought bravely under Colonels Mower, Boomer, and Holman, but the fire was too deadly, and they in turn were forced back. It was growing dark. The smoke of battle added to the coming night, and it was soon too dark to distinguish the gray from the blue uniform. The storm of battle gradually lulled to entire quiet.
Our troops bivouacked on the slope of the hill. The Confederates, for several hours, were occupied with burying their dead and removing their wounded.
A consultation between General Rosecrans and his division commanders resulted in a rearrangement of the troops early in the night, and everything
(1) Rosecrans in his official report says: "About this time [referring to a time subsequent to the capture and recovery of Sears's battery] it was deemed prudent to order up the first brigade of Stanley's division." This shows that Stanley had reached the vicinity of the battle-field, but for some reason no one had ordered him to the front.--C. S. H.
was made ready for battle in the morning. The enemy, however, left the vicinity of the field during the night, leaving the battery which had been the object of such a sanguinary struggle but a short distance to the rear, and near their first line of battle. The Fulton road being open, there was nothing to interfere with the enemy's escape. A pursuit was made the following day--but a pursuit of a defeated enemy can amount to little in a country like that of northern Mississippi, heavily wooded, and with narrow roads, when the enemy has time enough to get his artillery and trains in front of his infantry. To make an effective pursuit, it must be so close on the heels of the battle that trains, artillery, and troops can be made to blockade the roads by being mixed in an indiscriminate mass.
On the following day, September 21st, our troops were back in their old encampments at Jacinto. Just two weeks later, the same divisions and brigades were measured against each other on the field of Corinth.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT IUKA, MISS. September 19th, 1862.
The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded: m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.
THE UNION FORCES.
ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI.-- Major-General William S. Rosecrans.
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. David S. Stanley.
First Brigade, Col. John W. Fuller: 27th Ohio, Major Zephaniah S. Spaulding: 39th Ohio, Col. Alfred W. Gilbert: 43d Ohio, Col. J. L. Kirby Smith: 63d Ohio, Col. John W. Sprague: M, 1st Mo. Art'y, Capt. Albert M. Powell: 8th Wis. Battery (section), Lieut. John D. McLean: F, 2d U. S. Art'y, Capt. Thomas D. Maurice. Brigade loss: w, S. Second Brigade, Col. Joseph A. Mower: 26th Ill., Major Robert A. Gillmore: 47th Ill., Lieut.-Col. William A. Thrush: 11th Mo., Major Andrew J. Weber: 8th Wis.. Lieut.-Col, George W, Robbins: 2d Iowa Battery, Capt. Nelson T. Spoor: 3d apt. Alex. W. Dees. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 81; m, 4=93.
THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. C. S. Hamilton. Staff loss : w, 2.
Escort. C, 5th Mo. Cav.,Capt. Albert Borcherdt (w). Loss : k, 1: w, 2 =3.
First Brigade, Col. John E. Sanborn: 48th Ind., Col. Norman Eddy (w), Lieut.-Col. De Witt C. Rugg: 5th Iowa, Col. Charles L. Matthies; 16th Iowa, Col. Alexander Chambers (w), Lieut.-Col. Add. H. Sanders: 4th Minn. Capt, Ebenezer Le Gro: 26th Mo.. Col, George B. Boomer (w): 11th Ohio Battery, Lieut, Cyrus Sears (w). Brigade loss: k, 127: w, 434: m, 27=588. Second Brigads, Brig.-Gen. Jeremiah C. Sullivan: 10th Iowa, Col. Nicholas Perczel; 17th Iowa, Col. John W. Rankin (injured),Capt. Samson M. Archer(w), Capt. John L.Young: 10th Mo., Col. Samuel A. Holmes: E, 24th Mo.,Capt, Lafay- ette M. Rice: 80th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Matthias H. Bartilson (w), Major Richard Lanning : 12th Wis. Battery, Lieut. Lorenzo D. Immell. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 76; m, 5=86.
CAVALRY DIVISION, Col. John K. Mizner: 2d Iowa, Col. Edward Hatch: B and E, 7th Kans. Capt. Frederick Swoyer: 3d Mich., Capt. Lyman G. Willcox, Division loss: w, 9, Unattached. Jenks's Co., Ill. Cav. Capt. Albert Jenks, Loss: w, 1. Total loss of the Union Army: killed, 141; wounded, 613; captured or missing, 36=790.
General Rosecrans says (" Official Records," Vol. XVII. Pt. I. p. 74) that " we moved from Jacinto at 5 A. M. with 9000 men, on Price's forces at Iuka. After a march of 18 miles attacked them at 4:30 P.M. . . . with less than half our forces in action." Meanwhile the command of General E.O.C. Ord, comprising the divisions of Davies, Ross, and McArthur, numbering about 8000 men, was marching from Corinth direct on Iuka, and was within four or five miles of the battle-field on the 19th (see map, p. 730). The entire Union force near Iuka, including Ord, was about 17,000 men.
THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.
ARMY OF THE WEST.---Major-General Sterling Price.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Henry Little (k).
First Brigade, Col. Elijah Gates : 16th Ark., -----; Francis M. Cockrell: 3d Mo., Col. James A. Pritchard : 5th Mo.,---:;1st Mo. (dismounted cavalry), Lieut.-Col. W. D. Maupin: Mo. Battery, Capt. William Wade. Brigade loss: w, 10. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Louis Hebert: 14th Ark.,---: 17th Ark., Lieut.-Col. John Griffith: 3d La., Lieut.-Col. J. B. Gilmore (w): 40th Miss., Col. W. Bruce Colbert: 1st Tex, Legion (dismounted cavalry), Col. John W. Whitfield (w), Lieut.- Col. E. R. Hawkins: 3d Tex. (dismounted cavalry), Col. H. P. Mabry (w); St. Louis (Mo.) Battery, Capt. William E. Dawson: Clark (Mo.) Battery, Lieut. J. L. Faris. Brigade loss : k, 63: w, 305: m, 40 = 408. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Martin E. Green: 7th Miss. Battalion. Lieut.- Col. J. S. Terral: 43d Miss., Col. W. H. Moore: 4th Mo. Col. A. MacFarlane: 6th Mo., Col, Eugene Erwin: 3d Mo. (dismounted cavalry),----; Mo. Battery, Capt. Henry Guibor; Mo. Battery. Capt. John C. Landis. Fourth Brigade, Col. John D. Martin: 37th Ala., Col. James F. Dowdell (w): 36th Miss., Col. W. W. Witherspoon: 37th Miss., Col. Robert McLain; 38th Miss. Col. F. W. Adams. Brigade loss: k, 22: w, 95=117.
CAVALRY, Brig.-Gen. Frank C. Armstrong: Miss. regiment. Col. Wirt Adams; 2d Ark., Col. W. F. Slemons: 2d Mo., Col. Robert McCulloch: 1st Miss, Partisan Rangers, Col. W. C. Falkner. Loss not reported.
Total Confederate loss: killed, 85; wounded, 410: captured or missing. 40 = 535.
The battle was fought on the Confederate side by Little's division,
mainly by the brigades of Hebert and Martin, numbering 3179 men. But
effective strength of Price's entire command is estimated at about
including Dabney H. Maury's division, of three brigades. which, during
19th, was held near Iuka in readiness to confront Ord.
Originally published in 1887 by Robert Underwood Johnson and
Clarence Clough Buell, editors of the "The Century Magazine".
[scanned, reformatted and corrected; maps and illustrations are ommitted]
excerpt from THE BATTLE OF CORINTH by William S. Rosecrans, Major-General, USV., brevet Major-General, USA
THE battle of Corinth, Miss., which is often confounded in public memory with our advance, under Halleck, from Pittsburg Landing in April and May, 1862, was fought on the 3d and 4th of October, of that year, between the combined forces of Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price of the Confederacy, and the Union divisions of Generals David S. Stanley, Charles S. Hamilton, Thomas A. Davies, and Thomas J. McKean, under myself as commander of the Third Division of the District of West Tennessee.
The Confederate evacuation of Corinth occurred on the 30th of May, General Beauregard withdrawing his army to Tupelo, where, June 27th, he was succeeded in the command by General Braxton Bragg. Halleck occupied Corinth on the day of its evacuation, and May 31st instructed General Buell, commanding the Army of the Ohio, to repair the Memphis and Charleston railway in the direction of Chattanooga---a movement to which, on June 11th, Halleck gave the objective of "Chattanooga and Cleveland and Dalton"; the ultimate purpose being to take possession of east Tennessee, in cooperation with General G. W. Morgan. To counteract these plans, General Bragg began, on June 27th, the transfer of a large portion of his army to Chattanooga by rail, via Mobile, and about the middle of August set out on the northward movement which terminated only within sight of the Ohio River. The Confederate forces in Mississippi were left under command of Generals Van Dorn and Price. About the middle of July General Halleck
was called to Washington to discharge the duties of General-in-chief. He left the District of West Tennessee and the territory held in northern Mississippi under the command of General Grant, In August, by Halleck's orders, General Grant sent E. A. Paine's and Jeff. C. Davis's divisions across the Tennessee to strengthen Buell, who was moving northward through middle Tennessee, to meet Bragg, one of these divisions garrisoned Nashville while the other marched with Buell after Bragg into Kentucky.
In the early days of September, after the disaster of the "Second Bull Run," the friends of the Union watched with almost breathless anxiety the advance of Lee into Maryland, of Bragg into Kentucky, and the hurrying of the Army of the Potomac northward from Washington, to get between Lee and the cities of Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. The suspense lest McClellan should not be in time to head off Lee--lest Buell should not arrive in time to prevent Bragg from taking Louisville or assaulting Cincinnati, was fearful.
At this time I was stationed at Corinth with the "Army of the Mississippi," having succeeded General Pope in that command on the 11th of June. We were in the District of West Tennessee, commanded by General Grant. Under the idea that I would reenforce Buell, General Sterling Price, who, during July and August, had been on the Mobile and Ohio railway near Guntown and Baldwyn, Miss., with 15,000 to 20,000 men, moved up to Iuka about the 12th of September, intending to follow me; and, as he reported, "finding that General Rosecrans had not crossed the Tennessee River," he "concluded to withdraw from Iuka toward my [his] old encampment." His "withdrawal" was after the hot battle of Iuka on September 19th, two days after the battle of Antietam which had caused Lee's "withdrawal" from Maryland.
During the month of August General Price had been conferring with General Van Dorn, commanding all the Confederate troops in Mississippi except Price's, to form a combined movement to expel the Union forces from northern Mississippi and western Tennessee, and to plant their flags on the banks of the Lower Ohio, while Bragg was to do the like on that river in Kentucky. General Earl Van Dorn, an able and enterprising commander, after disposing his forces to hold the Mississippi from Grand Gulf up toward Memphis, late in September, with Lovell's division, a little over 8000 men, came up to Ripley, Mississippi, where, on the 28th of September, he was joined by General Price, with Hébert's and Maury's divisions, numbering 13,863 effective infantry, artillery, and cavalry.
This concentration, following the precipitate "withdrawal" of Price from Iuka, portended mischief to the Union forces in west Tennessee, numbering some forty to fifty thousand effectives, scattered over the district occupying the vicinity of the Memphis and Charleston railway from Iuka to Memphis, a stretch of about a hundred and fifteen miles, and located at interior positions on the Ohio and Mississippi from Paducah to Columbus, and at Jackson, Bethel, and other places on the Mississippi Central and Mobile and Ohio railways.
The military features of west Tennessee and northern Mississippi will be readily comprehended by the reader who will examine a map of that region
and notice: (1) That the Memphis and Charleston railway runs not far from the dividing lines between the States, with a southerly bend from Memphis eastward toward Corinth, whence it extends eastwardly through Iuka, crosses Bear River and follows the Tuscumbia Valley on the south side of that east and west reach of the Tennessee to Decatur. Thence the road crosses to the north side of this river and unites with the Nashville and Chattanooga road at Stevenson en route for Chattanooga. (2) That the Mobile and Ohio railway, from Columbus on the Mississippi, runs considerably east of south, passes through Jackson, Tennessee, Bethel, Corinth, Tupelo, and Baldwyn, Mississippi, and thence to Mobile, Alabama. (3) That the Mississippi Central, leaving the Mobile and Ohio at Jackson, Tennessee, runs nearly south, passing by Bolivar and Grand Junction, Tennessee, and Holly Springs, Grenada, etc., to Jackson, Mississippi. All this region of west Tennessee and the adjoining counties of Mississippi, although here and there dotted with clearings, farms, settlements, and little villages, is heavily wooded. Its surface consists of low, rolling, oak ridges of diluvial clays, with intervening crooked drainages traversing narrow, bushy, and sometimes swampy, bottoms. The streams are sluggish and not easily fordable, on account of their miry beds and steep, muddy, clay banks. Water in dry seasons is never abundant, and in many places is only reached by bore-wells of 100 to 300 feet in depth, whence it is hoisted by rope and pulley carrying water-buckets of galvanized iron pipes from 4 to 6 inches in diameter, and 4 to 5 feet long, with valves at the lower end. These matters are of controlling importance in moving and handling troops in that region. Men and animals need hard ground to move on, and must have drinking-water.
The strategic importance of Corinth, where the Mobile and Ohio crosses the Memphis and Charleston, ninety-three miles east of Memphis, results from its control of movements either way over these e fact that it
is not far from Hamburg, Eastport, and Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River, to which points good freight steamers can ascend at the lowest stages of water. Corinth is mainly on low, flat ground, along the Mobile and Ohio railway, and flanked by low, rolling ridges, except the cleared patches, covered with oaks and undergrowth for miles in all directions. With few clearings, outside of those made by the Confederate troops in obtaining fuel during their wintering in 1861-2, the country around Corinth, in all directions, was densely wooded.
While General Halleck was advancing on Corinth, the Confederates had extended a line of light defensive works from the Memphis and Charleston road on the west, about two and a half miles from the town, all the way round by the north and east to the same railway east. When the Union forces took possession, General Halleck ordered a defensive line to be constructed about a mile and a half from the town, extending from the Memphis and Charleston railway on the west around southerly to cover the Union front in that direction. After the departure of General Buell's command toward Chattanooga this work was continued, although we had no forces to man it adequately, and it was too far away to afford protection to our stores at Corinth. During August I used to go over from my camp at Clear Creek to General Grant's headquarters at Corinth, and after the usual greetings would ask: " How are you getting along With the line?" He would say: "Well, pretty slowly, but they are doing good work." I said to him: "General, the line isn't worth much to us, because it is too long. We cannot occupy it." He answered, " What would you do?" I said, "I would have made the depots outside of the town north of the Memphis and Charleston road between the town and the brick church, and would have inclosed them by field-works, running tracks in. Now, as the depot houses are at the cross-road, the best thing we can do is to run a line of light works around in the neighborhood Of the college up on the knoll." So, one day, after dining with General Grant, he proposed that we go up together and take Captain Frederick E. Prime with us, and he gave orders to commence a line of breastworks that would include the college grounds. This was before the battle of Iuka. After Iuka I was ordered to command the district, and General Grant moved his headquarters to Jackson, Tennessee. Pursuant to this order, on the 26th of September I repaired to Corinth, where I found the only defensive works available consisted of the open batteries Robinett, Williams, Phillips, Tannrath, and Lothrop, established by Captain Prime on the College Hill line. I immediately
ordered them to be connected by breastworks, and the front to the west and north to be covered by such an abatis as the remaining timber on the ground could furnish. I employed colored engineer troops organized into squads of twenty-five each, headed by a man detailed from the line or the quartermaster's department, and commanded by Captain William B. Gaw, a competent engineer. I also ordered an extension of the line of redoubts to cover the north front of the town, one of which, Battery Powell, was nearly completed before the stirring events of the attack. No rifle-pits were constructed between Powell and the central part covering the north-west front of the town, which was perfectly open north-east and south-east, with nothing but the distant, old Confederate works between it and the country.
To add to these embarrassments in preparing the place to resist a sudden attack, Grant, the general commanding, had retired fifty-eight miles north to Jackson, on the Mobile and Ohio railway, with all the knowledge of the country acquired during the four months in which his headquarters were at Corinth, and I, the new commander, could not find even the vestige of a map of the country to guide me in these defensive preparations.
During the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th of September, the breastworks were completed joining the lunettes from College Hill on the left. A thin abatis made from the scattering trees, which had been left standing along the west and north fronts, covered the line between Robinett and the Mobile and Ohio; thence to Battery Powell the line was mostly open and Without rifle-pits.
To meet emergencies, Hamilton's and Stanley's divisions, which had been watching to the south and south-west from near Jacinto to Rienzi, were closed in toward Corinth within short call.
On the 28th I telegraphed to General Grant at Columbus, Kentucky, confirmation of my report of Price's movement to Ripley, adding that I should move Stanley's division to Rienzi, and thence to Kossuth, unless he had other views. Two days later I again telegraphed to General Grant that there were no signs of the enemy at Hatchie Crossing, and that my reason for proposing to put Stanley at or near Kossuth was that he would cover nearly all the Hatchie Crossing, as far as Pocahontas, except against heavy forces, and that Hamilton would then move at least one brigade, from Rienzi. I asked that a sharp lookout be kept in the direction of Bolivar. October 1st, I telegraphed General Grant that we were satisfied there was no enemy for three miles beyond Hatchie; also, that prisoners reported that General John C. Breckinridge, of Van Dorn's command, had gone to Kentucky with three Kentucky regiments, leaving his division under the command of General Albert Rust, The combined forces under Van Dorn and Price were reported to be encamped on the Pocahontas road, and to number forty thousand. *
Amid the numberless rumors and uncertainties besetting me at Corinth during the five days between September 26th, when I assumed command, and October 1st, how gratifying would have been the knowledge of the following facts, taken from Van Dorn's report, dated Holly Springs, October 20th, 1862:
"Surveying the whole field of operations before me, . . . the conclusion forced itself irresistibly upon my mind that the taking of Corinth was a condition precedent to the accomplishment of anything of importance in west Tennessee. To take Memphis would be to destroy an immense amount of property without any adequate military advantage, even admitting that, it could be held without heavy guns against the enemy's gun and mortar boats. The line of fortifications around Bolivar is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it impossible to take the place by quick assault. . .. . It was clear to my mind that if a successful made upon Corinth from the west and north-west, the forces there driven back on the Tennessee
* In fact about 22,000, as stated by Van Dorn in the report quoted. And see "With Price East of the Mississippi," by Colonel Thomas L. Snead, p. 726.---EDITORS.
and cut off, Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, upon the arrival of the exchanged prisoners of war, west Tennessee would soon be in our possession, and communication with General Bragg effected through middle Tennessee. . . .
"I determined to attempt Corinth. I had a reasonable hope of success. Field returns at Ripley showed my strength to be about 22,000 men. Rosecrans at Corinth had about 15,000, with about 8000 additional men at outposts, from 12 to 15 miles distant. I might surprise him and carry the place before these troops could be brought in. . . . It was necessary that this blow should he sudden and decisive. . ..
"The troops were in fine spirits, and the whole Army of West Tennessee seemed eager to emulate the armies of the Potomac and of Kentucky. No army ever marched to battle with prouder steps, more hopeful countenances, or with more courage than marched the Army of West Tennessee out of Ripley on the morning of September 29th, on its way to Corinth."
But of all this I knew nothing. With only McKean's and Davies's divisions, not ten thousand men, at Corinth on the 26th of September, by October 1st I had gradually drawn in pretty close Stanley's and Hamilton's divisions. They had been kept watching to the south and south-west of Corinth.
Our forces when concentrated would make about 16,000 effective infantry and artillery for defense, with 2500 cavalry for outposts and reconnoitering.
On October 2d, while Van Dorn was at Pocahontas, General Hurlbut telegraphed the information, from an intelligent Union man of Grand Junction, that "Price, Van Dorn, and Villepigue were at Pocahontas, and the talk was that they would attack Bolivar." Evidence arriving thick and fast showed that the enemy was moving, but whether on Corinth or Bolivar, or whether, passing between, they would strike and capture Jackson, was not yet clear to any of us. I knew that the enemy intended a strong movement, and I thought they must have the impression that our defensive works at Coretty formidable. I doubted if they would venture to bring their force against our command behind defensive works. I therefore said: The enemy may threaten us and strike across our line entirely, get on the road between us and Jackson and advance upon that place, the capture of which would compel us to get out of our lines; or he may come in by the road from Tupelo so as to interpose his force between us and Danville. But all the time I inclined to the belief that it would not be for his interest to do that. I thought that perhaps he would cross the Memphis and Charleston road and, going over to the Mobile and Ohio road, force us to move out and fight him in the open country.
October 2d, I sent out a cavalry detachment to reconnoiter in the direction of Pocahontas. They found the enemy's infantry coming close in, and that night some of our detachment were surprised, and their horses and a few of the men were captured. Those that escaped reported the enemy there in force. This was still consistent with the theory that the enemy wished to cross the Memphis and Charleston road, go north of us, strike the Mobile and Ohio road and manoeuvre us out of our position.
To be prepared for whatever they might do, I sent Oliver's brigade of McKean's division out to Chewalla, ten miles north-west in Tennessee. On the morning of the 3d the enemy's advance came to Chewalla, and Oliver's brigade fell back fighting. I sent orders to the brigade commander to make
a stiff resistance, and see what effect it would have, still thinking that the attack was probably a mask for their movement for the north. I ordered Stanley to move in close to town near the middle line of works, called the "Halleck line," and to wait for further developments.
An order dated 1:30 A. M., October 3d, had set all the troops in motion. The impression that the enemy might find it better to strike a point on our line of communication and compel us to get out of our works to fight him or, if he should attempt Corinth, that he would do it, if possible, by the north and east, where the immediate vicinage was open and the place without defenses of any kind, governed these preliminary dispositions of my troops. The controlling idea was to prevent surprise, to test by adequate resistance any attacking force, and, finding it formidable, to receive it behind the inner line that had been preparing from College Hill around by Robinett.
To meet all probable contingencies, 9 o'clock on the morning of the 3d found my troops disposed as follows: Hamilton's division, about 3700 strong, on the
Purdy road north of the town, to meet any attempt from the north; Davies's division, 3204 strong, between the Memphis and Charleston and Mobile and Ohio railways, north-west of the town; McKean's division, 5315 strong, to the left of Davies's and in rear of the old Halleck line of batteries; and Stanley's division, 3500 strong, mainly in reserve on the extreme left, looking toward the Kossuth road.
Thus in front of those wooded western approaches, the Union troops, on the morning of October 3d, waited for what might happen, wholly ignorant of what Van Dorn was doing at Chewalla, ten miles away through thick forests. Of this General Van Dorn says:
"At daybreak on the 3d, the march was resumed . . . Lovell's division, in front, kept the road on the south side of the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Price, after marching on the same mad about five miles, turned to the left, crossing the railroad, and formed line of battle in front of the outer line of intrenchments and about three miles from Corinth."
The intrenchments referred to were old Confederate works, which I had no idea of using except as a cover for a heavy skirmish line, to compel the enemy to develop his force, and to show whether he was making a demonstration to cover a movement of his force around to the north of Corinth. During the morning this skirmish work was well and gallantly accomplished by Davies's division, aided by McArthur with his brigade, and by Crocker, who moved up toward what the Confederate commander deemed the main line of the Union forces for the defense of Corinth. Upon this position moved three brigades of Lovell's division,--Villepigue's, Bowen's, and Rust's,--in line, with reserves in rear of each; Jackson's cavalry was on the right en échelon, the left flank on the Charleston railroad; Price's corps of two divisions was on the left of Lovell.
Thus the Confederate general proceeded, until, "at 10 o'clock, all the Union skirmishers were driven into the old intrenchments," and a part of the opposing forces were in line of battle confronting each other. There was a belt of fallen timber about four hundred yards wide between them, which must be crossed by the Confederate forces before they could drive this
stubborn force of Davies's, sent to compel the enemy to show his hand. Van Dorn says: "The attack was commenced on the right by Lovell's division and gradually extended to the left, and by 1:30 P. M. the whole line of outer works was carried, several pieces [two] of artillery being taken."
Finding that the resistance made by Oliver's little command on the Chewalla road early in the morning was not stiff enough to demonstrate the enemy's object, I had ordered McArthur's brigade from McKean's division to go to Oliver's assistance. It was done with a will. McArthur's Scotch blood rose, and the enemy being in fighting force, he fought him with the stubborn ferocity of an action on the main line of battle, instead of the resistance of a developing force.
The same remark applies to the fighting of Davies's division, and as they were pushed and called for reënforcements, orders were sent to fall back slowly and stubbornly. The Confederates, elated at securing these old outworks, pushed in toward our main line, in front of which the fighting in the afternoon was so hot that McKean was ordered to send further help over to the fighting troops, and Stanley to send " a brigade through the woods by the shortest cut " to help Davies, whose division covered itself with glory, having Brigadier-General Hackleman killed, Brigadier-General Oglesby desperately wounded, with nearly twenty-five per cent. of its strength put out of the fight. Watching intently every movement which would throw light on the enemy's intentions, soon after midday I decided that it was a main attack of the enemy. Hamilton's division had been sent up the railroad as far as the old Confederate works in the morning, and formed the right of our line. At 1 o'clock his division was still there watching against attack from the north. When the enemy prepared to make the attack on our first real line of battle, word was sent up to Hamilton to advise us if any Confederate force had gotten through, on the Mobile and Ohio road. At 3 o'clock when and became very heavy, Stanley was ordered to move up from his position and succor McKean's and Davies's divisions that had been doing heavy fighting. Colonel Ducat, acting chief of staff, was sent to direct General Hamilton to file by fours to the left, and march down until the head of his column was opposite the right of Davies's, then to face his brigades south-westerly, and move down in that direction. The enemy's left did not much overpass the right of Davies, and but few troops were on the line of the old Confederate works. Hence Hamilton's movement, the brigades advancing en échelon, would enable the right of Buford's brigade to far out-lap the enemy's left, and pass toward the enemy's rear with little or no opposition, while the other brigade could press back the enemy's left, and by its simple advance drive him in and attack his rear.
Hamilton told Colonel Ducat that he wanted a more positive and definite order before he made the attack. Ducat explained the condition of the battle and urged an immediate movement, but was obliged to return to me for an order fitted to the situation. I sent the following:
"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, October 3d,
BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAMILTON, Commanding Third Division:
Rest your left on General Davies and swing round your
right and attack the enemy on their left flank, reenforced on your right and center. Be careful not to get under Davies's guns. Keep your troops well in hand. Get well this way. Do not extend to your right too much. It looks as if it would be well to occupy the ridge where your skirmishers were when Colonel Ducat left, by artillery, well supported, but this may be farther to right than would be safe. Use your discretion. Opposite your center might be better now for your artillery. If you see your chance, attack fiercely.---W. S. ROSECRANS, Brigadier-General."
I added a sketch of the line on a bit of paper. The delay thus caused enabled the enemy to overpass the right of Davies so far that while Ducat was returning he was fired on by the enemy's skirmishers, who had reached open ground over the railway between Hamilton and Corinth. Two orderlies sent on the same errand afterward were killed on the way. Upon the receipt of these explanations Hamilton put his division in motion, but by sunset he only reached a point opposite the enemy's left; and after moving down a short distance Sullivan's brigade, facing to the west, crossed the narrow flats flanking the railway, went over into the thickets, and had a fierce fight with the enemy's left, creating a great commotion. Buford's brigade had started in too far to the west and had to rectify its position; so that Hamilton's division thus far had only given the enemy a terrific scare, and a sharp fight with one brigade. Had the movement been executed promptly after 3 o'clock, we should have crushed the enemy's right and rear. Hamilton's excuse that he could not understand the order shows that even in the rush of battle it may be necessary to put orders in writing, or to have subordinate commanders who instinctively know or are anxious to seek the key of the battle and hasten to its roar. *
At nightfall of the 3d it was evident that, unless the enemy should withdraw, he was where I wished him to be---between the two railroad lines
* See General Charles S. Hamilton's statements, p. 758. -- EDITORS.
and to the south of them--for the inevitable contest of the morrow. Van Dorn says:
"I had been in hopes that one day's operations would end the contest and decide who should be the victors on this bloody field; but a ten miles' march over a parched country on dusty roads without water, getting into line of battle in forests with undergrowth, and the more than equal activity and determined courage displayed by the enemy, commanded by one of the ablest generals of the United States army, who threw all possible obstacles in our way that an active mind could suggest, prolonged the battle until I saw with regret the sun sink behind the horizon as the last shot of our sharp-shooters followed the retreating foe into their innermost lines. One hour more of daylight and victory would have soothed our grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep on that lost but not dishonored field. The army slept on its arms within six hundred yards of Corinth, victorious so far."
Alas, how uncertain are our best conclusions! General Van Dorn, in his subsequent report as above, bewails the lack of one hour of daylight at the close of October 3d, 1862. I bewailed that lack of daylight, which would have brought Hamilton's fresh and gallant division on the Confederate left and rear. That hour of daylight was not to be had; and while the regretful Confederate general lay down in his bivouac, I assembled my four division commanders, McKean, Davies, Stanley, and Hamilton, at my headquarters and arranged the dispositions for the fight of the next day. McKean's division was to hold the left, the chief point being College Hill, keeping his troops well under cover. Stanley was to support the line on either side of Battery Robinett, a little three-gun redan with a ditch five feet deep. Davies was to extend from Stanley's right north-easterly across the fiat to Battery Powell, a similar redan on the ridge east of the Purdy road. Hamilton was to be on Davies's right with a brigade, and the rest in reserve on the common ridge and out of sight from the west. Colonel J. K. Mizner with his cavalry was to watch and guard our flanks and rear from the enemy, and well and effectively did his four gallant regiments perform that duty. As the troops had been on the move since the night of October 2d, and had fought all day of the 3d (which was so excessively hot that we were obliged to send water around in wagons), it became my duty to visit their lines and see that the weary troops were surely in position.
I returned to my tent at three o'clock in the morning of October 4th, after having seen everything accomplished and the new line in order. It was about a mile in extent and close to the edge of the north side of the town. About 4 o'clock I lay down. At half-past 4 the enemy opened with
a six-gun battery. Our batteries, replying, soon silenced it, but I had no time for breakfast. The troops got very little. They had not been allowed to build fires during the night, and were too tired to intrench.
The morning opened clear and soon grew to be hot. It must have been ninety-four degrees in the shade. The enemy began to extend his infantry line across the north of the town. I visited the lines and gave orders to our skirmishers to fall back the moment it was seen that the enemy was developing a line of battle. About 8 o'clock his left, having crossed the Mobile and Ohio railroad, got into position behind a spur of table land, to reach which they had moved by the flank for about half a mile. When they began to advance in line of battle they were not over three hundred yards distant.
I told McKean on the left to be very watchful of his front lest the enemy should turn his left, and directed General Stanley to hold the reserve of his command ready either to help north of the town or to aid McKean if required. I visited Battery Robinett and directed the chief of artillery, Colonel Lothrop, to see to the reserve artillery, some batteries of which were parked in the public square of the town; then the line of Davies's division, which was in nearly open ground with a few logs, here and there, for breast-works, and then on his extreme right Sweeny's brigade, which had no cover save a slight ridge, on the south-west slope of which, near the crest, the men were lying down. Riding along this line, I observed the Confederate forces emerging from the woods west of the railroad and crossing the open ground toward the Purdy road. Our troops lying on the ground could see the flags of the enemy and the glint of the sunlight on their bayonets. It was about 9 o'clock in the morning. The air was still and fiercely hot. Van Dorn says the Confederate preparations for the morning were:
"That Hébert, on the left, should mask part of his own division on the left, placing Cabell's brigade en echelon on the left--Cabell having been detached from Maury's division for that purpose, move Armstrong's cavalry brigade across the Mobile and Ohio road, and, if possible, to get some of his artillery in position across the road. In this order of battle, Hebert was to attack, swinging his left flank toward Corinth, and advance down the Purdy ridge. On the right, Lovell, with two brigades in line of battle and one in reserve, with Jackson's cavalry to the right, was ordered to await the attack on his left, feeling his way with sharp-shooters until Hébert was heavily engaged with the enemy. Maury was to move at the same time quickly to the front directly at Corinth; Jackson to burn the railroad bridge over the Tuscumbia during the night."
The left of General Van Dorn's attack was to have begun earlier, but the accident of Hébert's sickness prevented. The Confederates, from behind a spur of the Purdy ridge, advanced splendidly to the attack The unfavorable line occupied by Davies's division made the resistance on that front inadequate. The troops gave way; the enemy pursued; but the cross-fire from the Union batteries on our right soon thinned their ranks. Their front line was broken, and the heads of their columns melted away. Some of the enemy's scattered line got into the edge of the town; a few into the reserve artillery, which led to the impression that they had captured forty pieces of artillery. But they were soon driven out by Stanley's reserve, and fled, taking nothing away.
At this time, while going to order Hamilton's division into action on the enemy's left, I saw the L-shaped porch of a large cottage packed full of
Captain George A. Williams, 1st U. S. Infantry, who commanded the siege artillery, says in his report:
"About 9:30 or 10 A. M. the enemy were observed in the woods north of the town forming in line, and they soon made their appearance, charging toward the town. As soon as our troops were out of the line of fire of my battery, we opened upon them with two 30-pounder Parrott guns and one 8-inch howitzer, which enfiladed their Line (aided by Maurice's battery and one gun on the right of Battery Robinett, which bore on that part of the town), and continued our fire until the enemy were repulsed and had regained the wood.
"During the time the enemy were being repulsed from the town my attention was drawn to the left side of the battery by the firing from Battery Robinett, where I saw a column advancing to storm it. After advancing a short distance they were repulsed, but immediately re-formed, and, storming the work, gained the ditch, but were repulsed. During this charge eight of the enemy, having placed a handkerchief on a bayonet and calling to the men in the battery not to shoot them, surrendered, and were allowed to come into the fort.
"They then re-formed, and, re-storming, carried the
ditch and the outside of the work, the supports having fallen a short
the rear in slight disorder. The men of the 1st U. S. Infantry, after
been driven from their guns (they manned the siege guns), resorted to
muskets, and were firing from the inside of the embrasures at the enemy
the outside, a distance of about ten feet intervening: but the rebels
gained the top of the work, our men fell back into the angle of the
as they had been directed to do in such an emergency. Two shells were
from Battery Williams into Battery Robinett, one bursting on the top of
and the other near the right edge. In the meanwhile the 11th Missouri
(in reserve) changed front, and, aided by the 43d and 63d Ohio
with the 27th Ohio Volunteers on their right, gallantly stormed up to
right and left of the battery. driving the enemy before them."--
Confederates. I ordered Lieutenant Lorenzo D. Immell, with two field-pieces, to give them grape and canister. After one round, only the dead and dying were left on the porch. Reaching Hamilton's division I ordered him to send Sullivan's brigade forward. It moved in line of battle in open ground a little to the left of Battery Powell. Before its splendid advance the scattered enemy, who were endeavoring to form a line of battle, about 1 P. M. gave way and went back into the woods, from which they never again advanced.
Meanwhile there had been terrific fighting at Battery Robinett. The roar of artillery and musketry for two or three hours was incessant. Clouds of
smoke filled the air and obscured the sun. I witnessed the first charge of the enemy on this part of the line before I went over to Hamilton, The first repulse I did not see because the contestants were clouded in smoke. It was an assault in column. There were three or four assaulting columns of regiments, probably a hundred yards apart. The enemy's left-hand column had tried to make its way down into the low ground to the right of Robinett, but did not make much progress. The other two assaulting columns fared better, because they were on the ridge where the fallen timber was scarcer. I ordered the 27th Ohio and 11th Missouri to kneel in rear of the right of Robinett, so as to get out of range of the enemy's fire, and the moment he had exhausted himself to charge with the bayonet [see p. 759]. The third assault was made just as I was seeing Sullivan into the fight. I saw the enemy come upon the ridge while Battery Robinett was belching its fire at them. After the charge had failed I saw the 27th Ohio and the 11th Missouri chasing them with bayonets.
The head of the enemy's main column reached within a few feet of Battery Robinett, and Colonel Rogers, who was leading it, colors in hand, dismounted, planted a flag-staff on the bank of the ditch, and fell there, shot by one of our drummer-boys, who, with a pistol, was helping to defend Robinett. I was told that Colonel Rogers was the fifth standard-bearer who had fallen in that last desperate charge. It was about as good fighting on the part of the Confederates as I ever saw. The columns were plowed through and through by our shot, but they steadily closed up and moved forward until they were forced back.
Just after this last assault I heard for the first time the word "ranch." Passing over the field on our left, among the dead and dying, I saw leaning against the root of a tree a wounded lieutenant of an Arkansas regiment who had been shot through the foot. As I offered him some water he said, "Thank you, General; one of your men just gave me "Whose troops are you?" He replied, "Cabell's." I said,
"It was pretty hot fighting here." He answered, "Yes, General, you licked us good, but we gave you the best we had in the ranch."
Before the enemy's first assault on Robinett, I inspected the woods toward our left where I knew Lovell's division to be. I said to Colonel Joseph A. Mower, afterward commander of the Seventeenth Army Corps, and familiarly known as "Fighting Joe Mower": "Colonel, take the men now on the skirmish line, and find out what Lovell is doing." He replied, "Very well, General." As he was turning away I added, "Feel them, but don't get into their fingers." He answered significantly: "I'll feel them !" Before I left my position Mower had entered the woods, and soon I heard a tremendous crash of musketry in that direction. His skirmishers fell back into the fallen timber, and the adjutant reported to me: "General, I think the enemy have captured Colonel Mower; I think he is killed." Five hours later when we captured the enemy's field- hospitals, we found that Colonel Mower had been shot in the back of the neck and taken prisoner. Expressing my joy at his safety, he showed that he knew he had been unjustly reported to me the day before as intoxicated, by saying: "Yes, General, but if they had reported me for being 'shot in the neck' today instead of yesterday, it would have been correct."
About 2 o'clock we found that the enemy did not intend to make another attack. Faint from exhaustion I sought the shade of a tree, from which point I saw three bursts of smoke and said to my staff, " They have blown up some ammunition wagons, and are going to retreat. We must push them." I was all the more certain of this, because, having failed, a good commander like Van Dorn would use the utmost dispatch in putting the forests between him and his pursuing foe, as well as to escape the dangers to him which might arise from troops coming from Bolivar.
Even at this distant time memory lingers on the numerous incidents of distinguished bravery displayed by officers and men who fought splendidly on the first day, when we did not know what the enemy was going to do. Staff as well as line officers distinguished themselves while in action. The first day my presence was required on the main line, and the fighting in front of that did not so much come under my eye, but on the second day I was everywhere on the line of battle. Temple Clark of my staff was shot through the breast. My sabre-tasche strap was cut by a bullet, and my gloves were stained with the blood of a staff-officer wounded at my side. An alarm spread that I was killed, but it was soon stopped by my appearance on the field.
Satisfied that the enemy was retreating, I ordered Sullivan's command to push him with a heavy skirmish line, and to keep constantly feeling them. I rode along the lines of the commands, told them that, having been moving and fighting for three days and two nights, I knew they required rest, but that they could not rest longer than was absolutely necessary. I directed them to proceed to their camps, provide five days' rations, take some needed rest, and be ready early next morning for the pursuit.
General McPherson, sent from Jackson with five good regiments to help us, arrived and bivouacked in the public square a little before sunset. Our pursuit of the enemy was immediate and vigorous, but the darkness of the night and the roughness of the country, covered with woods and thickets, made movement impracticable by night and slow and difficult by day. General McPherson's brigade of fresh troops with a battery was ordered to start at daylight and follow the enemy over the Chewalla road, and Stanley's and Davies's divisions to support him. McArthur, with all of McKean's division except Crocker's brigade, and with a good battery and a battalion of cavalry, took the route south of the railroad toward Pocahontas; McKean followed on this route with the rest of his divisl's cavalry; Hamilton followed McKean with his entire force.
The enemy took the road to Davis's Bridge on the Hatchie, by way of Pocahontas. Fortunately General Hurlbut, finding that he was not going to be attacked at Bolivar, had been looking in our direction with a view of succoring us, and now met the enemy at that point [Hatchie Bridge]. General Ord, arriving there from Jackson, Tennessee, assumed command and drove back
the head of the enemy's column. This was a critical time for the Confederate forces; but the reader will note that a retreating force, knowing where it has to go and having to look for nothing except an attack on its rear, always moves with more freedom than a pursuing force. This is especially so where the country is covered with woods and thickets, and the roads are narrow. Advancing forces always have to feel their way for fear of being ambushed.
The speed made by our forces from Corinth during the 5th was not to my liking, but with such a commander as McPherson in the advance, I could not doubt that it was all that was possible. On the 6th better progress was made. From Jonesborough, on October 7th, I telegraphed General Grant:
"Do not, I entreat you, call Hurlbut back; let him send away his wounded. It surely is easier to move the sick and wounded than to remove both. I propose to push the enemy, so that we need but the most trifling guards behind us. Our advance is beyond Ruckersville. Hamilton will seize the Hatchie crossing on the Ripley road tonight. A very intelligent, honest young Irishman, an ambulance driver, deserted from the rebels, says that they wished to go together to railroad near Tupelo, where they will meet the nine thousand exchanged prisoners, but he says they are much scattered and demoralized. They have much artillery."
From the same place, at midnight, after learning from the front that McPherson was in Ripley, I telegraphed General Grant as follows:
"GENERAL: Yours 8:30 P. M. received. Our troops occupy Ripley. I most deeply dissent from your views as to the manner of pursuing. We have defeated, routed, and demoralized the army which holds the Lower Mississippi Valley. We have the two railroads leading down toward the Gulf through the most productive parts of the State, into which we can now pursue them with safety. The effect of our return to old position will be to pen them up in the only corn country they have west of Alabama, including the Tuscumbia Valey, and to permit them to recruit their forces, advance and occupy their old ground, reducing us to the occupation of a defensive position, barren and worthless, with a long front, over which they can harass us until bad weather prevents an effectual advance except on the railroads, when time, fortifications,
and rolling stock will again render them superior to us. Our force, including what you have with Hurlbut, will garrison Corinth and Jackson, and enables us to push them. Our advance will cover even Holly Springs, which would be ours when we want it. All that is needful is to continue pursuing and whip them. We have whipped, and should now push them to the wall and capture all the rolling stock of their railroads. Bragg's army alone, west of the Alabama River, and occupying Mobile, could repair the damage we have it in our power to do them. If, after considering these matters, you still consider the order for my return to Corinth expedient, I will obey it and abandon the chief fruits of a victory, but, I beseech you, bend everything to push them while they are broken and hungry, weary and ill-supplied. Draw everything possible from Memphis to help move on Holly Springs, and let us concentrate. Appeal to the governors of the States to rush down some twenty or thirty new regiments to hold our rear, and we can make a triumph of our start."
As it was, Grant telegraphed to Halleck at 9 A. M. the next day, October 8th:
"Rosecrans has followed rebels to Ripley. Troops from Bolivar will occupy Grand Junction tomorrow, with reenforcements rapidly sent on from the new levies. I can take everything on the Mississippi Central road. I ordered Rosecrans back last night, but he was so averse to returning that I have directed him to remain still until you can be heard from."
Again on the same day, October 8, Grant telegraphed to Halleck:
"Before telegraphing you this morning for reenforcements to follow up our victories I ordered General Rosecrans to return. He showed such reluctance that I consented to allow him to remain until you could be heard from if further reenforcements could be had. On reflection I deem it idle to pursue further without more preparation, and have for the third time ordered his return."
This was early in October. The weather was cool, and the roads in prime order. The country along the Mississippi Central to Grenada, and especially below that place, was a corn country--a rich farming country--and the corn was ripe. If Grant had not stopped us, we could have gone to Vicksburg. My
judgment was to go on, and with the help suggested we could have done so. Under the pressure of a victorious force the enemy were experiencing all the weakening effects of a retreating army, whose means of supplies and munitions are always difficult to keep in order. We had Sherman at Memphis with two divisions, and we had Hurlbut at Bolivar with one division and John A. Logan at Jackson, Tennessee, with six regiments. With these there was nothing to save Mississippi from our grasp. We were about six days' march from Vicksburg, and Grant could have put his force through to it with my column as the center one of pursuit. Confederate officers told me afterward that they never were so scared in their lives as they were after the defeat before Corinth.
I have thus given the facts of the fight at Corinth, the immediate pursuit, the causes of the return, and, as well, the differing views of the Federal commanders in regard to the situation. Let the judgments of the future be formed upon the words of impartial history.
In a general order announcing the results of the battle to my command, I stated that we killed and buried 1423 officers and men of the enemy, including some of their most distinguished officers. Their wounded at the usual rate would exceed 5000. We took 2268 prisoners, among whom were 137 field-officers, captains, and subalterns.* We captured 3300 stand of small-arms, 14 stand of colors, 2 pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. We pursued his retreating column forty miles with all arms, and with cavalry sixty miles. Our loss was 355 killed, 1841 wounded, 324 captured or missing.
In closing his report General Van Dorn said:
"A hand-to-hand contest was being enacted in the very yard of General Rosecrans's headquarters and in the streets of the town. The heavy guns were silenced, and all seemed to be about ended when a heavy fire from fresh troops from Iuka, Burnsville, and Rienzi, who had succeeded in reaching Corinth, poured into our thinned ranks. Exhausted from loss of sleep, wearied from hard marching and fighting, companies and regiments without officers, our troops--let no one censure them--gave way. The day was lost. . . The attempt at Corinth has failed, and in consequence I am condemned and have been superseded in my command. In my zeal for my country I may have ventured too far without adequate means, and I bow to the opinion of the people whom I serve. Yet I feel that if the spirits of the gallant dead, who now lie beneath the batteries of Corinth, see and judge the motives of men' they do not rebuke me, for them is no sting in my conscience, nor does retrospection admonish me of error or of a reckless disregard of their valued lives."**
And General Price says in his report:
"The history of this war contains no bloodier page, perhaps, than that which will record this fiercely contested battle. The strongest expressions fall short of my admiration of the gallant conduct of the officers and men under my command. Words cannot add luster to the fame they have acquired through deeds of noble daring which, living through future time, will shed about every man, officer and soldier, who stood to his arms through this struggle, a halo of glory as imperishable as it is brilliant. They have won to their sisters and daughters the distinguished
*The official Confederate reports make their loss 505 killed, 2150 wounded, 2133 missing.-- EDITORS.
**The charges against General Van Dorn (of neglect
and of cruel and improper treatment of his officers and soldiers) were
by a Court of inquiry, which unanimously voted them
honor, set before them by a general of their love and admiration upon the event of an-impending battle upon the same field, of the proud exclamation, 'My brother, father, was at the great battle of Corinth.'"*
* Reference is doubtless made here to the address of General Albert Sidney Johnston to the soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi on the eve of the battle of Shiloh, April 3d, 1862.---EDITORS.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT CORINTH, MISS.
October 2d and 4th, 1862.
The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed: w for wounded: m w for mortally wounded: m for captured or missing : c for captured.
THE UNION FORCES.
ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI.--Major-General William S. Rosecrans.
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. David S. Stanley. Staff loss: w, 1.
First Brigade. Col. John W. Fuller: 27th Ohio, Maj. Zephaniah S. Spaulding; 39th Ohio, Col. A. W. Gilbert, Lieut.-Col. Edward F. Noyes; 43d Ohio, Col. J. L. Kirby Smith (m w), Lieut.-Col. Wager Swayne: 63d Ohio, Col. John W. Sprague; Jenks's Co., Ill. Cav., Capt. Albert Jenks; 3d Mich. Battery. Lieut. Carl A. Lamberg; 8th Wis. Battery (section), Lieut. John D. McLean; F, 2d U. S. Art'y Capt. Thomas D. Maurice. Brigade loss: k, 55; w, 256; m, 11=321. Second Brigade, Col. Joseph A. Mower (w): 26th Ill., Maj. Robert A. Gillmore; 47th Ill., Col. William A. Thrush (k), Capt. Hannan Andrews (w), Capt. Samuel R. Baker; 5th Minn., Col. Lucius F. Hub- bard; 11th Mo., Maj. Andrew J. Weber; 8th Wis. Lieut.-Col. George W. Robbins (w), Maj. John W. Jefferson (w), Capt. William B. Britton; 2d Iowa Battery, Capt. Nelson T. Spoor. Brigade loss: k, 48; w, 248; m, 26=322.
THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles S. Hamilton. Escort. C, 5th Mu. Cavalry. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Napoleon B. Buford: 48th Ind., Lieut. Col. De Witt C. Rugg (w), Lieut. James W. Archer; 59th Ind., Col. Jesse I. Alexander; 5th Iowa, Col. Charles L. Matthies; 4th Minn., Col. John B. Sanborn; 26th Mo., Lieut.-Col. John H. Holman (w); M, 1st Mo. Art'y, Lieut. Junius W. MacMurray; 11th Ohio Battery, Lieut. Henry M. Neil. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 48= 55. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Jeremiah C. Sullivan, Col. Samuel A. Holmes: 56th Ill. Lieut.-Col. Green B. Raum; 10th Iowa, Maj. Nathaniel McCalla; 17th lowa, Maj. Jabez Banbury; 10th Mo., Col. Samuel A. Holmes, Maj. Leonidas Horney; E, 24th Mo. Capt. Lafayette M. Rice; 80th Ohio, Maj., Richard Lanning (k). Capt. David Skeels; 6th Wis. Battery, Capt. Henry Dillon; 12th Wis. Battery, Lieut, Lorenzo D. Immell. Brigade loss: k, 34; w, 227; m, 15= 276.
CAVALRY DIVISION, Col. John K. Mizner. (Division organized into two brigades. Col. Edward Hatch commanding the First and Col. Albert L. Lee the Second.) 7th Ill. Lieut.-Col. Edward Prince; 11th Ill., Col. Robert G. Ingersoll: 2d Iowa, Maj. Datus E. Coon; 7th Kan., Lieut.-Col. T. P. Herrick; 3d Mich. Capt. Lymar G. Willcox: 5th Ohio (4 co's). Capt. Joseph C. Smith, Division loss: k, 5; w, 17; m, 14=36.
UNATTACHED: 64th Ill. (Yates's Sharp-shooters), Capt. John Morrill; 1st U. S. (6 co's--siege artillery), Capt. G. A. Williams, Unattached loss: k, 16; w, 53; m, 15=84. ARMY OF WEST TENNESSEE.
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Davies. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Pleasant A. Hackleman (k), Col. Thomas W. Sweeny : 52d Ill., Col. Thomas W. Sweeny, Lieut. Col. John S. Wilcox; 2d Iowa. Col. James Baker (m w), Lieut.-Col. Noah W. Mills (m w), Maj. James B. Weaver; 7th Iowa, Col. Elliott W. Rice; Union Brigade (composed of detachments of 58th Ill., and 8th, 12th, and 14th Iowa), Lieut.-Col. John P. Coulter. Brigade loss : k, 49; w, 318; m, 36=403. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Richard J. Oglesby (w), Col. August Mersy: 9th Ill., Col. August Mersy; 12th Ill., Col. Augustus L. Chetlain; 22d Ohio, Maj. Oliver Wood; 81st Ohio. Col. Thomas Morton. Brigade loss: k, 38; w, 222; m, 73=333. Third Brigade, Col. Silas D. Baldwin (w). Col. John V. Du Bois: 7th Ill. Col. Andrew J. Babcock; 50th Ill., Lieut.-Col. William Swarthout; 57th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Frederick J. Hurlbut. Maj. Eric Forsse. Brigade loss: k, 21; w, 115; m, 46 = 182. Artillery, Maj. George H. Stone: D, 1st Mo. Capt. Henry Richardson; H, 1st Mo., Capt. Frederick Welker; I, 1st Mo., Lieut. Charles H. Thurber; K, 1st Mo., Lieut. Charles Green, Artillery loss: k, 6; w, 29=35. Unat- tached: 14th Mo. (Western Sharp-shooters), Col. Patrick E. Burke. Loss: k, 6; w, 14; m, 3=23.
SIXTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. McKean. First Brigade, Col. Benjamin Allen, Brig.-Gen. John McArthur: 21st Mo. Col. David Moore, Maj. Edwin Moore; 16th Wis., Maj. Thomas Reynolds; 17th Wis., Col. John L. Doran. Brigade loss: k, 11; w, 67; m, 23=101. Second Brigade, Col. John M. Oliver: Indpt. Co., Ill. Cav., Capt. William Ford; 15th Mich.,n McDermott; 18th Mo. (4 co's), Capt. Jacob R. Ault; 14th Wis., Col. John Hancock; 18th Wis., Col. Ga- briel Bouck, Brigade loss: k, 45; w, 108; m, 38=191. Third Brigade, Col. Marcellus M. Crocker: 11th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. William Hall; 13th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. John Shane; 15th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. William W. Belknap, Col. Hugh T. Reid; 16th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Addison H. San- ders (w), Maj. William Purcell. Brigade loss: k, 14; w, 111; m, 24=149. Artillery, Capt. Andrew Hicken- looper: F, 2d III., Lieut. J. W. Mitchell; 1st Minn., Lieut. G. F. Cooke; 3d Ohio (section), Capt. Emil Munch, Sergt. Sylvanus Clark; 5th Ohio, Lieut. B. S.
Matson: 10th Ohio, Capt. H. B. White, Artillery loss: w, 8.
Total Union loss: killed, 355: wounded, 1841: captured missing, 324=2520.
The effective strength of Rosecrans's command is not specifically stated in the " Official Records." According to the return for September 30th, 1862, his "aggregate present for duty" was 23,077 (vol. XVII., Pt. II.,p, 246). Probably not less than twenty thousand participated in the battle. On page 172, Vol. XVII., Pt. I., General Rosecrans estimates the Confederate strength at nearly forty thousand and says that was almost double his own numbers.
THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.
ARMY OF WEST TENNESSEE.--- Major-General Earl Van Dorn.
PRICE'S CORPS OR ARMY OF THE WEST.---Major- General Sterling Price.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Louis Hébert, Brig.-Gen. Martin E. Green. First Brigade, Col. Elijah Gates: 16th Ark.,---: 2d Mo., Col. Francis M. Cockrell; 3d Mo., Col. James A. Pritchard (w): 5th Mo.,---: 1st Mo, Cav. (dismounted), Lieut.-Cuo. W. D. Maupin: Mo. Battery, Captain William Wade, Brigade loss: k, 53; w, 129; m, 92=477. Second Brigade. Col. W. Bruce Colbert: 14th Ark.,---: 17th Ark., Lieut.-Col. John Griffith: 3d La., -------: 40th Miss. ----; 1st Tex. Legion, Lieut.-Col. E. R. Hawkins. 3d Tex. Cav. (dismounted),---; Clark's (Mo.) Battery. Lieut. J. L. Faris; St. Louis (Mo.) Battery, Capt. William E. Dawson, Brigade loss: k, 11; w, 129; m, 132=272. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Martin E. Green. Col. W. H. Moore (w) : 7th Miss. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. J. S. Terral (w): 43d Miss., Col. W. H. Moore : 4th Mo. Col. A. MacFarlane: 6th Mo., Col. Eugene Erwin (w): 3d Mo. Cav. (dismounted),---; Mo. Battery, Capt. Henry Guibor; Mo. Battery, Capt. John C. Landis. Brigade loss: k, 77; w, 369; m, 302=748. Fourth Brigade, Col. John D. Martin (m w), Col. Robert McLain (w): 37th Ala.; 36th Miss., Col. W. W. Witherspoon: 37th Miss., Col. Robert McLain; 38th Miss. Col. F. W. Adams. (Battery attached to this brigade not identified.) Brigade loss; k, 41; w, 203=244.
MAURY'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Dabney H. Maury. Moore's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Moore: 42d Ala., Col. John W. Portis: 15th Ark., Lieut.-Col. Squire Boone; 23d Ark., Lieut.-Col. A. A. Pennington; 35th Miss., Col. William S. Barry; 2d Tex., Col. W. P. Rogers (k): Mo. Battery. Capt. H. M. Bledsoe. Brigade loss: k, 53; w, 230; m, 1012=1295. Cabell's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William L. Cabell: 18th Ark., Col. John N. Daly (m w): 19th Ark., Col. T. P. Dockery: 20th Ark., Col. H. P. Johnson (k): 21st Ark., Col. Jordan E. Cravens: Ark. Battalion (Jones's),--; Ark. Battalion (Rapley's), Capt. James A. Ashford; Ark. (Appeal) Battery. Lieut. William N. Hogg. Brigade loss: k, 98; w, 323; m, 214= 635. Phifer's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. C. W. Phifer: 3d Ark. Cav. (dismounted), --; 6th Tex. Cav. (dismounted), Col. L. S. Ross; 9th Tex. Cav. (dismounted),--; Stirman's Sharp-shooters. Col. Ras. Stirman: Ark, Battery (McNally's), Lieut. Frank A. Moore. Brigade loss: k, 94; w, 273; m, 200=567. Cavalry (composition probably incomplete), Brig.-Gen. Frank C. Armstrong: 2d Ark., Col. W. F. Slemons: Miss. Reg't, Col. Wirt Adams: 2d Mo., Col. Robert McCulloch, Cavalry loss: w, 2; m, 9=11. Reserve Artillery: Tenn. Battery (Hoxton's), Lieut. Thomas F. Tobin (c): Ala. Battery, Capt. Henry H. Sengstak. Artillery loss: k, 1;
DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI.
FIRST DIVISION. Maj.-Gen. Mansfield Lovell. First Brigade,
Rust: 4th Ala., Battalion, Maj.-- Gibson; 31st Ala., --; 35th Ala.,
A. E. Ashford: 9th Ark., Col. Isaac L. Dunlop; 3d Ky., Col. A. P.
7th Ky., Col. Ed. Crossland; Miss. (Hudson), Battery., Lieut.
R. Sweaney. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 117; m, 83= 225. Second Brigade
not fully reported), Brig.-Gen. J. B. Villepigue: 33d Miss., Col.
W. Hurst; 39th Miss., Col. W. B. Shelby. Brigade loss: k, 21; w,
m, 71=168. Third Brigade. Brig.-Gen. John S. Bowen : 6th Miss., Col.
Lowry: 15th Miss., Col. M. Farrell: 22d Miss., Capt. J. D. Lester;
Battalion, Capt. C. K. Caruthers: 1st Mo., Lieut.-Col. A. C.
La. (Watson) Battery, Capt. A. A. Bursley, Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 92;
40=160. Cavalry Brigade, Col. W. H. Jackson: 1st Miss., Lieut.- Col. F.
Montgomery: 7th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. J. G. Stocks. Brigade loss: k,1.
La. Zouave Battalion, Maj. L. Dupiere. Loss: k, 2; m, 14=16. Total
loss (including Hatchie Bridge, Oct. 5th): killed, 505; wounded, 2150;
missing, 2183=4838. General Van Dorn says ("Official Records,"
XVII., Pt. I., p. 378): "Field returns at Ripley showed my strength to
about 22,000 men." It is estimated that at least 20,000 were brought
action at Corinth.