Page 160 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE S. THOMAS

On November 7^th General Grant learned that Bragg had sent Longstreet's corps into East Tennessee, to wrest Knoxville from General Burnside, and capture his army or drive it back into Kentucky. As no direct assistance from Chattanooga was then possible Thomas was ordered to take the offensive immediately. The instructions given him embraced objects and methods.

HEADQ'RS MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI, Chattanooga, Tenn., November 7, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Commanding Department of the Cumberland.

GENERAL :—News just received from Major-General Burnside, taken in connection with information given by a deserter just in, whose statement you have, is of such a nature that it becomes an imperative duty for your forces to draw the attention of the enemy from Burnside to your own front. Already the enemy have attacked Burnside's most easterly garrison of two regiments and a battery, capturing the battery and about half of the forces. This corroborates the statement of the Georgia lieutenant as to the designs and present movements of the enemy.

I deem the best movement to attract the enemy to be an attack on the northern end of Missionary Ridge with all the force you can bring to bear against it, and when that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if possible, the enemy's line of communications between Dalton and Cleveland. Rations should be ready to issue a sufficiency to last four days, the moment Missionary Ridge is in our possession—rations to be carried in haversacks.

Where there are not horses to move the artillery, mules must be taken from the teams or horses from ambulances, or if necessary, officers dismounted and their horses taken. In view of so many troops having been taken from this valley and from Lockout, Howard's corps of Hooker's command can be used in this movement. Immediate preparations should be made to carry these directions into execution. The movement should not be made one moment later than tomorrow morning.

You having been over this country and having had a better opportunity of studying it than myself, the details are left to you.

I am General,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.
 
 

Page 161 - ATTACK POSTPONED

As soon as General Thomas received this order he sent for General W. F. Smith, and the following quotation from the letter of General Smith to the writer, under date of April /th, 1882, gives the conference and its result:

General Thomas said, that taking into account his numbers and condition, and the numbers and situation of the enemy, that the carrying out of the order meant disaster to us, and that I must endeavor to get the order countermanded, and wait for Sherman's army to arrive.

After a somewhat protracted conversation, I suggested to him that he should go up on the right bank of the river with me opposite to the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and make an examination, to which he assented, and we went up as far as the mouth of Chickamauga Creek.

From there we made a scrutiny of the character of the ground and the position of the right of the enemy on the ridge as marked by their works and smokes, and it was evident that General Thomas, with his command, could not turn the right of Bragg's army without uncovering Chattanooga. We then returned, and I went to the headquarters of General Grant, and reported the result of the reconnaissance, and told him in my judgment it was absolutely necessary to wait for the arrival of Sherman's army before attempting any movement.

The order was at once countermanded.

In his report and other official utterances, General Grant gave his reasons for this action. In his report he thus referred to his order and its revocation:

Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front, and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tenn., evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge, with a view to carrying it, and threatening the enemy's communications with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the seventh of November. After a thorough reconnaissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces, and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga; and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present, to contend against superior forces of the enemy, until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation.
 
 

Page 162 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

In a despatch to General Halleck, November 21^st, General Grant again referred to this projected movement:

I ordered an attack here two weeks ago, but it was impossible to move artillery. Now Thomas' chief of artillery says he has to borrow teams from Sherman to move a part of his artillery to where it is to be used. Sherman has used almost superhuman efforts to get up even at this time, and his force is really the only one that I can move. Thomas can take about one gun to each battery, and can go as far with infantry as his men can carry rations to keep them and bring them back. I have never felt such restlessness before as I have at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of the Cumberland. The quartermaster-general states that the loss of animals here will exceed ten thousand. Those left are scarcely able to carry themselves.

Professor Coppee, General Grant's first biographer, makes a statement in accord with the passage above quoted:

His (Grant's) first idea was to attack Missionary Ridge without delay, and of this plan he informed Burnside, telling him to hold Knoxville to the last extremity. But a sober second-thought, suggested by that calm prudence, which is one of his best characteristics, prompted him to wait the arrival of Sherman and his army, and thus by skill and carefulness to leave little to chance. *

Had this projected movement been subsequently represented in history in harmony with these quotations, no further reference to it would be necessary in this Biography. But as Badeau has made statements so radically different, their examination is imperative. This author states :

But Thomas announced that he had no horses to move his artillery, and declared himself entirely and absolutely unable to move until Sherman should arrive to cooperate. * * * * Nevertheless, Thomas' delay was a great disappointment. A prompt movement on the part of that commander would undoubtedly have had the effect to recall Longstreet; but now it was possible that the troops sent into East Tennessee might succeed in overthrowing the occupation which was so important. *

* Grant and his Campaigns, p. 220.
 
 

Page 163 - SELF-RELIANT

To emphasize this view of the case, the same author, in closing his account of the battle of Nashville, thus refers to the operations at Chattanooga, in connection with his idea of Thomas' character:

Grant knew all this well. The same traits which were exhibited in the Nashville campaign he had seen evinced at Chattanooga a year before. The same provoking, obstinate delay before the battle, the same splendid, victorious, irresistible energy afterwards. He believed, indeed, in Thomas, more than Thomas did in himself. The subordinate always shrank from responsibility." +

He supports the assumption expressed in the last of these sentences by a quotation from one of General Sherman's letters to himself:

"Thomas always shrank from supreme command and consequent responsibility."++

These positive statements are utterly erroneous. Thomas never shrank from supreme command unless the conditions of holding it were repugnant to him. He never shunned responsibility when corresponding independence and adequate resources were given to him. No man ever believed in Thomas more fully than Thomas believed in himself. A more self-reliant general never commanded in battle, a more symmetrical soldier never lived. His forcefulness in battle was the offspring of the same traits of character that made him reluctant to fight when he could not command adequate resources, or when additional preparations would magnify success. This illogical jumble of praise and disparagement evinces an utter misapprehension of the character and generalship of Thomas.

* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant. Vol. 1. pp. 463, 464.

+ Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant. Vol. III., pp. 279, 280.

++ Ibid. p. 280.
 
 

Page 164 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

But General Thomas did not delay on the 7th of November. He simply convinced General Grant that the operations which he had ordered were utterly impracticable. There was no room for delay since Grant countermanded the movement before the time for its execution.

Badeau has been exceedingly rash in asserting so positively, that " a prompt movement " on the part of Thomas "would undoubtedly have recalled Longstreet." If he has done this by authority the case is better for himself, but worse for General Grant. In the light of the subsequent battle at Chattanooga, a careful historian, critic, or general would be reluctant to put it beyond doubt that the execution of Grant's order of the 7^th, would have recalled Longstreet from East Tennessee. His recall was only one of the objects announced for attainment by the execution of this order. General Grant's objects, then, were identical with those proposed for the subsequent battle, which was fought upon conditions radically different from those existing on the 7th ; and although in that action all the other objects named were attained, Longstreet was not recalled from East Tennessee.

On the 25^th of November General Sherman led a larger force against the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, without success, than General Thomas could have safely. taken from Chattanooga on the 8^th. And when Sherman made his attack there were two other offensive columns threatening the enemy's centre and left flank. On the 8th, General Thomas had five divisions in Chattanooga, three in Lockout Valley and one between that valley and Bridgeport. Had Howard's corps been withdrawn from Hooker, the latter would have had only one small division with which to guard several miles of the most exposed part of the vital communications with Bridgeport. Besides it would have been difficult to determine how many of the remaining seven divisions could be safely withdrawn from the long line of fortifications, stretching
 
 

Page 165 - DANGEROUS POSSIBILITIES

around Chattanooga from river to river. And when the attacking column, composed of four, five or six divisions, had reached the northern end of Missionary Ridge, Thomas' army would have to be divided into four parts, and the parts so widely separated that direct cooperation would have been impossible.

General Bragg had eight divisions on his line after the departure of Longstreet's corps, and each of these, except the one on the summit of Lockout Mountain, was nearer Chattanooga and Lookout Valley than the point designated for Thomas' attack. Grant's plan of operations opened up several promising possibilities to the enemy. , Bragg could have massed his forces to resist Thomas, interposed his army between Thomas and Chattanooga, overwhelmed Hooker in Lookout Valley, or stormed the fortifications of Chattanooga, had they been held by a slender line of troops. In fine, the Confederate army could have acted as a unit against the smaller National army in fragments. Bragg would have had choice of offense or defense, with greatly superior advantages for either. If, therefore, the appointments of the Army of the Cumberland had been complete. General Thomas' reluctance to fight the enemy on the 8th of November would have been justified by other circumstances.

In view of these facts, and in the light of the battle, fought soon after, there are doubtless many men having some knowledge of war and of history, who will not admit the truth of Badeau's assumption that the action prescribed for Thomas by General Grant's order of November 7^th would have recalled Longstreet. This result would have been improbable, even if a successful attack had been made by Thomas on the northern end of Missionary Ridge, since, according to the plan of operations, the dislodgement of the enemy was to be supplemented by the rupture of the communications between Bragg and East Tennessee, and by throwing the National army west of his communications with Dalton.
 
 

Page 166 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Badeau has not explained the discrepancy between his own statements and those of General Grant. It is, therefore, left to conjecture whether this disagreement has resulted from inexcusably careless writing, misapprehension of the facts, or malign purpose on the part of Badeau, or a change in the views of General Grant since the publication of his official utterances.

During the ten days next following the revocation of General Grant's order preparations for offensive operations were prosecuted with great vigor.

On the 27^th of October General Thomas was appointed a brigadier general in the United States Army. This was not a prompt recognition of his services in the battle of Chickamauga. To have full force, a complimentary promotion must tread on the heel of the achievements which make it appropriate and necessary.
 
 

Page 167
 
 

The features of General Grant's final plan of battle at Chattanooga, Tennessee, were definitely set forth in his instructions to Generals Thomas and Sherman on November 18^th , 1863. These generals were directed to prepare for battle on the 21^st. The following letter indicates the plan of the commanding general :

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Chattanooga, Tenn., Nov. 18, 1863

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,

Commanding Department: and Army of the Cumberland:

GENERAL:- All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday morning at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan you understand, is for Sherman, with his force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of the Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to carry the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate a force against him. You will cooperate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division, in readiness to move wherever
 

 Page 168 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

ever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible, on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort will then be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well towards the north end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible.

The junction once formed, and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies, by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.

Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division, and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All the troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in their haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted, or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the engineering department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for crossing your infantry and artillery over Citico Creek.

I am, General,

Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Major General U. S. V. Commanding.
 
 

The plan thus defined was a modification of a previous one which had been formed before General Sherman arrived at Chattanooga, and which involved an attack upon Lookout Mountain. This attack was abandoned in consequence of a reconnoissance on the north bank of the river by Generals Grant, Thomas, Sherman, W. F. Smith, chief engineer, and J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery of the Army of the Cumberland, which had developed the fact that the northern heights of Missionary Ridge were not occupied by the enemy in force. The reason for this change of plan is thus given in General Grant's official report:
 
 

Page 169 - GRANTS PLAN

Upon further consideration, the great object being to mass all forces possible against one given point, namely. Missionary Ridge, converging toward the northern end of it, it was deemed best to change the original plan so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lockout Mountain,, which would give us Howard's corps of his command to aid in this purpose; and on the l8th the following instructions were given to Thomas. *

This final plan defines but one aggressive movement combining the offensive strength of the armies of Thomas and Sherman. To the latter was given the initiative against the northern heights of Missionary Ridge, and to the former, subsequent cooperation in sweeping the enemy from the ridge. There can be no accurate analysis of this battle that is not based upon General Grant's avowed object of massing all his available forces towards the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, that by Sherman's initial attack and Thomas' subsequent cooperation he might dislodge the enemy and drive him away from his communications. To this object Grant most persistently adhered, even after it was known that the anticipated conditions did not exist. And it is absolutely certain that the actual operations of the battle, other than Sherman's effort " to carry the ridge to about the tunnel" in independent movement, were not indicated in the pre-announced plan of battle. If, as several historians have asserted, General Grant's instructions to his chief subordinates were the history of the battle in outline, the objects and relations of the operations of the actual battle would have been distinctly mentioned in these instructions. But if the only pre-directed movement attempted beyond those that were plainly preparatory, was Sherman's effort to carry the ridge to the tunnel, and this failed, then Grant's pre-announced plan of battle did not give the history of the actual conflict even in outline. It is assumed in this history that the battle of Chattanooga was not fought according to Grant's plan in a single successful movement, beyond those of preparation,
 
 

* These are the instructions given by the order already quoted.
 
 

Page 170 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

and that the influence of General Thomas gave shape to a successful action whose conduct and specific results had not been anticipated by General Grant. During three days, from the 20^th to the 22^nd inclusive, General Grant postponed the battle from day to day, until at last the 24^th became the day fixed for its inauguration. This delay was due to General Sherman's failure, until the 22^nd, to attain, with sufficient forces, his assigned position on the north bank of the Tennessee River. Rain and bad roads had retarded the march of his troops from Bridgeport, and on the 22^nd the parting of the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry arrested two of his divisions in Lookout Valley.

At this juncture General Thomas was ready for battle. He had made all the preliminary movements which had been prescribed for his troops, in time for an earlier action. He had designated Wood's division for the movable column; had sent Jeff. C. Davis' division to report to Sherman; had stationed Howard's corps between the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry and the one at Chattanooga; his artillery had been planted on the heights north of the river, and Colonel Long's brigade* of cavalry had taken position to protect Sherman's left flank, and afterwards to move up the river upon the enemy's communications with Knoxville. Thus far General Thomas had addressed himself earnestly to the execution of General Grant's plan of battle. But upon the announcement of the third postponement of the action he began to make suggestions to General Grant, and urged him to attack the enemy on the 23^rd. He feared that General Bragg would ascertain the plan of sweeping the ridge from the north, and concentrate to defeat it, and he proposed that Howard's corps (the Eleventh) should be used by General Sherman in room of his two divisions in Lookout Valley, and that these divisions and Hooker's force

* This brigade had been sent to Sherman, in compliance with an order from General Grant.
 
 

Page 171 - URGES ATTACK

should be hurled against Bragg's left flank on Lockout Mountain simultaneously with Sherman's attack upon his right on Missionary Ridge. At the time this suggestion was made (Nov. 22^nd,) Bragg's right rested at a point on Missionary Ridge, opposite the left of our entrenched line on the east of Chattanooga and several miles from the northern end of the ridge. He had four divisions on the summit and western slope of Missionary Ridge and on the line across Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Mountain, and had not anticipated the proposed effort of two armies to cooperate against his right flank. Stevenson's division of his army held the summit of Lookout Mountain, and Cheatham's and Walker's the front slope. Had General Grant adopted Thomas' suggestion Sherman would have had five divisions for his initial movement and Thomas would have cooperated with him as prescribed with four, making in all nine divisions, against Bragg's four holding the long line from his right on Missionary Ridge to Lookout Mountain. Had Sherman leaped quickly across the Tennessee on the night of the 22^nd, Thomas would have been ready for cooperation, while only one of the four divisions that resisted Sherman on the 25^th, would have been on Missionary Ridge, and Bragg's right flank would have been found far south of the tunnel. This plan would have given General Hooker four divisions for operations against Bragg's left flank and with the same strategy he would have driven Cheatham's and Walker's divisions from the front of Lookout Mountain and eliminated Stevenson's from the action, as he did on the 24^th. On these conditions a decisive victory would have been won on the 23^rd, General Grant would have thrown into the action, every one of his thirteen divisions of infantry and each of his three columns of attack would have had adequate strength. But Grant yielded to Thomas only so far as to permit him to use for a demonstration against Lookout
 
 

Page 172 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Mountain such forces as might be in Lookout Valley when Sherman should be ready for action, and persisted in delaying another day for Sherman to gather to himself all of his divisions. It is demonstrable that the conditions for executing Grant's plan, with a movement against Lookout Mountain added, were more favorable on the 23^rd than at any other time. The reason given by General Thomas for Hooker's demonstration was that it would at least aid Sherman, even if it did not result in assault, and to aid Sherman was to contribute to the success of the initial and dominant feature of Grant's plan. Thomas' plan for the 23^rd would have assured the most nicely adjusted cooperation of the three attacking columns. As a war problem it offered every factor, or element, essential to a brilliant solution. Bragg held a long line and, consequently, one weak against simultaneous attacks upon flanks and centre, and no one competent to determine the force of the several elements of a war problem will deny that the best conditions that existed during the three days of desultory fighting were present on the 23^rd. Had a general battle been delivered on that day, Bragg would not at last have massed his entire army on Missionary Ridge for final defense. His positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge were exceedingly strong, but his centre in the intervening valley, as he had disposed his forces, was comparatively weak. Under the attack of five divisions on one flank and of four on the other, while there was a central column of four more for cooperation, the enemy's long line would doubtless have quickly crumbled.

The action of the 23^rd was not, however, such as Thomas had suggested. Neither was it such as Grant had planned. In semblance of a turning movement, Sherman had sent Ewing's division to Steven's Gap. To meet this division General Bragg withdrew some of his troops from line, and this step led to the belief in his own army that it was to
 
 

Page 173 - RECONNOISSANCE ORDERED

be withdrawn. This error was reported by deserters to Generals Sheridan and Wood; whereupon General Grant directed Thomas to order a reconnoissance to ascertain the truth or falsity of this report. It did not occur to either Grant or Thomas that this reconnoissance, instituted to ascertain whether or not there was to be a battle, would become the first and ruling departure from Grant's plan. An ordinary operation of this type to solve so simple a problem could not have produced such a result. But General Thomas did not organize an ordinary reconnoissance. He directed General Gordon Granger, commanding the Fourth corps, to put in readiness for action his two divisions then in hand in front of Chattanooga. He also directed General Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth corps, to support these divisions on their right by Baird's division, and ordered General Howard with his corps * to perform a similar office on their left. Five divisions were thus disposed in readiness to utilize any possible developments. Thomas made ample provision for emergencies without having any definite anticipations. It certainly was not expected that a reconnoissance with a definite object would result in the advance of the central divisions nearly a mile toward Missionary Ridge. But preparations were made for a heavy fight, if necessary, to secure the safety of the leading divisions and attain the object specifically mentioned by General Grant. In making ample preparations to attain these objects, General Thomas made it possible to produce a result which had a vital relation to all the successful operations of the battle.

At 12.30 P.M. Wood's division with Sheridan's on its right, dashed forward to a line of hills nearly half-way to Missionary Ridge from the entrenchments east of Chattanooga. The enemy was holding these hills and the intervening low ground, but the onset of the two divisions was
 
 

* This corps had crossed into Chattanooga on the 22^nd.
 
 

Page 174 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

so sudden and resistless, that in an instant the enemy was dislodged. Orchard Knob, the more imposing hill, was covered by Wood's division, and the knolls to the right by Sheridan's. When Thomas saw Wood's flags on the knob, he signaled to him : " You have gained too much to with-draw, hold your position and I will support you," and immediately ordered Howard to move his corps abreast of Wood's left, and Baird to advance his division to Sheridan's right.

At 3 P. M. General Grant sent the following despatch to Washington:

CHATTANOOGA, NOVEMBER 23, 1863-3 P. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:

General Thomas' troops attacked the enemy's left (sic.) at 2 P.M. to-day, and carried his first line of rifle-pits, running over the knoll one thousand two hundred yards in front of Wood's fort and low ridge to the right of it, taking about two hundred prisoners besides killed and wounded. Our loss small. The troops moved under fire with all the precision of veterans on parade. Thomas' troops will entrench themselves and hold their position until daylight, when Sherman will join the attack from the mouth of South Chickamauga, and a decisive battle will be fought.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

This despatch reveals Grant's estimate of this advance of the central line in its relation to Sherman's anticipated movement across the Tennessee during th e following night, and his conjunction with Thomas in fighting a decisive battle the next day. All his communications to Thomas on the 20^th, 21^st and 22^nd, and this despatch to General Halleck, concur in expressing his expectation that Sherman would be ready to attack at daylight of the morning after he should begin to cross the river. And this is an important factor in determining the hypothetical relations of the anticipated operations of the battle as well as in accounting for the actual operations and their results.
 
 

Page 175 - GRANT'S CHANGED PLANS

Referring in his official report to the action of the 23^rd, General Grant said:

" Thomas having done on the twenty-third with his troops in Chattanooga Valley what was intended for the twenty-fourth, bettered and strengthened his advanced positions during the day, and pushed the Eleventh corps forward along the south bank of the Tennessee River across Citico Creek, one brigade of which, with Howard in person, reached Sherman just he had completed the crossing of the river."

It is difficult to harmonize the statement that Thomas did on the 23^rdwhat was intended for the 24^th with General Grant's instructions, which defined Thomas' first movement, with the advance of his forces well toward the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, to form a junction with Sherman. Neither does it agree with the order to Thomas requiring a reconnoissance to ascertain the truth or falsity of the reported withdrawal of Bragg's army. That the advance of the central divisions directly forward was accepted in room of their movement towards the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge is certainly true, but the establishment of a line of battle near Bragg's right flank and center before Sherman's movement was developed, was a radical departure from Grant's plan, and of itself defeated the prescribed cooperation of Thomas with Sherman towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge. When Thomas' central divisions advanced directly forward and entrenched a line, the movement was far from being identical with the one prescribed for them on the 24^th in Grant's plan, since they were then massed on the right towards Rossville rather than on Thomas' left towards Sherman's point of attack. The centre of Wood's division rested on Orchard Knob, which was situated south of east from Fort Wood. On the right of this division were the divisions of Sherman, Baird and Johnson, while on the left were Schurz's and Steinwehr's of the Eleventh corps. The maintenance of this line, therefore, forbade the

Page 176 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

conjunction of Thomas' and Sherman's forces until the latter should carry the summit of Missionary Ridge far south of the tunnel. Yet the impossibility of their conjunction, except on the condition of the abandonment of Thomas' "advanced positions," did not induce General Grant to forego his purpose to initiate his operations for ' the dislodgment of the enemy with Sherman's attack, as defined in his plan of battle, but it did eventually cause him to weaken Thomas to strengthen Sherman.

The advance of the central divisions induced changes also in Bragg's line. When Howard aligned his corps on the left of Wood's division, his left overlapped Bragg's right flank on Missionary Ridge, and led him to believe that Thomas' advance indicated an effort to turn his right flank and capture his depot of supplies at Chickamauga Station in the rear of that flank. He had no knowledge of the purpose to attack his right with forces then in position on the north bank of the Tennessee. But in view of danger to that flank from the forces that had moved toward it and overlapped it, he resolved to strengthen his right at the expense of his left, and during the night of the 23nd extended his line northward by transferring Walker's division from the northern slope of Lookout Mountain to Missionary Ridge.

Had there been a general battle on the 24^th, as Grant anticipated, the conditions would have been somewhat different from those existing on the 23^rd. Sherman had gained one division (Ewing's), but Osterhaus' was still in Lookout Valley, and the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry had again parted. The enemy's force on Lookout Mountain had lost one division. Thomas and Sherman would have had ten divisions for their co-operative attack against five divisions of the enemy on Missionary Ridge, and the line across Chattanooga Valley.

In estimating the wisdom of General Thomas' persistence in moving Hooker's column against Lookout Mountain on
 
 

Page 177 - ORDERS TO HOOKER

the 24^th, the fact that a general decisive battle was expected on that day must be kept in view.

When General Hooker ascertained from Grant's instructions to Thomas that he was to be left in Lockout Valley in command of troops that were to be inactive except in the contingency of fighting on the defensive, he requested General Thomas to permit him to go into the battle with the Eleventh corps. The desired permission was granted, but was afterwards recalled, when Thomas had gained Grant's consent to use for offense the troops in Lookout Valley. This consent was gained on the 22^nd, but no positive assurance was then given that Hooker would be reenforced from Sherman's army; General Thomas nevertheless instructed Hooker to act offensively with Geary's and Cruft's divisions, five brigades in all. General Grant did not consent to the diversion of Osterhaus' division to Hooker until it was certain that it could not join Sherman in time for his movement across the Tennessee River. While the final disposition of this division was still in doubt, Thomas sent the following despatch to Hooker:-

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga, Tenn., Nov. 24-th, 12.30 p. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER, Lockout Valley:-

Intercepted rebel despatches are to the effect that the rebels expect us to attack them on their left in the morning. General commanding desires that you make demonstration early as possible after daybreak on point of Lookout Mountain. General Grant still hopes Woods' division (Osterhaus') will get across to join Sherman, in which case your demonstration will aid Sherman's crossing. If Woods can't cross, you can take the point of Lookout, if your demonstration develops its practicability.

J. J. REYNOLDS, Major-General and Chief of Staff

Later in the morning of the 24^th it was ascertained that Osterhaus' division could not cross in time to join Sherman before his projected attack at daylight, and then General
 
 

Page 178 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Grant consented that it should be added to Hooker's slender column for a movement which had been eliminated from the plan of battle, for the purpose of giving the greatest possible force to operations against the enemy's right flank. General Thomas' instructions to General Hooker gave him entire freedom as to the manner of attack. He was required to demonstrate first, and if he deemed it practicable to carry the position, he was authorized to attempt it; in all other respects he was independent. General Thomas was always ready to accord a just measure of independence to subordinates who were held responsible for methods and results. He also accorded to Hooker the merit of carrying Lookout Mountain, except the origination of the movement, which he claimed for himself, not as original in conception, but in its relations to the actual battle.

It is safe to assume that Hooker adopted the best possible plan to dislodge the enemy from Lookout Mountain. He placed two brigades (Grose's and Woods') in plain sight, to rebuild a bridge near the base of the mountain and attract the attention of the enemy, while he removed the remainder of his forces up the valley and up the mountain side till the right of his line touched the foot of the palisades the perpendicular ledge of rocks that walls the summit of the mountain. Having gained this important advantage without the knowledge of the enemy, he swept round the front with this enfilading line, and Cheatham's division receiving fire in front, flank and rear, fled before him. Stevenson's division on the summit could not render assistance except by a long, circuitous route, and Hooker was too rapid in his pursuit, for help to come to Cheatham's division, by any circuit, long or short. The enemy, however; in his flight, found friendly shelter on the eastern slope, among the trees, and behind huge fragments of rocks which the elements had detached from the overhanging ledge. Here, also, reenforcements were met, coming from Chattanooga Valley. Thus sheltered and
 
 

Page l79 - LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

supported, the routed enemy was enabled to cover the road leading down the mountain from Summerville, until Stevenson's division had descended, and then the whole force moved across the valley to Missionary Ridge, burning the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, to prevent immediate pursuit.

This victory was gained more by strategy than hard fighting, but there was nevertheless all the fighting necessary to give full force to the superb strategy. The grand scenery and the roar of cannon from Moccasin Point heightened the thrilling effect of a battle fought in part above the mist which shrouded portions of the mountain. Hooker's operations turned Bragg's left flank, but made it possible for the enemy to strengthen his right. This result, however, could not have followed had there been a general battle on the 24^th. In the event of such a battle, Hooker's action would have had its full effect, since no reenforcements from the valley could have been sent to prevent the separation of Stevenson's division from the main army, and there would have been two divisions less against Sherman than there were on the following day. When Bragg had lost Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, his position on Missionary Ridge was untenable, it being open to turning movements through the gap at Rossville and, the gaps farther south, and from the first it had been exposed to such a movement round the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge. General Bragg was not ignorant of his exposure to turning operations on right and left; and if a correspondent of the Richmond Dispatch, writing under the nom-de-plume of " Sallust," may be credited, orders were issued for the retreat of the army. These, however, were revoked, on the supposition that better results would follow another day of battle.
 
 

Page 180 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

At midnight General Thomas reported the operations of the 23^rd and 24^th in cipher:

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Nov. 24th, 1863,12 M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, General-in-Chief:-

Yesterday, at half past twelve, Granger's and Palmer's corps, supported by Howard's, were advanced directly in front of our fortifications, drove in the enemy's pickets, and carried his first line of rifle-pits between Chattanooga and Citico Creeks. We captured nine commissioned officers, and about one hundred and sixty enlisted men. Our loss about one hundred and eleven.

To-day Hooker, in command of Geary's division, Twelfth corps, Osterhaus' division, Fifteenth corps, and two brigades, Fourteenth corps, carried north slope of Lookout Mountain, with small loss on our side, and the loss to the enemy of five or six hundred prisoners killed and wounded not reported.

There has been continuous fighting from twelve o'clock until after night, but our troops gallantly repulsed every attempt to retake the position. Sherman crossed the Tennessee River before daylight this morning, at the mouth of South Chickamauga, with three divisions of the Fifteenth corps, one division of the Fourteenth, and carried the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge. General Grant has ordered a general advance in the morning. Our success so far has been complete, and the behavior of the troops admirable.

GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General.

Thus passed the 24^th, with no general decisive battle. In the afternoon of that day, Sherman gained position on Missionary Ridge, near the right flank of the enemy. This flank rested on an elevation north of the tunnel, with sloping ground towards the north, east and west, and strong extemporized defenses to the north and west. The deep depression in the ridge separated the two armies.

General Grant's announcement of a prospective decisive battle on the 24^th was certainly based upon the belief that Sherman would cross the river during the night of the 23^rd, and open the engagement at daylight the next morning. He also expected such immediate success as would establish the condition for the cooperation of Thomas. It certainly was not worth the trouble to conceal the first stages of Sherman's movement, by hills and darkness, if
 
 

Page 181 - SHERMAN'S DELAY

the march from the south bank of the Tennessee River towards the northern heights of Missionary Ridge could not have been begun until one o'clock in the afternoon of the 24^th. General Grant evidently designed that this movement should be a surprise; and when it failed to be a surprise it lost its special objective, and its exact relation to his plan. Had Sherman made his attack at daylight on the 24^th, in fulfilment of Grant's promise to General Halleck, the enemy's right would not have been sheltered by defenses on the summit north of the tunnel. The fact, therefore, that his attack was not made until the morning of the 25^th, presents this dilemma: either General Grant misapprehended the conditions of the movement, or General Sherman was needlessly tardy in executing it. Grant gave Sherman six hours in which to cross the river and dispose his troops for attack, and yet during the thirty hours next after midnight on the 23^rd, Sherman only carried the two northernmost heights of the ridge, with a skirmish line in slight action. In fact Bragg, without serious contest, gave up all the ground north of the deep depression which cuts Missionary Ridge almost to its base, because he did not wish to extend his line beyond that point.

General Grant's pre-announced plan of battle utterly miscarried, through General Sherman's delay in attacking the enemy's flank, whether this delay resulted from defect of plan, or default in execution. It was in reference to such a possibility that General Thomas advised that a battle should be fought on the 23^rd.
 
 

Page 182 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Grant's instructions to Thomas in relation to the action of the 25th were embodied in the following note:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Chattanooga, Tenn., Nov. 24-th, 1863

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS, Commanding Army of the Cumberland.

GENERAL :-

General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel, with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require.

If Hooker's present position on the mountain can be maintained with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General Commanding.

Several important facts come to light in this note. General Grant was mistaken as to the degree of Sherman's success, and his order to Thomas to attack simultaneously with Sherman and in cooperation with him, was based upon this misapprehension. Sherman had not carried the ridge to the tunnel; his right was not at the tunnel and on top of the hill; and hence the condition for the cooperation of Thomas, mentioned specifically in the announcement of Grant's plan on the 18th, had not been established. Neither did General Grant, on the night of the 24th, think of using Hooker's troops against Missionary Ridge the next day. He did not know that the enemy's forces that had occupied Lookout Mountain were in motion towards the main army on Missionary Ridge.

These illusions disappeared on the morning of the 25^th, and with them the practicability of Grant's instructions to Thomas.

The conditions for a general engagement on the 25^th were very different from those existing on the two previous days. The two divisions which Hooker had driven from Lookout Mountain, and the troops from the line across Chattanooga Valley, were now on Missionary Ridge, and Bragg's line was shorter by the distance from Missionary
 
 

Page 183 - HOWARD JOINS SHERMAN

Ridge to the crest and northern slope of Lockout Mountain. The development of Sherman's operations against the enemy's right flank had drawn Cleburne's and Walker's divisions to the strong position north of the tunnel, and with a line greatly shortened, Bragg had two divisions free to move wherever needed.

Sherman attacked the right flank of the enemy early in the morning, but failed to carry the summit immediately north of the tunnel. General Grant observed his movements and their results from Orchard Knob, and at once gave orders for the movement of troops to his support. The evening previous, Thomas had, in compliance with Grant's orders, made arrangements for the earliest possible cooperation with Sherman. He had directed Howard to throw his left forward, in readiness to connect with Sherman's right as he should move southward. General Grant had not specified the mode of cooperation, since this was contingent upon Sherman's movements. The advance of Howard's left to the railroad, in anticipation of touching Sherman's right, had only the effect to expedite the march of the whole corps to Sherman at 9:45 A.M.

The state of affairs on the right was quite as unexpected as that on the left.

As soon as Thomas had learned that the enemy had left Lockout Mountain, he sent the following order to Hooker:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, November 2ºth, 1863, 8 A. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER :-

Leave Carlin's brigade * at Summertown road, to rejoin General Palmer. Move with the remainder of your force, except two regiments to hold Lookout, on the Rossville road towards Mission Ridge, looking well to your right flank.

By Command of GENERAL THOMAS.

J. J. REYNOLDS, Major-General and Chief of Staff
 
 

* This brigade had gone to Hooker the evening before.
 
 

Page 184 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

A little later he modified these instructions :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Orchard Knob, November 25. 1863

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER:-

I wish you and Palmer to move forward firmly and steadily upon enemy's works in front, using General Sheridan as a pivot.

GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General

This combination was not designed to interfere with General Sherman's operations, but to supplement them. It was however, abortive; Hooker's movement was arrested at Chattanooga Creek, and Sherman's apparent need of reenforcements induced General Grant to detach Baird's division from the right of the central line, and send it to Sherman. Thomas was then too weak in the centre for any action except in support of forces on right and left.

With Sherman fighting for the tunnel and Hooker building a bridge over Chattanooga Creek, the forenoon and part of the afternoon passed away. Sherman had been repulsed in every attempt to carry the enemy's position north of the tunnel. In the meantime the central divisions had been in-active in the presence of General Grant. At 3 P.M. there was no prospect of victory. The day was far spent; Hooker was not in sight on the right; Sherman having failed to accomplish his mission was resting on the left; while according to Grant's plan of battle, the condition for the central divisions to begin their cooperative movement did not exist At this hour General Grant said " We must do something for Sherman," and thereupon ordered Thomas' central line to advance and carry the rifle-pits at the base of Missionary Ridge. Badeau thus describes the situation at the time this order was issued:
 
 

Page 185 - SHERMAN'S EXPLANATION

Grant was watching- the progress of the fight from Orchard Knoll and seeing the danger to which Sherman was exposed he now ordered Baird's division of the Fourteenth corps to support the extreme left, but Sherman sent word that he had all the force necessary and Baird was put in position on Thomas’ left. Baird accordingly marched by the left flank in front of Fort Wood to take position on Howard's right. This movement was plainly perceived by the enemy, and impressed him with the idea that Grant's main assault was to be made on the rebel right; a massive column of Bragg's forces soon was seen to move northward along the crest of the ridge, regiment after regiment filing towards Sherman.

Meanwhile the day was waning and Thomas' attack which was to relieve Sherman had not been made. Grant looked eagerly for the advance of Hooker moving north on the ridge with his left in Chattanooga Valley, and his right thrown east of the ridge. *

From General Grant's own words and this statement of Badeau, it is evident that this advance of the central divisions was designed to relieve the pressure upon Sherman ; either to arrest supposed danger, or to open the way for his success in gaining the enemy's position north of the tunnel. General Sherman had expected General Thomas to attack early in the day. In his official report he explicitly mentions this expectation :

Thus matters stood about 3 P. M. The day was bright and clear and the amphitheatre of Chattanooga lay in beauty at our feet. I had watched for the attack of General Thomas "early in the day."

This watching for Thomas' attack was doubtless based upon Grant's order of the evening previous, which required Sherman to attack and Thomas to cooperate. But Sherman was perhaps ignorant of the fact that the order for the cooperative attack was induced by the belief that he had carried the ridge to the tunnel, and that according to the plan of battle the condition for the cooperation of Thomas was established. The explanation of General Grant's action in first sending Howard's corps and then Baird's division from General Thomas was his desire that Sherman should turn the enemy's right before Thomas should cooperate with him. And the fact that Thomas' forces in the centre were by General Grant's order

* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. I, p. pp. 506, 507
 
 

Page 186 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

diminished from six divisions to eight brigades, while Sherman, after Baird's division reported to him, had seven divisions clustered around the enemy's position at the tunnel, is incontestable evidence that no independent attack was required of Thomas early in the day. It is therefore an untenable assumption, contradicted by Grant's orders and official report, though assumed to be true by many historians, that Sherman's attack was designed as a feint to cause Bragg to weaken his centre that Thomas might storm it. In General Sherman's Memoirs this passage is found:-

The object of General Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme flanks of Bragg's position was to disturb him to such an extent, that he would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so that Thomas' army could break through his centre. The whole plan succeeded admirably, but it was not until after dark that I learned the complete success at the centre, and received General Grant's order to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek. *

Badeau's statements are to the same effect:-

Hooker was to draw attention to the right, to seize and hold Lockout Mountain, while Sherman attacking Missionary Ridge on the extreme left, was still further to distract the enemy ; and then when reenforcements and attention should be drawn to both rebel flanks, the centre was to be assaulted by the main body of Grant's force under Thomas.+

The rebel centre, as Grant had foreseen, was weakened to save the right ; and then the whole mass of the Army of the Cumberland was precipitated on the weakened point ; the centre was pierced, the heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga won.++

This author gives the relative strength of the three columns:

Hooker's force amounted to about ten thousand; Sherman's including Howard's to over twenty thousand; and Thomas' command included almost thirty thousand soldiers.++
 
 

* Memoirs, Vol. 1., p. 364.

+ Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. 1., p. 525.

++ Ibid., p. 528.

+++ Ibid., p. 524
 
 

Page l87 - MISTAKES OF GRANT'S BIOGRAPHERS

And states that General Sherman told him:-

That he did not consider the hill for which he fought on November 23rd, (sic.) as very important in itself, and therefore used only three regiments, in the original attack; but he made as much noise and show as he could to alarm Bragg for the safety of that flank and of the railroad bridge just in rear. His effort was to induce Bragg to detach as much as possible from the centre, and so to weaken that which Sherman knew from Grant would be the critical point of the battle. *

Coppee referring to Sherman's attack says:

General Sherman's duty was twofold; to beat the enemy if possible and at all events to keep him in full force in his front while an attack should be made in another part of the field.+

These historians have made two mistakes, one in calling an unexpected result an object, and another in asserting that it was the purpose of General Grant that the central forces under Thomas in person should make an independent assault. It is certainly true that Bragg did move troops to his extreme right on the 24^th and also on the 25^th. Sherman's movement across the Tennessee with four divisions, and his advance from the river, indicated some great purpose. It was imperative that Bragg should send to meet Sherman all the troops that he could spare from his centre. On the 24^th he sent Cleburne's and Walker's divisions from the right of his line to establish a flank at the tunnel. These were the troops that first resisted Sherman on the morning of the 25^th . When Howard's corps was seen marching to Sherman, the danger to the enemy's right flank was patent to Bragg. But by this time the troops from Lockout Mountain were available, and first Stevenson's division was sent to General Hardee, who was in command of the right wing of Bragg's army. When afterwards Baird's division followed the Eleventh corps to Sherman,
 
 

* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. 1., p. 505.

+ Grant and his Campaigns, p. 229.
 
 

Page 188 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

General Bragg sent Cheatham's division to the right. The movement of these floating divisions to the enemy's right induced the belief in the National army that Bragg was weakening his centre to reenforce his right. This was true, in one view, for the troops from Lookout Mountain could have been used against Thomas. But Bragg's line in front of Thomas remained unchanged, and he put together before Sherman the troops that had composed the two flanks of his original line. Now the attacks of Hooker and Sherman had this result rather than that of drawing troops from Bragg's centre to his flanks. Sherman was in sight, with a very large force, menacing his right flank and communications, and Hooker was not yet in view, and Bragg sent the troops that had fought Hooker, to oppose Sherman, keeping his line before Thomas as it had been first formed, on the 25^th, after the withdrawal of them from Chattanooga Valley.

There are many facts which prove that General Grant did not regard the central column, after he had detached Howard's corps from it, as his main reliance for carrying the enemy's position, and he could not have meditated an independent assault for it at noon, when he ordered Baird's division to Sherman. When this was done, more than half of all the infantry forces on the field of battle were subject to Sherman, and of all the opposing forces more than half were on Bragg's right flank. Had Sherman been conducting a mere imposing feint, while Thomas was to assault an exceedingly strong position as the culmination of the battle, Grant would not have given seven divisions for the feint and only three for the paramount effort. Neither is it true that the "main body of Grant's forces"-"the whole mass of the Army of the Cumberland "-was, at last, " precipitated on the weakened point." Of the nine divisions belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, on the field of battle at the time of the final assault, three were with Sherman and two with Hooker.
 
 

Page 189 - HELPING SHERMAN.

The three that were under Sherman, two regiments excepted, were in the, battle only as quiet reserves. Davis' division was in the rear of Sherman's fighting forces and Howard's corps was between Missionary Ridge and Chickamauga Creek at rest and undeployed. General Davis, chafing under enforced inaction, requested permission to turn the enemy's right flank by moving his division to its rear, but this movement, which might have produced decisive results; especially if Howard's corps, or part of it, had participated, was forbidden by General Sherman. This movement would have supported the direct attack most effectively, since there were no defenses on the east side of the ridge, and the slope on that side was far from steep. Besides it would have harmonized with Grant's plan of dislodging the enemy by simultaneous attacks in two directions closely cooperative. If, however, the disposition of forces made by General Grant in preparation for the action and during the three days of battle, do not prove that he expected more than an imposing feint from Sherman, his official report written in retrospect of all objects, operations and results, brings this truth into bold relief. It is not surprising that Grant did not order Thomas with Baird's, Wood's, Sheridan's and Johnson's divisions to carry the summit of Missionary Ridge, since he had only hoped to dislodge the enemy by an attack upon his flank, supported by a simultaneous one in front. And if he defined to himself the exact relation of the advance of the four central divisions of carrying the lower defences of the enemy, with Sherman's operations on the left, or Hooker's on the right, he gave no intimation of such relation to others at the time, beyond saying: " We must do something for Sherman." Badeau states that it was in consequence of apprehended danger to Sherman that General Grant ordered Baird's division to his support.*
 
 

* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. 1. p. 506.
 
 

Page 190 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Still it is not credible that any other fear was entertained than that Sherman could not overcome the resistance of the enemy. It could not have been supposed that with six divisions in hand, Sherman was in danger of being thrown upon the defensive. But acting upon the belief that Bragg had greatly weakened his centre to maintain his right, General Grant might have reasonably supposed that a movement against his lower defenses would cause the return, to the enemy's centre, of some of the forces that had moved to his endangered right flank. This movement, therefore, is easily explained, if considered as a diversion in favor of Sherman. Neither is there mystery in it if it was made, in accordance with Grant's report, in expectation that Hooker would be ready to cooperate with the central forces, by the time they had carried the enemy's rifle-pits at the base of the ridge. But on the supposition that it was intended to be an independent attack upon the enemy's line on the summit, it is involved in the profoundest mystery. Since, if Grant intended that the central divisions should storm the summit without support on right or left, he gave no instructions to his subordinates, from General Thomas down, that suggested such an effort as a possible contingency. These divisions and their commanders of every grade had known for two days that they were in line before the enemy for the purpose of assaulting the summit, eventually, but had been held in extreme quietness in the presence of General Grant, while waiting for the success of other forces. Grant stated in his official report that his instructions to Thomas required that these troops should re-form in the rifle-pits for the ulterior effort, but he nevertheless gave no intimation that this ulterior effort was to be made without further orders from himself. But in advance of trial, a position under the artillery and musketry of the enemy should have been regarded as a poor place to re-form a line of battle. And this fact taken in connection with other circumstances, suggests the risk that this advance, without assured support, involved.
 
 

Page 191 - HOOKER'S ADVANCE

The report of General Grant also asserts that the appearance of Hooker on the enemy's left was to be the signal for storming the summit of Missionary Ridge. But General Hooker was not in sight when the order for the advance of the central divisions was given. Neither was there good ground for the expectation that he would appear as early as 3 P.M. He did not leave Chattanooga Creek until after 2 P. M. Thereafter he had to march several miles to reach the left flank of the enemy. Time was required to dispose his troops for action. Resistance to his advance was to be expected; and the summit and slopes of Missionary Ridge from Rossville to the enemy's flank were covered somewhat densely with woods which offered a bar to rapid marching and gave help to the enemy in preventing a quick movement. Resistance was first offered at Rossville, and afterward at several points on the summit, but with no other effect than to slightly retard Hooker's northward movement. The enemy had selected for his advanced position on that flank the breastworks on the crest, immediately north of Rossville, which our army had thrown up the next day after the battle of Chickamauga; and here two regiments of. infantry and a battery of artillery had been posted. General Bragg's report does not give the strength of the forces that were detached from the left of his line of battle to oppose Hooker, but the feebleness of the resistance at Rossville and other points gave proof that want of time rather than the opposition of the enemy prevented the appearance of Hooker on the left of Bragg's line in front of Thomas as soon as expected.

The action prescribed for the central line was quickly and gallantly performed. But when the troops reached the rifle-pits at the base of the hill, and at some points on the slope, they came under a terrific fire of musketry and artillery. The quick action of at least forty cannon at
 
 

Page 192 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

short range wrought fearful carnage in the rifle pits, and this was supplemented by the deadly fire of musketry from the summit. They had no orders to go forward, and none to retreat. There were no supporting forces in sight on right or left. The situation offered them the opportunity to stand still and die, to go forward without orders to stop the destructive fire to which they were exposed, or to retreat on the same condition to avoid it. The men in the ranks and their immediate commanders chose to go forward, and they speedily executed one of the most brilliant assaults known to martial history. The advance of the troops beyond the enemy's lower breastwork was a surprise to all the generals on Orchard Knob. General Grant had not ordered such an advance, and General Thomas had been opposed to the movement as ordered when there was no prospect of support from Sherman or Hooker, and disregarding mere suggestions from General Grant made earlier in the afternoon had not sent the troops forward until positively ordered to do so.

Neither of these generals had any direct relation to this unexpected assault beyond their concurrent agency in the development of the situation which made it possible. Thomas established his line on Orchard Knob and the lateral hills when simply ordered to make a reconnoissance, and Grant put the troops composing it under the fire of the enemy and thus gave them an opportunity to gain a great victory without orders.

General Grant gave the following account of the operations of the 25th in his official report :-

Early in the morning of the twenty-fifth the remainder of Howard's corps reported to Sherman and constituted a part of his forces during that day's battle, the pursuit and subsequent advance for the relief of Knoxville.

Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy, but from his occupying a line across the mountain and to the railroad bridge across Chickamauga Creek, his rear and stores at Chickamauga Station. This caused the enemy to move heavily
 
 

Page 193 - OFFICIAL REPORTS

against him. This movement of his being plainly seen from the position I occupied on Orchard Knob, Baird's division of the Fourteenth corps was ordered to Sherman's support, but receiving a note from Sherman informing me that he had all the force necessary, Baird was put in position on Thomas' left.

The appearance of Hooker's column was at this time anxiously looked for and momentarily expected moving north on the ridge with his left in Chattanooga Valley and his right east of the ridge. His approach was intended as the signal for storming the ridge in the centre with strong columns, but the length of time necessarily consumed in the construction of a bridge near* Chattanooga Creek, detained him to a later hour than was expected. Being satisfied from the latest information from him, that he must by this time, be on his way from Rossville, though not yet in sight, and discovering that the enemy, in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman, was weakening his centre on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops constituting, our centre Baird's division (Fourteenth corps), Wood's and Sheridan's divisions (Fourth corps), and Johnson's division (Fourteenth corps) with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to re-form his lines with a view of carrying the top of the ridge.

These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive; stopped but a moment until the whole were in line, and commenced ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of artillery, and musketry from still well filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver however, was seen in all that long line of brave men; their progress was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession.

General Thomas' report of the same operations is subjoined :-

"About noon General Sherman becoming heavily engaged with the enemy, they having massed a strong force in his front, orders were given for General Baird to march his division within supporting distance of General Sherman; moving his command promptly in the direction indicated he was placed in position to the left of Wood's
 
 

* This bridge was over Chattanooga Creek.
 
 

Page 194 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

division of Granger's corps. Owing to the difficulties of the ground his troops did not get into line with Granger's until about 2.30 P. M., orders were then given him to move forward on Granger's left and within supporting distance against the enemy's rifle-pits on the slope and at the foot of Missionary Ridge. The whole line then advanced against the breastworks and soon became warmly engaged with the enemy's skirmishers ; these giving way retired upon their reserves posted within their works, our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line. The enemy seized with panic, abandoned the works at the foot of the hill, and retreated precipitately to the crest, where they were closely followed by our troops, who apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches."

General Thomas evidently did not know at the time his report was written that General Baird actually reported to General Sherman, and that the march thither and return, rather than the difficulties of the ground had delayed him in attaining position.

The following passage is from the official report of General Sherman:-

An occasional shot from Fort Wood and Orchard Knoll, and some musketry fire and artillery over about Lockout Mountain, was all that I could detect on our side ; but about 3 P M. I noticed the white line of musketry fire in front of Orchard Knoll, extending farther and farther right and left and on. We could only hear a faint echo of sound, but enough was seen to satisfy me that General Thomas was at last moving on the centre. I knew that our attack had drawn vast masses of the enemy to our flank, and felt sure of the result. Some guns which had been firing on us all day were silent, or were turned in a different direction.

It is evident from General Grant's language that when he ordered the advance of the central divisions he expected Hooker rather than Sherman to establish the condition for assault. And Grant had then departed so far from his scheme of massing " all the forces possible against one given point, namely. Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end of it," that he was dependent upon a general who by the
 
 

Page 195 - CARRYING MISSIONARY RIDGE

original plan had been consigned to inaction in Lookout Valley, to give the signal for storming Missionary Ridge in the centre. Grant had hoped that the signal would have come from the opposite direction, where ten divisions could have cooperated in an attack on front and right flank, but now the experiment was in prospect with seven divisions, upon the opposite flank. And the general, whose appearance was expected to give the signal, had come from his prescribed inaction in Lookout Valley, through the smoke of his battle on the mountain's front and across Lookout Valley, to the summit of Missionary Ridge. And yet again the plan miscarried, because the direct attack transcended orders, was begun too early and executed too quickly for Hooker to reach the left of Bragg's continuous line on Missionary Ridge.

In many features beyond its success and the absence of orders, this assault by about twenty thousand men surpasses the precedents of the American civil war, and those of other modern wars. Its most remarkable feature was its unity. The supreme moments of battle sometimes create impulses more potent than plans and orders. And in the absence of unusual inspiration, it is not probable that embattlements so long and lofty would have been carried throughout their extent almost at the same instant had each officer of every grade been definitely instructed before and as to the best mode of assault. So nearly together did the four divisions reach the summit, that General Thomas, seeing the crowning banners from Orchard Knob, reported that the enemy's line was gained simultaneously at six different points. This was not strictly true. According to the testimony of General Baird and of some of the Confederate commanders. Wood's central brigade first pierced the enemy's line. The projection of the slope gave the enemy's line-defenses first to this division, and it led to the crest. Nevertheless, the conditions gave a common impulse to the whole force to pass the lower rifle-pits; and although
 
 

Page 196 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

the officers of higher rank were at first somewhat bewildered and undecided, there was from first to last as much consonance of movement and as strict cooperation as could have been attained under definite instructions. The origin of the action, as well as its conditions, enforced concert of action as fully as could have been possible under the orders of one controlling mind. The division commanders acted in unison as soon as the movement was so far precipitated by the eagerness of the soldiers that its success was dependent upon the instantaneous cooperation of the four divisions. The summit might not have been held had not all the divisions reached the crest at nearly the same instant. When General Bragg was informed that his line had been broken on the right of his own position, he made effort to restore it by detaching troops from his own presence ; but these troops and himself were instantly put to flight by Sheridan's division. This fact shows that Sheridan was so near the crest when Wood gained it, that Bragg's effort to dislodge Wood miscarried at its inception; and in turn Wood's enfilading fire diminished the resistance to Sheridan's left brigade.

This assault was unique in its origin, conditions, conduct, and issue; and in the risk it involved it is almost without parallel. This central line, at the time, alone covered Chattanooga, and if the troops composing it had retreated after carrying the lower defenses of the enemy, or had failed in storming the summit, there would have been no decisive battle that day, unless defeat had come to the National arms. Had these troops been broken in organization and spirit by defeat, retreat, and losses, Bragg's whole army would have been between Sherman and Hooker commanding the shortest lines to Chattanooga, with most inviting possibilities on right and left. So far forth, therefore, as this action in origin, form and issue was unprecedented, is the degree of the risk apparent.
 
 

Page 197 - STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY

Grant's order required a movement involving great risk within its pre-prescribed limitations, and the hazard of the subsequent unordered assault can hardly be estimated.

There were, in these divisions, eleven brigades in line of battle, one of Johnson's having been left in the entrenchments at Chattanooga. Bragg had nominally three divisions in his left wing,-- Anderson's, Bate's, and Stewart's. But Anderson's command was more than a full division, as to it had been attached the troops that had been recalled by the battle, while en route to Knoxville. The troops that opposed Hooker at Rossville returned to the main line before it received the final assault. It may, therefore, be safely assumed that the opposing forces in this action were approximately of the same numerical strength, with the advantages of position and the defensive more than doubling Bragg's strength. It is not surprising, therefore, that he confessed, in his official report of the battle, that he could not account for the loss of a position which should have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column. There was one fact, however, which he may not have duly considered. Numerous transverse depressions divide the summit of Missionary Ridge, where his left wing was in line, into numerous rounded hillocks; so that only a small part of his line'was in view from any point in it, while every one of his soldiers could see the whole assaulting column, at least in the first stages of its advance. This, perhaps, more than anything else except the manifest spirit and momentum of the assaulting forces, caused his troops to give up their strong position. They did, however, resist. Bragg bore testimony to this; and a loss of twenty per cent. in some of Thomas' divisions gives proof of positive resistance. But the Confederate troops did not fight as they had fought before, and as they did fight afterwards, in offense and defense.

In addition to the troops that formed Bragg's left wing, Cheatham's division from the right participated in the action, resisting Baird's division as it wheeled to the left upon the crest. It is evident, therefore, that Cheatham's division, the last to leave Lookout Mountain, was made, by position and circumstances, a reserve for each wing of the Confederate army.
 
 

Page 198 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

To this movement of Cheatham's, the resulting conflict with Baird, and the general issue of the battle, General Grant thus alludes in his official report:-

The resistance to Thomas' left being overcome, the enemy abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of Sherman, and by twelve o'clock at night was in full retreat; and the whole of his strong positions on Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga Valley, and Missionary Ridge, were in our possession, together with a large number of prisoners, artillery and small arms.

In the evening he wrote to General Sherman:-

No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which Thomas troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and can feel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your command, in taking first so much of the same range of hills, and then in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to make Thomas' part certain of success. The next thing now will be to relieve Burnside.

Having full knowledge of the facts thus briefly narrated, General Thomas was justified in stating in his official report that the battle was not fought in accordance with General Grant's plan. He wrote:-

"It will be perceived from the foregoing report, that the original plan of operations was somewhat modified to meet and take advantage of emergencies which necessitated material modifications of that plan. It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it been carried out, could not possibly have led to more successful results."

It will be believed by all who carefully analyze the operations of this battle, in their origin, relations, conduct, and results, that the general who stated officially that the original plan of operations was somewhat modified, exerted potent influence in making the changes. He was a subordinate, was by the side of his superior in rank during the battle, was restrained in handling his own army, and yet his personality was felt in every successful operation.
 
 

Page 199 - THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND

Another brief passage from his report demands insertion as characteristic of General Thomas:-

The alacrity and intelligence displayed by officers in executing their orders, the enthusiasm and spirit displayed by the men who did the work, cannot be too highly appreciated by the Nation, for the defense of which they have, on so many other memorable occasions, nobly and patriotically exposed their lives in battle.

All the successful operations of this battle were executed by troops from the Army of the Cumberland, except the two brigades of Osterhaus' division, Fifteenth Corps, under General Hooker. And this fact effectually refutes the imputation that the morale of this army was impaired by the battle of Chickamauga, and the succeeding situation at Chattanooga. And yet there is little room to doubt that before the battle. General Grant distrusted it for offense, believing that a dispiriting defensive at Chattanooga, combined with the loss of the battle-field at Chickamauga, had produced such demoralization that it would not take the aggressive boldly, unless under the leadership of another army and the inspiration of its success. General Sherman, in his Memoirs, is very explicit in asserting that this was General Grant's opinion:-

General Grant pointed out to me a house on Missionary Ridge where General Bragg's headquarters were known to be. He also explained the situation of affairs generally: that the mules and horses of Thomas' army were so starved that they could not haul his guns; that forage, corn, and provisions were so scarce that the men, in hunger, stole the few grains of corn that were given to favorite horses; that the men of Thomas' army had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga, that he feared they could not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive; that Bragg had detached Longstreet, with a considerable force, up into East Tennessee to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was in danger, etc.; and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious to attack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or at least to force him to recall Longstreet. The Army of the Cumberland had so long been in the trenches that he wanted my troops to hurry up to take the offensive first, after which he had no doubt the Cumberland Army would fight well. *
 
 

* Memoirs, Vol. 1., pp. 361-2.
 
 

Page 200 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

General Grant's official utterances do not explicitly reveal his distrust of this army, but some of them preceding the battle imply such distrust. At any rate, he has made no denial of General Sherman's statements in the premises. And as his conduct of the battle accorded fully with the assumption that he feared that the Army of the Cumberland would not fight well in offense, except under the leadership of another army, the evidence is conclusive that he has been correctly reported. He certainly made persistent efforts to unite Sherman's four divisions, postponing battle for three days that this might be effected, and that General Sherman might have his own troops for the initial attack. It is equally true that, although only one of Sherman's divisions failed to join him, General Grant detached troops from Thomas' central column, until there were more men from the Army of the Cumberland under the commander of the Army of the Tennessee than under Thomas himself. It must therefore be inferred that there was a special reason for Grant's adherence to his leading movement as long as there was any probability of its success, his belief that Sherman's success was essential to victory; an inveterate attachment to his own plan, which was subjected to experiment only in the unsuccessful operations against Bragg's right flank; or the fear of driving the enemy eastward rather than southward, and thus still further endangering Burnside. But the valor of the army from Chickamauga and the trenches at Chattanooga won the battle, whether General Grant did or did not consider that a successful initial attack by the Army of the Tennessee was essential to victory. And had this been achieved, history would have set the service over against the saving help rendered at the battle of Shiloh, by the Army of the Cumberland, when, under another name, it was commanded by General Buell. But the effort to give corresponding aid at Chattanooga having failed, the war did not give another opportunity to balance the account.
 
 

Page 201

BRAGG'S routed army was pursued to Ringgold. At that place a sharp conflict occurred between the advance of Grant's forces under Hooker and Cleburne's division, the enemy's rear guard. General Grant had sent Howard's corps with supporting forces across to. the railroad leading from Cleveland to Dalton, to break that road and prevent the passage of Longstreet's forces to Bragg, or the detachment of troops from the retreating army to strengthen the former against General Burnside. General Bragg, however, having lost about six thousand by capture alone in the battles before Chattanooga, had no thought of still further diminishing his army, and was only intent upon posting it in the nearest practicable defensive position. Grant arrested the pursuit of the enemy at Ringgold, although a small force advanced beyond that place. He was still anxious in regard to affairs in East Tennessee, and at once sent General Sherman with a very large force into that region. Sherman had, in addition to his own army, Howard's corps, Sheridan's, Wood's and Davis' divisions, and a large force of cavalry under General Elliott, chief of cavalry, all from the Army of the Cumberland.

The remainder of General Thomas' troops, after a part of them had buried their dead comrades left upon the field of Chickamauga, took position in the vicinity of Chattanooga.
 
 

Page 202 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

During the winter of 1863-4 the army was widely scattered in Middle and East Tennessee, engaged in minor military operations, repairing railroads, building bridges, stockades, fortifications and store-houses, transporting supplies and restoring the appointments lost at Chickamauga.

Its attitude was mainly defensive while accumulating supplies and making preparations generally for an aggressive campaign into Georgia from Chattanooga as a base. This state of affairs devolved upon General Thomas a perplexing administration. There was danger that while his army was scattered from Nashville to East Tennessee, the enemy concentrated at Dalton, Georgia, would break through this long line at one of its weakest points. He was in the field but once during the winter, all the remoter operations of his forces having been, from necessity, submitted to subordinate commanders. He was under orders in February to conduct operations in East Tennessee, but these orders were revoked by General Grant because he thought it was necessary to move against the enemy at Dalton, as a diversion in favor of Sherman who was operating in Mississippi against General Polk, with Mobile as a possible objective.

The correspondence relating to the projected operations from Knoxville is subjoined :

Grant to Thomas, February 6, 1864:-

Reports of scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has removed most of his force from your front, two divisions going to Longstreet. Longstreet has been reenforced by troops from the East. This makes it evident the enemy intends to secure East Tennessee if they can, and I intend to drive them out, or get whipped, this month. For this purpose you will have to detach at least ten thousand men besides Stanley's division (more will be better). I can partly relieve the vacuum at Chattanooga by troops from Logan's command. It will not be necessary to take artillery or wagons to Knoxville, but all the serviceable artillery horses should be taken to use on artillery there. Six mules to each two hundred men should also be taken, if you have them to spare. Let me know how soon you can start.
 
 

Page 203 - PROPOSED MOVEMENT TO KNOXVILLE

Thomas to Grant, February 8, 1864:-

Your despatch of 2 P. M., February 6, was received that evening, but only so much of it could be translated as to make me understand that I am expected to detach from my command ten thousand men, in addition to Stanley's division, and to report when I can start. I can start a portion of the additional troops day after to-morrow, but I do not see how they can be fed in an exhausted country, until the railroad is completed to London. I am in hopes of getting the railroad completed and in operation to London by Thursday next. These ten thousand should be replaced by troops from Logan's command immediately, else the enemy might take advantage of my move towards Knoxville, and attack and capture this place. It will require an entire division to hold the railroad secure from here to Loudon.

Thomas to Grant, February 10, 1864:-

The engineer reports that he will have the railroad finished to Loudon on Friday next. As they are very much in need of supplies, at Knoxville, I think it will be best to allow time for accumulation there before the troops from here move up. I will try to provide for the defense of the place by placing a division of General Logan's corps at Chickamauga Station, and Davis' division in front of Cleveland, to cover the railroad, taking with me Stanley's, Johnson's and Baird's divisions. Will you order the division of Logan to move to this place as soon as possible ?

Grant to Thomas, February 10, 1864.:-

Prepare to start for Knoxville on Saturday. I will order Logan to send to Chattanooga all the troops he can, and still hold his line of railroad. The number will probably be about five thousand men. One division of your command will have to move out to hold the road to the Hiawassee.

Grant to Thomas, February 12, 1864:-

Conversation with Major-General Foster* has undecided me as to the propriety of the contemplated move against Longstreet. Schofield telegraphs the same view. I will take the matter into consideration […] during the day, after further talk with Foster, and give you the conclusion arrived at. If decided that you do not go, I will instruct Schofield to let Granger send off his veterans at once.

Should you not be required to go into East Tennessee, could you not make a formidable reconnoissance towards Dalton, and if successful in driving the enemy out, occupy that place, and complete the railroad up to it this winter?
 
 

* General Foster had succeeded General Burnside in command of the Department of the Ohio, and on account of ill health had himself been superseded by General Schofield.
 
 

Page 204 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE S. THOMAS

Thomas to Grant, February 12, 1864 :-

I think an attack on Dalton would be successful, if you let me have the division of Logan's during the movement.

Thomas to Grant, February 15, 1864:-

Your communication of the 13th, by General Elliott, was received yesterday. Seven regiments of Logan's force have arrived. General Matthias reports that the remainder will reach here to-morrow. My plan was to place Matthias in reserve, near Cleveland, and march with Stanley's division, supported by two brigades of Matthias', on the road from Cleveland to Dalton, and, with the Fourteenth army corps, take the direct road from here to Dalton, covering my advance and right flank with cavalry. I have thought of the route you suggest, but find, upon inquiry, that the roads across the mountain are so difficult that they can hardly be considered practicable at this season of the year. I have been considerably embarrassed by having Generals Stanley and Davis summoned before the McCook court of inquiry just at this time ; but if it continues to rain through the day as it did last night, I think nothing will be gained by starting just yet. In the mean time, Stanley and Davis can get back by Wednesday. Should the weather clear up, however, I will not wait. I intend to relieve as much of the cavalry at Calhoun as I can with infantry, and send it (the cavalry) toward Dalton, via Spring Place, in cooperation with Stanley's force.
 
 

Page 205 - JOHNSTON APPOINTED TO COMMAND

Thomas to Grant, February 16, 1864:-

I have just received a telegram from General Schofield, dated February I4th, stating that he had reliable information that Longstreet had advanced to Strawberry Plains, and had brought pontoon boats. Schofield thought that he might intend to make a cavalry raid to cut his communication with London, or that he might advance to attack Knoxville and asks me to send him reenforcements as early as practicable. What shall I do ? If reenforcements are sent to Knoxville, they will be detained there for the winter, and cannot make an advance on Longstreet until the London and Strawberry Plains bridges are re-built. It will also be necessary to give up any demonstration against Dalton. But if Schofield can hold Knoxville, the demonstration on Dalton can be made, and I hope with success. Captain Gay, just from Knoxville, and gone to Nashville, does not mention such reports."

Grant to Thomas, February 17, 1864:-

Longstreet cannot afford to place his forces between Knoxville and the Tennessee. If he does, it will then be time to move against him. The work of a raid on the road can soon be repaired, if it cannot be prevented. Make your contemplated move as soon as possible.

In assigning General Joseph E. Johnston to the command of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, the President and Secretary of War impressed upon him the importance of early operations against the Army of the Cumberland. But fortunately General Johnston was detained by the necessity of improving the morale and restoring the appointments of his army impaired by the battle of Missionary Ridge, as well as by the reported strength of the forces at Chattanooga, Knoxville, and intermediate places.

General Thomas, however, discerned the possibilities to the enemy concentrated at Dalton, while his own army was diffused over a long line and greatly reduced by furloughs granted to re-enlisting regiments. He was manifestly unwilling to uncover Chattanooga, to save East Tennessee from any real or supposed danger. During December, January, and the first half of February, there was an army of forty thousand men at Dalton, and at this time that army could have taken Cleveland, and separated the forces holding Chattanooga and Knoxville. Thomas was therefore wise in mentioning the danger to Chattanooga, should a large force be sent from that place to Knoxville.

The movement against Dalton was projected by General
 
 

Page 206 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Grant on the supposition that Johnston had detached largely from his army to aid Longstreet against Burnside in East Tennessee, and to assist Polk in resisting the advance of Sherman in Mississippi. The objects proposed were, to gain Dalton, and, if that could not be effected, to prevent the transfer of more troops to Polk. By orders from Richmond, two divisions under General Hardee were sent to Mississippi on the 7^th of February, but no forces had been sent to East Tennessee. General Thomas at first believed that Dalton might be captured, if he could advance from Chattanooga with a strong force; but when he ascertained Johnston's strength, he considered, the project impracticable.

On the 22d of February all the forces that could be safely withdrawn from Chattanooga and the line of communications, were put in motion towards Dalton. Johnston's advanced troops were at Tunnel Hill, while his other forces were holding positions of great strength south of that point. As General Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth corps, approached Tunnel Hill, the enemy retired to Buzzard's Roost, an almost impregnable natural position, commanding the railroad. On the 25^th, Davis' division, supported by Johnson's, made an unsuccessful effort against the enemy. At this juncture General Thomas joined his troops, and at once became convinced that the enemy's forces outnumbered his own, and besides were posted so as to more than double their strength in defense. By this time the .impracticability of supplying his troops was fully developed, he therefore advised their immediate withdrawal. General Grant, however, not having heard of the issue of Sherman's campaign, counseled the maintenance of the attitude that indicated an advance to the heart of the South until General Sherman could be heard from, and suggested measures for holding the position before Buzzard's Roost. Deeming further menace impracticable, Thomas retired his forces to their former
 
 

Page 207 - STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY AT DALTON

positions; and this action had no evil result, as General Sherman had turned back from Meridian, Mississippi, before Thomas had set out from Chattanooga. General Thomas ascertained, during his operations, that Johnston's detached troops had returned, and he supposed his menace had brought them back, whereas it was in consequence of the countermarch of General Sherman.

The following despatches reveal the views of Grant and Thomas in relation to the movement on Dalton:-

Thomas to Grant, February 19, 1864:

Assistant Surgeon Jacob Miller, Sixth Missouri volunteer infantry, arrived here yesterday from Dalton. He was captured at Lebanon, Alabama, when General Logan sent out an expedition towards Rome. He reports Cleburne's division at Tunnel Hill; Stewart's division between Tunnel Hill and Dalton ; Walker two miles out from Dalton, towards Spring Place; Cheatham at Dalton, and Stevenson's and Bates divisions to the west of Dalton two miles. He saw all of the camps, and estimates their force between thirty and forty thousand. He moreover states that no troops have been sent away except one brigade of infantry, which went to Rome about the first of this month.

Thomas to Grant from Tunnel Hill, Ga., February 26, 1864, 7.30 A. M. :-

I arrived here last night. Davis and Johnson occupy the pass at Buzzard's Roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their front, who outnumber them in artillery. It is not possible to carry this place by assault. General Palmer made the attempt to turn, yesterday, with Baird's and Cruft's divisions, but was met by an equal force, exclusive of their cavalry, and in an equally strong position as at Buzzard's Roost. After expending nearly all of his ammunition, he retired during the night to Catoosa Platform. Our transportation is poor and limited; we are not able to carry more than sixty pounds per man ; artillery horses so poor, that Palmer could bring but sixteen pieces. The country is stripped entirely of subsistence and forage. The enemy's cavalry is much superior to ours. Prisoners taken yesterday report that a portion of Cleburne's division has returned. I will await the development of this day, and advise you further.
 
 

Page 208 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Grant to Thomas, February 27, 1864:-

It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be held in full belief that an advance into the heart of the South is intended, until the fate of General Sherman is fully known. The difficulties of supplies can be overcome by keeping your trains running between Chattanooga and your position. Take the depot trains at Chattanooga, yours and General Howard's wagons. These can be replaced temporarily by yours returning. Veterans are returning daily. This will enable you to draw reenforcements constantly to your point. Can General Schofield not also take a division from Howard's corps ? It is intended to send Granger to you the moment Schofield is thought to be safe without him.

General Grant to General Whipple, (Thomas' chief of staff), February 27, 6 P. M.:-

Information has reached Washington that orders have been given for Johnston's army to fall back. General Thomas should watch any such movement, and follow it up closely. Can't you draw teams from Bridgeport and Stevenson, to send supplies to the front ? They have teams in great numbers at those places. Every energy should be exerted to get supplies and reenforcements forward. Troops will leave here at the rate of two or three thousand a day for the front Many of them go to Chattanooga.

Thomas to Grant, February 27, 1864, 10 P. M. :-

Your two despatches of this date received. I have just returned from the front. My troops, after ceaseless labor under the greatest embarrassments for want of transportation, reached within three miles of Dalton, where they were received by the enemy strongly posted, and in force fully equal to my own in infantry. His artillery and cavalry was not only in better condition (as regards horses), but at least two to our one in pieces and men. We found the country entirely stripped of everything like forage, and our mules being in such poor condition that double the number of teams we now have could not supply the troops, I thought it best to come back to Ringgold, and, if workmen can be found by Colonel McCallum, to go to work deliberately to repair the railroad, and advance as it progresses. The present condition of the roads is not good, and one day's rain would render the part across Chickamauga bottom impassable for loaded wagons. So it would be absolutely necessary to repair the railroad
 
 

Page 209 - PROPOSES TO TURN DALTON

to supply the troops at Ringgold. The fact of working on the road would hold Johnston at Dalton, unless he intended to leave under any circumstances. Howard’s teams and the depot teams at this place and Bridgeport are in no better condition than those belonging to the divisions, all being composed of such mules as we have been able to keep after a fashion during the winter. Johnston has no idea of leaving Dalton until compelled, and having a force greater than I now have under my immediate command, I cannot drive him from that place.

If Longstreet has retired, why can I not get Granger's two divisions and my first cavalry division back ? The little cavalry I had on the expedition is completely run down from constant work and from want of forage.

It should be observed that while General Thomas had but four divisions of infantry and a small cavalry force with which to advance against General Johnston, the latter had nearly as large a force at Dalton, the last of February, as he had in May, when General Sherman advanced against him with more than one hundred thousand men.

Johnston, referring to his detachment of two divisions to Polk, and the advance of Thomas against Dalton, said in his report:

The force detached was probably exaggerated to Major-General Thomas; for on the 23d the Federal army advanced to Ringgold; on the 24th drove in our outposts; and on the 2 th skirmished at Mill Creek Gap and in the corn valley east of Rocky Face Mountain. We were successful at both places.

General Thomas' despatches to General Grant evince a very clear perception of the situation. He assumed that Johnston's position at Mill Creek Gap, or Buzzard's Roost, if well defended, was impregnable, as was demonstrated in the following May; and that the enemy would not leave Dalton until compelled to do so, which was likewise true. And he discerned the only way to dislodge Johnston, and made it known to General Grant in the following despatch, proposing to turn Dalton and take Atlanta with less than the whole of his own army:-
 
 

Page 210 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Thomas to Grant, February 28, 1864 :-

General Butterfield, by my direction, has recently examined the line between here and Nashville, and reports that he thinks six thousand men will be sufficient to guard that line, two regiments of which force should be cavalry. From what I know of the road between Nashville and Decatur, two thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry will be sufficient to protect that line. One thousand infantry, will be sufficient to protect the line from Athens to Stevenson. Probably both lines of communication can be guarded by six thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, a great portion of which should be made up from the local militia of Tennessee, or troops organized especially for the preservation of order in the State. I believe, if I commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and Fourth corps in front, with Howard's corps in reserve, that I can move along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition, as far, at least, as Atlanta. I should want a strong division of cavalry in advance. As soon as Captain Merrill returns from his reconnoissance along the railroad lines, I can give you a definite estimate of the number of troops required to guard the bridges along the road.

In his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Thomas thus referred to the plan proposed in his despatch to General Grant:-

The above proposition was submitted to General Grant for his approval, and if obtained, it was my intention (having acquired by the reconnoissance of February 23d, 24th, and 2gth a thorough

knowledge of the approaches direct upon Dalton from Ringgold and Cleveland) to have made a strong demonstration against Buzzard's Roost, attracting Johnston's whole attention to that point, and to have thrown the main body of my infantry and cavalry through Snake Creek Gap upon his communications, which, I had ascertained from scouts, he had up to that time neglected to observe or guard. 'With this view I had previously asked for the return to me of Granger's

troops and my cavalry from East Tennessee, and had already initiated preparations for the execution of the above movement as soon as the spring opened sufficiently to admit of it. See the following telegrams in illustration. *

The despatches referred to had relation to the return of his troops from East Tennessee, the repair of the railroad towards Dalton, and the protection of the railroad to Nashville.
 
 

* Report to Com. on Conduct of War, p, 198.
 
 

Page 211 - PLANS OF CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES

His plan of offense was a bold one for a single army, and his purpose was to make it as large as possible, leaving the fewest men behind that could hold the communications securely. The plan itself will appear in another chapter; and although it was not tested when or in the way that General Thomas suggested, its merits cannot be questioned.

From December 1863 to May 1864, the project of a forward movement by the Confederate army at Dalton was discussed by the authorities at Richmond and General Johnston. The latter urged that an increase of his army and additional material were necessary should such a movement be attempted. He proposed that Longstreet's command from East Tennessee and troops from Beauregard's and Folk's departments should be promptly sent to him. Reenforcements to raise his army to seventy-five thousand men were promised, but were not to be sent to him until he should appoint a time for his advance.

The plan formed at Richmond required that he should not attempt to capture fortified places, but to draw out Thomas' troops, if practicable, and force -them to battle in an open field; failing .in this, Johnston was instructed to concentrate all available troops, break Thomas' line at Kingston, East Tennessee, isolating the army at Knoxville, and then to strike and destroy the railroad leading from Nashville to Chattanooga. The sanguine Confederate leaders even hoped that Johnston would be able to move to the rear of Nashville also, and reclaim the " provision country " of Tennessee and Kentucky.

Had seventy five thousand men been given to Johnston when Thomas' army was most scattered and weakest, some, if not all, of these results might have been produced, and had the army that wintered at Dalton, been hurled against Thomas' line where it was weakest, from Cleveland to Kingston, there might have been a serious derangement of the plan of operations from Chattanooga as a base. But the winter and much of the spring passed in the discussion of plans, rather than in preparation for offense or defense, and thus the opportunity was lost.
 
 

Page 212 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

General Johnston, however, anticipated that General Grant would take the offensive with a large army, and on the 18th of March asked for immediate reenforcements to meet Grant in battle should he advance and if successful pursue his defeated army; or should Grant not advance, to take the offensive himself, and proposed, if practicable, to strike near Chattanooga, or to march into Middle Tennessee through North Alabama. Still when General Sherman advanced from Chattanooga in May, with an immense army, or three armies in one, reenforcements from Polk's department had not reached Dalton, and other service had been assigned to General Longstreet.

On the 18th of March General Johnston wrote to General Bragg, chief staff officer to Mr. Davis:-

I expressly accept taking the offensive. Only differ with you as to details. I assume that the enemy will be prepared to advance before we are, and will make it to our advantage. Therefore I propose as necessary, both for the offensive and defensive, to assemble our troops here immediately. Other preparations for advance are going on. *

And yet on the first of May he reported an army of less than forty-five thousand men at Dalton, when the offensive was impracticable.

On the 25th of November, during the action on Missionary Ridge, General Thomas thought of the burial of the officers and men who were then falling as well as those who had yielded their lives on other fields. Previous to the advance which resulted in the rout of the Confederate army, a line of troops in reserve coursed over a hill to the right and rear of Sheridan's position, revealing a suitable configuration for a National cemetery. Subsequently, by his order, this hill was taken for this use. During
 
 

*Johnston's " Narrative of Military Operations," page 298.
 
 

Page 213 - ''TIRED OF STATE RIGHTS"

the preparation of the ground he manifested great interest in the work, and frequently rode out from the town to note the progress and to make suggestions. He provided amply for the work, by detaching troops, at times whole regiments, for this duty. He directed not only that his soldiers should be carefully buried, but that the grounds should be beautified. And through his action in its establishment, and his support of those in charge, he made it the type of the National cemeteries in the West, and caused a change for the better in those in the East. It was meet that the first National cemetery, founded by military order, should give the ideal of the last resting places of the Nation's heroes.

In conferring with General Thomas in regard to the plan of burial, the chaplain in charge asked, if the dead should be buried according to their several states. The general was silent for a moment and then said very positively : " No, no. Mix them up; mix them up. I am tired of state-rights."

Whatever may have been General Thomas' views of this political dogma at the beginning of the war, it is certain that in December 1863, he abhorred it. He rose superior to its claims at the beginning of the struggle, so far at least as to give unhesitating support to the General government in suppressing a rebellion which resulted from its application. He may not have brushed away at once the subtleties by which the ablest statesmen of the South maintained the doctrine. But when he had seen the legitimate fruits, in a gigantic war, and had perceived that the Confederate government had been compelled to infringe upon the recognized rights of states to give vigor to a war, waged for their establishment, he grew "tired of states rights." The logic of war, left no doubt in his mind, that the rights of states, as understood in the South, stood opposed to complete National autonomy.
 
 

Page 214 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

In accordance with his antagonism to state rights, General Thomas supported the government in declaring slaves contraband of war, and in enlisting them as soldiers when their freedom had been proclaimed by the President of the United States. He was too pronounced in his loyalty and too direct and severe in his logic, to falter when extreme measures were adopted. He was, therefore, prepared for the radical solution of the problems of the war as they were developed in the various stages of the conflict. When the enlistment of the manumitted slaves was ordered by the National authorities no department commander performed his duty in giving efficiency to colored regiments more loyally than General Thomas. He gave advice and encouragement to the officers who were engaged in organizing and commanding negro troops in his department. And when these troops exhibited their proficiency in the manual of arms and drill, he was often among the delighted spectators.

General Thomas was strictly observant of the rules of war in relation to the treatment of citizens of the South when within his lines, giving them protection whenever they could justly claim it, and visiting upon them just punishment when they violated the restrictions imposed upon non-combatant enemies. As an illustration of just severity the following order, relating to murders by guerillas, is adduced:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga, Tenn., January 6, 1864

GENERAL ORDERS No. 6.

It having been reported to these headquarters that, between seven and eight o'clock on the evening of the 23d ult., within one and a half miles of the village of Mulberry, Lincoln County, Tenn., a wagon which had become detached from a foraging train belonging to the United States was attacked by guerrillas, and the officer in command of the foraging party, 1st Lieut. Porter, Co. A, 27th Indiana volunteers, the teamster, wagon-master, and two other soldiers who had been sent to load the train (the latter four unarmed) were captured. They were immediately mounted and hurried off, the guerrillas avoiding the road, until their party halted about one o'clock in the morning on the bank of Elk River, where the rebels
 
 

Page 215 - GUERILLA WARFARE

stated they were going into camp for the night. The hands of the prisoners were then tied behind them, and they were robbed of everything of value about their persons. They were next drawn up

in line, about five paces in front of their captors, and one of the latter, who acted as leader, commanded "Ready," and the whole party immediately fired upon them. One of the prisoners was shot through the head and killed instantly, and three were wounded. Lieut. Porter was not hit. He immediately ran, was followed and fired upon three times by one of the party, and finding that he was about to be overtaken, threw himself over a precipice into the river, and succeeding in getting his hands loose, swam to the opposite side, and although pursued to that side and several times fired upon, he, after twenty-four hours of extraordinary exertions and great exposure, reached a house, whence he was taken to Tullahoma, where he now lies in a critical situation. The others after being shot, were immediately thrown into the river. Thus the murder of three men: Newell

E. Orcutt, 9^th Independent Battery, Ohio vol. artillery, John W. Drought, Co. H. 22^nd Wisconsin volunteers, and George W. Jacobs, Co. D, 22^nd Wisconsin volunteers, was accomplished by shooting and drowning. The fourth, James W. Foley, 9^th Independent Battery Ohio vol. artillery, is now lying in hospital, having escaped by getting his hands free while in the water.

For these atrocious, cold-blooded murders, equaling in savage ferocity any ever committed by the most barbarous tribes on the continent, committed by rebel citizens of Tennessee, it is ordered that the property of all other rebel citizens living within a circuit of ten miles of the place where these men were captured, be assessed each in their due proportion according to his wealth, to make up the sum of thirty thousand dollars, to be divided among the families who are dependent upon the murdered men for support:

Ten thousand dollars to be paid to the widow of John W. Drought, of North Cape, Racine County, Wisconsin, for the support of herself and two children.

Ten thousand dollars to be paid to the widow of George W. Jacobs, of Delavan, Walworth County, Wisconsin, for the support of herself and one child.

Ten thousand dollars to be divided between the aged mother and sister of Newell E. Orcutt, of Burton, Geauga County, Ohio.

Should the persons assessed fail within one week after notice shall have been served upon them to pay in the amount of their tax in money, sufficient of their personal property shall be seized and sold at public auction to make up the amount
 
 

Page 216 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.

Major-General H. W. Slocum, U. S. Volunteers commanding Twelfth army corps, is charged with the execution of this order. The men who committed these murders, if caught, will be summarily executed, and any persons executing them will be held guiltless and will receive the protection of this army, and all persons who are suspected of having aided, abetted or harbored these guerrillas will be immediately arrested and tried by military commission.

By command of MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,

WM. D. WHIPPLE, Assist. Adjt-General
 
 

These guerrillas were one day citizens, in pretension, and the next day were engaged in the wanton murder of our soldiers. Extreme measures were imperative to suppress this irregular warfare within the lines of his army, and General Thomas did not hesitate to hold communities responsible for such cowardly and cruel acts. These men had the support of citizens who were protected by the army, and as citizens the criminals themselves were protected. It was just that both classes should be punished as far as this could be done, when the murders could not be traced to individuals. The fines imposed and collected were justly applied to the support of the nearest relatives of the murdered soldiers.

The Army of the Cumberland, under General Thomas, never wantonly destroyed the property of enemies. There were doubtless some cases of unauthorized spoliation and destruction of property. For military reasons, as justified by the laws and usages of war, property was taken by the proper officers, and accounted for to the owners and to the supply departments, beyond this all pillaging was forbidden. And no army during the war was less addicted to pillage than the Army of the Cumberland. By judicious and regular foraging during the East Tennessee campaign General Davis' division was so well supplied, and kept so close in hand as to call forth the official commendation of General Sherman. And this division simply represented the army.
 
 

Page 217 - PREPARING FOR SPRING CAMPAIGN

The months of March and April were especially devoted to preparation for a campaign in Georgia. While General Thomas and his army were thus engaged against difficulties neither few nor easily overcome, there was need of constant watchfulness against probable offense by General Johnston* who, as has been mentioned, was under orders to take the offensive, and the weak points in Thomas' long line invited attack. The fears concerning Longstreet's movements detained the Fourth corps and cavalry in East Tennessee. It was therefore in doubt for several weeks which of the opposing armies would first be ready for offense.

On the 17th of March General Grant assumed command of the Armies of the United States, as lieutenant-general, and on that day General Thomas was informed by him that General W. T. Sherman had been assigned to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. At this time General Thomas ranked General Sherman by date of commission as a major-general of volunteers, but the assignment of the latter to the command of a military division gave him seniority over all department commanders. Appreciating this fact and having committed himself voluntarily to an unprotesting acquiescence in all orders affecting his own position, Thomas quietly accepted the prescribed subordination, --so quietly that it has since been assumed that he preferred an inferior office through fear of the responsibility of chief command.

By the 1st of May the Army of the Cumberland was fully prepared for the meditated campaign. It then comprised about sixty-five thousand men for the field. The appointments of this army were then superb and its organization perfect in detail. General Thomas had anticipated all its wants.

Few generals have been as exhaustive in preparation as he, when time permitted, and fewer still have been so closely observant of details or so thoroughly acquainted with the soldiers of a large army in their minor

Page 218 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

organizations. Lieut-Colonel Wilkinson, commanding the Ninth Michigan regiment, which for a long time was headquarters guard, once said, that he was in constant fear lest General Thomas should evince a more complete knowledge of his regiment than himself. At times the general did not see the regiment for months, and yet he could give the names of the sergeants and the companies to which they severally belonged. He was a close observer, and having a very retentive memory, he often surprised those about him by his intimate knowledge of the minutest details of matters to which he had not seemingly given attention. An illustration of the completeness of General Thomas' professional knowledge is given in the following statement of General Gates P. Thruston :

When I became a member of his staff, as judge advocate, it was a matter of surprise to me to find how remarkably familiar and accomplished he was with all matters of military law and precedent; and other officers of his staff in the various departments often remarked to me that he seemed to know the usage, details and system of each department of service as thoroughly as though he had passed his entire military service in it. During two years in the judge advocate's department I devoted almost my entire time to fitting myself for the duties of the position. I sent to Europe for books, and read everything pertaining to military law and that branch of the service; yet in the preparation of court-martial orders, or in the consid