Page 311 - CONTINGENCIES OF THE CAMPAIGN

The situation at Nashville was, therefore, from first to last, complicated with Sherman's march to the sea. General Canby was patrolling the Mississippi to prevent the transfer of troops from the west bank of that river to Hood; and General Thomas was required at first, to fight before he was fully prepared, and then, when an action was impossible, in order that Canby might move to the support of General Sherman when he should touch the Gulf of Mexico or the Atlantic Ocean, or make a diversion somewhere in the South to prevent a concentration against his army of more than sixty thousand men. It was not enough that this great army should have been eliminated from western operations, detailing upon Thomas a campaign overcharged with embarrassments; but he was also commanded to fight a battle against his own judgment, to release Canby from duty on the Mississippi that he might cooperate with Sherman in the outcome of his march through a State where there was no great army to offer resistance, and but few organized troops to witness his progress, except from safe seclusion.

In his despatch to Thomas, of December 8^th, General Grant mentioned three armies as the support of the rebellion. These, doubtless, were Lee's at Richmond, Hood's at Nashville, and Kirby Smith's, on the right bank of the Mississippi. Two of these were then making effort to unite in order to change the military status in the West. After the battle of Nashville, Grant informed Thomas that he was pursuing one of the two armies upon which the Southern Confederacy rested.

Badeau has given great prominence to the fact that the lieutenant-general had plans, the execution of which General Thomas' delay was defeating. The following quotations will show how damaging this delay was supposed to be:

In the meantime the situation at Nashville was becoming daily more humiliating and dangerous. *
 
 

* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. III., p. 230
 
 

Page 312 - THE LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

In reference to the rupture of telegraphic communication with Chattanooga, this author laments:

"And this was the mortifying sequence, to the great campaigns of Grant and Sherman for Chattanooga and Atlanta."*

It was far from being necessary to risk the security of Tennessee, or the upsetting of Grant's plans at the South and East, as well as the West, in order to raise or equip another thousand or two of horse.+

Thus the delay of Thomas might defeat operations a thousand miles away.++

It was not only Nashville that Grant was considering but Louisville and the country beyond the Ohio. +++

When it is considered that General Grant had said to Thomas, that if he destroyed Hood's army there would be only "one army left to the so-called Confederacy, capable of doing us harm," it seems incredible that Grant had plans of operations that did not have their centres at Richmond and Nashville. If he had plans that looked in other directions, they were extremely vicious. On the supposition that the two armies - Lee's and Hood's - supported the rebellion, General Grant had, in permitting the march to the sea, eliminated Sherman's large army from the final problem, unless that army by a long circuit was to appear at Richmond. If it was anxiety for Sherman, as apart from the relations of his movement to the operations in Virginia, that prompted Grant's urgency for an immediate battle at Nashville, then he turned away from one of the two dominant objectives, to give attention to an incidental military enterprise.

The peremtory order to Thomas to fight regardless of weather and reenforcements, suggests the question: What is the degree of independence ordinarily given to army commanders, conducting operations on fields remote from the stations of the commander-in-chief?

*Mil. His., U. S. Grant, Vol. III. page 231.

+ Ibid, p. 220. ++ Ibid, 220. +++ Ibid, p. 221.
 
 

Page 313 - HIS SELF RELIANCE

The refusal of Thomas to fight when under positive orders to do so, was either an act of insubordination, or one of legitimate independence as an army commander. But whether he was insubordinate, or contending for the independence inherent in his position, General Thomas did refuse to fight; from the 6^th to the 10^th of December, because, in his judgment, his preparations were not adequate, and from the 10^th to the 15^th, because upon trial he had found that he could not safely move his troops to position for battle. He was conducting operations far from the station of General Grant, and as this fact enhanced his responsibility as an army commander, it gave corresponding independence.

When General Rosecrans was peremptorily ordered, in August l863, to move against the enemy, he indignantly inquired of General Halleck whether his order was "intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of moving my troops.''

Halleck's reply was: "The orders for the advance of your army and that its progress be reported daily are peremptory."

But Rosecrans, afterwards had full freedom, as to maneuver and time of battle. And instances are rare, if any can be found, wherein a distant superior denied discretion to .an army commander as to preparations and time of battle. General Thomas' view of his own case was well expressed by him to the writer:

"I thought, after what I had done in the war, that I ought to be trusted to decide when the battle should be fought. I thought I knew better when it should be fought, than any one could know as far off as City Point, Virginia."

This was a strictly personal view, but doubtless underlying it, there was a clear perception of such independence for an army commander as corresponded with his responsibility for results. He did not ask for a long delay, and
 
 

Page 314 - THE LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

was ready for battle in seven days after his last infantry force arrived at Nashville. After that time he was ready, but for five days more a general movement of' his troops to position, or an attack in force, was impossible,

General Grant certainly distrusted Thomas in the peculiar situation at Nashville. He said to Thomas, "It has seemed to me you have been slow;" and said of him, "I fear he is too cautious to take the initiative." But whatever was the degree of Grant's distrust, so long as he retained Thomas in command, he should have given him the discretion which has been generally, if not always, awarded to army commanders, not in the presence of superiors. If Grant meant by stating Thomas was slow, that he was reluctant to fight a battle until he was prepared, Grant was right. If he meant that Thomas was slow in preparing for the battle, Grant was wrong. Thomas was not over cautious at Nashville or any where else. He was bold always, without being rash; and cautious without being timid. No general was more cautious when there was need of caution, and no one ever bolder or more forceful when the time for action came; nor was there ever a general more stubborn when required to act against his own judgment. And it may well be doubted if any general ever did so much in so short a time, towards organizing, equipping and mounting his forces for battle, as did General Thomas between the 1^st and 10^th of December.

With full knowledge of the situation in its interior embarrassments and exterior complications, General Thomas made his preparations and dispositions for attacking Hood's army. He was calm and strong, in resisting the pressure from Washington and City Point, and in his attitude no general has ever been more heroic or patriotic. He was heroic in his independence, and self-reliance, and in his promise to submit without a murmur to loss of command, and in calmly bearing the burden of responsibility, resulting from a state of affairs that had not been regarded as possible by the people of the North.
 
 

Page 315 - HOOD IN FRONT OF NASHVILLE

General Hood took position on the hills south of Nashville on the 2^nd and 3^rd of December. His main line extended from the Hillsboro' turnpike on his left to the Chattanooga railroad on his right. His right was well offered, his left somewhat refused. The railroad embankment, gave protection on his right flank, his left rested on isolated hills partially fortified, and defended by artillery. In his centre was an advanced entrenched line to strengthen his grasp of the Franklin turnpike, his direct line of retreat. The left of this line, almost touched the salient of Thomas' line, held by the Fourth corps. Hood's line was nearly seven miles in length, but did not touch the Cumberland River at either end, and consequently Nashville was not invested even on the south side of the river, though, it is fair to say, all communication between Thomas' army and the country south of it was suspended.

The advance of Hood to Nashville, to drop the offensive before his prominent objective, would have been a mystery if he had not himself explained it. He knew that he was not strong enough for further offense, and that unless re-enforced his campaign must fail before its purpose was well developed. He had had dreams of commanding a great army in Kentucky. He had in fancy established his army in that State, with his left at Richmond, covering by its extension to the right, the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains and the roads into Virginia. In expectation he had defeated Thomas and all other commanders in Tennessee and Kentucky, and had brought support to General Lee in Virginia, in advance of Sherman's aid, by way of Savannah, to Grant. But, in reality, Hood had seated himself to await his expected reenforcements from the right bank of the Mississippi River, hoping, in the meantime, that through a successful defensive he might follow a defeated army into
 
 

Page 316 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Nashville. And if his own estimate of his strength is accepted as true, he was to achieve this crowning success with less than twenty-five thousand men. The plan upon which he was operating was doubtless a good one for a large army such as had existed in his imagination, when first he thought of an advance through Tennessee and Kentucky to Virginia. But it was inviting the doom which soon fell upon him and his people, to sit down before Thomas. Hood's movement through Tennessee had brought no recruits to his army. The watchfulness of General Canby prevented the coming of reenforcements from Kirby Smith. And if Hood had made a hopeful advance from Franklin, the sight of the fortifications before Nashville, and of the forces holding them, had thrown him upon the defensive with no thought of attack, turning movements, or further, advance, except in the remote possibility that a successful defensive and reenforcements should give reality to his visions of victory in the West, and afterward in the East. The army at Nashville was too strong to be attacked and too strong to be put in his rear, by his own advance into Kentucky. If he had anticipated its strength, he would doubtless have waited for his promised reenforcements at Florence. His plan had miscarried, and yet he did not retreat, but waited before Nashville in semblance of offense, until Thomas sallied from his entrenchments to crush him.

Hood's advance to the Tennessee River, as the first step in the execution of a great plan, had been justified by its success. His advance from that river to Nashville, without strength to continue the offensive, regarded by himself as imperative, under the circumstances, resulted in a failure in striking contrast with his first success. Had he marched first to meet his expected reenforcements, and forced for them a passage over the Mississippi, his subsequent northward march might have resulted in victories in Tennessee and Kentucky. But to offer himself in his reported weakness
 
 

Page 317 - HOOD'S HOPES AND PLANS

to Thomas, was the extreme of folly. The issue of the combat at Franklin should have arrested his advance, until at least, his reenforcements had joined him. It is utterly incredible, however, that he could have hoped for success by any turn of fortune with an army of twenty-five thousand men, or that he would be permitted a long waiting for reenforcements.

It is not easy to get the true history of a campaign of such issue from him who planned or conducted it, especially when its failure carried with it, the cause for which the war had been waged. But weak as Hood represented himself to be, he nevertheless acted as if he felt secure on Brentwood Hills. Before the battle he sent a part of his cavalry into Kentucky, and another greater part, with two brigades of infantry to operate against Murfreesboro. And this he certainly would not have done, without strong confidence in his army, and the advantages of the defensive.

In Hood's official report this passage is found:

"On the second of December the army took position in front of Nashville, about two miles from the city. Lieutenant-General Lee's corps constituted our centre, resting upon the Franklin pike, with Cheatham's corps upon the right and. Stewart's on the left and the cavalry on either flank extending to the river. I was causing strong detached works to be built to cover our flanks intending to make them enclosed works, so as to defeat any attempt of the enemy should he undertake offensive movements against our flank, and rear. The enemy still held Murfreesboro with about six thousand men strongly fortified. His also held small forces at Chattanooga and Knoxville, It was apparent that he would soon have to take the offensive to relieve his garrisons at those points or cause them to be evacuated, in which case I hoped to capture the forces at Murfreesboro and should then be able to open communication with Georgia and Virginia. Should he attack us in position I felt that I could defeat him and thus gain possession of Nashville with abundant supplies for the army. This would, give me possession of Tennessee. Necessary steps were taken to furnish the army with supplies which the people were ready and willing to furnish. Shoe shops were in operation in each brigade. We had captured sufficient railroad stock to use the road to Pulaski,
 
 

Page 318 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

and it was already in successful operation. Having possession of that State we should have gained largely in recruits and could sit an early day have moved forward to the Ohio, which would have frustrated the plans of the enemy as developed in his campaign towards the Atlantic coast."

And from his book; "Advance and Retreat," written afterwards, the following passage is quoted:

"After the failure of my cherished plan to crush Schofield's army before it reached its strongly fortified position around Nashville, I remained with an effective force of only twenty-three thousand and fifty-three. I was therefore well aware of our inability to attack the Federals in their new stronghold with any hope of success, although Schofield's troops had abandoned the field at Franklin, leaving their dead and wounded in our possession, and had hastened with considerable alarm into their fortifications which, latter information in regard to their condition after the battle I obtained through spies. I knew equally well that in the absence of the prestige of complete victory, I could not venture with my small force to cross the Cumberland River into Kentucky, without first receiving reenforcements from the Trains-Mississippi Department. I felt convinced that the Tennesseans and Kentuckians would not join our forces, since we had failed in the first instance to defeat the Federal army and capture Nashville. The President was still urgent in his instructions relative to the transference of troops to the Army of the Tennessee from Texas, and I daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their safe passage across the Mississippi River.

Thus, unless strengthened by these long-looked for reenforcements, the only remaining chance of success in the campaign, at this juncture, was to take position, entrench around Nashville and await Thomas' attack, which, if handsomely repulsed, might afford us an opportunity to follow up our advantage on the spot and enter the city on the heels of the enemy.I could not afford to turn southward unless for the special purpose of forming a junction with the expected reenforcements from Texas and with the avowed intention to march back again upon Nashville. In truth, our army was in that condition which rendered it more judicious, the men should face a decisive issue rather than retreat in other words, rather than renounce the honor of their cause without having made a last and manful effort to lift up the sinking fortunes of the Confederacy. I therefore determined to move upon Nashville, to entrench, to
 
 

Page 319 - HOOD’S BLUNDERS

accept the chances of reenforcements from Texas, and even at the risk of an attack in the meantime by overwhelming numbers, to adopt the only feasible means of defeating the enemy with my reduced numbers viz. to await his attack and if favored by success to follow him into his works. I was apprised of each accession to Thomas' army but was still unwilling to abandon the ground as long as I saw a shadow of probability of assistance from the Trans-Mississippi Department, or of victory in battle, and, as I have just remarked, the troops would, I believed, return better satisfied even after defeat if, in grasping at the last straw, they felt that a brave and vigorous effort had been made to save the country from disaster. Such, at the time, was my opinion, which I have since had no reason to alter." *

General Hood's first blunder in the conduct of the campaign was in not attacking General Sherman at Gaylesville when he had only sixty thousand men; his second was waiting so long at Florence without effort to help his promised reenforcements across the Mississippi River; the third was his failure to crush Schofield at Spring Hill; and the fourth was his offer of himself to Thomas, to be crushed.

On the whole, though entrenched, Hood's army grew weaker day by day. It was not well supplied, and the outcome of this semblance of a siege was doubtful in the extreme in the view of all the thoughtful men of that army. The dropping of the offensive by an army which was to have been inspired by constant advance and success, of itself impaired the morale of the Confederate troops.

With the National army the case was radically different. Organization, discipline and conscious advance in preparations for battle and pursuit, gave spirit and purpose to the soldiers within: the entrenchments at Nashville.

The corps commanders at Nashville, were Major-General John M. Schofield, commanding Twenty-third corps; Major-General Andrew J. Smith, commanding Sixteenth corps; Major-General James B. Steedman, commanding a provisional corps, comprising his own forces from the District of
 
 

* " Advance and Retreat," pp. 899, 300.
 
 

Page 320 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

the Etowah, the garrison of Nashville under Brigadier-General John F. Miller, and the employees of the quartermaster's department, under Brigadier- General James L. Donaldson; Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, commanding Fourth corps; and Brevet Major-General James H.Wilson, chief of the cavalry of the Military Division of the Mississippi, commanding the Cavalry corps of that military division.

These generals were called together for consultation twice, before the battle of Nashville. The first meeting was called by General Thomas even alter he received his peremptory order to attack the enemy. He then made known the nature of the orders which he had received from General Grant, and that he had decided that obedience was impracticable. This meeting was informal and not in all respects in the form of a council of war. The commanding general, contrary to the custom or law which obtains in such councils, opened the conference with an announcement of his own decision. The other generals, however, observed the authoritative usage of councils of war, and expressed their view's in the inverse order of their rank unanimously sustaining General Thomas in his purpose to withhold battle until the ice should melt.

The second meeting was held at 3 P. M., on the 14^th. The ice had melted and a battle was practicable on the following day. This meeting was in form a council of war. The commanding general requested suggestions as to a plan of battle, and the corps commanders spoke in the inverse order of their rank. But insofar as it was in reality a council of war, It was a departure from General Thomas' usual course in forming plans. It is not, therefore, probable that had he been in command of his own army, he would have invited his ranking subordinates to suggest a plan of battle. No general ever sustained more cordial relations with his officers of all grades, but no commander was more independent of their aid in forming
 
 

Page 321 - HIS PLAN OF BATTLE

his plans. It is probable, if not certain, that had the Army of the Cumberland, in its unity, been at Nashville, he would have announced his plan to his corps commanders before inviting suggestions from them. But having three corps commanders, from three distinct armies, he requested suggestions, although from his official mention of this meeting, it is evident that his chief object in calling them together, was to make known his own plan and give the necessary instructions for its effective execution. At this time, and ever afterwards, he regarded General Schofield as unfriendly to himself, and this conviction may have moved him, to defer in full measure to his subordinates.

In nothing was General Thomas' independence and self reliance more fully manifested than in his habit of forming plans in all situations, and his boldness in suggesting them to his superiors in rank. To himself, in advance of experiment, his own plans were always demonstrably practicable. And no plan of his was ever put upon trial with resultant failure. For his superiors to adopt his suggestions was to succeed, to reject them was to fail.

In this meeting at Nashville, General Wood proposed a plan, which General Thomas said would be adopted with some added details. He approved General Wood's plan, doubtless, because it harmonized with his own previously formed. He expected to deliver battle on the 10^th, and his plan for it must have been matured before that day.

Immediately after the adjournment of the conference, or council of war, General Thomas announced his plan of operations with unusual precision, as follows:

"Major-General A. J. Smith commanding detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on and near the Harding pike in front of his present position, will make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left. Major-General Wilson commanding the Cavalry corps Military Division of the Mississippi, with three divisions will move on and support General Smith's right, assisting
 
 

Page 322 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORG H. THOMAS

as far as possible, in carrying the left of the enemy's position, and be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable opportunity occurs. Major-General Wilson will also send one division on the Charlotte pike, to clear that road of the enemy and observe in the direction of Bell’s Landing to protect our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it will rejoin the main force. Brigadier-General T. J. Wood commanding Fourth corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Lawren's Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the Fourth corps on the Hillsboro' pike to support General Smith's left and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced positions on the Montgomery Hill. Major-General Schofield commanding Twenty-third army corps will replace Brigadier-General Kimball's division of the Fourth corps with his troops, and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Lawren's Hill with a strong skirmish line. He will move the remainder of his force in front of the works and cooperate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the enemy. Major-Gen. Steedman, commanding District of Etowah, will occupy the interior line in rear of his present position, stretching from the reservoir on the Cumberland River at Fort Negley with a strong skirmish line, and mass the remainder of his force in its present position to act according to the exigencies which may arise during these operations. Brigadier-General Miller with troops forming the garrison of Nashville, will occupy the interior line from the battery on hill 210 to the extreme right, including the enclosed work on the Hyde's Ferry road. The quartermaster's troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the battery on hill 210. The troops occupying the interior line will be under the direction of Major-General Steedman, who is charged with the immediate defense of Nashville during the operations around that city. Should the weather permit, the troops will be formed to commence operations at 6 A. M. on the 15^th, or as soon thereafter as practicable."

General Thomas subsequently slightly modified this plan by directing Genera Steedman to make a feint against the enemy's right to veil the effort to turn his left.

In outline this plan did not depart radically from the type most frequently adopted a feint to conceal the real attack, - but in the details, in the tactical combinations, in the close relation of the various assaults, and in the determination
 
 

Page 323 - NASHVILLE -- FIRST DAY

of the strength of the various attacking columns, there was displayed generalship that will bear comparison with the skill of the most famous soldiers of the world. For the first time in his career, Thomas was permitted to plan a great battle for himself, and it was historically meet that the general who had never failed to originate plans of operations, or to suggest modifications of those formed by superiors in rank, which were not exactly coincident with the conditions necessary for their successful execution, should for his last and greatest battle, form a plan which with only slight modifications, made by himself, was carried out with transcendent results.

Seldom has a battle been fought in more exact conformity to plan, than the battle of Nashville, and this is true, not only in comparison with the great battles of our civil war, but also in comparison with those of Europe, fought by the great masters of war. The leading features of the plan, and of the battle itself, were the feint upon the enemy's right, and the combinations of infantry and cavalry in overwhelming' attacks upon his left, resulting in doubling up successive portions of his line, and finally dislodging him altogether. It was unlike the typical battle of the Confederate commanders -- massing so heavily against a flank as to forbid a strong general line of battle. Thomas made provision for a strong line of battle throughout its entire length, for overwhelming attacking columns, for a feint which might have been easily changed to a successful turning movement, and for security to his rear in the event of unsuccessful offense. Hood's hope of following a defeated army into the city of Nashville would not have been realized had he repulsed every attack made upon his entrenched army. In these respects and others, the battle of Nashville was distinctive, illustrating generalship which comprehended the minutest details, as well as the grandest combinations.
 
 

Page 324 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

The morning of the 15^th was foggy, and under the veil of densest mist, the cavalry and infantry made the movements required by the orders of the commanding general, though the cavalry were delayed by the march of Smith's infantry, to the left, across their front instead of their rear, as was understood and agreed between Wilson and Smith.

About 8 o'clock the fog had so far lifted, that it was deemed advisable to open the battle, and Brigadier-General W. D. Whipple, chief of staff; bore an order to General Steedman to move in feint against the enemy's right. This feint was vigorously executed by Colonel Morgan's brigade of colored troops, and Lieut.-Colonel Grosvenor's provisional brigade, producing the impression upon General Hood that his right flank was in danger. He consequently sent troops thither from his centre and left.

In the meantime, the cavalry divisions, some of them by a long circuit had reached the rear of the enemy's left flank. This device having caused Hood to concentrate on his right, the movement to turn his left by a combination of infantry and cavalry was put upon trial. General Smith's corps had been formed with Garrard's division on the left of the Harding turnpike, McArthur's on the right of that road, and Colonel Moore's in reserve. General Wilson had connected Hatch's division of cavalry with McArthur's right, and posted Croxton's brigade on the right of Hatch, holding Knipe's division in reserve. These forces, thus formed, wheeled to the left, and carried several of the enemy's advanced positions. The cavalry, after getting within reach of the enemy, assaulted on foot, and fell upon him, in flank and rear, simultaneously with the direct attack of infantry in front. In this initial assault, four guns and one hundred and fifty prisoners were captured. A second position was carried in the same manner. The cooperation of infantry and cavalry was so perfect, that while each force claimed the captured guns and prisoners, they were rightly common property. Subsequently General Hatch in
 
 

Page 325 - NASHVILLE -- FIRST DAY

independent movement carried a position farther to the right, and captured a battery without the direct aid of infantry. Garrard carried a. position on the left of the Hillsboro' road and Wood was equally successful. His corps had been. formed with Elliott's division on the right, Kimball's in the centre, and Beatty's on the left, each division providing its own resent. Wood first carried Montgomery Hill, with Post's brigade of Beatty's division supported by Streight's; and afterwards each division of the Fourth corps carried the enemy's entrenched line in its front.

The lines of advance were converging, and General Thomas, after the first successful assaults, made new dispositions. He moved Schofield's corps from reserve in rear of Wood and Smith, to the right of the latter. Schofield then advanced beyond the redoubts first captured by Wilson and Smith, crossed the Hillsboro' road, and a valley beyond, and drove the enemy from hills overlooking the Granny White turnpike. On the extreme left, Steedman was equally successful; Colonels Morgan and Grosvenor turned the enemy's right flank, and Colonel Thompson, commanding a brigade of colored troops, crossed Brown's Creek, and carried the left of Hood's fortifications on the Nolensville turnpike.

In this action the enemy was forced from his first and second lines and pressed back to an entirely new position, where he spent the night in making defenses. General Thomas was successful in every operation, and although the victory was not yet decisive he and his army felt the strongest assurance of the utter defeat of the enemy when a new day should give opportunity to renew the conflict.

In accordance with his disposition to underestimate his own failures, General Hood, in his report of the battle and in his book, only admitted that, towards evening, he lost the outposts on his left with the artillery and small force holding them, while in fact he gave up his entire position - his
 
 

Page 326 -  LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

advanced line and his main line, - and he lost seventeen guns and twelve hundred men by capture. He thus mentioned his change of position.

"Finding that the main movement of the Federals was directed against our left, the chief engineer was instructed to carefully select a line in prolongation of the left flank; Cheatham's corps was withdrawn from the right during the night of the 15^th and posted on the left of Stewart -- Cheatham's left flank resting near the Brentwood Hills. In this position the men were ordered to construct breastworks during that same night."*

Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee's report furnishes evidence of the abandonment of their first position:

"During the night Cheatham's corps was withdrawn from my right and moved to the extreme left of the army. The army then took position about one mile in rear of its original line, my corps being on the extreme right."

General Hood, in taking a new position and preparing for further defense, expressed confidence in his army, although he complained that its morale had been impaired by General Johnston holding it to the defensive for a long period behind fortifications. Had Hood so elected he could have retreated during the night of the 15^th, far more easily, and with less demoralization to his troops, than after a second defeat; that he did not then retreat gives proof of the wildest infatuation. No general with common prudence, with an army of such reported weakness, would have taken position for battle, against an army such as Hood's own belief gave to Thomas. And it taxes the most expansive credulity to put the least faith in Hood's statements, that during the action of the 16^th, he formed a. plan for offense against such an army. If his army was not stronger than he represented it to be, nothing but the expectation of reenforcements from the southwest justified his remaining
 
 

* " Advance and Retreat," page 302.
 
 

Page 327 - NASHVILLE -- FIRST DAY

before Nashville until Thomas was ready for battle. To continue the conflict after the action of the 15^th with the expectation that ulterior offense would be possible, evinced madness rather than generalship.

It was not known on the evening of the 15^th, whether Hood would retreat or await another attach, General Thomas, therefore, gave instructions to his corps commanders, which had reference alike to battle or pursuit.

Thomas and his army thought only of decisive victory as the issue of further fighting, and in this belief the authorities at Washington, General Grant and the Northern people fully sympathized. The lieutenant-general, en route to Nashville, halted at Washington, and in common with the President and the Secretary of War, sent official congratulations to Thomas. General Logan turned back from Louisville, because the condition upon which he was to take command of the army had passed away. And throughout the North the rebound from extreme anxiety intensified the joy which the news of battle and success produced.
 
 

Page 328

HOOD'S new line, shorter by two and a half miles than the former one, coursed over the detached hills in front of the main Brentwood range. A series of hills on the east, trending south west, and another on the west, trending southeast, form at their termination in these directions the Brentwood Gap, through which the Franklin road passes. His left having been driven back so far, was necessarily well refused, bending back at right angles at a point near Schofield's position. This angle was upon a. fortified hill, and from that point the line extended southward to another hill, also fortified. The right rested at Overton Hill, another entrenched position.

During the night General Schofield felt uneasy, being on the right of the infantry and not far from the enemy, and requesting reenforcements, Colonel Moore's division of Smith's corps was sent to him and placed by him in reserve. The entrenchment of his position gave additional evidence of Schofield's disquietude.

Hood's right had been withdrawn so far during the night, that the forenoon of the 16^th was spent in developing his new position in that quarter. Early in the morning Wood, in compliance with the order of General Thomas, advanced to the Franklin road, and formed his corps with Elliott's division on the right of that road, Beatty's on the left of it, and Kimball's in reserve. He then advanced three-fourths of a mile and encountered the
 
 

Page 329 - NASHVILLE – SECOND DAY

enemy's skirmish line, behind barricades a half mile in front of his main line. In concert with Wood's movement, Smith on his right and Steedman on his left, advanced to the immediate presence of the enemy. To protect the rear of the left flank of the army, Steedman ordered Colonel J. G. Mitchell's brigade of Cruft's provisional division to advance and hold Riddle's Hill. Wilson moved to the rear of Hood's left as rapidly as practicable. He had his corps in hand, Johnson's division having removed to the Hillsboro' turnpike from the extreme right towards Bell's Landing, in consequence of the retirement of the enemy from his front during the night. Hood's forces in front of Hammond's brigade were very demonstrative early in the day, and skirmished sharply to resist Wilson's advance.

The rough and slippery ground and the dense forest between the cavalry and Hood's left flank greatly retarded Wilson's movement, it being necessary for his men to dismount and advance on foot. But by noon he had formed a continuous line of skirmishers in front of Hatch's division and Hammond's brigade of Knipe's division, while Croxton's brigade was in readiness to support Hatch or Hammond. This line of cavalry was parallel to the enemy's line of infantry, facing towards Nashville, or to the north, its left connecting with Schofield's right. General Schofield's line faced to the east, except a part on the left, which curved around the angle in the enemy's line. The remainder of the line of infantry - Smith's Wood's and Steedman's - looked directly to the south. The enemy's flank, therefore, was in a pocket, our lines facing it on the north, west and south.
 
 

Page 330 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

General Thomas gave in his report a full account of the preliminary operations of the 16th, in compliance with his instructions of the previous evening.

"At 6 A. M. on the l6th Wood's corps pressed back the enemy's skirmishers across the Franklin pike to the eastward of it, and then swinging slightly to the right, advanced due south from Nashville, driving the enemy before him, until he came upon his new main line o f works, constructed during the night on what is called Overton's Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the Franklin pike. General Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville pike and formed his command on the left of General Wood, effectually securing the latter's left flank, and made preparations to cooperate in the operations of the day. General A. J. Smith's command moved out on the right of the Fourth corps (Wood's) and, establishing connection with General Wood's right, completed the new line of battle. General Schofield's troops remained in the position taken up by them at dark on the day previous, facing eastward and towards the enemy's left flank, the line of the corps running perpendicular to General Smith's troops. General Wilson's cavalry, which had rested for the night at the six-mile post on the Hillsboro pike, was dismounted and formed on the right of Schofield's command, and by noon of the 16^th, had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear and stretched across the Granny White pike, one of his two outlets towards Franklin. As soon as the above dispositions were completed, and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued. Our entire line approached to within six hundred yards of the enemy's at all points. His centre was weak as compared to. either his right at Overton's Hill, or his left on the hills bordering tho Granny White pike, Still I had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin."

General Thomas rode to the six-mile post on the Hillsboro' turnpike, and met General Wilson between 9 and 10 A. M. Wilson was then endeavoring to carry out the original plan of battle, by making efforts to gain the rear of the enemy's line of battle, but meeting stronger opposition than he had anticipated, he suggested to General Thomas that the cavalry should be transferred to operate against Hood's right flank. General Thomas, however, directed him to continue his movement, as already begun, until he found it impracticable to attain the end in view, in which

event, the cavalry corps might be moved to the opposite flank. Wilson then reenforced Hatch's and Hammond's dismounted skirmishers, and by noon reached the rear of Hood's left flank. The attainment of this position by Wilson was to be the signal for a general attack from right to left, Wilson and Schofield to take the initiative in conjunction.
 
 

Page 331 - SCHOFIELD'S DELAY

When the cavalry, at noon, had gained position in the rear of Hood's left flank, Wilson sent a messenger to inform Generals Thomas and Schofield that he was ready to move against the enemy. Schofield, however, did not advance, but at l P. M. requested reenforcements. General Thomas was so anxious that the prescribed cooperative attack should be made, that at first he directed General Smith to send another division to Schofield But when Smith protested against being left close to the enemy with only one division, Thomas sent General Whipple, his chief of staff, to ascertain if Schofield needed reenforcements. General Whipple having reported that it was not necessary to take a second division from Smith, General Thomas revoked the order which required that one should be sent.

In the meantime General Wilson, being very impatient at the delay of Schofield, sent one staff officer after another to Thomas to make known his readiness to attack, and finally rode round the left of Hood's line to learn the cause of the failure of the infantry to attack.

At 3 P.M. Generals Wood and Steedman, weary of waiting, attacked Hood's right flank, on Overton Hill, with Post's and Thompson's brigades supported by Streight's. This assault, though vigorous and well sustained, was unsuccessful, except in causing General Hood to send troops to his right from his centre and left.

After this action on his left, General Thomas rode towards his right flank to hasten, if possible, the cooperative attack by Schofield and Wilson. As he reached the position of the Sixteenth corps, Smith referred to him a request from General McArthur for permission to assault the salient of Hood's line directly in front of Couch's division of the Twenty-third corps. Thomas said:

"No; the prescribed order of attack gives the initiative to General Schofield in conjunction with the cavalry, and I desire the maintenance of this order; I will ride to General Schofield's position and hasten his attack."
 
 

Page 332 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

When he met Schofield he directed him to advance against the fortified position in his front. Schofield was reluctant to move from fear of the loss an assault would produce, and Thomas said: "The battle must be fought, if men are killed."

While the matter was under discussion Thomas looked to the left, and observing that McArthur was moving upon the angle in the enemy's line, said to General Schofield: "General Smith is attacking without waiting for you; please advance your entire line."

At this moment General Wilson called the attention of the commanding general to the movement of the cavalry upon the fortified hill, on the extreme flank of Hood's line. Both assaults were successful, and, almost at the same instant, McArthur's division moving southward, carried the angle of Hood's line, and Wilson's troops, moving in the opposite direction and striking the enemy in reverse, gained the other important position.

When the shout of victory from the right was heard the divisions of the Fourth corps and Steedman's troops moved upon the enemy with resistless force, and Hood's right was as quickly routed as his left had been. The combined attack of Smith and Wilson was made at 3.30 P. M. and by 4 P. M., the left half of Hood's army was in confused retreat. A few minutes later the other half was routed. But unfortunately night was too near at 4.30 P. M. on a dark foggy afternoon in December, for the triumphant army to gather the fruits of such a victory. Had the attack on the right been made at noon the result would have been different. As it was, Hood's army was utterly broken, his troops ill confusion and panic rushed towards Brentwood pass, but the darkness arrested pursuit by the infantry.
 
 

Page 333 - McARTHUR'S ASSAULT

Referring to the delay on the part of Schofield, General Smith wrote in his official report:

"The Twenty-third corps was on my right in the entrenchments thrown up by them the night before and nearly at right angles with my present line. Expecting that corps to take the initiative as they were on the flank of the enemy, I held the command in its present position, keeping up a slow artillery fire at their line without eliciting any reply. About 1 o'clock I received a request from General Schofield and a few minutes later, an order from you (Thomas) to send another division to his assistance, he having retained the one sent at daylight that morning, not having any reserve and my whole line being immediately in front of the enemy and liable to be attacked and broken at any point wherever a brigade should be withdrawn, I therefore sent a staff officer to him to state the condition of my command and ascertain if he could not get along without the division. The officer reported to me that General Schofield's line was not engaged, and upon the condition being reported to him, that he said he did not need the additional force, consequently it was not sent. About 3 o'clock P. M., General McArthur sent word that he could carry the line on his right by assault. Major-General Thomas being present the matter was referred to him and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from General Schofield to whom he had sent. General McArthur not receiving any reply and fearing if the attack should be longer delayed, the enemy would use the right to strengthen his works, directed the first brigade Colonel W. L. McMillen, Ninety-fifth Ohio infantry, commanding, to storm the hill on which was the left of the enemy's line, and the second and third brigades of the division to attack in front, when the first should be half-way up the hill."

General Schofield presented the case as follows :

"During the morning, therefore, our operations were limited to preparations for defense, and cooperation with the cavalry, which was operating to strike the Granny White pike in the rear of the enemy. About noon the troops on my left (Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with the enemy in his new position, the enemy again withdrew from his left a considerable force to strengthen his right and centre, when I ordered General Cox to advance, in conjunction with the cavalry, and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the enemy's entrenched line and overlooking the Granny White pike. The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force but was not entrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or energy which I
 
 

Page 334 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS
 
 

had expected, yet probably with as much as I had reason to expect, considering the attenuated character of General Cox's line, and the great distance and the rough ground over which the attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by General Wilson's cavalry, (dismounted) whose gallantry and energy on that and other occasions which, came under my observation, cannot be too greatly praised. Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right, the salient hill, in front of General Couch, was attacked and carried by General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's division, and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which constituted, the extreme flank of the enemy's entrenched line, was attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General Cox's division, the latter capturing eight pieces of .artillery and two to three hundred prisoners.''

General Hood distinctly recognized the effect of McArthur's assault:

"About 3.30 P. M., the Federals concentrated a number of guns against a portion of one line, which passed over a mound on the left of our centre, and which had been occupied during the night. This point was favorable for massing troops for an assault under cover of artillery. Accordingly the enemy availed himself of the advantage presented, massed a body of men - apparently one division - at the base of this mound, and under the fire of artillery which prevented our men from raising their heads above the breastworks, made a sudden and gallant charge up to and over our entrenchments. Our line thus pierced, gave way; soon thereafter it broke at all points, and I beheld, for the first and only time, a Confederate army abandon the field in confusion." *

General Hood made no reference to the cavalry which gained his rear and assaulted his line in reverse, in conjunction with the direct attack of infantry in front, but during the action of the 16^th, he sent this despatch to General Chalmers :

"For God's sake drive the Yankee cavalry from our left and rear, or all is lost."

This message was captured by General Wilson and sent to General Thomas at noon on the 16^th .
 
 

* "Advance and Retreat," pp. 302 and 303.
 
 

Page 335 - WILSON'S CAVALRY

In fact the action of the cavalry in this battle was one of its remarkable features, and justified all the efforts of Thomas and Wilson to re-mount and equip as large a force as possible. It is true that this was done primarily to resist the enemy's cavalry and reap the fruits of victory in pursuit, but when through the mistake of Hood, only one division of his cavalry presented itself on his left flank, Wilson's forces, mounted and dismounted, established a precedent for the fighting of cavalry which may be the prophecy of a complete revolution in the methods and operations of that arm. In no battle of the war did cavalry perform a more brilliant part, and in no other was such an opportunity afforded to troopers. Had the cavalry been equally divided to operate upon the flanks of the infantry instead of being massed on the right, the battle of Nashville would have lost one of its salient features. General Thomas gave Wilson an opportunity to show what cavalry can do to dislodge an entrenched enemy, and cavalry had never before been employed so admirably and effectively in a great battle. It was a different office from that given to the tens of thousands of horsemen who followed Mural in the wars of Napoleon, but an equally effective one, though less imposing in movement and charge. At Nashville the cavalry had something to do, beyond the development of the enemy's position and guarding the flanks of infantry lines, – their frequent service in battle. In this action, Wilson's corps assaulted the enemy's entrenched lines, in independent movement and also in cooperation with the infantry. It is true that they dismounted to attack, but they rode to position, in some instances by a circuit of twenty miles, and in no case in less than five.

A large force of cavalry was a condition of the decisive victory at Nashville, since by the unprecedented cooperation of cavalry and infantry the pivotal advantages were gained. The infantry on the left had no direct help from the cavalry, but on the right the turning movements were made by Wilson, and by his cooperation the strongest positions of the enemy on that part of his line were carried.
 
 

Page 336 -  LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

The achievements of Wilson's corps stand against all possible criticism, as the justification of all the efforts that had been made to give it efficiency, and fully compensated for the consequent postponement of the action. The fact that General Thomas had been a cavalry officer for many years, may account in part for his desire to equip as large a force of this arm as was possible, but doubtless the paramount reason, was his belief that a strong corps of cavalry could be effectively used at Nashville.

This battle, in its conduct, immediate results, and remote effects, takes rank with the great battles of the world. Each distinct operation was a connected part of the whole, measured and adjusted in the mind of him, who not only planned the battle, but gave it unity and force by special instructions to his corps commanders before it occurred, and during its progress. By it one of the two great armies of the Confederacy was eliminated from the final problem, and with the total overthrow of that army, the very cause which it had so long and so gallantly sustained was lost.

The change in the grand strategy made General Thomas chief were he had been subordinate. Deprived of two corps of his army, with "broken forces," he smote to death one half of the rebellion. Denied permission to go with Sherman to the sea, he was given the grandest opportunity for patriotic service and martial fame which the war afforded.

The estimates of the .strength of the two armies engaged at Nashville have been exceedingly conflicting. General Thomas' estimate of the strength of Hood's army, when it advanced from Florence, was based upon the reports of the generals who were operating against its northward movement. He made preparations to meet in battle an army of, at least, fifty thousand men. And prior to the publication of General Hood's estimate of the strength of his army it was generally believed that he had this number of men of all arms. It is not unusual for defeated generals to underestimate their forces, and Hood has certainly done this in accounting for his failure.
 
 

Page 337 - HOOD'S ESTIMATE OF HIS FORCE

But if his army was no larger than he has represented it, his rashness in advancing to Nashville has no parallel in the war. Generals have often been compelled to enter upon defensive campaigns with forces inferior to those of their enemies, but they have not often taken the offensive when their objects and hopes have been so out of proportion to the strength of their armies. Beauregard, as well as Hood, is open to the charge of extreme rashness, if the army which he sent upon remote aggression was as weak as it was reported to be by its commander.

On December 6^th General Beauregard thus concluded a long letter to the Confederate President, in which he discussed the prominent features of the situation in the West:

"Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas' army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky, and, perhaps Ohio, and thus prevent him from reenforcing Grant. Meanwhile supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources."

His endorsement upon General Hood's report of the Tennessee campaign expresses the belief that Hood had a larger army than Thomas, until the latter was reenforced at Nashville. He wrote:

"It is clear to my mind, that after the great loss of life at Franklin, the army was no longer in a condition to make a successful attack on Nashville, a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being reenforced constantly by river and railroad."
 
 

* See Appendix.
 
 

Page 338 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

had all his forces at Nashville, except Jackson's division of cavalry and two brigades of infantry.

It is demonstrable from other facts that Hood greatly underestimated the strength of his army at Nashville.

According to the report of Colonel Parkhurst, provost-marshal general of the Army of the Cumberland, Hood lost during the Tennessee campaign, about fifteen thousand men by capture and desertion. To this number should be added for his total loss, the killed in battle and skirmish, which at Franklin alone was seventeen hundred and fifty, and the unreported desertions. He had eighteen thousand men, infantry and artillery, at Tupelo, Miss., Jan. 10^th, l865. If to this number his cavalry is added, whose approximate strength was nine thousand, a loss of nearly thirty thousand is shown. And yet he claimed that he lost only ten thousand men in the campaign.*

Hood's return on November 6th, 1864, is as follows:

Effective total present,...........................30,600

Total present,.........................................40,740

Aggregate present,.................................44,719

The "effective total" included Jackson's division of cavalry, but did not embrace Forrest's corps - Buford's and Chalmers' divisions - nor the infantry reenforcements which joined his army at Florence later in the month. These added, his "aggregate present" comprised from fifty-five to sixty thousand men, when he crossed the Tennessee River. But General Hood made his 30,600 "effectives", as reported November 6^th, the basis of all his subsequent estimates of strength and losses, in the different stages of his campaign. He asserted twice, in the book published after his death, that his cavalry numbered 2306 men.** But this was the number of "effectives"  reported for Jackson's division alone. The exact number of men embraced in the three
 
 

* "Advance and Retreat," page 335.

** "Advance and Retreat," pp. 298, 310
 
 

Page 339 - STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES

divisions of cavalry, under General Forrest, is not known, since returns for Buford's and Chalmers' divisions, during the Tennessee campaign are not found in the archive office at Washington. Colonel Kniffin's table, comprising extracts from consolidated returns for Dec. 10^th, gives an aggregate, exclusive of two brigades of cavalry, of fifty thousand and thirteen men.* General Hood admitted a loss of seven thousand five hundred and forty-seven men before he reached Nashville,** and if this number is added to the aggregate on December 10^th, as given by Colonel Kniffin, he had at Florence an army of fifty-seven thousand five hundred and sixty men. Now General Hood stated that he had less than twenty thousand "effectives" at Nashville, after deducting the force under General Forrest at Murfreesboro'.*** But he had at Nashville all of his forces except Jackson's division of cavalry and two brigades of infantry. In his official report the following statements are made:

I had sent Major General Forrest with the greatest part of his cavalry and Bate's division of infantry to Murfreesboro' to ascertain if it was possible to take the place. After a careful examination, and reconnoisance in force, in which, I am sorry to say, the infantry behaved badly, it was determined that nothing could be accomplished by assault. Bate's division was withdrawn, leaving Forrest with Jackson's and Buford's cavalry in observation. Mercer's and Palmer's brigades of infantry were sent to replace Bate's division. Shortly afterwards, Buford's division was withdrawn and ordered to the right of the army on the Cumberland River.

General Thomas had at Nashville about fifty thousand men for offensive operations. A large part of this aggregate was not heavily engaged on either day of battle. General Schofield lost from his corps, which was only slightly engaged on either day, eleven men killed, and one hundred and fifty-three wounded.
 
 

* See Appendix. ** "Advance and Retreat," page 298.

*** Ibid, page 305.
 
 

Page 340 - LIFE. OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

In striking contrast with this loss of a corps, General Smith lost from one brigade, on the second day, three hundred and fifteen killed and wounded. On that day Moore's division, from Smith's command, being in reserve to Schofield, was not in the action.

It is therefore evident, that Hood having a larger army than reported, and having entrenched positions, had superior advantages at the battle of Nashville. And yet his strong positions were carried by forces that, in all probability, did not outnumber his own.

Badeau, in estimating the strength of Thomas' army at Nashville, is scarcely less inaccurate than was General Hood, in estimating his own army. Badeau thus states Thomas' strength:

"The interior works were manned by quartermaster’s employees, so that all the enlisted troops of the command could be put into action.* Thomas' infantry was now fifty-five thousand strong, Hood's about twenty-two thousand. The National cavalry in front of Nashville numbered twelve thousand, the rebel, seventeen hundred." **

This aggregate of sixty-seven thousand men is contrasted, in the same sentence with Hood's aggregate of twenty-three thousand, seven hundred, and the sentence itself forms part of a general account of General Thomas' dispositions for battle. And yet according to the return which he quotes, the fifty-five thousand infantry included, besides, the garrison of Nashville, all the troops at Murfreesboro' and Chattanooga, and intermediate posts. Whatever may have been the intention of Badeau, his confused statements are quite as misleading as meditated deception could have made them.
 
 

* It was not the intention of Thomas, at any time, to put all his enlisted troops into the action.

** Mil. Hist., U. S. Grant, Vol. III., page 251.
 
 

Page 341 - HIS JUDGMENT VINDICATED BY VICTORY

If, however it is true that Thomas overestimated Hood's army, so did Grant and other generals. If Thomas gathered superabundant resources and made superfluous preparations, his action in this respect may be set over against Grant's excessive fear that direful consequences would follow the postponement of battle for a few days. Thomas did not expect the advance of Hood's' army into Kentucky, Grant did. The lieutenant-general feared that Hood would detach from his army to operate against remote cities, when he had abandoned the offensive and was hoping for victory, as the result of a successful defense, or the coming of expected reenforcements from Texas, while Thomas quietly but energetically, made his preparations for a battle in which he routed and destroyed Hood's army.

Thomas' losses were light as compared with results and in view of the fact that his army attacked an entrenched enemy. Only three hundred and eighty-seven men were killed, twenty-five hundred and fifty-eight wounded, and one hundred and twelve captured or missing, in aggregate three thousand and fifty-seven.

General Grant thus referred to the battle of Nashville in his "Report of the operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to command":

"Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient, over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased. upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared, he would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started west to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City I received General Thomas' despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed, I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General. Thomas immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment."
 
 

Page 342 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

In this report General Grant explicitly admits that Thomas could not attack at the time that he ordered him to do so, "without regard to weather or reenforcements," but he maintains that the battle should have been fought before the inclement weather prevented. From his point of view, this is the best representation of the case that he could have made.

However, the consequences of delay were not such as Grant feared. The cavalry force sent into Kentucky did no harm, and was promptly followed and driven back into Tennessee by General E. M. McCook, with two brigades of his division. It is true that Hood entrenched his position in front of Nashville, but this did not prevent defeat. Had Thomas attacked Hood, as soon as he had taken position, he would have found an entrenched line. In the last stages of the war no army, even when on the offensive, ever encamped for a night near the enemy, without entrenching. Hood entrenched his second position, the night after he lost his first.

General Sherman, also admits that the battle vindicated General Thomas:

Meantime, on the 15^th and 16^th of December were fought in front of Nashville the great battles, in which General Thomas so nobly fulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully given in his own official reports, long since published. Rumors of these great victories reached us at Savannah by piecemeal, but his official report came on the 2?th of December, with a letter from General Grant, giving in general terms the events up to the 18^th, and I wrote at once through my chief of staff, General Webster, to General Thomas complimenting him in the highest terms. His brilliant victory at Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah, to make a complete whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended by Mr. Lincoln, who recognized it fully in his personal letter of December 26^th, hereinbefore quoted at length, and which I also claimed at the time in my Special Field Order, No. 6, of January 8, 1865. *
 
 

* Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 219,
 
 

Page 343 - HIS ACCOUNT OF NASHVILLE

MY DEAR GENERAL WASHINGTON, May 30^th, 1874.

"I have not been able to write to you until now, and threw aside even to-day matters pressing on me, to write to you even briefly, for my mind is full of other subjects. It was I that mentioned to you, Thomas' address or account of his Nashville campaign. There was previously a small club in Washington that met at each other's houses, taking them in succession, for conversation upon and discussion of scientific subjects, The evening was closed by an inexpensive supper. It was usual for a member to invite any stranger in Washington, who might be supposed to take an interest in such matters. Finally it became the custom for the member at whose house the meeting took place, to give an account of anything that he thought interesting, or have some friend do so.

One evening when the club met at General Eaton's (commissary-general of subsistence) General Thomas was present and gave us an account of his Nashville campaign, illustrated by maps. There were only about fifteen persons present. The exceeding modesty and diffidence of General Thomas made a very strong impression on me. He reminded me of a diffident youth at West Point undergoing the yearly examination, whose suffering on such occasions, only those afflicted with diffidence can comprehend and remember, which they do to the last days of their lives. The perspiration gathered profusely on his forehead. This painful diffidence from a man who had had such experiences greatly surprised me, and its simplicity almost amused me. Occupied as I had been all through the war with what was taking place with the Army of the Potomac, I knew but little of the manner in which the operations of other armies had taken place. General Thomas' account gave me a different view of his operations and the battle of Nashville from what I had previously had, and corrected some erroneous impressions. He seemed to me just as simple-hearted as when I had met him in Florida at the time he joined his regiment coming freshfrom the Military Academy.

Sincerely yours,

A. A. HUMPHREYS.

MAJOR-GENERAL DE PEYSTER, N. Y.
 
 

Page 344 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

NORWICH, CONN., May 30^th, 1874.

MY DEAR GENERAL DE PEYSTER :

In answer to your favor of the 23^rd, I would state that I recall very readily the account which Gen. Geo H. Thomas gave one evening before a scientific club in Washington of the battle of Nashville. He had drawn plans showing the position of the opposing forces, and pointed out the order of attack as made in the different points along the line, and stated the results of the several movements. Substantial success was attained by the Union, forces at every point, the enemy was beaten back, and the close of the first day indicated strongly what became complete on the day following -- his thorough defeat.

I scarcely need say that we all listened to General Thomas with rapt attention and with great gratification. His plans and statements were so clear and explicit that I think every one present must have obtained a good idea of the plan of the battle and of the manner in which it was fought. What struck me very forcibly and I presume others present were impressed in the same manner, was the apparent forgetfulness of himself, in connection with the events he was describing. Had we not known that he was the commanding general, and that every movement was the result of the action of his mind and will, we should never have imagined it from any allusion he made to himself. But when he came. to pronounce an opinion upon the whole subject and to point out, as he did, what he called a grave error of judgment, he made himself prominent at once and threw the blame entirely on himself.

At the close of the first day, he says he ought to have detached a force and sent it round to the rear of the enemy and cut off his retreat. Had he done so, he would have captured nearly or quite the whole of Hood's army. As it was Hood was enabled to effect his retreat. I asked him if he was not pronouncing a rigorous and unjust judgment, and suggested that at the close of the first day it was impossible for him to decide whether Hood's forces were thoroughly demoralized and defeated or not, that if he had detached a force of sufficient strength to the enemy's rear to cut off his retreat, whether it would not have so weakened his attacking columns the second day, that they would have fought with less confidence of victory, and whether, if Hood's men had known that their retreat was cut off, it might not have given them the energy of despair and impelled them to fight so as to turn back the tide of victory. He did not yield at all to my suggestions. He said that a general must be prepared to take some risks' and that Hood's army ought all to have
 
 

Page 345 - HOOD HOPEFUL OF SUCCESS

been captured. The entire absence of all self-assertion on the part of General Thomas, his unaffected modesty, were most conspicuous the whole evening. It seemed to me that had any other officer but himself been in command, he would never have indulged in so severe a criticism of his conduct.

Believe me very truly yours,

L. F. S. FOSTER.

The last sentence of Senator Foster's letter is indeed true. Much as General Thomas differed from his superiors in respect to the operations in which he participated, he never indulged in criticism, except to his most intimate friends, or in unfolding his own views for historical record.

The decisiveness of the victory on the second day at Nashville may have suggested to General Thomas the movement to the enemy's rear, as the one which would have resulted in the capture of Hood's entire army. This victory has certainly led to the supposition that this army had been so demoralized by the battle of Franklin, that it did not fight at Nashville with its traditional vigor. Some of the evidences of General Hood's faith in the morale of his army have already been mentioned -- his advance to Nashville, his first and second entrenched positions, and his purpose to assume the offensive. During the action of the 15^th, the left of his line had been driven back four miles, and yet he was confident of successful defense. He did not anticipate disaster, as the following quotation indicates:

I did not, I might say, anticipate a break at that time, as our forces up to that moment had repulsed the Federals at every point and were waving their colors in defiance crying out to the enemy, "Come on, Come on." Just previous to the fatal occurrence, I had matured the movement for the next morning. The enemy's right flank by this hour, stood in air some six miles from Nashville, and I had determined to withdraw my entire force during the night and attach this exposed flank in rear. I could safely have done so, as I still had open a line of retreat. *
 
 

* " Advance and. Retreat," p 303
 
 

Page 346 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

If Hood had not been confident of success in defense, it would have been a glaring error to leave his detached forces at Murfreesboro' without orders to move, until his army was retreating from Nashville. The fact that there were troops at Murfreesboro' and in Kentucky proves this confidence, almost as conclusively as the withholding of orders until the night of the 16^th.

But believing subsequently in the practicability of the capture of Hood's army by the movement of a strong force to his rear on the night of the 15^th, Thomas was bold to declare his error in not doing so. In the face of so decisive a victory most generals would have been silent in regard to after-thoughts whose expression would diminish their fame, but Thomas was truthful even when the truth was against himself.

An anecdote will show how calm and how thoughtful of minor matters General Thomas was on the morning of the fifteenth of December, although under the weight of great responsibility, and perplexing embarrassments. As he rode through the city to the field of battle, he suddenly halted the accompanying cavalcade of staff officers and escort, and beckoned Major Mills to him from the side-walk. The major was one of the quartermasters on duty at Nashville, charged with the issue of fuel. The general asked: "Have I drawn all my allowance of coal for this month?" Receiving a negative answer, he then said: "Will you please send fourteen bushels of coal to Mr. Harris, my neighbor? I was out of coal and borrowed this number of bushels from him the other day." The promise having been given, he expressed his thanks and rode on. Who else in the crisis of his career, expecting every moment to be overtaken by an order relieving him from command, would have given attention to a matter so trivial ?

An anecdote, related by a gentleman connected with the Sanitary Commission, illustrates the extreme calmness of General Thomas in the most critical moments of battle. This gentleman went to the battle-field at Nashville to witness
 
 

Page 347 - HIS OPINION OF THE NEGRO

the action and observe the bearing of the commanding general. He therefore kept as near Thomas as practicable, and only once noticed the slightest gesture indicative of interest in the operations of the army. Having ordered an assault, General Thomas and his staff were watching the advance of the attacking column. Suddenly an officer exclaimed: "General, they have stopped." The sententious reply was: "They have not." The troops were then near the enemy's entrenchments and all knew that the crisis had come, but the only indication the general gave of his consciousness of the decisive moment, was a gentle stroke of his beard. There was no change of countenance or mien when the troops leaped over the enemy's entrenchments. This serenity of bearing in battle, was, no doubt, a potent cause of the uniform steadiness of soldiers in his presence, even in the most threatening emergencies of battle.

The colored troops displayed bravery and other soldierly traits at Nashville. When riding over the field General Thomas saw their dead commingled with the bodies of white soldiers, he said: "This proves the manhood of the negro." Morgan's brigade participated gallantly in Steedman's feint, on the first day, and Thompson's brigade assaulted on the left of Post's brigade, on the second day, with marked steadiness and bravery. In an address before the New York Historical Society, General De Peyster quoted the words of General Thomas which give his estimate of those troops and their race:

It will take time for the regeneration of the negro, but he will come out purified by the terrible ordeal to which he has been. subjected, and assume an honorable position in the ranks of humanity. That which is too weak to stand the protracted trial will perish; that which is too thoroughly infected with the poisonous influence of slavery will slough off; but the remnant will be found to be men, and discharge their duties as citizens in our midst. *
 
 

* "Nashville -- the Decisive Battle of the Rebellion."
 
 

Page 348 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

It was meet that he who had given official and personal encouragement to those in his department who organized and disciplined negro soldiers, should witness their valor in battle and bear testimony to it; and that the former slaveholder should condemn slavery, and express hope for those who had been subjected to its poisonous influences.
 
 

Page 349

Although the battle of Nashville resulted in a victory unprecedented in its decisiveness, in view of circumstances and conditions, it did not exempt General Thomas from instructions and orders from the Capital and from General Grant, in reference to the pursuit of the defeated enemy. With the official congratulations to Thomas and his army, were mingled exhortations to vigorous pursuit. Thomas was told that he had a great opportunity, and was urged so strongly to destroy Hood's army in retreat as to imply, that the victorious general was either ignorant of the grand possibility, or needed special spurring to gather the fruits of victory. He had been urged beyond precedent to fight the enemy, and when he had fought one of the most brilliant battles in the world's history, he was pressed with equal vigor to do what he would have done without suggestion from his superiors. Seemingly the difficulties of the pursuit were overlooked, and the only recognized barrier to the complete overthrow of the enemy was the sluggishness of Thomas. But in fact the difficulties were almost insurmountable, and the sluggishness altogether imaginary.

General Hood did not lose the Franklin road, his direct line of retreat. His army to save itself, dropped all material that impeded its rapid movement. A few brigades that maintained organization formed a stalwart rearguard, conscious of the importance and peril of their office. Hood moved as far as possible during the night of the 16^th, and the distance then gained was of immense advantage. General Wood with his corps pursued rapidly for several miles, but was unable to overtake the enemy. General Wilson remounted his cavalry, and continued the pursuit till 11 P.M. The night was rainy, and intensely dark.

About four miles north of the Harpeth, General Hatch encountered Chalmers' division formed in line across the road. Hatch immediately dismounted a part of his division, and deployed his men on each side of the road, and then charging the enemy's centre with the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry. Colonel Spaulding leading, broke the line and routed the whole force; capturing General Rucker, then commanding the division, and three guns. This action took place about ten o'clock at night.

General Wilson has given the following anecdote: General Thomas frequently said to Wilson during the first half of December, "they are treating me like a boy," and as often asserted that, if let alone he would whip Hood. Late at night, on the l6th, when on the Granny White turnpike in pursuit of the enemy, Wilson heard a horseman approaching; soon General Thomas rode up, offered his hand and said, "I told you we could whip Hood," and in an instant rode back to his quarters.

Before daylight on the 17^th, Wilson's corps was again in motion; Knipe's, Croxton's, and Hatch's troops on the Granny White turnpike, and Johnson's, on the Hillsboro' road. General Knipe leading, found the enemy strongly posted at Hollow Tree Gap, on the direct road, four miles north of Franklin. The enemy was again charged in front and on his flanks, and quickly dislodged, losing four hundred and thirteen prisoners and three colors.
 
 

Page 351 - PURSUIT OF HOOD

The cavalry then advanced, and crossed the Harpeth River at Franklin, and at the fords above and below the town,* advancing thereafter on the Columbia, Carter's Creek, and Lewisburg turnpikes, under orders to move rapidly forward, and endeavor to press round the flanks of the enemy's rearguard. This accomplished, it was expected that by direct and flank attacks, Hood's last organized brigades would be broken and dispersed. Late in the evening the enemy was found in open fields, one mile north of the west Harpeth. Wilson at once ordered Hatch and Knipe to charge the flanks of this force, and Lieutenant Hedges, with a detachment of the Fourth U. S. cavalry to attack its centre on the road. The enemy opened with artillery, but Wilson's forces, undeterred by this fire charged his centre and flanks, drove him from position and captured his guns. Darkness prevented further pursuit.

General Hood thus mentioned this action in his official report:

"During this day's march the enemy's cavalry pressed with great boldness and activity, charging our infantry repeatedly with the sabre, and at times penetrating our lines."

Early in the morning of the 17^th, the Fourth corps advanced, first to Franklin, and then in the rear of the cavalry on the Columbia turnpike.

Early the next morning the Cavalry corps, although out of rations, renewed the pursuit, in the endeavor to strike the rearguard at Spring Hill. But the enemy having marched rapidly could not again be brought to a stand.

" The densely wooded country, muddy roads, and plowed fields, rendered almost impassable by the constant rain, made it very difficult for the troops, traveling on the right and left of the pike, to get forward fast enough to overtake the enemy marching on the pike."**
 
 

* General Wilson, in compliance with orders from General Thomas, had sent Johnson's division on the Harding Turnpike to turn Franklin.

** General Wilson's Report of Operations of Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. of Miss.
 
 

Page 352 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

It was General Thomas' intention to hurry his infantry forward on the main road, and move his cavalry on lateral roads to intercept the enemy. But this proved to be impracticable. The protracted rain rendered the natural roads almost impassable for cavalry, and the branching roads diverged too much from the enemy's line of retreat to be used for flank movements. The infantry was therefore compelled to follow in the rear of the cavalry. Thomas soon perceived that he could not reach Hood's army by direct pursuit, and sent Steedman's forces to Decatur and beyond, in hope of destroying his bridge or intercepting his fugitive troops south of the Tennessee River. This movement also, though quickly accomplished, failed in its main object, but several detachments of cavalry from the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, Second Michigan, and the Tenth, Twelfth and Thirteenth Indiana regiments, constituting Colonel William J. Palmer's brigade of Wilson's corps, advanced from Decatur upon Hood's line of retreat in Mississippi, captured a large supply train, a pontoon train, and defeating detachments of cavalry, captured a large number of prisoners. This movement to the south bank of the Tennessee had another object, -- the re-occupation of the abandoned posts.

Generals Wilson and Wood advanced under constant rains to Rutherford's Creek on the 19^th. Here there was delay, the enemy had destroyed the bridge and the deep swift current forbade fording. The next day a bridge was extemporized and Hatch's division crossed and advanced rapidly to Columbia, but found that the enemy had crossed, and lifted his pontoon bridge. At noon on the 21^st, the pontoon train arrived at Rutherford's Creek. A bridge was thrown at once, as the Fourth corps joined the cavalry at Columbia. At this place was also delay resulting from the difficulty of throwing a bridge in the extreme cold which followed the rain, and of adapting it, when thrown, to the continued subsidence of the water. The Fourth corps crossed Duck River on the evening of the 23^rd, and the cavalry the next morning.
 
 

Page 353 - DIFFICULTIES OF THE PURSUIT

General Hood had hoped, when he began to retreat, that he would be able to hold the line of Duck River defensively, but when he had retreated to that river, the condition of his army was such as to forbid any measure but a run for life. He was joined at Columbia by Forrest's command from Murfreesboro'. He had then a stronger rearguard with a new commander. Besides, the country south of Columbia gave better positions for defense. Hood's rear forces were encountered at Linnville, and at another point north of Pulaski, and driven from position. The rearguard was closely followed through that town by Colonel Harrison's brigade of cavalry. In his haste the enemy left the bridge over Rockland Creek, but halted in a narrow pass beyond. Here he turned upon Harrison and captured one of his guns, but lost fifty prisoners when Hatch, Croxton and Hammond moved upon his flanks. At Sugar Creek he abandoned an entrenched position as soon as Wilson developed preparations to attack. At this point the pursuit was abandoned in consequence of information that Hood's fugitive forces had crossed the Tennessee at Bainbridge, where a pontoon bridge had been in waiting for some time. This crossing was effected in sight of the gunboats under Admiral Lee, sent to that place to intercept the retreat.

While the weather and other circumstances favored the pursuit of Hood's army, Thomas lacked the requisites for rapid pursuit by his whole army. He was compelled to depend upon trains for supplies, as the country contiguous to Hood's line of retreat had been previously stripped of provisions for his army. Had there been supplies in that region, their collection would have impeded pursuit. Numerous streams, swollen by several days of rain, crossed the road upon which Hood retreated, and General Thomas had been deprived of

Colonel George P. Buell's Fifty-eighth Indiana regiment of trained pontoniers and bridge-builders. The march to the sea had taken away this invaluable regiment, which had had astonished General Sherman by its swiftness in throwing pontoons on the way, and in restoring a heavy bridge over the Ogeechee River. An effort had been made by Colonel Merrill, in compliance with orders from General Thomas, to construct pontoons and organize a force of pontoniers, but there had not been sufficient time to provide a sufficient number for such a pursuit, or to train a battalion of pontoniers. These were needed since the enemy destroyed as far as possible all bridges behind him. There had been a slight delay in consequence of the error of a staff officer in writing Murfreesboro' instead of Nolensville, in an order from General Thomas for the movement of the pontoon train. The train however had gone but a short distance toward Murfreesboro' before it was turned across to the Nolensville road and thence on a fine road to Rutherford's Creek. The one road to Columbia through Franklin was too crowded with troops and trains for a quicker movement on that road.

While using all his resources to overtake and crush Hood's army, Thomas was indignant that it was considered necessary to urge him from day to day to exert himself to gain these ends. He was still more tried by the suggestion of reasons for the vigorous pursuit of Hood's army. General Grant, upon his arrival at Washington, on the 15^th, introduced the official spurring which was continued for several days thereafter. His first despatch was at 11.30 P. M., of that day:

I was Just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a despatch from Van Dusen, detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's army and make it useless for future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies but take them from the country as the enemy has done. Much is now expected.
 
 

Page 355 - UNNEEDED SUGGESTIONS

On the 18th, at noon, he telegraphed:

The armies operating against Richmond have fired two hundred guns in honor of your great victory. Sherman has fully established his base on Ossabaw Sound with Savannah fully invested. I hope to be able to fire a salute to-morrow in honor of the fall of Savannah. In all your operations we hear nothing of Forrest. Great precaution should be taken to prevent him crossing the Cumberland or Tennessee Rivers below Eastport. After Hood is driven as far as it is possible to follow him, you want to re-occupy Decatur and all other abandoned points.

In the same spirit. General Halleck telegraphed, on the 21^st :

Permit me, General, to urge the vast importance of a hot pursuit of Hood's army. Every possible sacrifice should be made, and your men for a few days will submit to any hardships and privations to accomplish the .great result. If you can capture or destroy Hood's army, General Sherman can entirely crush out the rebel military force in all the Southern States. He begins a new campaign about the first of January, which will have the most important results if Hood's army can now be used up. A most vigorous pursuit on your part is therefore of vital importance to General Sherman's plans. No sacrifice must be spared to obtain so important a result.

To this despatch General Thomas replied:

Your despatch of 12 M., this day is received. General Hood's army is being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it is possible for one army to pursue another. We cannot control the elements, and you must remember that to resist Hood's advance into Tennessee, I had to re-organize and almost thoroughly equip the force now under my command. I fought the battle of the fifteenth and sixteenth instants, with the troops but partially equipped, and, notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather, and the partial equipments, have been enabled to drive the enemy beyond Duck River, crossing two streams with my troops, and driving the enemy from position to position without the aid of pontoons and with but little transportation to bring up supplies of provisions and ammunition. I am doing all in my power to crush Hood's army and, if it be possible, will destroy it. But pursuing an enemy through an exhausted country, over mud roads completely sogged with heavy rains, is no child's play, and cannot be accomplished as quickly as thought of. I hope, in urging me to push the enemy, the department remembers that General Sherman took
 
 

Page 356 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

with him the complete organization of the Military Division of the Mississippi, well equipped in every respect as regards ammunition, supplies and transportation, leaving me only two corps partially stripped of their transportation to accommodate the force taken with him, to oppose the advance into Tennessee of that army which had resisted the advance of the army of the Military Division of the Mississippi on Atlanta, from the commencement of the campaign till its close, and which is now, in addition,.aided by Forrest's cavalry. Although my progress may appear slow, I feel assured that Hood's army can be driven from Tennessee and eventually driven to the wall by the force under my command. But too much must not be expected of troops which have to be re-organized, especially when they have the task of destroying a force, in a winter's campaign, which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers in spring and summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that this army is willing to submit to any sacrifice to crush Hood's army, or to strike any other blow which may contribute to the destruction of the rebellion.

Thus boldly and truthfully did General Thomas describe the situation, and vindicate himself and his army.

Badeau's comments upon this despatch as follows :

The defence was eloquent, but on one or two points hardly fair. Sherman left Thomas much more than two corps, as has been repeatedly shown; and Thomas had been, since the 3d of October, in command of all the district north of the Tennessee. His headquarters were established at the greatest depot west of the Alleghanies, where thousands of quartermaster's employes were at his disposal to provide transportation, and every facility was afforded for supplying and equipping his troops. Few armies during the war were better furnished than that which fought so successfully at Nashville. It was to ensure this readiness that Thomas had so persistently retreated and delayed; and during the few days before the battle, he had himself repeatedly assured the general-in-chief, that he was entirely ready for offensive operations, and waited only for favorable weather. The completeness of his success demonstrates that he was ready. As to the willingness of both Thomas and his army to make every sacrifice and every effort, that had been displayed on many fields, but never more conspicuously than in this campaign. Nothing was at fault but the disposition for elaborate preparation which, at all times, and under all circumstances, was so marked a feature of Thomas' character. *
 
 

*Mil. Hist., U. S. Grant, Vol. Ill, pp. 267 and 268.
 
 

Page 357 - HIS REPLY TO HALLECK

It is clear that General Thomas referred to the forces of the Military Division of the Mississippi, organized for field service -- those that had participated in the Atlanta campaign. The garrisons were included in the forces of the Department of the Cumberland, but the Army of the Cumberland, distinctively, embraced the troops organized and equipped for field service. In this view of the case Thomas was strictly accurate. Sherman did take with him the complete organization of the Military Division of the Mississippi, well equipped in every respect as regards ammunition, supplies and transportation, leaving Thomas only two corps, partially stripped of their transportation.

Thomas held command north of the Tennessee subject to Sherman's orders until the 12^th of November. It is true that Sherman did not interfere with the management of affairs at Nashville as a depot of supplies, but it is not true that every facility was offered Thomas for supplying and equipping his troops, and something more than quartermaster's employes are needed to provide transportation for an army. General Thomas could not get horses for his cavalry rapidly, even by sending his dismounted men back to Kentucky, and it was still more difficult to increase his army transportation at Nashville. Nashville was a large depot, but the mules and wagons were drawn from the North. General Smith's troops went to Nashville by water and were almost entirely destitute of transportation. The troops from garrison duty were in like condition.

When General Thomas reported himself "entirely ready for offensive operations," he did not mean that his army was fully equipped for the pursuit of the enemy to the Tennessee River. He had been ordered to fight without regard to weather and reenforcements, and at the earliest moment after the ice melted, he engaged the enemy. The army at Nashville was doubtless well furnished for battle, but it was not well furnished for the pursuit, as General Thomas truthfully asserted in his despatch to General Halleck. It is true
 
 

Page 358 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

that Thomas always insisted on adequate preparations, and his disposition in this regard was vindicated by his uniform success. No American general surpassed Thomas if any equaled him in discerning beforehand what forces and preparations were needed for campaign and battle.

Badeau is manifestly in error in supposing that General Halleck might have been ordered by the Secretary of War to send his despatch of the 21^st. * Such a supposition is precluded by Mr. Stanton's despatch of the next day, which most emphatically disclaimed any sympathy with the tone and purport of the one which General Thomas so indignantly answered. The Secretary of War said :

I have seen to-day General Halleck's despatch of yesterday, and your reply. It is proper for me to assure you, that this department has the most unbounded confidence in your skill, vigor and determination to employ to the best advantage all the means in your power to pursue and destroy the enemy. No department could be inspired with more profound admiration and thankfulness for the great deeds, which you have already performed, or more confiding faith that human effort could do no more, and no more than will be done by you and the accomplished and gallant officers and soldiers of your command.

Secretary Stanton had been impatient of General Thomas* delay, and his utterances in respect to the postponement of offensive operations had not been complimentary. But this despatch made full atonement for all previous disparagement. In view of the great victory the supposition that Thomas needed urging was abhorrent to Stanton, and his opinion of Halleck's despatch impelled him to speak in strongest praise and in expression of the firmest confidence. No matter who, or what, inspired Halleck's despatch, Mr. Stanton was quick to free his department from the appearance of sympathy with it.
 
 

* Mil. Hist. U. S. Grant, Vol. III. page 265
 
 

Page 359 - SHERMAN’S SPARE ARMY

In reply to the Secretary of War, Thomas telegraphed:

I am profoundly thankful for the hearty expression of your confidence in my determination and desire to do all in my power to destroy the enemy and put down the rebellion, and in the name of this army, I thank you for the complimentary notice you have taken of all connected with it, for the deeds of valor they have performed.

On the 22^nd, Grant also telegraphed congratulations:

You have the congratulations of the public for the energy with which you are pushing Hood. I hope you will succeed in reaching his pontoon bridge at Tuscumbia before he gets there. Should you do so, it looks to me that Hood is cut off. If you succeed in destroying Hood's army there will be but one army left to the so-called Confederacy, capable of doing us harm. I will take care of that, and try to draw the sting from it, so that in the spring we shall have easy sailing. You have now a big opportunity, which I know you are availing yourself of. Let us push and do all we can before the enemy can derive benefit, either from the raising of negro troops on the plantations, or white troops now in the field.

General Grant does not state in this despatch that he expected Sherman, with his large army, to assist in drawing the sting from Lee's army, but that this was his expectation is evident from the fact that Sherman was under orders at the date of this despatch, to transport his army by sea to Virginia. On the 27^th, Grant assented to Sherman's march through the Carolinas to Virginia, and then wrote to General Sherman :

Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army, pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood is now retreating, with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in men has probably not been far from twenty thousand, besides deserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collected together, and many of the deserters re-assembled. If we can, we should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving as proposed, will do it.****

I have thought that Hood being so completely wiped out for present harm, I might bring A. J. Smith here with fourteen to fifteen thousand men. With this increase I could hold my lines, and move out with a greater force than Lee has. It would compel Lee to retain
 
 

Page 360 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

all his present force in the defenses of Richmond, or abandon them entirely. This latter contingency is probably the only danger to the easy success of your expedition. In the event you should meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it, or find the sea coast. Of course I shall not let Lee's army escape, if I can help it, and will not let it go without following to the best of my ability. Without waiting further directions, then, you may make your preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can.

From this outline of the projected operations on the Atlantic coast, the special anxiety for the complete destruction of Hood's army becomes apparent, and the inspiration of Halleck's despatch of the 21^st, to Thomas is taken out of the realm of doubt. It is equally apparent that Grant thought of dismembering Thomas' army while it was in pursuit of the enemy, that he might be able to hold his lines, and move out with a greater force than Lee could command, and thus compel him to hold Richmond with his entire army, or abandon that city altogether. There was already a vast preponderance of National troops on the Atlantic coast. The Army of the Potomac outnumbered the Confederate Army of Virginia, and the Confederate leaders had not been able to gather an army south of Richmond, half the size of Sherman's. The only strong reason for the dismemberment of the army that achieved the victory at Nashville, before the condition of Hood's forces was known, was the immediate reenforcement of the Army of the Potomac.

On the 21^st of January, Grant wrote a letter to Sherman, which sharply censured Thomas for lack of vigor in the pursuit of Hood's army, and also, for his unwillingness to advance into Alabama:

Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland, with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23^rd; the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. * * * * *
 
 

Page 361 - THE COMPLETEST VICTORY OF THE WAR
 
 

I was induced to do this because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from which he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but is not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give the enemy no rest, determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force, surplus, to go to Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and if so, by which of several routes he would select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea coast to the interior, toward Montgomery and Selma. Thomas' forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby.

General Thomas frequently asserted with great boldness that he followed Hood's army as rapidly as possible, and made every practicable effort to destroy it. In this way he positively refutes General Grant's allegation of sluggishness, although he never saw the letter in which this charge is made.

In view of the conflicting assertions of Grant and Thomas, it may be asked, when during the war, under corresponding or different circumstances, was a defeated army followed so far, so vigorously, or so disastrously to itself, as in the case of the pursuit of Hood's army? And if the adverse circumstances of this pursuit are considered, the assumption can be sustained, that it surpassed all other efforts to destroy armies in retreat that were made during the war. All things considered, the victory at Nashville transcended all other victories of the war, and no other pursuit so fully supplemented a decisive victory, in effecting the destruction of an army.
 
 

Page 362 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

In no other campaign of the war was an army so broken by field operations, as was Hood's in Tennessee. It was virtually annihilated. The broken column of fourteen thousand men, lost five-sevenths of its strength by desertion on its way to North Carolina, from Mississippi. The meagre remnant wandering across the continent, dispirited and feeble, the only force distinctly representing the grand, heroic Confederate Army of the Tennessee, told the story of Nashville, and of the pursuit which followed. And yet this spiritless column of less than five thousand men, was the only offset made by the enemy to the eighty or ninety thousand veteran soldiers sent to the Atlantic coast from the Military Division of the Mississippi.

Thomas was ordered by General Grant to depend upon an exhausted country for supplies, and obedience would have arrested the pursuit almost at its beginning. With insufficient transportation he was retarded in the pursuit, but without any he could not have pursued at all.

He did trust his advanced forces to subordinates, but when and where did ever an army commander take personal command of his vanguard in pursuing a defeated army? The character and service of the generals to whom he entrusted his leading corps, cavalry and infantry, certainly justified his action. When Grant sent General James H. Wilson to be chief of cavalry of the Military Division of the Mississippi, he said to Sherman, that Wilson would add fifty per cent. to the strength of the cavalry. Surely a general thus endorsed, who had, besides, in the operations preceding the battle of Nashville, and in that action, proved that this endorsement was just, could be safely trusted to conduct the operations of his corps out of the sight of the commanding general, when the place assigned him in the pursuit was the legitimate position for the chief of cavalry. And Thomas did not err in placing General Wood, commanding the Fourth corps, in the advance with the cavalry. The Fourth corps had engaged in
 
 

Page 363 - GENERALS WILSON AND WOOD

some of the severest conflicts of the Atlanta campaign and had sustained its reputation in the battles of Franklin and Nashville, and the general who commanded this corps in the action at Nashville, had been prominent as a division commander at Stone River, Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge and in many of the severest conflicts in Georgia. It was therefore fitting that General Thomas should associate Wood with Wilson in leading his forces in the pursuit of Hood's army.

General Thomas, however, was near the head of his army until he reached Pulaski, forty miles from the Tennessee River. Here he remained until the pursuit terminated, but he nevertheless gave specific directions to Generals Wilson and Wood in respect to the operations on the other side of Pulaski. The operations beyond that place were as much the result of his personal direction as the previous movements had been. General Wood in his official report explicitly mentions the directions given by General Thomas, in regard to the movements south of Pulaski, and also gives the general character of the pursuit:

On the following morning, the twenty-fourth, I was detained until twelve M., waiting for the cavalry to come up and move out. Shortly after the cavalry had passed out through my camp, Brevet Major-General Wilson sent me a message to the effect that he had found the ground so soft that he could not operate off the turnpike, and begging that I would not become impatient at the delay he was causing in the movement of my command. At twelve M., the road was free of the cavalry, when the corps was put in motion and marched sixteen miles that afternoon and encamped two miles south of Linnville.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

Sunday morning, the twenty-fifth, the corps followed closely on the heels of the cavalry, passed through Pulaski from which the cavalry had rapidly driven the enemy's rearguard and encamped for the night six miles from the turn on the Lamb's Ferry road. The corps marched sixteen miles on the twenty-fifth, the last six miles on a road next to impracticable from the depth of the mud. As we could not have the use of the turnpike further south than Pulaski, I ordered all the artillery of the corps, but four batteries, to be left at
 

Page 364 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Pulaski, using the horses of the batteries left to increase the horses of the pieces taken with the command to eight, and of the caissons to ten horses each. I also ordered that only a limited number of ammunition wagons, carrying but ten boxes each should accompany the command, These arrangements were necessary on account of the condition of the road on which the enemy had retreated.Without extra teams to the artillery carriages and lightening the usual load of an ammunition wagon, it would have been impractical to get the vehicles along; a vigorous pursuit would have been impossible. These dispositions were reported to the commanding general. He directed me to follow the cavalry and support it. The pursuit was continued with all possible celerity to Lexington, Alabama, thirty miles south of Pulaski. Six miles south of Lexington, Brevet Major-General Wilson learned certainly on the twenty-eighth that the rear of the enemy had crossed the river on the twenty seventh and that his bridge was taken up on the morning of the twenty-eighth. These facts were reported to the commanding general who ordered that the pursuit be discontinued. To continue it further at that time, besides being useless, even if possible, was really impossible. Of the pursuit it may be truly remarked, that it is without a parallel in this war. It was continued for more than a hundred miles at the most inclement season of the year over a road, the whole of which was bad, and thirty miles of which were wretched almost beyond description."

General Wilson's official utterances are in striking harmony with those of General Wood:

"The rebels retreated that night (Dec. 24th,) to the vicinity of Pulaski, but the next day were driven through that place closely pressed by Harrison's brigade. The bridge across Richland Creek was saved by the celerity and good management with which Colonel Harrison handled his command, so that without delaying he continued the pursuit, and by 2 P.M., came up with the enemy, strongly entrenched at the head of a heavily wooded and deep ravine, through which ran the road. The country was so difficult and broken, that the men of Harrison's brigade were necessarily in weak order, but nothing daunted they pressed the enemy's skirmishers back to their fortified position. Here they were compelled to halt, and while the troops of Hatch's, Croxton's and Hammond's commands were marching through the woods to their support, a few hundred of the enemy's infantry, for the first time since the battles about Nashville, sallied forth from their breast-works, and drove back Harrison's attenuated skirmish line, and captured one gun of Smith's battery "I,"

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Page 365 - THE PURSUIT OF HOOD

Fourth United States Artillery. They were promptly driven back, but had succeeded in getting the captured gun off. Hammond, Croxton and Hatch moving on the flanks of their position, they abandoned it hastily, just before night, leaving about fifty prisoners in our hands. On the 26th the pursuit was continued to the Sugar Creek, the enemy falling back, and making but slight resistance. At the latter place they took up a strong position, and held it until General Hammond had developed his forces, and got ready to attack. Hastily withdrawing, they continued their march throughout the night. It had now become evident that no effort on the part of my command could again bring Forrest to risk another engagement. Having neither rations nor forage, and learning that the main body of the rebel troops had already reached the south side of the Tennessee, I directed the corps to halt, and the next morning I sent Colonel Spaulding, of the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry, with five hundred picked men, after the enemy, with directions to continue the pursuit until he had reached the Tennessee River. He reached the river at Bainbridge early on the morning of the 28th, the last of the enemy having crossed and taken up the bridge during the night. The road from Pulaski to Bainbridge was us bad as it could possibly be, the country through which it runs, almost entirely denuded of forage and army supplies. Both men and forces suffered greatly. Hood having effected his escape, the corps was ordered to Eastport for the purpose of refitting and resting, Before this order was received, however, Hatch, Hammond and Harrison had marched to Athens, on the road to Huntsville, in, pursuance of previous instructions from General Thomas.

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Before closing this report it may not be improper to say, that through the entire campaign the bravery and steadiness of the cavalry troops, new and old, were most conspicuous. Nothing could have been more admirable than their conduct on the Harpeth in the two days' battle at Nashville, in the affair on the west Harpeth, or in the pursuit which followed. I know of no battles of the war where the influence of the cavalry was more potent, or of any pursuit sustained so long and well. The results of the campaign added to those following the same policy in the Army of the Potomac, clearly demonstrate the wisdom of massing the entire cavalry of an army, and it is to be hoped will obtain from the War Department a recognition of the corps already organized.
 

Page 366 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

The following statement from General Wilson supplements this report:

"In pursuit of Hood's army, the cavalry lost about five thousand horses, from exhaustion, exposure, and insufficient forage. This fact alone is sufficient to show the difficulties which were encountered and the resolution with which they were surmounted."

There is, therefore, the strongest concurrent testimony from Generals Thomas, Wilson and Wood, to the fact that the pursuit of Hood was conducted with great vigor, and with disastrous results to the enemy. Neither is it true, as Grant wrote to Sherman, that Thomas intrusted the advance to subordinates, and that when Hood crossed the Tennessee River, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the state. General Thomas did trust the very efficient generals who commanded his two corps - cavalry and infantry - which led in the pursuit from Nashville to the Tennessee, in all matters of detail, but, from first to last, they moved in obedience to his instructions. And when Hood crossed the Tennessee, Thomas was at Pulaski, which place he had reached before the enemy crossed that river, and the operations beyond that place were conducted under his orders, which were as specific as is usual to corps commanders. General Wilson received orders from General Thomas on the 27th, to pursue the enemy to the Tennessee, and then endeavor to cross at Eastport, Miss., under cover of the gunboats, and destroy the Memphis and Charleston railroad bridge over Bear Creek. When the last of Hood's army crossed the Tennessee, Schofield's corps was at Columbia, Smith's at Pulaski, Wood's and Wilson's south of Pulaski, and General Thomas was in the best possible position to direct the movements of his entire army, should the forces south of Pulaski develop the necessity for the advance of Smith and Schofield. A part of the cavalry in rear of General Wilson was directed to Athens by General Thomas, and seldom, if ever, has an army commander kept scattered forces in motion more completely by his own orders.
 

Page 367 - A CONFEDERATE GENERAL'S OPINION

If General D. H. Maury may be believed, the opinion did not obtain amongst those who fled from Nashville, that there was a lack of vigor on the part of the troops who drove the enemy through rain, snow, cold and mud across the State of Tennessee, and over the Tennessee River. In the "Southern Historical Society Papers" for June, l876, General Maury thus refers to General Thomas and the battle of Nashville:

"It is charitable to believe that in making these dispositions for his own movements and for the defense of Nashville, Sherman must have estimated the personal resources of General Thomas very highly; the result amply justified such an estimate. The army, with which Thomas gained his great victory, was largely made up of forces detached for the occasion from other armies, of new levies and of dismounted cavalry, some of whom were remounted in presence of the enemy, and was therefore ill-fitted to cope with the veteran army of Hood.
So impatient was the Federal Government of the delay of Thomas in attacking Hood, that on the 9th of December he was ordered to be relieved from the command of the army.
The order was, fortunately for Halleck, suspended. Thomas would not attack till he was ready. His victory was decisive. But even after that, the Washington City generalissimo, Halleck, complained that Thomas did not press Hood's army.
I have never heard anybody who was in Hood's army at that time, justify Halleck's complaints on this score. Thomas' own letter replying to these indiscreet strictures, shows the stuff of which the writer was made.
In calm review of these operations, it is but fair to say that in the whole course of the war, there was no finer illustration of generalship exhibited by any Federal commander than General Thomas' defense of Nashville."

General Grant was palpably in error in his later criticisms of the conduct of Thomas in the pursuit of Hood's army. And these later criticisms are palpably in conflict with his commendation of Thomas for his vigor in pursuing the enemy. The facts, however, vindicate Thomas. His generalship, as displayed in the conduct of the entire campaign, will bear comparison with that of any other general in any other campaign of the war. If success is accepted as the criterion of generalship, his conduct of the
 

Page 368 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

operations and battles of this campaign gives him a place beside the great captains of the world. If a higher standard, and one more just is adopted, his generalship stands in boldest relief. Success may depend upon the action of subordinates, or a good army may win victories despite the blunders of its generals. But the higher criterion takes into account the mastery of resources, provision against the possibilities to the enemy, and the nice adjustment and aggregate force of all operations.
Had the battle of Nashville been fought in summer or early autumn, and a victory been won, with no subsequent pursuit, history would have given this action a place in the category of great conflicts. But fought in winter, and supplemented by a pursuit scarcely less disastrous to the enemy than the battle itself, conducted with meagre transportation, when wagons were the only dependence for supplies, across swollen streams, with scant appointments for bridging them, in rain, snow, cold and mud, the operations as a whole are lifted into prominence even in the narrow range of transcendent military achievements.
A general's opinion of another soldier, has no rightful place in history, unless sustained by facts. A great general's higher relations to history should not be endangered by his own utterance of unsupported statements - made from afar and in ignorance of facts - in regard to another great general, whose achievements have given him an unequivocal and brilliant fame. Grant and Thomas will both be accurately weighed when all partialities and prejudices are laid aside, and this will be done without reference to their opinions of each other. History has nicely adjusted balances, though their use is often long delayed.
An estimate of Hood's loss in men, has been given. His loss in material was correspondingly great. He admitted a loss of fifty-four pieces of artillery, but the actual number was seventy-two. The road from Nashville to Bainbridge
 

Page 369 - LETTER TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON

was strewn with small arms a