Below left you see a high resolution view of part of Grant's battle map (below right), the basis of which had prepared by Thomas's topographical engineers before the battle. It shows the north end of Missionary ridge and the disposition of Sherman's troops (in blue) the evening of 24 Nov. and the day of 25 Nov. 1863, and most of Cleburne's troops (in red) on the 25th. Grant received this map well before the battle, and the unit dispositions were superimposed after the battle so that the map could be attached to Grant's battle report. The objective for 24 Nov. in Sherman's orders of 18 Nov. was the tunnel. He did not reach this objective but stopped a mile short and blamed his error on "wrongly laid-down maps." However, the map below is not "wrongly laid-down", nor is it difficult to read. As you can plainly see, there is no possibility that a conscientious officer experienced in map reading could have mistaken the first rise "Billy the Goat" Hill (so named after the battle) for the tunnel area. He first had to cross one road (Campbell St. today), and then at least see another road (Lightfoot Mill Rd.). If he really had had defective maps Sherman would have included them in his battle report, but he didn't. The assertion that Sherman, who undoubtedly had the same map as Grant did, could have been misled by defective maps in his possession is therefore a baldfaced lie. Note that Sherman, at the end of his battle report, did state that he attached a map made after the battle. However, even this map is not in the official Atlas, so he lied about that too. He could not attach the one below because it would made his distortion of the record and the magnitude of his incompetence even more obvious. Further below you see recent photos of this part of Missionary Ridge.
 

Northern limit of "Tunnel              "Billy the Goat" Hill  where      Hill",  today Campbell St.               Sherman stopped on 24 Nov.
Detail of map to right	Grant's battle map - click to enlarge

Sherman Reservation or Tunnel Hill today: The letters in red refer to the positions on the photo below. Swett's Battery was at (C) at the end of a gradual 200 yard-long slope. The tunnel runs from just to the left of York street to the vertical line on the right (the red dots). Lightfoot Mill Rd. (D) follows the cut at the south end of Tunnel Hill, and Campbell St. or Hwy. 17  (B) goes through the cut at the north end of Tunnel Hill. Both Roads existed at the time and are shown on the map above this one. Sherman's objective was thus Lightfoot Mill Rd. He stopped on the afternoon on the rise near where Battery Drive is today (A). Then he telegraphed to Grant that he had reached his objective. The entrance to the park, the end of North Crest Road,  is at the blue X. You have to park your car just off Lightfoot Mill Rd. and walk in because the gate is always closed. It is an unsupervised park, but worth seeing anyway, because the run up the slope to Swett's battery was a killing field. Cleburne let Sherman's troops get up out of the ravine at B and onto the field in front of the battery on purpose.

The photo below was taken on 25 Nov. 2000 from the top of a building in the Ft. Wood historical district, a point about 3 miles southwest from the western tunnel mouth. The first rise at the top ("Billy the Goat" hill or Sherman Heights) and the two dips through which Campbell St. and Lightfoot Mill Rd. run are easily visible with the naked eye. The second dip is above the railroad tunnel, Sherman's objective in his orders. Sherman had years of experience of getting armies through hills when he looked through a telescope from Ft. Wood where he had a "magnificient view of the panorama" (Memoirs, page 361) on the morning of 15 Nov. 1863. He knew that there will be a road through every dip in a ridge. So, what was going through his mind when he was supposed to be informing himself so as to better carry out his assigned role in the coming battle and to protect the lives of his men? The most reasonable explanation is that, on 15 Nov. 63, he was elated knowing that Grant was going to stack the deck in his favor, giving him most of the Union forces. Finally he was going to win one. But on 24 and 25 Nov. he was so afraid of messing up again that he became indecisive and froze up. This is the typical behavior of a manic depressive. Is that the sort of commander you would prefer for yourself if you could choose? On the afternoon of 25 Nov. 1863 Cleburne counter-attacked and took about 250 Union prisoners, most of whom subsequently died in Andersonville.

This is what Sherman saw from Ft. Wood the morning of 15 Nov. 1863, except that there were fewer trees standing. ..

View of what the ridge looked to Sherman on the 16th from the north bank. The photo was taken part way up a private drive. As far as I could determine, the only views of the north end of the ridge from the north bank which are not obstructed by trees or this silo are from private residences on River Hills or from Continental Apartments.

"To be successful in combat, a commanding general has to be an expert on the terrain, roads, and rivers in this theater of operations. George Thomas captured these data on maps and notebooks so that he knew every feature of the countryside where he would be fighting....These pages from Thomas' map journal are an example of his meticulous recording ot the topography of the geographic areas where he would be operating. The breadth, accuracy, and diversity of his collected intelligence are astounding: distances between points, road conditions and carrying capacities, river crossings, landmarks, potable water, forage, cover - even the loyalties and trustworthiness of local residents. Information was gathered from many sources, ranging from military engineering surveys to spies and escaped prisoners. (National Archives)" Buell, Warrior Generals, pp. 189-90