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Reports of the battle for Chattanooga 23-25 Nov. 63

1. George H. Thomas
2. Ulysses S. Grant
3. Joseph Hooker
4. William T. Sherman
5. Peter J. Osterhaus
6. August Willich
7. Henry W. Halleck
------------
8. Braxton Bragg
9. Patrick R. Cleburne
10. Alexander P. Stewart  ?



2. Ulysses S. Grant
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55] NOVEMBER 23-27, 1863.--The Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign. No. 4. --Reports of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, U.S. Army, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi, including operations since October 18, with orders and correspondence, November 19-29, congratulatory orders, and the thanks of Congress.

[ar55_24 con't]
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 23, 1863--3 p.m.
(Received 6.40 p.m.)
General Thomas' troops attacked the enemy's left at 2 p.m. to-day, carried the first line of rifle-pits running over the knoll, 1,200 yards in front of Fort Wood, and low ridge to the right of it, taking about 200 prisoners, besides killed and wounded. Our loss small. The troops moved under fire with all the precision of veterans on parade. Thomas' troops will intrench themselves, and hold their position until daylight, when Sherman will join the attack from the mouth of the Chickamauga, and a decisive battle will be fought.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in- Chief.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 24, 1863--6 p.m.
(Received 4 a.m., 25th.)
The fight to-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope ann point high up. I cannot yet tell the amount of casualties, but our loss is not heavy. Hooker reports 2,000 prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
 Major-General HALLECK.
 <ar55_25>
WASHINGTON, November 25, 1863--8.40 a.m.
Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside.
 A. LINCOLN, President United States.
Maj. Gen. U.S. GRANT.
-----
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 25, 1863--11.30 a.m.
I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that General Burnside is hard pressed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. I know that you will do all in your power to relieve him.
 H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
 Major-General GRANT, Chattanooga, Tenn.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 25, 1863--7.15 p.m.
(Received 10 p.m.)
Although the battle lasted from early dawn till dark this evening, I believe I am not premature in announcing a complete victory over Bragg. Lookout Mountain top, all the rifle-pits in Chattanooga Valley, and Missionary Ridge entire have been carried, and now held by us. I have no idea of finding Bragg here to-morrow.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General, Commanding.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 25, 1863--7.30 p.m.
(Received 2.10 a.m., 26th.)
I have heard from Burnside to the 23d, when he had rations for ten or twelve days. He expected to hold out that time. I shall move the force from here on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and send a column of 20,000 men up the south side of the Tennessee, without wagons, carrying four days' rations and taking a steam-boat loaded with rations, from which to draw on the route.
If Burnside holds out until this force gets beyond Kingston, I think enemy will fly, and, with the present state of the roads, must abandon almost everything. I believe Bragg will lose much of his army by desertion, in consequence of his defeat in the last three days' fight.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General, Commanding.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
 <ar55_26>
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 26, 1863--11.15 a.m.
I congratulate you and your army on the victories of Chattanooga. This is truly a day of thanksgiving.
 H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
 Maj. Gen. U.S. GRANT, Chattanooga, Tenn.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 27, 1863--1 a.m.
(Received 3.10 a.m.)
I am just in from the front. The rout of the enemy is most complete. Abandoned wagons, caissons, and occasional pieces of artillery are everywhere to be found. I think Bragg's loss will fully reach sixty pieces of artillery. A large number of prisoners have fallen into our hands. The pursuit will continue to Red Clay in the morning, for which place I shall start in a few hours.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
-----
RINGGOLD, GA., 2 p.m.,
Via Chattanooga, Tenn., November 27, 1863--7 p.m.
(Received 1.30 a.m., 28th.)
The pursuit has continued to this point with continuous skirmishing. It is asserted by citizens that Longstreet is expected to-morrow, and that the enemy will make a stand at Dalton. I shall not take their word, however, but will start Granger this evening to
Burnside's relief. I am not prepared to continue pursuit farther.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General, Commanding.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 28, 1863--9.20 p.m.
(Received 12.35 p.m., 29th.)
The pursuit of the enemy to beyond Ringgold shows their great defeat and demoralization. Prisoners taken must amount to 6,000 or more. Over forty pieces of artillery have fallen into our hands. The roads everywhere are strewn with wagons, caissons, small-arms, and ammunition. Troops are now on their way to the relief of Burnside. Granger goes to Knoxville, or until he knows Longstreet has left East Tennessee. Sherman goes to the Hiwassee, and will be sent farther if it becomes necessary.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
 <ar55_27>
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., December 7, 1863--7 p.m.
(Received 1.40 a.m., 8th.)
Our losses in killed, wounded, and missing in recent battle about 4,000. Enemy's loss in killed about the same. We took over 6,000 well prisoners, forty-two pieces of artillery, and caisson and battery wagons for a large number of pieces. Number of small-arms collected about 5,000. Many have, no doubt, been collected by regiments and not accounted for.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
 Major-General HALLECK.
-----
HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., December 23, 1863
COLONEL: In pursuance of General Orders, No. 337, War Department, of date Washington, October 16, 1863, delivered to me by the Secretary of War at Louisville, Ky., on the 18th of the same month, I assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, comprising the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and telegraphed the order assuming command, together with the order of the War Department referred to, to Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside, at Knoxville, and to Maj. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, at Chattanooga. My action in telegraphing these orders to Chattanooga in advance of my arrival there, was induced by information furnished me by the Secretary of War, of the difficulty with which the Army of the Cumberland had to contend in supplying itself over a long mountainous and almost impassable road from Stevenson, Ala., to Chattanooga, Tenn., and his fears that General Rosecrans would fall back to the north side of the Tennessee River. To guard further against the possibility of the Secretary's fears, I also telegraphed to Major-General Thomas on the 19th of October, from Louisville, to hold Chattanooga, at all hazards; that I would be there as soon as possible. To which he replied on same date, "I will hold the town till we starve."
Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d of October, and found that General Thomas had immediately, on being placed in command of the Department of the Cumberland, ordered the concentration of Major-General Hooker's command at Bridgeport, preparatory to securing the river and main wagon road between that place and Brown's Ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain. The next morning after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with Thomas and Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, I made a reconnaissance of Brown's Ferry and the hills on the south side of the river and at the mouth of Lookout Valley. After the reconnaissance, the plan agreed upon was for Hooker to cross at Bridgeport to the south side of the river with all the force that could be spared from the railroad, and move on the main wagon road by way of Whiteside's to Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley. Maj. Gen. J. M. Palmer was to proceed by the only practicable route north of the river from his position opposite Chattanooga to a point on the north bank of the Tennessee River and opposite Whiteside's, there to cross to the south side to hold the road passed over by Hooker.
In the meantime, and before the enemy could be apprised of our intentions, a force under the direction of Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, <ar55_28> chief engineer, was to be thrown across the river at or near Brown's Ferry to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, covering the Brown's Ferry road, and orders were given accordingly It was known that the enemy held the north end of Lookout Valley with a brigade of troops, and the road leading around the foot of the mountain from their main camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley. Holding these advantages he would have had little difficulty in concentrating a sufficient force to have defeated or driven Hooker back. To remedy this the seizure of the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley and covering the Brown's Ferry road was deemed of the highest importance. This, by the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry, would secure to us by the north bank of the river, across Moccasin Point, a shorter line by which to re-enforce our troops in Lookout Valley than the narrow and tortuous road around the foot of Lookout Mountain afforded the enemy for re-enforcing his. The force detailed for this expedition consisted of 4,000 men, under command of General Smith, chief engineer, 1,800 of which, under Brig. Gen. W. B. Hazen, in sixty pontoon-boats, containing 30 armed men each, floated quietly from Chattanooga past the enemy's pickets to the foot of Lookout Mountain on the night of the 27th of October, landed on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry, surprised the enemy's pickets, stationed there, and seized the hills covering the ferry, without the loss of a man killed and but 4 or 5 wounded. The remainder of the forces, together with the materials for a bridge, was moved by the north bank of the river across Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry without attracting the attention of the enemy, and before day dawned the whole force was ferried to the south bank of the river, and the almost inaccessible heights rising from Lookout Valley and its outlet to the river and below the mouth of Lookout Creek were secured.
By 10 a.m. an excellent pontoon bridge was laid across the river at Brown's Ferry, thus securing to us the end of the desired road nearest the enemy's forces, and the shorter line over which to pass troops if a battle became inevitable. Positions were taken up by our troops from which they could not have been driven except by vastly superior forces, and then only with great loss to the enemy. Our artillery was placed in such position as to completely command the road leading from the enemy's main camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley. On the 28th, Hooker emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie by the direct road from Bridgeport, by way of Whiteside's, to Chattanooga with the Eleventh Army Corps, under Major-General Howard, and Geary's division of the Twelfth Army Corps, and proceeded to take up positions for the defense of the road from Whiteside's, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelley's Ferry, throwing the left of Howard's corps forward to Brown's Ferry. The division that started under command of Palmer for Whiteside's reached its destination and took up the position intended in the original plan of this movement. These movements, so successfully executed, secured to us two comparatively good lines by which to obtain supplies from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport, namely, the main wagon road by way of Whiteside's, Wauhatchie, and Brown's Ferry, distant but 28 miles, and the Kelley's Ferry and Brown's Ferry road, which, by the use of the river from Bridgeport to Kelley's Ferry, reduced the distance for wagoning to but 8 miles. <ar55_29>
Up to this period our forces at Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy's line extending from the Tennessee River above Chattanooga to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from 60 to 70 miles over the most impracticable of roads to any supplies. The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied on for moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within gunshot of and overlooking our very fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued our retreating forces. Already more than 10,000 animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga, over Walden's Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week. The enemy was evidently fully apprised of our condition in Chattanooga, and of the necessity of our establishing a new and shorter line by which to obtain supplies, if we could not maintain our position; and so fully was he impressed of the importance of keeping from us these lines--lost to him by surprise and in a manner he little dreamed of--that in order to regain possession of them a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's forces on a portion of Hooker's troops (Geary's division, of the Twelfth Corps) the first night after Hooker's arrival in the valley. This attack failed, however, and Howard's corps, which was moving to the assistance of Geary, finding that it was not required by him, carried the remaining heights held by the enemy west of Lookout Creek. This gave us quiet possession of the lines of communication heretofore described south of the Tennessee River. Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly, the sub-reports having been sent to Washington without passing through my hands. By the use of two steam-boats, one of which had been left at Chattanooga by the enemy and fell into our hands, and one that had been built by us at Bridgeport, plying between Bridgeport and Kelley's Ferry, we were enabled to obtain supplies with but 8 miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steam-boats was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army, but actual suffering was prevented. Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tenn., evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge, with a view to carrying it, and threatening the enemy's communication with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the 7th of November. After a thorough reconnaissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga, and I was forced to leave Burnside for the present to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the meantime reconnaissances were made and plans matured  for operations. <ar55_30>
Dispatches were sent to Sherman informing him of the movement of Longstreet and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga.
On the 14th of November, I telegraphed to Burnside as follows:

Maj. Gen. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE:
Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whiteside's to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside's to Kelley's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley. Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until that time. I can hardly conceive of the enemy's breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send you 10,000 men, not because they cannot be spared, but how could they be fed after they got even one day east of here?
U.S. GRANT, Major-General.

On the 15th, having received from the General-in-Chief a dispatch (of date the 14th) in reference to Burnside's position, the danger of his abandonment of East Tennessee unless immediate relief was afforded, and the terrible misfortune such a result would be to our arms, and also dispatches from Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, and Colonel Wilson, of my staff, sent at the instance of General Burnside, informing me more fully of the condition of affairs as detailed to them by him, I telegraphed him as follows:

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 15, 1863.
Maj. Gen. AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE:
I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the dispatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson, it would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley which you will necessarily possess. Holding to that point, should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream, even if it sacrificed half of the cavalry of the Ohio Army. By holding on and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville, he should not be allowed to escape with an army capable of doing anything this winter. I can hardly conceive of the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did so at all it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat. Kingston, looking at the map, I thought of more importance than any one point in East Tennessee. But my attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it might be passed by, and Knoxville and the rich valley about it possessed, ignoring that place entirely. I should not think it advisable to concentrate a force near Little Tennessee to resist the crossing, if it would be in danger of capture, but I would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy.
U.S. GRANT, Major-General.

 <ar55_31>
 Previous reconnaissances, made first by Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, and afterward by Thomas, Sherman, and myself, in company with him, of the country opposite Chattanooga and north of the Tennessee River, extending as far east as the mouth of the North Chickamauga, and also of the mouth of the South Chickamauga and the north end of Missionary Ridge, so far as the same could be made from the north bank of the river without exciting suspicion on the part of the enemy, showed good roads from Brown's Ferry up the river and back of the first range of hills opposite Chattanooga, and out of view of the enemy's positions. Troops crossing the bridge at Brown's Ferry could be seen and their numbers estimated by the enemy, but not seeing anything further of them as they passed up in rear of these hills, he would necessarily be at a loss to know whether they were moving to Knoxville or held on the north side of the river for future operations at Chattanooga. It also showed that the north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that the banks of the river from the mouth of South Chickamauga Creek westward to his main line in front of Chattanooga was watched only by a small cavalry picket. This determined the plan of operations indicated in my dispatch of the 14th to Burnside. Upon further consideration (the great object being to mass all the force possible against one given point, namely. Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end of it) it was deemed best to change the original plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's corps of his command to aid in this purpose, and on the 18th the following instructions were given Thomas:

Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS:
All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chickamauga, his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery); and to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and center, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move whenever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The juncture once formed, and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Farther movements will then depend on those of the enemy.
Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks and 100 rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek.
U.S. GRANT, Major-General

 <ar55_32>
A copy of these instructions was furnished Sherman,(*) with the following communication:

Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN:
Inclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the south; but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.
U.S. GRANT, Major-General.

Sherman's forces were moved from Bridgeport by way of Whiteside's, one division threatening the enemy's left flank in the direction of Trenton, crossing at Brown's Ferry, up the north bank of the Tennessee to near the mouth of South Chickamauga, where they were kept concealed from the enemy until they were ready to force a crossing. Pontoons for throwing a bridge across the river were built and placed in North Chickamauga, near its mouth, a few miles farther up, without attracting the attention of the enemy. It was expected we would be able to effect the crossing on the 21st of November, but owing to heavy rains Sherman was unable to get up until the afternoon of the 23d, and then only with Generals Morgan L. Smith's, John E. Smith's, and Hugh Ewing's divisions, of the Fifteenth Corps, under command of Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair, of his army. The pontoon bridges at Brown's Ferry having been broken up by the drift consequent upon the rise in the river and rafts sent down by the enemy, the other division (Osterhaus') was detained on the south side, and was on the night of the 23d ordered, unless it could get across by 8 o'clock the next morning, to report to Hooker, who was instructed, in this event, to attack Lookout Mountain, as contemplated in the original plan.
A deserter from the rebel army, who came into our lines on the night of the 22d of November, reported Bragg falling back. The following letter from Bragg, received by flag of truce on the 20th, tended to confirm this report:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, In the Field, November 20, 1863.
Maj. Gen. U. S. GRANT,
Commanding U.S. Forces. &c., Chattanooga:
General: As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BRAXTON BRAGG, General, Commanding.

Not being willing that he should get his army off in good order, Thomas was directed, early on the morning of the 23d, to ascertain the truth or falsity of this report by driving in his pickets and making him develop his lines. This he did with the troops stationed at Chattanooga and Howard's corps (which had been brought into Chattanooga because of the apprehended danger to our pontoon bridges from the rise in the river and the enemy's rafts) in the most <ar55_33> gallant style, driving the enemy from his first line and securing to us what is known as Indian Hill or Orchard Knoll, and the low range of hills south of it. These points were fortified during the night and artillery put in position on them. The report of this deserter was evidently not intended to deceive, but he had mistaken Bragg's movements. It was afterward ascertained that one division of Buckner's corps had gone to join Longstreet, and a second division of the same corps had started but was brought back in consequence of our attack. On the night of the 23d of November Sherman, with three divisions of his army, strengthened by Davis' division, of Thomas', which had been stationed along on the north bank of the river, convenient to where the crossing was to be effected, was ready for operations. At an hour sufficiently early to secure the south bank of the river, just below the mouth of South Chickamauga, by dawn of day, the pontoons in North Chickamauga were loaded with 30 armed men each, who floated quietly past the enemy's pickets, landed, and captured all but 1 of the guard, 20 in number, before the enemy was aware of the presence of a foe. The steam-boat Dunbar, with a barge in tow, after having finished ferrying across the river the horses procured from Sherman with which to move Thomas' artillery, was sent up from Chattanooga to aid in crossing artillery and troops, and by daylight of the morning of the 24th of November 8,000 men were on the south side of the Tennessee and fortified in rifle-trenches. By 12 m. the pontoon bridges across the Tennessee and the Chickamauga were laid, and the remainder of Sherman's force crossed over, and at half past 3 p.m. the whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, to near the railroad tunnel, was in Sherman's possession. During the night he fortified the position thus secured, making it equal, if not superior, in strength to that held by the enemy. By 3 o'clock of the same day Colonel Long, with his brigade of cavalry, of Thomas' army, crossed to the south side of the Tennessee and to the mouth of South Chickamauga Creek, and made a raid on the enemy's lines of communications. He burned Tyner's Station, with many stores, cut the railroad at Cleveland, captured near a hundred wagons and over 200 prisoners. His own loss was small. Hooker carried out the part assigned him for this day equal to the most sanguine expectations. With Geary's division (Twelfth Corps) and two brigades of Stanley's division (Fourth Corps), of Thomas' army, and Osterhaus' division (Fifteenth Corps), of Sherman's army, he scaled the western slope of Lookout Mountain, drove the enemy from his rifle-pits on the northern extremity and slope of the mountain, capturing many prisoners, without serious loss. Thomas, having done on the 23d with his troops in Chattanooga what was intended for the 24th, bettered and strengthened his advanced positions during the day, and pushed the Eleventh Corps forward along the south bank of the Tennessee River, across Citico Creek, one brigade of which, with Howard in person, reached Sherman just as he had completed the crossing of the river. When Hooker emerged in sight of the northern extremity of Lookout Mountain, Carlin's brigade, of the Fourteenth Corps, was ordered to cross Chattanooga Creek and form a junction with him. This was effected late in the evening, and after considerable fighting. Thus on the night of the 24th our forces maintained an unbroken line, with open communications, from the north end of Lookout Mountain, through Chattanooga «3 R R--VOL XXXI, PT II» <ar55_34> Valley, to the north end of Missionary Ridge. On the morning of the 25th, Hooker took possession of the mountain top with a small force, and with the remainder of his command, in pursuance of orders, swept across Chattanooga Valley, now abandoned by the enemy, to Rossville. In this march he was detained four hours building a bridge across Chattanooga Creek. From Rossville he ascended Missionary Ridge and moved northward toward the center of the now shortened line. Sherman's attack upon the enemy's most northern and most vital point was vigorously kept up all day. The assaulting column advanced to the very rifle-pits of the enemy, and held their position firmly and without wavering. The right of the assaulting column being exposed to the danger of being turned, two brigades were sent to its support. These advanced in the most gallant manner over an open field on the mountain side to near the works of the enemy, and lay there partially covered from fire for some time. The right of these two brigades rested near the head of a ravine or gorge in the mountain side, which the enemy took advantage of, and sent troops, covered from view, below them and to their right rear. Being unexpectedly fired into from this direction, they fell back across the open field below them, and reformed in good order in the edge of the timber. The column which attacked them was speedily driven to its intrenchments by the assaulting column proper. Early on the morning of the 25th the remainder of Howard's corps reported to Sherman, and constituted a part of his forces during that day's battle, the pursuit, and subsequent advance for the relief of Knoxville. Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy, but, from his occupying a line across the mountain and to the railroad bridge, across Chickamauga Creek, his rear and stores at Chickamauga Station. This caused the enemy to mass heavily against him. This movement of his being plainly seen from the position I occupied on Orchard Knoll, Baird's division, of the Fourteenth Corps, was ordered to Sherman's support, but receiving a note from Sherman informing me that he had all the force necessary, Baird was put in position on Thomas' left. The appearance of Hooker's column was at this time anxiously looked for and momentarily expected, moving north on the ridge with his left in Chattanooga Valley and his right east of the ridge. His approach was intended as the signal for storming the ridge in the center with strong columns, but the time necessarily consumed in the construction of the bridge near Chattanooga Creek detained him to a later hour than was expected. Being satisfied from the latest information from him that he must by this time be on his way from Rossville, though not yet in sight, and discovering that the enemy in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman was weakening his center on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops, constituting our center, Baird's division (Fourteenth Corps), Wood's and Sheridan's divisions (Fourth Corps), and Johnson's division (Fourteenth Corps), with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines on the rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge. These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees-from a hive--stopped but a moment until the whole were in line--and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, <ar55_35> following closely the retreating enemy, without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from near thirty pieces of artillery and musketry from still well-filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was seen in all that long line of brave men. Their progress was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession. In this charge the casualties were remarkably few for the fire encountered. I can account for this only on the theory that the enemy's surprise at the audacity of such a charge caused confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces. The nearness of night, and the enemy still resisting the advance of Thomas' left, prevented a general pursuit that night, but Sheridan pushed forward to Mission Mills.
The resistance on Thomas' left being overcome, the enemy abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of Sherman, and by 12 o'clock at night was in full retreat, and the whole of his strong positions on Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga Valley, and Missionary Ridge were in our possession, together with a large number of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms. Thomas was directed to get Granger, with his corps, and detachments enough from other commands, including the force available at Kingston, to make 20,000 men, in readiness to go to the relief of Knoxville, upon the termination of the battle at Chattanooga, these troops to take with them four days' rations, and a steam-boat loaded with rations to follow up the river. On the evening of the 25th November, orders were given to both Thomas and Sherman to pursue the enemy early the next morning, with all their available force, except that under Granger intended for the relief of Knoxville. On the morning of the 26th, Sherman advanced by way of Chickamauga Station, and Thomas' forces, under Hooker and Palmer, moved on the Rossville road toward Graysville and Ringgold. The advance of Thomas' forces reached Ringgold on the morning of the 27th, where they found the enemy in strong position in the gorge and on the crest of Taylor's Ridge, from which they dislodged him, after a severe fight, in which we lost heavily in valuable officers and men, and continued the pursuit that day until near Tunnel Hill, a distance of 20 miles from Chattanooga. Davis' division (Fourteenth Corps), of Sherman's column, reached Ringgold about noon of the same day. Howard's corps was sent by Sherman to Red Clay to destroy the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland, and thus cut off Bragg's communication with Longstreet, which was successfully accomplished. Had it not been for the imperative necessity of relieving Burnside, I would have pursued the broken and demoralized retreating enemy as long as supplies could have been found in the country. But my advices were that Burnside's supplies would only last until about the 3d of December. It was already getting late to afford the necessary relief. I determined, therefore, to pursue no farther. Hooker was directed to hold the position he then occupied until the night of the 30th, but to go no farther south at the expense of a fight. Sherman was directed to march to the railroad crossing of the Hiwassee, to protect Granger's flank until he was across that stream, and to prevent further re-enforcements being sent by that route into East Tennessee. Returning from the front on the 28th, I found that Granger had not yet got off, nor would he have the number of men I had directed. Besides, he moved with reluctance and complaints. I therefore determined, notwithstanding the fact that two divisions of Sherman's forces had marched from <ar55_36> Memphis, and had gone into battle immediately on their arrival at Chattanooga, to send him with his command, and orders in accordance therewith were sent him at Calhoun to assume command of the troops with Granger, in addition to those with him, and proceed, with all possible dispatch, to the relief of Burnside. General Elliott had been ordered by Thomas, on the 26th of November, to proceed from Alexandria, Tenn., to Knoxville, with his cavalry division, to aid in the relief of that place. The approach of Sherman caused Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville, and retreat eastward on the night of the 4th of December. Sherman succeeded in throwing his cavalry into Knoxville on the night of the 3d. Sherman arrived in person at Knoxville on the 6th, and, after a conference with Burnside in reference to "organizing a pursuing force large enough to either overtake the enemy and beat him or drive him out of the State," Burnside was of the opinion that the corps of Granger, in conjunction with his own command, was sufficient for that purpose, and on the 7th addressed to Sherman the following communication:

KNOXVILLE, December 7, 1863.
Major-General SHERMAN:
I desire to express to you and to your command my most hearty thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied that your approach served to raise the siege. The emergency having passed, I do not deem for the present any other portion of your command but the corps of General Granger necessary for operations in this section, and inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the forces immediately with him in order to relieve us, thereby- rendering the position of General Thomas less secure, I deem it advisable that all the troops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, should return at once to within supporting distance of the forces in front of Bragg's army. In behalf of my command, I again desire to thank you and your command for the kindness you have done us.
A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General.

Leaving Granger's command at Knoxville, Sherman, with the remainder of his forces, returned by slow marches to Chattanooga. I have not spoken more particularly of the result of the pursuit of the enemy because the more detailed reports accompanying this do the subject justice. For the same reason I have not particularized the part taken by corps and division commanders. To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, I feel under more than ordinary obligations for the masterly manner in which he discharged the duties of his position, and desire that his services be fully appreciated by higher authorities.
The members of my staff discharged faithfully their respective duties, for which they have my warmest thanks.
Our losses in these battles were 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 330 missing; total, 5,616. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was probably less than ours, owing to the fact that he was protected by his intrenchments, while our men were without cover. At Knoxville, however, his loss was many times greater than ours, making his entire loss at the two places equal to, if not exceeding, ours. We captured 6,142 prisoners, of whom 239 were commissioned officers, 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 7,000 stand of small-arms.
The Armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee, for their energy and unsurpassed bravery in the three days' battle of Chattanooga and the pursuit of the enemy, their patient endurance in marching <ar55_37> to the relief of Knoxville, and the Army of the Ohio for its masterly defense of Knoxville and repeated repulses of Longstreet's assaults upon that place, are deserving of the gratitude of their country.
I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General, U.S. Army.
 Col. J. C. KELTON, Assistant Adjutant-General.
ADDENDA.
CHATTANOOGA, November 19, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, Bridgeport, Ala.:
The chief engineer reports that he will require 750 oarsmen to carry out the programme of effecting the crossing of the river. Of this number he has secured all he can from General Thomas' command, 375, and will require the balance from your forces. As these men and the brigade who are to fill its boats have to march about 5 miles higher up the river than the balance of the command, I would suggest that the detail be made to-night and they placed in advance for the remainder of the march. The commanding officer of this detachment can be instructed to report to General W. F. Smith for a guide to conduct his march from Brown's Ferry to their place of embarkation.
 U. S. GRANT, Major-General.
-----
NOVEMBER 19, [1863.]
 General GRANT,
Chattanooga:
General Ewing arrived at Trenton yesterday at 10 a.m. John E. Smith's division is all on the march, and the two other divisions are crossing the river now. I start myself to-day. It is rather slow work crossing the bridge here, but we worked almost all night. I will be at Shellmound or Whiteside's to-night, and about General Hooker's to-morrow. I will keep the column closed up, and reach the camp opposite Chattanooga as soon as possible.
 W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
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CHATTANOOGA, November 20, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,
Bridgeport, Ala.:
To-morrow morning I had first set for your attack. I see now it cannot possibly be made then, but can you not get up for the following morning? Order Ewing down immediately, fixing the time for his starting so that the roads and bridge will be full all the time. I see no necessity for his moving by a circuitous route, but you can bring him as you deem proper, reflecting that time is of vast importance to us now that the enemy are undeceived as to our move up to Trenton. Every effort must be made to get up in time to attack on Sunday evening.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
 <ar55_38>
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 20, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Commanding Department and Army of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: On reflection, I think it would be better to let Howard start as soon as possible, making his march and crossing of the river by daylight. Our forces will be seen by the enemy coming out of Lookout Valley, and seeing this force cross into Chattanooga will have a tendency to conceal from them Sherman's movement. If it is not practicable to make this change now without interfering too much with uses it was previously intended to put the bridge to, I do not insist on the change being made.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
-----
 Major-General GRANT,
Comdg. Division of the Mississippi, Chattanooga, Tenn.:
GENERAL: Your letter of this morning, suggesting that General Howard pass across the river in daylight, was handed to me at Fort Wood, and I have taken the earliest opportunity to reply, after returning to my quarters. I did not give the order to General Howard, because, by an arrangement with General Smith, chief engineer, he is to have the exclusive use of the bridge all afternoon, to enable him to pass across the river the balks and chesses for the pontoon bridge to be thrown across the river above.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
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CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 20, 1863.
 Major-General THOMAS,
Commanding Department of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: A note just received from General Sherman, giving present position of his forces, shows an entire impossibility for him to get all his troops up and over Brown's Ferry before to-morrow night. His attack cannot be made, therefore, before Sunday morning (22d), if then. I have written to him to use all dispatch to be ready by that time. You can make your arrangements for this delay. You can exercise your own judgment about bringing Howard across to-night, as previously directed. The only advantage it will be in getting continuous use out of the bridges.
Very respectfully,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-general.
 <ar55_39>
CHATTANOOGA, November 21, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,
Bridgeport, Ala.:
I am directed by the general commanding to say that, in order to avoid delay, you will have your troops pass your transportation and move up at once, leaving only a sufficient force to guard your trains.
 JNO. A. RAWLINS, Brigadier-General, and Chief of Staff.
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CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 21, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Commanding Department of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: I have just received a report of the position of Sherman's forces. The raid last night has thrown them back so much that it will be impossible for him to get into position for action to-morrow morning. He will be up, however, against all calamities that can be foreseen, to commence on Monday morning.
Very respectfully,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General, Commanding.
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CHATTANOOGA, November 22, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,
Near Chattanooga:
Owing to the late hour when Ewing will get up, if he gets up at all to-night, and the entire impossibility of Woods reaching in time to participate to-morrow, I have directed Thomas that we will delay yet another day. Let me know to-morrow, at as early an hour as you can, if you will be entirely ready for Tuesday morning. I would prefer Woods should be up to cross with the balance of your command, but if he can [not] be up in time to cross as soon as your pontoons are laid, I would prefer you should commence without him, to delaying another day.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
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CHATTANOOGA, November 22, 1863.
 Brig. Gen. CHARLES R. WOODS, Comdg. First Div., Army of the Tenn., near Chattanooga:
You must get up with your force to-morrow without fail. Pass the wagon train and leave it to follow with rear guard. If you cannot get up with your artillery, come without it, leaving it to follow. I will expect the head of your column at Brown's Ferry by 10 a.m. to-morrow (23d) without fail.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
(One copy of above sent commanding officer at Whiteside's, one to commanding officer at Bridgeport, and they ordered to forward by courier.)
 <ar55_40>
HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 22, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding Army of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: The bridge at Brown's Ferry being down to-day, and the excessively bad roads since the last rain, will render it impossible for Sherman to get up either of his two remaining divisions in time for the attack to-morrow morning. With one of them up, and which would have been there now but for the accident to the bridge, I would still make the attack in the morning, regarding a day gained as of superior advantage to a single division of troops.
You can make your arrangements for this delay.
Very respectfully,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-general.
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HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 22, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding Army of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: Up to the hour I left General Sherman's headquarters, 3.30 this afternoon, General Davis had not reported to him. If Davis has not received orders to report to Sherman, and to receive his directions directly from him during the present movement, please so instruct him at once.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
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HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
Chattanooga, November 23, 1863--3.30 a.m.
 Major FULLERTON, Assistant Adjutant-General:
MAJOR: I have the honor to forward you the following information obtained from two deserters who came inside the lines of this division after 12 this a.m.:
These men state the rebel army is retreating. Say the troops which passed over the ridge yesterday were going to Chickamauga Station. They say the rumor in camps was yesterday that by this evening there would be nothing but their pickets left. Say their wagon trains had been ordered in (they had been kept to the rear for foraging purposes). They fully corroborate the statement of prisoners received yesterday morning as to their artillery having all left. I send the prisoners to corps provost-marshal herewith.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
 TH. J. WOOD, Brig. Gen., U. S. Vols., Comdg., General Officer of the Day.
(Forwarded to General Grant.)
 <ar55_41>
HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, November 23, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding Army of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: The truth or falsity of the deserters who came in last night, stating that Bragg had fallen back, should be ascertained at once. If he is really falling back, Sherman can commence at once laying his pontoon trains, and we can save a day.
Very respectfully,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
Camp opposite Chickamauga, November 23, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
Chattanooga:
DEAR GENERAL: I received your letter at the hands of Captain Audenried, and immediately made the orders for the delay of twenty hours. I need not express how I felt, that my troops should cause delay, but I know Woods must have cause, else he would not delay. Whitaker's and Cruft's troops fill the road, doubtless, and it must be a ditch full of big rocks. But Ewing is up, and if possible Woods or Osterhaus (for I got an orderly in the night announcing that he had overtaken and would resume command to-day) will be also. But in any event we will move at midnight, and I will try the Missionary Ridge to-morrow morning, November 24, in the manner prescribed in my memorandum order for to-day. I will use the Second Division in place of the First as guide, and Jeff. C. Davis' division will act as reserve, and bring me forward the artillery as soon as the bridge is put down. I will try and get out at least six guns in the first dash for the hills.
As you ask for positive information, I answer: No cause on earth will induce me to ask for longer delay, and to-night at midnight we move. What delays may occur in the pontoons I cannot foretell. I will get Jeff. C. Davis to make some appearances opposite Harrison, to make believe our troops are moving past Bragg to interpose between him and Longstreet.
Every military reason now sanctions a general attack. Longstreet is absent, and we expect no more re-enforcements, therefore we should not delay another hour, and should put all our strength in the attack.
Yours, truly,
 W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
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HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., November 23, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, Commanding Department of the Tennessee:
GENERAL: General Thomas to-day advanced his lines about 1,200 yards, carrying the enemy's first line of rifle-pits, and now occupies Orchard Knoll, in front of Fort Wood, and the rifle-pits and range of hills to the right of it. He will fortify and hold the ground thus <ar55_42> taken. General Howard's corps is advanced to the railroad bridge next to the river and to the left of Fort Wood, and will occupy this advanced position to-night, and from there move early in the morning, hugging the river closely, to form a junction with you. Our loss was light; the enemy's, in killed and wounded, supposed to be small. We captured full 200 prisoners.
By order of Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant:
 JNO. A. RAWLINS, Brigadier-General, and Chief of Staff.
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CHATTANOOGA,
November 23, 1863.
 Brigadier-General WOODS, (Care Major-General Hooker):
If the bridge is in readiness for you to cross between now and 8 a.m. to-morrow, cross over and come immediately to Chattanooga, in the absence of further orders. Should you not be able to cross by that time, report to General Hooker, to join him in any effort he may be called on to make.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-general.
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BALD MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION,
November 23, 1863.
 Major-General GRANT:
Sherman has four divisions across. General Woods has come up and is now embarking. Six pontoons more will complete the bridge.
Howard has halted about half a mile from Sherman, and made his men lie down. The rebels have men behind the railroad bank to right of the tunnel. Cannot see whether few or many.
 C. A. DANA.
(Similar dispatch to Thomas.)
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 NOVEMBER 24, 1863--11.20 a.m.
 General SHERMAN:
Thomas' forces are confronting enemy's line of rifle-pits, which seem to be but weakly lined with troops. Considerable movement has taken place on top of the ridge toward you. Howard has sent a force to try and flank the enemy on our left, and to send through to communicate with you. Until I do hear from you I am loath to give any orders for a general engagement. Hooker seems to have been engaged for some time, but how I have not heard. Does there seem to be a force prepared to receive you east of the ridge? Send me word what can be done to aid you.
Yours,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
 <ar55_43>
 NOVEMBER 24, 1863--12.40 p.m.
 Maj. Gen. O. O. HOWARD, Commanding Eleventh Corps:
Resist but bring on no attack until otherwise directed unless troops to right or left of you become engaged. In that case push your line forward or to the right or left, as circumstances may require. The open space between you and Sherman cannot be closed until Sherman advances to shorten it. General Thomas is not here, but I will communicate this order to him as soon as he can be found.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
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 NOVEMBER 24, 1863--12.40 p.m.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS:
General Howard reports enemy moving on Schurz' front. Hold reserves of Granger, or a portion of his force, if there are no reserves to spare, to be in readiness to move to Howard's assistance, if he is attacked.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-general.
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CHATTANOOGA,
November 24, 1863--1 p.m.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga:
Sherman's bridge was completed at 12 m., at which time all his force was over, except one division. That division was to cross immediately when his attack would commence. Your forces should attack at the same time, and either detain a force equal to their own or move to the left to the support of Sherman, if he should require it.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
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CHATTANOOGA, November 24, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, Near Chattanooga :
You will attack the enemy at the point most advantageous from your position at early dawn to-morrow morning (25th instant). General Thomas has been instructed to commence the attack early to-morrow morning. He will carry the enemy's rifle-pits in his immediate front, or move to the left to your support, as circumstances may determine best.
General Hooker carried the point and eastern slope of Lookout Mountain to-day, and now holds the line from the white house to the point where the railroad passes beneath the mountain down to the river at the Chattanooga side. He reports that his men are unflinching and cannot be driven from their position, which they are strengthening every moment; that the enemy still holds the top of Lookout Mountain, and he cannot prevent it until he can get around <ar55_44> and take possession of the Summertown road, which he is informed will require him to descend into the valley. He has captured two guns, and he thinks full 2,000 prisoners. Our loss is not severe, he says.
Carlin's brigade crossed over Chattanooga Creek from here to Lookout late this afternoon to Hooker's support. It has had considerable fighting.
The enemy's wagon trains were seen passing between 2 and 3 p.m. down the Summertown road from the top of the mountain to Chattanooga Valley.
By order Major-General Grant:
 JNO. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General.
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HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 24, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding Army of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel, with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill; his left at Chickamauga Creek.
I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation.
Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's present position on the mountain can be maintained with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare and ascend by the first practicable road.
Very respectfully,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General, Commanding.
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MISSION RIDGE STATION, November 25, 1863--12.45 p.m.
 Major-General GRANT:
Where is Thomas?
 SHERMAN, Major-General.
-----
ORCHARD KNOB,  November 25, 1863--1 p.m.
 Major-General SHERMAN:
I am here; my right is closing in from Lookout Mountain toward Missionary Ridge.
 GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General.
 <ar55_45>
CHATTANOOGA, November 25, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,
Near Chattanooga:
If you can, without interfering with the disposition of your troops for the attack, put in the brigade of Howard's corps now with you on your right, so that it may fall in on the left of its own corps as soon as the condition of affairs will permit, you will please do so, as his corps is small.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
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CHATTANOOGA, November 25, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga :
I am directed by the general commanding to say that you will start a strong reconnaissance in the morning at 7 a.m., to ascertain the position of  the enemy.
If it is ascertained that the enemy are in full retreat, follow them with all your force, except that which you intend Granger to take to Knoxville. This will make sufficient force to retain here. I have ordered Sherman to pursue also, he taking the most easterly road used by the enemy, if they have taken more than one.
Four days' rations should be got up to the men between this and morning, and also a supply of ammunition. I shall want Granger's expedition to get off by the day after to-morrow.
By order of Major-General Grant:
 JNO. A. RAWLINS, Brigadier-General, and Chief of Staff.
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CHATTANOOGA, November 25, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,
Near Chattanooga.
No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which Thomas' troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and can feel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your command in taking, first, so much of the same range of hills, and then in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to make Thomas' part certain of success. The next thing now will be to relieve Burnside. I have heard from him to the evening of the 23d. At that time he had from ten to twelve days' supplies, and spoke hopefully of being able to hold out that length of time. My plan is to move your forces out gradually, until they reach the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Granger will move up the south side of the Tennessee with a column of 20,000 men, taking no wagons, or but few, with him. His men will carry four days' rations with them, and the steamer Chattanooga, loaded with rations, will accompany the expedition. I take it for granted that Bragg's entire force has left. If not, of course the first thing is to dispose of him. If he has gone, the only thing necessary to do to-morrow will be to send out a reconnaissance to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
 <ar55_46>
P. S.--On reflection, I think we will push Bragg with all our strength to-morrow, and try if we cannot cut off a good portion of his new troops and trains. His men have manifested a strong desire to desert for some time past, and we will now give them a chance. I will instruct Thomas accordingly. Move the advance force early on the most easterly road taken by the enemy.
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HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, In the Field, Chattanooga, November 26, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Army of the Tennessee:
GENERAL: Your dispatch received. Thomas was ordered to pursue with all his force, except Granger's, on the road the enemy retreated, and is no doubt in motion before this.
The general commanding will be with the pursuing column, that he may give such general directions on the field as circumstances may suggest. Until you receive other orders, you will follow up the enemy on the most easterly road he may have taken, as directed by dispatch of last evening, being governed by your own judgment and the enemy's movements, the object being to bring him to battle again, if possible.
By order of Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant:
 JNO. A. RAWLINS, Brigadier-General, and Chief of Staff.
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HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., November 26, 1863. (Received 27th.)
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding Department and Army of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: Sherman put Jeff. C. Davis' division in motion to pursue the enemy about midnight last night. Howard's corps followed at 4 a.m. this morning, and ordered his other three divisions to close up by Chickamauga Depot. He crossed on pontoon bridge at mouth of Chickamauga, and goes up on east side all the way.
You will please move in the direction of the enemy all the force indicated for the pursuit in your orders of last night with all possible dispatch.
By order of Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant:
 JNO. A. RAWLINS, Brigadier-General, and Chief of Staff.
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RINGGOLD, GA., November 27, 1863--12.30 p.m.
 Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Army of the Tennessee:
GENERAL: Hooker has engaged the enemy here, strongly posted on the hills. It looks as if it will be hard to dislodge them. If you can move down with a force east of the ridge on the east side of <ar55_47> the railroad it will effectually turn the enemy's position. I do not care about the pursuit being continued farther south. I am anxious, however, to have the Cleveland and Dalton Railroad effectually destroyed. I think one brigade will be sufficient to do this. They can move on any road most direct, and should go without a wagon.
If you know any reason why one brigade will not be sufficient for the duty indicated, or why a force sufficient for it should not be detached at this time, you need not send them until you can communicate with me.
Yours,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-general.
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RINGGOLD, GA., November 27, 1863--1 p.m.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Near Chattanooga:
Hooker has just driven the enemy from this place, capturing three pieces of artillery and some prisoners. Sherman is near by. It is reported by citizens that Longstreet is expected to-morrow, and that the enemy will make a stand at Dalton. I do not intend to pursue farther however. I think it best not to rely on statements of citizens altogether. You will direct Granger, therefore, to start at once, marching as rapidly as possible, to the relief of Burnside. Should he obtain satisfactory evidence that Longstreet has abandoned the siege of Knoxville, he will return at once.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
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HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Ringgold, Ga., November 27, 1863--7.30 p.m.
 Major-General GRANT:
Colonel Grose, commanding brigade sent toward Tunnel Hill, reports that Bragg and Breckinridge staid last night at a house 2 miles from here, on the left of the road; Hardee and Cleburne about a mile from here; that the enemy are in strong force about 2 miles from here. They have burned a long railroad bridge about 2¼ miles distant, the second bridge from here. Hardee made remark at breakfast this a.m., "Longstreet was in extremely critical position." The road good, and no evidence of any train stalled. Citizen said no heavy train passed since 9 a.m. They had 2 of our wounded prisoners, which Colonel Grose brought in.
Very respectfully,
 JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General, Commanding.
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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Graysville, November 28--10.10.
 General GRANT:
DEAR GENERAL: I have been over to see Generals Davis and Howard, and will start to-morrow for Cleveland. Will be to-morrow night near a point marked Tucker's on the Coast Survey map. General Howard <ar55_48> moves by the old Alabama road, and Davis and Blair by the Ringgold and Ooltewah road.
Now I hear that the cavalry have already destroyed a large part of the railroad about Cleveland, and I infer from the dispatches that Colonel Duff has shown me that Longstreet is yet (27th) at or near Knoxville, passing rather above Knoxville, and that Sam. Jones is coming to him from Abingdon. General Hooker also has sent me a copy of his report to you, that Bragg is collecting his army at Tunnel Hill, and that he has held on to Palmer. Now these may change your plans. If so, send me orders via Tyner's and Ooltewah. It may be imprudent to spread too much. That was Rosecrans' mistake, and we should not commit it.
Unless I receive orders I will go to Calhoun, and find out something definite about Longstreet, and if he is coming down we must thwart him. I don't like to see Hooker alarmed, but it would be prudent to have the road cleared of all the trains, ambulances, caissons, &c., that are now sticking in the mud. Hooker also has too much artillery to move with anything like expedition.
Yours, truly,
 W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
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GRAYSVILLE, GA., November 28, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER,
Commanding Right Wing, Army in the Field:
General Sherman will start with his force for Loudon, leaving to-morrow morning. You will remain where you are during the 29th and 30th, or advance toward Dalton, if you find it practicable to do so without a battle. Should you be able to get a force into Dalton, destroy all materials that might be used in the support of an army. The object in remaining where you are is to protect Sherman's flank while he is moving toward Cleveland and Loudon. If, therefore, you should become satisfied that a force of the enemy move up the Dalton and Cleveland road, you will either attack them or move into Dalton behind them after they have passed, as you may regard most favorable.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
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RINGGOLD, GA., November 28, 1863--5 p.m.
 Major-General GRANT:
GENERAL: I have received your note regarding General Sherman's movement and my remaining here, and so forth.
This noon an orderly of General Johnston's, as he represented himself, came into our lines and reports the enemy re-enforcing and intrenching at Tunnel Hill. A column of troops from General Joe Johnston, he reports, sent to re-enforce Bragg. That General Cheat-ham's division was marching back to Tunnel Hill this morning, and that the enemy were advancing this side of Tunnel Hill. There has <ar55_49> no opportunity occurred yet for me to ascertain the truth of this report. General Thomas has ordered General Palmer's corps back to Chattanooga. I have taken the liberty of detaining General Palmer until I can send a copy of your order to General Thomas.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 JOSEPH HOOKER,  Major-General, Commanding.
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CHATTANOOGA, November 29, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. GORDON GRANGER,
Commanding Fourth Corps:
It is now ascertained that up to the 26th instant Longstreet had not abandoned the siege of Knoxville. Now that Bragg's army has been driven from Chattanooga, there is no reason to suppose he will abandon the siege until forced to do so by re-enforcements sent to Burnside's aid, when he will probably take up his march eastward to rejoin Lee about Richmond, or halt where he comes to railroad communication with Richmond, but where he can still threaten East Tennessee. On the 23d instant, General Burnside telegraphed that his rations would hold out ten or twelve days; at the end of this time, unless relieved from the outside, he must surrender or retreat. The latter will be an impossibility. You are now going for the purpose of relieving this garrison. You see the short time in which relief must be afforded or be too late, and hence the necessity for forced marches. I want to urge upon you in the strongest possible manner the necessity of reaching Burnside in the shortest time.
Our victory here has been complete, and if Longstreet can be driven from East Tennessee, the damage to the Confederacy will be the most crushing they have experienced during the war.
This important task is now intrusted to you, and it is expected that you will do your part well. Use as sparingly as possible of the rations you take with you. Replenish all you can from what you find on the road, giving receipts in order that settlements may be made with loyal persons hereafter.
Deeming what is here said [sufficient] to show you the importance of great promptitude in the present movement, I subscribe myself,
 U.S. GRANT, Major-General.
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CHATTANOOGA, November 29, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN:
News is received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th. At that time the place was invested, but the attack on it was not vigorous, Longstreet evidently having determined to starve the garrison out. Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I have lost all faith in his energy and capacity to manage an expedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think, therefore, that I shall have to send you. «4 R R VOL--XXXI. PT II» <ar55_50>
Push as rapidly as you can to the Hiwassee and determine for yourself what force to take with you from that point. Granger has his corps with him, from which you will select in conjunction with the forces now with you. In plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from that force organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside. The balance send back to Chattanooga.
Granger has a boat loaded with provisions, which you can issue and return the boat. I will have another loaded to follow you. Use, of course, as sparingly as possible from the rations taken with you, and subsist off the country all you can.
It is expected that Foster is moving by this time from Cumberland Gap on Knoxville. I do not know what force he has with him, but presume it will range from 3,500 to 5,000. I leave this matter to you, knowing that you will do better acting upon your discretion than you could trammeled with instructions. I will only add that the last advices from Burnside himself indicated his ability to hold out rations only to about the 3d December.
 U.S. GRANT, Major-general.
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CHATTANOOGA, November 29, 1863--7 a.m.
 Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER, Commanding, &c., near Ringgold, Ga.:
I am directed by the major-general commanding to acknowledge the receipt of your note of November 28, 5 p.m., and to say that your detention of Palmer's corps is approved, and in view of the bare probability that the enemy may have assumed a menacing attitude in your front, you are authorized to detain Palmer as long as you may think necessary.
In anticipation of your return here in a few days, and the probable continuance of bad roads, the general thinks you had better send back your extra artillery and wagons at once.
 J. H. WILSON, Brigadier-General.
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HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Ringgold, Ga., November 29, 1863--1 p.m.
 Major-General GRANT:
Your dispatch of 7 a.m. received. I notified General Thomas of my detention of Palmer's corps last evening by the same courier that carried the dispatch to you. At the same time General Palmer notified General Thomas, asking for orders in view of his having been ordered to Chattanooga by General Thomas. General Thomas' reply, dated at midnight, to General Palmer, ordered him to return at once. Upon General Palmer showing me this order I of course directed his compliance with it. He has been gone some three hours with his command. The enemy are unquestionably prepared to make a defense at Tunnel Hill, but the only force that has shown itself in front of my advance pickets has been a body of about 50 <ar55_51> cavalry. I do not think it is their intention to make an advance movement. I will know more concerning their position and movements as soon as my detachment of cavalry left in direction of Trenton comes up. I expect them every moment. All the wagons, except those required to take back two steam-engines, have been returned. We have only two batteries here. I inclose copy(*) of a letter captured here, written by one of General Hardee's staff.
Very respectfully,
 JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General, Commanding.
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GENERAL ORDERS,No. 7. HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,
In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., December 8, 1863.
The general commanding takes great pleasure in publishing to the brave armies under his command the following telegraphic dispatch just received from the President of the United States:
WASHINGTON, December 8, 1863.
Major-General GRANT:
Understanding that your lodgment at Chattanooga and Knoxville is now secure, I wish to tender you and all under your command my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all.
A. LINCOLN.
By order of Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant:
 T. S. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant-General.
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GENERAL ORDERS,No. 9.
HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS., In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., December 10, 1863.
The general commanding takes this opportunity of returning his sincere thanks and congratulations to the brave armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and their comrades from the Potomac, for the recent splendid and decisive successes achieved over the enemy. In a short time you have recovered from him the control of the Tennessee River, from Bridgeport to Knoxville; you dislodged him from his great stronghold upon Lookout Mountain: drove him from Chattanooga Valley; wrested from his determined grasp the possession of Missionary Ridge; repelled, with heavy loss to him, his repeated assaults upon Knoxville, forcing him to raise the siege there; driving him at all points, utterly routed and discomfited, beyond the limits of the State. By your noble heroism and determined courage you have most effectually defeated the plans of the enemy for regaining possession of the States of Kentucky and Tennessee. You have secured positions from which no rebellious power can drive or dislodge you. For all this the general commanding thanks you collectively and individually. The loyal people of the United States thank and bless you. Their hopes and <ar55_52> prayers for your success against this unholy rebellion are with you daily. Their faith in you will not be in vain. Their hopes will not be blasted. Their prayers to Almighty God will be answered. You will yet go to other fields of strife, and, with the invincible bravery and unflinching loyalty to justice and right which have characterized you in the past, you will prove that no enemy can withstand you, and that no defenses, however formidable, can check your onward march.
By order of Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant:
 T. S. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant-General.
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GENERAL ORDERS,No. 398.
WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, December 21, 1863.
The following joint resolution by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States is published to the Army:
JOINT RESOLUTION of thanks to Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and the officers and soldiers who have fought under his command during the rebellion; and providing that the President of the United States shall cause a medal to be struck, to be presented to Major-General Grant in the name of the people of the United States of America.
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of Congress be, and they hereby are, presented to Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, and through him to the officers and soldiers who have fought under his command during this rebellion, for their gallantry and good conduct in the battles in which they have been engaged; and that the. President of the United States be requested to cause a gold medal to be struck, with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions, to be presented to Major-General Grant.
SEC. 2. And be it further resolved, That, when the said medal shall have been struck, the President shall cause a copy of this joint resolution to be engrossed on parchment, and shall transmit the same, together with the said medal, to Major-General Grant, to be presented to him in the name of the people of the United States of America.
SEC. 3. And be it further resolved, That a sufficient sum of money to carry this resolution into effect is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.
SCHUYLER COLFAX, Speaker of the House of Representatives.
H. HAMLIN, Vice-President of the United States, and President of the Senate.
Approved December 17, 1863.
A. LINCOLN.
By order of the Secretary of War:
 E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.


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