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1. George H. Thomas
2. Ulysses S. Grant
3. Joseph Hooker
4. William T.
Sherman
5. Peter J.
Osterhaus
6. August Willich
7. Henry W. Halleck
------------
8. Braxton Bragg
9. Patrick R.
Cleburne
10. Alexander
P. Stewart ?
[ar55_313 con't]
HDQRS. ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH ARMY CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., March 13, 1864.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
SIR: My attention has been called to a few clerical errors in the copy
of report of the operations of my command in the vicinity of Chattanooga,
and to several of my own, which I desire to correct before its publication.
For this reason I request that the inclosed copy may be substituted for
the one forwarded through the headquarters of the military division, and
that the latter may be returned to me.
By a comparison of the reports the only essential change in the meaning
will be found to be in substituting "12-pounder battery of howitzers" for
24-pounder, as I had erroneously written it.
I should address this request through Lieutenant-General Grant if assured
of his whereabouts, and now request that it may be referred to him if in
Washington.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.
<ar55_314>
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., February 4, 1864.
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part
taken by my command in those operations of the army which resulted in driving
the rebel forces from their positions in the vicinity of Chattanooga, and
of its participation, immediately afterward, in their pursuit.
In order that these operations may be distinctly understood--that the
troops concerned be known and receive the honor due them--it is necessary
to premise by stating that the general attack was ordered to be made on
the enemy's extreme right at daylight on the 21st of November, and that
preparatory orders were sent, through me, on the 18th, for the Eleventh
Corps to cross to the north bank of the Tennessee River on the 20th. At
this time the Eleventh, and a part of the Twelfth Corps, were encamped
in Lookout Valley opposite to the left of the enemy's line.
In consequence of the non-arrival of the force mainly relied on to
lead off, the attack was postponed to the following morning, and again
postponed until the 24th for the same reason. Meanwhile orders were received
for the Eleventh Corps to go to Chattanooga, where it reported on the 22d.
This divided my command, and, as the orders contemplated no advance from
Lookout Valley, application was made by me to the major-general commanding
the department for authority to accompany the Eleventh Corps, assigning
as a reason that it was my duty to join that part of my command going into
battle. This was acceded to, and, preparatory to leaving, invitation was
sent for Brigadier-General Geary, who was the senior officer in my absence,
to examine with me the enemy's positions and defenses, and to be informed
at what points I desired to have his troops held. This was to enable me
to make use of the telegraph in communicating with him advisedly during
the progress of the fight, should a favorable opportunity present itself
for him to advance.
On the 23d, the commander of the department requested me to remain
in Lookout Valley, and make a demonstration as early as possible the following
morning on the point of Lookout Mountain, my command to consist of the
parts of two divisions. Later in the day, the 23d, a copy of a telegram
was received from the major-general commanding the Division of the Mississippi
to the effect that in the event the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry could
not be repaired in season for Osterhaus' division, of the Fifteenth Corps,
to cross by 8 a.m. on the 24th, the division would report to me. Soon after,
another telegram, from the headquarters of the department, instructed me,
in the latter case, to take the point of Lookout Mountain if my demonstration
should develop its practicability. At 2 a.m. word was received that the
bridge could not be put in serviceable condition for twelve hours, but
to be certain on the subject, a staff officer was dispatched to ascertain,
and at 3.15 a.m., on the 24th, the report was confirmed.
As now composed, my command consisted of Osterhaus' division, Fifteenth
Corps; Cruft's, of the Fourth; Geary's, of the Twelfth (excepting from
the two last-named divisions such regiments as were required to protect
our communications with Bridgeport and Kelley's Ferry); Battery K, of the
First Ohio, and Battery I, First New York, of the Eleventh Corps (the two
having horses for but one); a part of the Second Kentucky Cavalry, and
Company K, of the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, making an aggregate force
of 9,681. <ar55_315> We were all strangers, no one division ever having
seen either of the others.
Geary's division, supported by Whitaker's brigade, of Cruft's division,
was ordered to proceed up the valley, cross the creek near Wauhatchie,
and march down, sweeping the rebels from it. The other brigade of the Fourth
Corps to advance, seize the bridge just below the railroad, and repair
it. Osterhaus' division was to march up from Brown's Ferry, under cover
of the hills, to the place of crossing; also, to furnish supports for the
batteries. The Ohio battery was to take a position on Bald Hill, and the
New York battery on the hill directly in rear. The Second Kentucky Cavalry
was dispatched to observe the movements of the enemy in the direction of
Trenton, and the Illinois company to perform orderly and escort duty. This
disposition of the forces was ordered to be made as soon after daylight
as practicable.
At this time the enemy's pickets formed a continuous line along the
right bank of Lookout Creek, with the reserves in the valley, while his
main force was encamped in a hollow half way up the slope of the mountain,
the summit itself was held by three brigades of Stevenson's division, and
these were comparatively safe, as the only means of access from the west,
for a distance of 20 miles up the valley, was by two or three trails, admitting
of the passage of but 1 man at a time, and even those trails were held
at the top by rebel pickets. For this reason no direct attempt was made
for the dislodgment of this force. On the Chattanooga side, which is less
precipitous, a road of easy grade has been made communicating with the
summit by zig-zag lines running diagonally up the mountain side, and it
was believed that before our troops should gain possession of this, the
enemy on the top would evacuate his position, to avoid being cut off from
his main body, to rejoin which would involve a march of 20 or 30 miles.
Viewed from whatever point, Lookout Mountain, with its high palisaded
crest, and its steep, rugged, rocky, and deeply-furrowed slopes, presented
an imposing barrier to our advance, and when to these natural obstacles
were added almost interminable, well-planned, and well-constructed defenses,
held by Americans, the assault became an enterprise worthy of the ambition
and renown of the troops to whom it was intrusted.
On the northern slope, midway between the summit and the Tennessee,
a plateau or belt of arable land encircles the crest. There a continuous
line of earth-works had been thrown up, while redoubts, redans, and pits
appeared lower down the slope, to repel an assault from the direction of
the river. On each flank were rifle-pits, epaul-ements for batteries, walls
of stone, and abatis to resist attacks from either the Chattanooga or Lookout
Valleys. In the valleys themselves were earth-works of still greater extent.
Geary commenced his movement as instructed, crossed the creek at 8
o'clock, captured the entire picket of 42 men posted to defend it, marched
directly up the mountain, until his right rested on the palisades, and
headed down the valley.
At the same time Grose's brigade advanced resolutely, with brisk skirmishing,
drove the enemy from the bridge, and at once proceeded to put it in repair.
The firing at this point alarmed the rebels, and immediately their
columns were seen filing down the mountain from their camps, and moving
into their rifle-pits and breastworks; at the same time numbers <ar55_316>
established themselves behind the embankment of the railroad, which enabled
them, without exposure, to sweep, with a fire of musketry, the field over
which our troops would be compelled to march for a distance of 300 or 400
yards.
These dispositions were distinctly visible, and as facilities for avoiding
them were close at hand, Osterhaus was directed to send a brigade, under
cover of the hills and trees, about 800 yards higher up the creek, and
prepare a crossing at that point. This was Brigadier-General Woods' brigade.
Soon after this Cruft was ordered to leave a sufficient force at the
bridge to engage the attention of the enemy, and for the balance of Grose's
brigade to follow Woods'. Meanwhile a section of howitzers was planted
to enfilade the positions the enemy had taken, and Osterhaus established
a section of 20-pounder Parrotts to enfilade the route by which the enemy
had left his camp. The battery on Bald Hill enfiladed the railroad and
highway leading to Chattanooga, and all the batteries and sections of batteries
had a direct or enfilading fire within easy range on all the positions
taken by the rebels. Besides, the 20-pounder Parrotts could be used with
good effect on the rebel camp on the side of the mountain. With this disposition
of the artillery it was believed we would be able to prevent the enemy
from dispatching relief to oppose Geary, and also keep him from running
away.
At 11 o'clock Woods had completed his bridge. Geary's lines appeared
close by, his skirmishers smartly engaged, and all the guns opened. Woods
and Grose then sprang across the river, joined Geary's left, and moved
down the valley. A few of the enemy escaped from the artillery fire, and
those who did ran upon our infantry and were captured. The balance of the
rebel forces were killed or taken prisoners, many of them remaining in
the bottom of their pits for safety until forced out by our men.
Simultaneous with these operations the troops on the mountain rushed
on in their advance, the right passing directly under the muzzles of the
enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over ledges and bowlders, up hill
and down, furiously driving the enemy from his camp and from position after
position. This lasted until 12 o'clock, when Geary's advance heroically
rounded the peak of the mountain.
Not knowing to what extent the enemy might be re-enforced, and fearing
from the rough character of the field of operations that our lines might
be disordered, directions had been given for the troops to halt on reaching
this high ground, but, fired by success, with a flying, panic-stricken
enemy before them, they pressed impetuously forward. Cobham's brigade,
occupying the high ground on the right, between the enemy's main line of
defense on the plateau and the palisades, incessantly plied them with fire
from above and behind, while Ireland's brigade was vigorously rolling them
up on the flank, and both being closely supported by the brigades of Whitaker
and Creighton, our success was uninterrupted and irresistible.
Before losing the advantages the ground presented us, the enemy had
been re-enforced. Meantime, after having secured the prisoners, two of
Osterhaus' regiments had been sent forward on the Chattanooga road, and
the balance of his and Cruft's divisions had joined Geary. All the rebel
efforts to resist us only resulted in rendering our success more thorough.
After two or three short but sharp conflicts, the plateau was cleared.
The enemy, with his re-enforcements, <ar55_317> driven from the walls
and pits around Craven's house (the last point at which he could make a
stand in force), all broken and dismayed, were hurled in great numbers
over the rocks and precipices into the valley.
It was now near 2 o'clock, and our operations were arrested by the
darkness. The clouds, which had hovered over and enveloped the summit of
the mountain during the morning, and to some extent favored our movements,
gradually settled into the valley and completely veiled it from our view.
Indeed, from the moment we had rounded the peak of the mountain, it was
only from the roar of battle and the occasional glimpse our comrades in
the valley could catch of our lines and standards that they knew of the
strife or its progress; and when, from these evidences, our true condition
was revealed to them, their painful anxiety yielded to transports of joy
which only soldiers can feel in the earliest moments of dawning victory.
Deeming a descent into the valley imprudent, without more accurate
information of its topography, and also of the position and strength of
the enemy, our line was established on the east side of the mountain, the
right resting on the palisades, and the left near the mouth of Chattanooga
Creek, and this we strengthened by all the means at hand, working until
4 o'clock, when the commander of the department was informed that our position
was
impregnable.
During all of these operations the batteries on Moccasin Point, under
Captain Naylor, had been busily at work from the north bank of the Tennessee
River, and had contributed as much to our assistance as the irregularities
of the ground and the state of the atmosphere would admit of. From our
position we commanded the enemy's lines of defense, stretching across Chattanooga
Valley, by an enfilading fire, and also by a direct fire, many of his camps,
some of which were in our immediate vicinity. Also direct communication
had been opened with Chattanooga, and at a quarter past 5 o'clock Brigadier-General
Carlin, Fourteenth Corps, reported to me with his brigade, and was assigned
to duty on the right of the line, to relieve Geary's command, almost exhausted
with the fatigue and excitement incident to their unparalleled march.
To prevent artillery being brought forward, the enemy had undermined
the road and covered it with felled timber. This was repaired and placed
in serviceable condition before morning.
During the day and until after midnight an irregular fire was kept
up along our line, and had the appearance at one time of an effort to break
it. This was on the right, and was at once vigorously and handsomely repelled.
In this, Carlin's brigade rendered excellent service. His report is herewith
forwarded.
Before daylight, anticipating the withdrawal of the rebel force from
the summit of the mountain, parties from several regiments were dispatched
to scale it, but to the Eighth Kentucky must belong the distinction of
having been foremost to reach the crest and at sunrise to display our flag
from the peak of Lookout, amid the wild and prolonged cheers of the men
whose dauntless valor had borne it to that point.
During the night the enemy had quietly abandoned the mountain, leaving
behind 20,000 rations, the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades,
and other matériel.
An impenetrable mist still covered the face of the valley. Prisoners
reported that the enemy had abandoned it, but, deeming it imprudent to
descend, a reconnaissance was ordered, and soon after <ar55_318> 9 o'clock
report came in that the rebels had retired, but that their pickets still
held the right bank of Chattanooga Creek, in the direction of Rossville.
Soon after the fog vanished, and nothing was to be seen in the valley but
the deserted and burning camps of the enemy.
Among the fruits of the preceding operations may be enumerated the
concentration of the army, the abandonment of defenses upward of 8 miles
in extent, the recovery of all the advantages in position the enemy had
gained from our army on the bloody field of Chickamauga, giving to us the
undisputed navigation of the river and the control of the railroad, the
capture of between 2,000 and 3,000 prisoners, 5 stand of colors, 2 pieces
of artillery, upward of 5,000 muskets, &c.
Of the troops opposed to us were four brigades of Walker's division,
Hardee's corps, a portion of Stewart's division of Breckinridge's corps,
and on the top of the mountain were three brigades of Steven-sons division.
In conformity with orders, two regiments were dispatched to hold the
mountain, Carlin's brigade directed to await orders on the Summertown road,
and at 10 o'clock my column, Osterhaus (being nearest the road) leading,
marched for Rossville.
On arriving at Chattanooga Creek it was discovered that the enemy had
destroyed the bridge, and, in consequence, our pursuit was delayed nearly
three hours. As soon as the stringers were laid, Osterhaus managed to throw
over the Twenty-seventh Missouri Regiment, and soon after all of his infantry.
The former deployed, pushed forward as skirmishers to the gorge in Missionary
Ridge, and drew the fire of the artillery and infantry holding it, and
also discovered that the enemy was attempting to cover a train of wagons
loading with stores at the Rossville house.
As the position was one presenting many advantages for defense, the
skirmishers were directed to keep the enemy engaged in front, while Woods'
brigade was taking the ridge on the right, and four regiments of Williamson's
on the left. Two other regiments of this brigade were posted on the road
leading to Chattanooga to prevent surprise. In executing these duties the
troops were necessarily exposed to the enemy's artillery, but as soon as
it was discovered that his flanks were being turned and his retreat threatened,
he hastily evacuated the gap, leaving behind large quantities of artillery
and small-arm ammunition, wagons, ambulances, and a house full of commissary
stores. Pursuit was made as far as consistent with my instructions to clear
Missionary Ridge.
Meanwhile the bridge had been completed and all the troops over or
crossing. Osterhaus received instructions to move, with his division, parallel
with the ridge on the east, Cruft on the ridge, and Geary in the valley,
to the west of it, within easy supporting distance. The batteries accompanied
Geary, as it was not known that roads could be found for them with the
other divisions without delaying the movements of the column.
General Cruft, with his staff, preceded his column in ascending the
ridge to supervise the formation of his lines, and was at once met by a
line of the enemy's skirmishers advancing. The Ninth and Thirty-sixth Indiana
Regiments sprang forward, ran into line under their fire, and instantly
charging, drove back the rebels, while the residue of the column formed
their lines, Grose's brigade, with the Fifty-first Ohio and Thirty-fifth
Indiana, of Whitaker's, in advance, <ar55_319> the balance of the latter
closely supporting the front line. It was, however, soon found that the
ridge on top was too narrow to admit of this formation, and the division
was thrown into four lines. By this time the divisions of Geary and Osterhaus
were abreast of it, and all advanced at a charging pace.
The enemy had selected for his advance line of defense the breastworks
thrown up by our army on its return from Chickamauga, but such was the
impetuosity of our advance that his front line was routed before an opportunity
was afforded him to prepare for a determined resistance. Many of the fugitives,
to escape, ran down the east slope to the lines of Osterhaus, a few to
the west, and were picked up by Geary. The bulk of them, however, sought
refuge behind the second line, and they, in their turn, were soon routed,
and the fight became almost a running one. Whenever the accidents of the
ground enabled the rebels to make an advantageous stand, Geary and Osterhaus,
always in the right place, would pour a withering fire into their flanks,
and again the race was renewed. This continued until near sunset, when
those of the enemy who had not been killed or captured gave way, and in
attempting to escape along the ridge, ran into the arms of Johnson's division,
of the Fourteenth Corps, and were captured.
Our enemy, the prisoners stated, was Stewart's division. But few escaped.
Osterhaus atone captured 2,000 of them. This officer names the Fourth Iowa,
Seventy-sixth Ohio, and Twenty-seventh Missouri Regiments as having been
especially distinguished in this engagement. Landgraeber's battery of howitzers
also rendered brilliant service on this field.
Here our business for the day ended, and the troops went into bivouac,
with cheers and rejoicings, which were caught up by other troops in the
vicinity and carried along the ridge until lost in the distance.
Soon after daylight every effort was made, by reconnaissance and inquiry,
to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, but to no purpose. The field
was as silent as the grave. Knowing the desperate extremities to which
he must be reduced by our success, with his retreat seriously threatened
by the only line left him with a hope of success, I felt satisfied the
enemy must be in full retreat, and accordingly suggested to the commander
of the department that my column march to Graysville, if possible, to intercept
him. This was approved of, and, re-enforced by Palmer's corps, all moved
immediately in that direction, Palmer's corps in advance.
On arriving at the west Fork of the Chickamauga River, it was found
that the enemy had destroyed the bridge. To provide for this contingency,
Major-General Butterfield, my chief of staff, had in the morning prudently
requested that three pontoons, with their balks and chesses, might be dispatched
for my use, but as they had not come up, after a detention of several hours,
a bridge was constructed for the infantry, the officers swimming their
horses. It was not until after 3 o'clock the regiments were able to commence
crossing, leaving the artillery and ambulances to follow as soon as practicable;
also a regiment of infantry as a guard, to complete the bridge, if possible,
for the artillery, and also to assist in throwing over the pontoon bridge
as soon as it arrived. Partly in consequence of this delay, instructions
were given for Palmer's command to continue on to Graysville on reaching
the La Fayette road, and for the balance of the command to proceed to Ringgold
(Cruft now leading), <ar55_320> as this would enable me to strike the
railroad 5 or 6 miles to the south of where it was first intended. Palmer
was to rejoin me in the morning.
Soon after dark word was received from Palmer, through a member of
his staff, that he had come up with the enemy, reported to be a battery
and 2,000 or 3,000 infantry. Instructions were sent him to attack them
at once, and while forming his lines to the left for that purpose, the
remaining part of the column was massed as it came up, to the right of
the road, and held awaiting the movements of Palmer. His enemy was discovered
to be a battery of three pieces, with a small escort, and was the rear
of the rebel army on the road from Graysville to Ringgold. Three pieces
of artillery were captured, and subsequently an additional piece, with,
I believe, a few prisoners. I have received no report from this officer
of his operations while belonging to my command, although mine has been
delayed six weeks in waiting.
We were now fairly up with the enemy. This at 10 o'clock at night.
Cruft's division advanced and took possession of the crest of Chickamauga
hills, the enemy's abandoned camp fires still burning brightly on the side;
and we all went into bivouac.
My artillery was not yet up, and in this connection I desire that the
especial attention of the commander of the department may be called to
that part of the report of General Osterhaus which relates to the conduct
of the officers who had the pontoon bridge in charge. I do not know the
names of the officers referred to;was not furnished with a copy of their
instructions, nor did they report to me. The pontoons were not brought
forward to the point of crossing at all, and the balks and chess-planks
only reached their destination between 9 and 10 p.m.; distance from Chattanooga
10 miles, and the roads excellent.
Then trestles had to be framed, and the bridge was not finished until
6 o'clock the following morning.
The report of Lieut. H. C. Wharton, of the Engineers, and temporarily
attached to my staff, who was left behind to hasten the completion of the
bridge, is herewith transmitted. No better commentary on this culpable
negligence is needed than is furnished by the record of our operations
in the vicinity of Ringgold.
The town was distant 5 miles. At daylight the pursuit was renewed,
Osterhaus in advance, Geary following, and Cruft in the rear. Evidences
of the precipitate flight of the enemy were everywhere apparent; caissons,
wagons, ambulances, arms, and ammunition were abandoned in the hurry and
confusion of retreat. After going about 2 miles, we came up with the camp
he had occupied during the night, the fires still burning. A large number
of prisoners were also taken before reaching the East Fork of the Chickamauga
River.
We found the ford, and also the bridge to the south of Ringgold, held
by a body of rebel cavalry. These discharged their arms and quickly gave
way before a handful of our men, and were closely pursued into the town.
I rode to the front on hearing the firing, where I found Osterhaus
out with his skirmishers, intensely alive to all that was passing, and
pushing onward briskly. He informed me that four pieces of artillery had
just left the rebel camp, weakly escorted, and ran into the gorge, which
he could have captured with a small force of cavalry. The gorge is to the
east of Ringgold, and we were approaching it <ar55_321> from the west.
A little firing occurred between our skirmishers, as they entered the town,
and small parties of the rebel cavalry and infantry, the latter retiring
in the direction of the gap. This is a break in Taylor's Ridge of sufficient
width for the river to flow and on its north bank room for an ordinary
road and a railroad, when the ridge rises with abruptness on both sides
400 or 500 feet, and from thence, running nearly north and south, continues
unbroken for many miles. Covering the entrance to it is a small patch of
young trees and undergrowth.
It was represented by citizens friendly to our cause, and confirmed
by contrabands, that the enemy had passed through Ringgold, sorely pressed,
his animals exhausted, and his army hopelessly demoralized. In a small
portion of it only had the officers been able to preserve regimental and
company formations, many of the men having thrown away their arms. A still
greater number were open and violent in their denunciations of the Confederacy.
In order to gain time, it was the intention of the rear guard to make
use of the natural advantages the gorge presented to check the pursuit.
The troops relied on for this were posted behind the mountain and the trees,
and the latter were also used to mask a couple of pieces of artillery.
Only a feeble line of skirmishers appeared in sight.
The only way to ascertain the enemy's strength was to feel of him,
and, as our success, if prompt, would be crowned with a rich harvest of
matériel, without waiting for my artillery (not yet up, though after
9 o'clock), the skirmishers advanced. Woods deployed his brigade in rear
of them under cover of the embankment of the railroad, and a brisk musketry
fire commenced between the skirmishers. At the same time the enemy kept
his artillery busily at work. Their skirmishers were driven in, and as
we had learned the position of the battery, the Thirteenth Illinois Regiment,
from the right of Woods' line was thrown forward to seize some houses,
from which their gunners could be picked off by our men. These were heroically
taken and held by that brave regiment. Apprehensive that he might lose
his artillery, the enemy advanced with a superior force on our skirmishers,
and they fell back behind Woods' line, when that excellent officer opened
on the rebels and drove them into the gorge, they leaving, as they fled,
their dead and wounded on the ground. Our skirmishers at once re-occupied
their line, the Thirteenth Illinois all the time maintaining its position
with resolution and obstinacy. While this was going on in front of the
gorge, Osterhaus detached four regiments, under Colonel Williamson, half
a mile to the left, to ascend the ridge and turn the enemy's right. Two
of these, the Seventy-sixth Ohio, supported by the Fourth Iowa, were thrown
forward, and as the enemy appeared in great force, when they had nearly
gained the crest, Geary ordered four of his regiments still farther to
the left, under Colonel Creighton, for the same object, where they also
found an overwhelming force confronting them. Vigorous attacks were made
by both of these columns, in which the troops exhibited extraordinary daring
and devotion, but were compelled to yield to numerical superiority. The
first took shelter in a depression in the side of the ridge about 50 paces
in rear of their most advanced position, and there remained. The other
column was ordered to resume its position on the railroad.
All the parties sent forward to ascertain the enemy's position and
«21 R R--VOL XXXI, PT II» <ar55_322> strength were small,
but the attacks had been made with so much vigor, and succeeded so well
in their object, that I deemed it unwise to call up the commands of Palmer
and Cruft, and the remaining brigades of Geary, to deliver a general attack
without my artillery. I therefore gave instructions for no advance to be
made, and for the firing to be discontinued, except in self-defense. These
orders were conveyed and delivered to every officer in command on our advance
line.
Word was received from General Woods that appearances in his front
were indicative of a forward movement on the part of the enemy, when Ireland's
brigade, of Geary's division, was sent to strengthen him. Cobham's brigade,
of the same division, took a well-sheltered position behind the knoll,
midway between the depot and the opening to the gap. These officers were
also ordered not to attack or to fire unless it should become necessary.
I may here state that the greatest difficulty I experienced with my
new command, and the one which caused me the most solicitude, was to check
and curb their disposition to engage, regardless of circumstances, and,
it appears, almost of consequences. This had also been the case on Lookout
Mountain and on Missionary Ridge. Despite my emphatic and repeated instructions
to the contrary, a desultory fire was kept up on the right of the line
until the artillery arrived, and you will see by the reports of commanders
that, under cover of elevated ground between my position and our right,
several small parties advanced to capture the enemy's battery and harass
his flank at the gap. It is with no displeasure I refer to these circumstances
in evidence of the animation of the troops, neither is it with a feeling
of resentment, for of that I was disarmed by an abiding sense of their
glorious achievements. It has never been my fortune to serve with more
zealous and devoted troops.
Between 12 and 1 o'clock the artillery came up, not having been able
to cross the West Fork of the Chickamauga until 8 o'clock on the morning
of the 27th. Under my acting chief of artillery, Major Reynolds, in conjunction
with Generals Geary and Osterhaus, one section of 12-pounder howitzers
was placed in position to bear on the enemy in front of our right and to
enfilade the gap; another section of 10-pounder Parrotts was assigned to
silence the enemy's battery, and one section farther to the left, to bear
on some troops held in mass in front of Geary's regiments. At the same
time a regiment from Cruft's division had been sent around by the bridge
to cross the Chickamauga, and, if possible, to gain the heights of the
ridge on the south side of the river, the possession of which would give
us a plunging fire upon the enemy in the gorge. Two companies had nearly
gained the summit when they were recalled. The artillery had opened with
marked effect, the enemy's guns were hauled to the rear, his troops seen
moving, and before 1 o'clock he was in full retreat. Williamson's brigade
followed him over the mountain, while skirmishers from the Sixtieth and
One hundred and second New York Regiments pursued him through the gap.
Efforts were made to burn the railroad bridges, but the rebels were driven
from them and the fires extinguished.
During the artillery firing the major-general commanding the Division
of the Mississippi arrived, and gave directions for the pursuit to be discontinued.
Later in the day, soon after 3 o'clock, I received instructions from him
to have a reconnaissance made in the direction of Tunnel Hill, the enemy's
line of retreat, for purposes <ar55_323> of observation, and to convey
to the enemy the impression that we were still after him. Grose's brigade
was dispatched on this service. About 2 miles out he ran upon a small force
of rebel cavalry and infantry, and pursued them about a mile and a half,
when he fell upon what he supposed to be a division of troops, posted on
the hills commanding the road. The brigade returned at 8 o'clock, and went
into bivouac. Colonel Grose's report in this connection concludes by saying
that "we found broken caissons, wagons, ambulances, dead and dying men
of the enemy strewn along the way to a horrible extent."
As some misapprehension appears to exist with regard to our losses
in this battle, it is proper to observe that the reports of my division
commanders exhibit a loss of 65 killed and 377 wounded, about one-half
of the latter so severely that it was necessary to have them conveyed to
the hospital for proper treatment.
They also show of the enemy killed and left on the field 130. Of his
wounded we had no means of ascertaining, as only those severely hurt remained
behind, and they filled every house by the wayside as far as our troops
penetrated. A few of our wounded men fell into the enemy's hands, but were
soon retaken. We captured 230 prisoners and 2 flags, to make no mention
of the vast amount of property and matériel that fell into our hands.
Adding to the number of prisoners and killed, as above stated, the lowest
estimated proportion of wounded to killed usual in battle would make the
losses of the enemy at least three to our one.
From this time the operations of the Right Wing, as it was now called,
became subordinate to those of the column marching to the relief of the
garrison of Knoxville.
Instructions reached me from the headquarters of the military division
to remain at Ringgold during the 29th and 30th, unless it should be found
practicable to advance toward Dalton, without fighting a battle, the object
of my remaining, as stated, being to protect Sherman's flank, with authority
to attack or move on Dalton should the enemy move up the Dalton and Cleveland
road.
In retreating, the enemy had halted a portion of his force at Tunnel
Hill, midway between Ringgold and Dalton, and as he evinced no disposition
to molest Sherman, my command rested at Ringgold. I was kept fully advised
of the rebel movements through the activity and daring of the Second Kentucky
Cavalry, which had joined me on the 28th.
In obedience to verbal directions given me by the commander of the
division, the railroad was thoroughly destroyed for 2 miles, including
the bridges on each side of Ringgold, by Palmer's and Cruft's commands;
also the depot, tannery, all the mills, and all matériel that could
be used in the support of an army. We found on our arrival large quantities
of forage and flour. What was not required by the wants of the service
was either sent to the rear or burned.
Our wounded were as promptly and as well cared for as circumstances
would permit. Surgeon Moore, the medical director of the Army of the Tennessee,
voluntarily left his chief to devote himself to their relief, and under
his active, skillful, and humane auspices, and those of the medical directors
with the divisions, they were comfortably removed to Chattanooga on the
28th. My sincere thanks are tendered to all the officers of the medical
staff for their zealous and careful attentions to the wounded, on this
as well as our former <ar55_324> fields. Especially are they due to
Surgeon Ball, medical director of Geary's division, and to Surgeon Menzies,
medical director of Cruft's division.
On the 29th, Major-General Palmer returned to Chattanooga with his
command, having in charge such prisoners as remained in Ringgold. On the
30th, the enemy being reassured by the cessation of our pursuit, sent a
flag of truce to our advanced lines at Catoosa, by Maj. Calhoun Benham,
requesting permission to bury his dead and care for his wounded, abandoned
on the field of his last disaster at Ringgold.
Copies of this correspondence have heretofore been forwarded.(*) Also,
on the 30th, under instructions from department headquarters, Grose's brigade,
Cruft's division, marched for the old battle-field at Chickamauga, to bury
our dead; and on the 1st December, the infantry and cavalry remaining left
Ringgold, Geary and Cruft to return to their old camps, Osterhaus to encamp
in Chattanooga Valley.
The reports of commanders exhibit a loss in the campaign, including
all the engagements herein reported, in killed, wounded, and missing, of
960. Inconsiderable, in comparison with my apprehension, or the ends accomplished;
nevertheless, there is cause for the deepest regret and sorrow.
Among the fallen are some of the brightest names of the army. Creighton
and Crane, of the Seventh Ohio; Acton, of the Fortieth Ohio; Bushnell,
of the Thirteenth Illinois; Elliott, of the One hundred and second New
York, and others, whose names my limits will not allow me to enumerate,
will be remembered and lamented as long as courage and patriotism are esteemed
as virtues among men. The reports of commanders also show the capture of
6,547 prisoners (not including those taken by Palmer at Graysville, of
which no return has been received), also 7 pieces of artillery, 9 battle-flags,
not less than 10,000 stand of small-arms, 1 wagon train, and a large amount
of ammunition for artillery and infantry, forage, rations, camp and garrison
equipage, caissons and limbers, ambulances, and other impedimenta. The
reports relating to the capture of the flags are herewith transmitted.
In the foregoing, it has been impossible to furnish more than a general
outline of our operations, relying upon the reports of subordinate commanders
to give particular and discriminating information concerning the services
of divisions, brigades, regiments, and batteries. These reports are herewith
respectfully transmitted.
The attention of the major-general commanding is especially invited
to those of the division commanders. As to the distinguished services of
those commanders, I cannot speak in terms too high. They served me day
and night, present or absent, with all of the well-directed earnestness
and devotion they would have served themselves had they been charged with
the responsibilities of the commander. The confidence inspired by their
active and generous co-operation, early inspired me to feel that complete
success was inevitable. My thanks are due to General Carlin and his brigade
for their services on Lookout Mountain on the night of the 24th. They were
posted in an exposed position, and when attacked repelled it with great
spirit and success.
I must also express my acknowledgments to Major-General Palmer <ar55_325>
and his command for services rendered while belonging to my column. Lieutenant
Ayers, of the signal corps, with his assistants, rendered me valuable aid
in his branch of the service during our operations.
Major Reynolds, the chief of artillery of Geary's division, proved
himself to be a skillful artillerist, and requires especial mention for
his services. His batteries were always posted with judgment and served
with marked ability. The precision of his fire at Lookout and Ringgold
elicited universal admiration.
To my staff more than ever am I indebted for the assistance rendered
upon this occasion. Major-General Butterfield, chief of staff, always useful
in counsel, was untiring and devoted on the field; Capt. H. W. Perkins,
assistant adjutant-general; Col. James D. Fessenden, Maj. William H. Lawrence,
Capt. R. H. Hall, Lieuts. P. A. Oliver and Samuel W. Taylor, aides-de-camp,
bravely and intelligently performed all their duties.
Lieut. H. C. Wharton, a promising young officer of Engineers, reported
to me from the staff of the major-general commanding the department, and
was unwearied in his assistance, both as an engineer and as an officer
of my personal staff.
Major-General Howard has furnished me, for transmittal, his able report
of the operations and services of the Eleventh Corps, from the time it
passed from my command, November 22, to that of its return, December 17.
As it relates to events of which I had no personal knowledge, it only remains
to comply with his wishes, with the request that the major-general commanding
the department will give it his especial attention.
I may add, that the zeal and devotedness displayed by this corps and
its commander, in performing all the duties assigned them, and in cheerfully
encountering its perils and privations, afford me great satisfaction.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
[Indorsement.]
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
In Field, Culpeper Court- House, Va.,
March 25, 1864.
Respectfully forwarded to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D.C.
I know of no objection to the substitution of this for Major-General
Hooker's original report of his operations in the battle of Chattanooga.
Attention is called to that part of the report giving, from the reports
of his subordinate commanders, the number of prisoners and small-arms captured,
which is greater than the number really captured by the whole army.
U.S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General, U. S. Army.
<ar55_326>
[Inclosure.]
Report of Casualties in General Hooker's command during the battles
of Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, and Ringgold.
O Officers. T Total
M Men. A Aggregate
----Killed---- ---Wounded---- ---Missing---
Command. O M T O M T O M T A
Geary's division (Second Division, Twelfth Corps ). 7 49 56 33 252
285 .... 4 4 345
Osterhaus' division (First Division, Fifteenth Corps). 7 50 57 39 296
335 4 40 44 436
Cruft's division (First Division, Fourth Corps). 1 20 21 11 112 123
.... 2 .... 146
Carlin's brigade (First Brigade, First Division, Fourteenth Corps).
.... .... 25 .... .... 134 .... .... .... 159
Total, less Fourteenth Corps 15 119 159 83 660 877 4 46 48 1,086
General Palmer, commanding Fourteenth Corps, has made no report of the
casualties in his command.
The Eleventh Corps is not included, as it was not under my command.
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-general, Commanding.
ADDENDA.
CONFIDENTIAL.]
HDQRS. ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 20, 1863.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division, Twelfth Corps:
The major-general commanding directs that you hold one-half of your
command in readiness to occupy that part of our line now held by the Eleventh
Corps, and that the latter be relieved as soon after dark to-night as practicable.
He recommends that you send the necessary staff officers along the line
to-day, in order to examine it and see how the pickets are stationed, so
that the change may be made without delay or confusion. The general considers
this part of the line more exposed than the part on which your division
is established, and he requests that your disposition be made accordingly.
Very respectfully,
H. W. PERKINS,
Lieutenant, Aide-de-Camp, and Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 20, 1863--6.20 p.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
The major-general commanding directs me to say that your command will
not move for a day or two.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
<ar55_327>
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 20, 1863--6.20 p.m.
Major-General HOWARD:
The major-general commanding directs me to say that you will not move
your corps until further orders.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 21, 1863.
Major-General REYNOLDS,
Chief of Staff:
I have the honor to report that, in compliance with your instructions
of last night, the orders directing a movement of my command have been
suspended, and that it remains as heretofore. I beg leave to report further
that two divisions of Major-General Sherman's command are still in my rear.
One of them was encamped in the vicinity of Trenton last night, the other
somewhere beyond Whiteside's. If free use of the bridge at Brown's Ferry
can be given the former for crossing as it comes up, it may be able to
cross the Tennessee to-night, while the latter will not probably reach
it to cross before to-morrow.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 22, 1863.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
The major-general commanding directs that you relieve General Howard's
pickets without delay, in accordance with your previous order. The movement
as countermanded will be made to-day. The general would like to see you
here at headquarters for a few moments.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 22, 1863.
Major-General HOWARD,
Commanding Eleventh Corps:
The major-general commanding directs that, in compliance with orders
from department headquarters, you move your command so <ar55_328> as
to cross Brown's Ferry bridge about 2 p.m. to-day, and thence to Chattanooga
direct. Brigadier-General Geary will be instructed to relieve your pickets.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 22, 1863--8.45 p.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
The major-general commanding directs me to say that the operations
are suspended again, in consequence of unexpected delays. You will let
your troops remain where they now are until further orders.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-general, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 22, 1863.
Colonel NICHOLAS,
Commanding Cavalry Detachment:
The major-general commanding directs that you march with your whole
force at daylight to-morrow in the direction of Trenton, keeping a sharp
lookout on all the approaches from the south and east, reporting without
delay any force you may find to Brigadier-General Geary, who will be found
at these headquarters. You should move with two days' rations and forage,
unless you are likely to gather forage in the valley. Take advantage of
rout movement to gather all the forage you need. The general suggests that
you send your wagons to Kelley's Ferry to-day for what supplies you need,
as there are no wagons on the road from Chattanooga there, and to-morrow
there will be a great many.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-general, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 22, 1863--9 p.m.
Col. T. P. NICHOLAS,
Commanding Cavalry Detachment:
The major-general commanding directs me to inform you that the movement
has been suspended, and that you will not move your command until further
orders.
Very respectfully,
H. W. PERKINS,
Lieutenant, Aide-de-Camp, and Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen.
<ar55_329>
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 22, 1863--9 p.m.
Major-General HOWARD,
Commanding Eleventh Corps:
The major-general commanding directs me to inform you that the movement
has been suspended until further orders. He says that if your command has
crossed at Brown's Ferry, you will encamp on that side; if not, you can
return to your old camps to-night.
Very respectfully,
H. W. PERKINS,
Lieutenant, Aide-de. Camp, and Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 23, 1863--10.45 p.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY, Commanding Division:
The major-general commanding directs that you move your command at
the sound of the first firing in the morning.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863.
Brigadier-General GEARY, Commanding Division:
The major-general commanding directs that you hold your command in
readiness to march at daylight, leaving the requisite number of troops
to hold your line, say, two or three regiments, and those in readiness
to join you should it be necessary. One brigade of General Cruft's troops
will be ordered to support you. The general is ordered to take Lookout
Mountain, and a division of General Sherman's is ordered to support the
movement. He desires that your chief of artillery may take charge of the
battery on Bald Hill, and to be there as soon after daylight as practicable.
He also desires that you will cross Lookout Creek just above Wauhatchie,
near the mill, and he suggests that you take one section of artillery with
you. This may involve the necessity of bridging the creek, and he desires
that you go prepared for it. After crossing Lookout Creek march down the
valley, sweeping every rebel from it. At the same time a corresponding
crossing will be made down here. Make your movements with the utmost rapidity.
General Whitaker is instructed to march to Wauhatchie, and there report
to you.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. LAWRENCE,
Major, and Aide-de-Camp.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863.
Brigadier-General CRUFT, Commanding Division:
The major-general commanding directs that you have your command in
readiness to move at the earliest dawn of day. Let General Whitaker's <ar55_330>
brigade be instructed to take position at Wauhatchie and to co-operate
with General Geary, who will cross Lookout Creek near that place. The brigade
will march without wagons, inasmuch as after crossing the creek they will
march down it. Further instructions will reach you in due time.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. LAWRENCE,
Major, and Aide-de-Camp.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863.
Brigadier-General GEARY:
General Hooker thinks you had better not attempt to come down on the
right bank of Lookout with wheels, unless you find the road so good that
it will not delay your advance.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863--5 a.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
One of General Cruft's brigades will move down when the battery moves
at daylight to Bald Hill. You are to move promptly at daylight.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863--5.50 a.m.
Brigadier-General CRUFT,
Commanding Division:
A staff officer will be here in waiting to accompany your brigade that
moves to seize the bridges over Lookout Creek. Please let him know when
it is ready, and have it move as promptly as possible so as to seize the
bridges by daylight. The one is a pole bridge, the other a stringer bridge.
Both have been partially destroyed. The general desires that they be promptly
seized, and skirmishers put out in front to hold and repair them and prevent
the enemy seizing or destroying them.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
<ar55_331>
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley Tenn., November 24, 1863--8 a.m.
Officer Commanding Batteries at Moccasin Point:
General Hooker desires that you will keep a sharp lookout on the easterly
slope of the nose of Lookout Mountain. If any of the enemy's troops move
up there shell them.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863.
Major-General BUTTERFIELD,
Chief of Staff.
Not a man has been removed from the picket line of our camp to-day.
It is the same line we have had since General Howard left, and I desire
it to be held by those men. Have you any reports of the cavalry sent out
in the direction of Trenton? On the receipt of this they must be instructed
to keep well out and on the alert night and day. You will also direct an
officer and a company of men from the regiment holding the right of General
Geary's picket line to proceed at once and destroy the bridge effectually
by which General Geary crossed Lookout Creek in the vicinity of Wauhatchie
this morning. I want the name of the officer intrusted with this duty,
for him to report by letter when he has executed it.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863.
Brigadier-General CRUFT:
Major-General Hooker directs that as soon as the enemy are started
our forces pursue to the crest of Lookout Slope only, where the lines will
be formed. Pursue no farther than the crest without further orders. The
bridges are to be made perfect after the troops have passed.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863.
Brigadier-General OSTERHAUS,
Commanding Division.
General Hooker directs that as soon as your troops cross the bridges
must be made firm and strong, and passable for artillery. <ar55_332>
As soon as the enemy are started our forces will pursue vigorously as far
as the crest of the slope of Lookout. At the crest the commands will be
halted and lines formed, with the troops closed up.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, TWELFTH ARMY CORPS,
Lookout Mountain, Tenn., November 24, 1863---1 p.m.
Maj. Gen. D. BUTTERFIELD,
Chief of Staff, Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps:
GENERAL: We are nearly on the crest of the hill. Everything is successful
so far. The enemy holds the crest in considerable force against us.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. W. GEARY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
-----
HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, TWELFTH ARMY CORPS,
Lookout Mountain, Tenn., November 24, 1863--1.15 p.m.
Maj. Gen. D. BUTTERFIELD,
Chief of Staff, Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps:
GENERAL: We are immediately under the crest of the hill. We have between
300 and 400 prisoners, and have taken two pieces of artillery. Please send
me artillerists to work them.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. W. GEARY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
-----
LOOKOUT VALLEY,
November 24, 1863--1.30 p.m.
Captain NAYLOR:
Our troops had the crest of Lookout Mountain at 12 o'clock. Your dispatch
is dated 1.30. Where do you see their flank?
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863--2 p.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
Make yourself strong in the position you occupy to-night. I am on the
Chattanooga road, and do not know that I will be able to communicate with
you personally to-night. Our men are busy removing trees and other obstructions.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.
<ar55_333>
HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, TWELFTH ARMY CORPS,
Lookout Mountain, Tenn., Nov. 24, 1863--2.45 p.m.
Maj. Gen. D. BUTTERFIELD,
Chief of Staff, Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps:
GENERAL: We are pressed heavily, and need re-enforcements. We must
have ammunition; I have sent for some, but it does not come. My rear should
be well looked to.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. W. GEARY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
-----
SIGNAL STATION,
November 24, 1863.
General HOOKER:
Do you want any help?
J. M. PALMER,
Major-General.
-----
NOVEMBER 24, [1863.]
General PALMER:
Can hold the line I am now on; can't advance. Some of my troops out
of ammunition; can't replenish.
HOOKER,
Major-general.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Mountain, Tenn., November 24, 1863--4 p.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
After the fog lifts I expect to descend into the valley, unless I receive
orders to the contrary. The force I have there now should be able to hold
it until that time. Our communications on the left with Chattanooga is
established. In all probability the enemy will evacuate to-night. His line
of retreat is seriously threatened by my troops.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-general, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Mountain, Tenn., November 24, 1863--4.50 p.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
I congratulate you and your command on their glorious achievements
of to-day. As the upper part of the line is most exposed, it has been stiffened
with re-enforcements. As every inch of-ground <ar55_334> we have wrenched
from the enemy to-day must be held until a renewal of the conflict, perhaps
to-morrow, see that your troops get up their ammunition and strengthen
their defenses.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863--6.30 p.m.
Major-General HOOKER:
I am for the present at the foot of the hill, where we were this a.m.
Shall go to old headquarters at 10.30, if all remains quiet here. The cavalry
have returned; been to Trenton, and nothing there but a little of the Fourth
Tennessee Cavalry. Have sent them orders to send out pickets and patrols
on all approaches for 3 or 4 miles up the valley. The work on the bridges
progresses very slowly. Have had Perkins pushing it. General Cruft promises
to have the bridge near the railroad passable for wagons in thirty-five
minutes. Have not been able to get any account or hear from the right of
Geary's old line; hope to, soon. It got dark before I could start the pioneers
for Kelley's Ferry, in compliance with General Reynolds' order; shall start
them at daylight. I gave Captain Hall, when he left, full statement of
position of affairs, which he has probably explained to you. Will they
occupy the enemy at daylight from Chattanooga?
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, TWELFTH ARMY CORPS,
Lookout Mountain, Tenn., November 24, 1863--7 p.m.
Maj. Gen. D. BUTTERFIELD,
Chief of Staff, Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps:
GENERAL: Our position will be untenable when the fog lifts, owing to
the great advantages of the enemy with his sharpshooters on the cliff.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. W. GEARY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863--8.30 p.m.
Major-General HOOKER:
Orderly just brought a dispatch from you. Orderly, horse, and all got
in the creek, and the dispatch is wet and torn, could not clearly read
it, but could make out order for destruction of the bridges over which
Geary crossed, and have sent full, positive, and peremptory instructions.
I sent you a report from cavalry sent to Trenton. I had heretofore directed
Colonel Nicholas to picket and <ar55_335> patrol all approaches. Will
now send him word to keep his whole force out night and day on the alert
until otherwise ordered. I have some companies of the Twenty-fifth Iowa
here (near where we were this morning). I shall hold them here as a reserve
to throw to any portion of the line attacked. Brown's Ferry bridge complete.
A corporal brought word to send prisoners to Chattanooga. Reynolds' dispatch
to you said Kelley's. Which shall be done? The bridge over Lookout, near
railroad, is complete for teams.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863--8.45 p.m.
Col. T. P. NICHOLAS,
Commanding Cavalry Detachment :
General Hooker directs that you keep your whole force out day and night
constantly, and on the alert, until further orders. Fight and dispute the
passage of any force, blocking their way. Give us full and timely information.
Guard and watch all approaches. Acknowledge receipt of this.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863--10 p.m.
Brigadier-General OSTERHAUS,
Commanding Division:
General Hooker directs that you have your batteries cross Lookout Creek
and report to him at daylight. Have all the ammunition replenished to-night,
the animals all well fed early, and everything in readiness for a good
day's work to-morrow. The Twenty-fifth Iowa have been ordered across Lookout
Creek to join their division, moving at daylight.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., November 24, 1863--10 p.m.
Major REYNOLDS,
Chief of Artillery:
General Hooker directs that you cross Lookout Creek with your batteries
and report to him at daylight. Have all the ammunition replenished, the
horses well fed early, and all in readiness for a good day's work.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD',
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
<ar55_336>
HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, TWELFTH ARMY CORPS,
Lookout Mountain, Tenn., November 25, 1863--Daylight.
Major-General HOOKER:
I have the honor to inform you that our flag waves over the peak of
Lookout Mountain.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. W. GEARY,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
White House, Lookout Mountain, Nov. 25, 1863--9.30 a.m.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
The commands will advance on the Rossville road toward Mission Ridge.
General Osterhaus will take the advance, guarding well his right flank.
General Cruft will follow General Osterhaus. General Whitaker will detach
another regiment, leaving two regiments to hold Lookout. General Geary
will follow with his command the rear of the whole. General Carlin's brigade
remains at Summertown road, and will rejoin General Palmer.
By command of Major-General Hooker:
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
In the Field, November 25, 1863--12.45 p.m.
Major-General HOOKER:
More evidences of hastily abandoned camps, tents, bayonets, hospitals,
and wounded; think there are two regiments and two guns covering train
of wagons that left here this a.m. Push Osterhaus on the bridge.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-general, Chief' of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Missionary Ridge, Ga., November 26, 1863.
Brigadier-General GEARY,
Commanding Division:
The following will be the order of march to-day: First, Cruft's division,
followed by Geary, with one battery under Reynolds, Geary followed by Osterhaus.
The route will be to Graysville, via Rossville, and the march will be made
with all possible dispatch, with the column well closed up. The leading
division will throw skirmishers well to the front and on to the flanks.
By command of Major-General Hooker:
SAMUEL W. TAYLOR,
Lieutenant, and Aide-de-Camp.
<ar55_337>
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Chickamauga Creek, Ga., November 26, 1863--1.40 p.m.
Major-General HOOKER:
Major-General Palmer is here at head of column with brigade and division.
Bridge destroyed. No pioneers here. If the pontoons are coming, hurry them
up. Graysville, 3½ miles. I fear two hours' delay, if not more.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Near Pea Vine Creek, November 26, 1863--10 p.m.
Brigadier-General OSTERHAUS,
Commanding Division:
The troops will be held in readiness to march in the direction of Ringgold
at daylight to-morrow. Have your column ready. General Osterhaus will have
the advance, followed by General Geary; General Cruft in rear. General
Palmer will move from Graysville along the railroad, in the direction of
Ringgold, at daylight, using his discretion as to leaving any force at
Graysville, being governed by any information he may obtain before his
march.
By command of Major-General Hooker:
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Ringgold, Ga., November 27, 1863--3.40 p.m.
Brigadier-General CRUFT,
Commanding Division :
General Hooker directs that you send a brigade to Tunnel Hill. Reports
state enemy's wagon train stalled beyond here in that direction. By energetic
movement your brigade may make important captures. Though not intended
to bring on an engagement, the force should, if possible, convey to the
enemy an impression of pursuit. Let the commanding officer report promptly
and frequently to these headquarters what is passing in front, and remain
out until further orders. Let them move promptly.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Ringgold, Ga., November 28, 1863--7.15 a.m.
Major-General PALMER,
Commanding :
General Hooker directs that you send at once a brigade to thoroughly
and effectually destroy the two railroad bridges between here «22
R R--VOL XXXI, PT II» <ar55_338> and Tunnel Hill; after doing
this, to effectually destroy at least a mile of railroad track, taking
up the ties, burning them, and bending the rails. The depot and store-house
at the railroad are all to be destroyed. A caisson out on the road beyond
the gap should be brought in. Our wounded are nearly all off, and we shall
only be waiting for the effectual completion of the work ordered to return.
Urge energy, but not such as to do the work partially, upon the officer
intrusted with this duty.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
HEAD OF ADVANCE GUARD, ARMY OF THE TENN.,
In the Field, November 30, 1863.
Commanding Officer Federal Forces at Ringgold:
SIR: I understand that 8 of my wounded and 4 of my dead are lying between
our respective pickets. I desire to remove them, and I request that you
will not fire upon the detail sent for that purpose. If the dead I left
on the field at Ringgold are not yet buried, I would esteem it a courtesy
to be allowed to send a detail to bury them also.
You will please signify your intentions in these respects to the officer
bearing this flag, Maj. Calhoun Benham, assistant adjutant-general and
chief of my staff, who will take the steps which may be necessary in the
premises.
I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
P. R. CLEBURNE,
Major-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Ringgold, Ga., November 30, 1863.
Major-General CLEBURNE,
Commanding:
I am directed by Major-General Hooker to acknowledge the receipt of
your communication of this date. No objection will be made to the removal
of your wounded and dead between the respective pickets, between the hours
of 12 and 2 p.m. to-morrow, December 1, by a party not to exceed 30 in
number, under a flag of truce. The dead left on the field at Ringgold have
all been buried.
Very respectfully,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
-----
CIRCULAR.]
HDQRS. ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Ringgold, Ga., November 30, 1863.
The commands will march to-morrow as follows:
General Cruft's division at 2 a.m., returning to his camps on the road
to Bridgeport. <ar55_339>
General Geary's division at 2.30 a.m., returning to his camp in Lookout
Valley.
General Osterhaus' division will follow General Geary and encamp in
Chattanooga Valley, between Rossville and Chattanooga, and report to General
Grant for instructions. The baggage and wagons will start as soon as the
moon is up.
The cavalry under Colonel Nicholas will bring up the rear. General
Geary, directly before leaving, will cause all the mills, the railroad
depots, the tanneries, and the two road bridges over Chickamauga River
near Ringgold to be thoroughly destroyed.
Colonel Nicholas, commanding the cavalry, will keep his cavalry at
least a mile in rear of General Osterhaus' column during the movement,
and report to General Osterhaus until his division shall have passed Rossville,
when Colonel Nicholas will return with his command to camp in Lookout Valley.
By command of Major-General Hooker:
H. W. PERKINS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., December 28, 1863.
Hon. SALMON P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury:
SIR: I wrote you very hastily from Ringgold, and in my letter intimated
that the battle just ended had developed and closed differently from what
was designed, so far as concerned the operations of my column. I had no
time to explain, and have had none since until now. That you may correctly
understand my reasons for making that statement, I send you herewith copies
of instructions and correspondence,(*) which will leave you no room for
misapprehension. I mark them confidential, as I am not satisfied, under
the orders of the War Department, that I am at liberty to furnish them
even to a minister of the Government. By the first order, which unceremoniously
deprived me of the Eleventh Corps, you will perceive that the strategy
and tactics of the campaign were to throw it into the hands of Sherman,
to my exclusion. On receiving the order, I said to General Thomas that
it was my practice to accompany the portion of my command going into battle,
and that if he had no objection I would go with the Eleventh Corps to Chattanooga,
to which he assented, and said that he would be glad to have me do so.
You will observe the attack was ordered to be made on Saturday, the 19th.
At that time the greater part of the troops to whom this duty was assigned
were at Bridgeport, certainly two good marches distant. Of course they
were not on hand at the appointed time, and the movement, which was intended
to be more or less of a surprise, was postponed, first until the next day
(Sunday), and again until the following Tuesday. You will rightly conclude
that these delays extinguished all possible hope of taking the enemy unawares,
especially if you bear in mind that the pontoons were removed to the point
of crossing and the batteries placed in position to cover it on the day
first named for the execution of the movement. This, however, had no material
consequence, for it was so remote from <ar55_340> the right of the enemy's
position on Missionary Ridge that he appears to have regarded it as a matter
of no moment to him. Meantime, I received a request from General Thomas
to remain in Lookout Valley, I presume for the reason that he apprehended
some demonstrations of the enemy in this direction, as at the time of making
it it was not known that any force would be left me to make an aggressive
movement. Things began to look squally for me. I said to Butterfield that
it was cut and dried for me to be a spectator to the fight, but thought
that I would have a toe in the stirrup somehow before it was over; that
it had been my fortune to take a leading part in every battle, except that
of the first Malvern, from the beginning of the rebellion; that man proposed
and God disposed in this matter of battles, and went about my business,
obeying orders as usual to the best of my ability. Monday night came and
found three of Sherman's divisions over the river at Brown's Ferry, when,
lo, and behold! the pontoon bridge parted and left Osterhaus' division
on my side in Lookout Valley. Near midnight I received orders, as you will
read, that in the event that division could not cross that night, I would
consider it of my command and attack Lookout Mountain. Immediately I dispatched
a staff officer to the bridge, and found it could not be repaired before
the following night, and at once ordered the troops to be in position for
the assault on Lookout at daylight, and at the earliest dawn set about
my business. You know the rest. That day I crossed. Lookout, and the night
of that day and the following morning Sherman crossed the Tennessee with
his command. Those that crossed first took possession of high ground and
commenced throwing up defenses, the enemy doing the same thing on a continuation
of the same ridge, a broad ravine or depression dividing them. The morning
found the former with one line and the latter with two lines of hastily
thrown-up defenses, not so long, however, but that they could readily be
turned either to the right or the left. Sherman attacked them in front
and was repulsed, and only abandoned it after the fourth trial; not, however,
until he had carried the advanced line, but with losses more severe than
those experienced by that officer in his attacks on Vicksburg, the 28th
and 29th of December, 1862. The enemy's supports were placed behind his
second line, and on that was placed his main reliance. All of Sherman's
attacks were made long after I had carried Lookout, which had enabled me
to command the enemy's defenses across Chattanooga Valley, and which my
success had compelled him to abandon. This placed me on the direct line
to cut off his retreat, while Sherman, had he been successful, could only
have pushed him back over the only line he had to retreat on. This attack
on the left, after I had taken Lookout, which was well known to all the
army, can only be considered in the light of a disaster. Sherman is an
active, energetic officer, but in judgment is as infirm as Burnside. He
will never be successful. Please remember what I tell you. It was natural
for Grant to feel partial to his old companions, and do all in his power
to enhance their renown, Nevertheless, you will appreciate my nervousness
in being placed in the situation in which this partiality was manifested,
almost wholly at my expense. I will do Grant the justice to believe that
he was honestly of the opinion that the plan he adopted was the most likely
to insure success to our arms. He aimed for the battle to commence and
end on the left, while it commenced and ended on the right. I am informed
that he has since said, "Damn the battle; I had nothing to do with it."
<ar55_341>
Be this as it may, with the aid of the instructions and my explanation
you will be able to form an enlightened judgment on the subject. The day
after Lookout I encountered the rebels again on Missionary Ridge, where
my dispositions and their execution were extremely gratifying to me. On
the Pea Vine a part of my forces had another encounter, no less satisfactory,
and at Ringgold, the day following, still another. I was now fairly up
with the tail end of the enemy's column. After marching all the morning
through great quantities of his material of war and taken many prisoners,
we fairly jammed him into the ravine in the mountains through which his
route led, and then attacked, with one brigade, his rear guard, which had
been posted to defend it, that being the only mode by which we could ascertain
its strength and position. It was stoutly held by a division, and the attack
failed. A brigade was then sent to the left to turn it, and there, too,
our troops were met with an overwhelming force. I then sent a detachment
to the right to find a vulnerable point, and while it was moving the artillery
came up (having been detained up to this time in waiting for the bridges
to be built, as the enemy destroyed them as fast as he fell back), and
as soon as it was in position to rake the ravine the enemy was compelled
to give way, and the pursuit was renewed until suspended by General Grant
in person. My losses in all of these operations will be near 1,100 men.
I took upward of 4,000 prisoners, 8 pieces of artillery, 8 stand of colors,
an innumerable lot of small-arms, large quantities of artillery and small
ammunition, a great number of caissons and wagons, large quantities of
grain and flour, camp and garrison equipage, &c. The troops were wrought
up to an intense degree of excitement, and I believe that there is no one
of them, from the highest to the lowest, who will not say that those four
days were not only the most eventful, but the happiest of their lives.
We started out with two days' rations, but that was enough. We lived on
the excitement. My command consisted of detachments from all of the armies,
and met for the first time the morning of the advance on Lookout. The introduction
was informal but satisfactory, and soon ripened into mature and, I trust,
a lasting friendship. This much for ourselves; now for the enemy. The Union
people in Ringgold informed me that the army retreated through that town
in a disorganized and demoralized condition, about one-third of them without
arms, having thrown them away; one-third with arms, but herded together
like cattle, and in the residue only had their officers been able to preserve
anything like company and regimental formation, and all the rank and file
swearing that they would not serve the damned Confederacy any longer. I
was convinced at the time with the force I then had it was in my power
to follow that army until I had captured or destroyed it.
The pursuit, however, was suspended for the reason, I presume, that
the commanding general had not sufficient confidence in the opinion of
Burnside as to the impregnability of his position at Knoxville to leave
him to take care of himself until I could take care of Bragg's army. He
may have been influenced by considerations of which I had no knowledge.
I only know that here the pursuit ended. The rebels have now an advanced
division at Tunnel Hill, and his main force is at Resaca, where they are
intrenching. That army is now suffering from as many as forty desertions
per day, which is reducing their force faster than they can make additions
to it by conscription. It numbers about 35,000. <ar55_342> Bragg's army
have no heart in the cause. Their own officers appear to distrust the fidelity
of the enlisted men, and as they have no discipline like that in Lee's
army, they will retire as soon as a forward movement is made by our troops.
Before the battle of Lookout I had opened communication with Cheatham's
division holding the summit of the mountain, and had good reason to believe
that I would have succeeded in bringing in all of the enlisted men, with
some of the officers, but for their untimely removal. They were relieved
by Stevenson's division. The only conditions I required were that they
should give themselves up to me with arms in their hands and take the oath
of allegiance; theirs, that they should be permitted to return to their
homes, or go where the conscription should not reach them. You will remember
that when Bragg retreated from Tennessee, he was compelled to march the
Tennessee troops under guard. Among the deserters there are also a good
many Georgians and Alabamians. The disaffection in the armies of the South
proper, as Jefferson Davis calls the Cotton States, must fill the minds
of the rebel authorities with cruel apprehensions. Bragg has since been
displaced, but I look for no great change, no matter who may be named for
his successor. The hostility to the rebellion and to the leaders has become
a part of their nature. The poor white men of the South had so long been
accustomed to being led and governed, that in the incipiency of the rebellion
they had no inclination to follow their instincts, and now only venture
to assert their independence when impelled to it from the sternest motives
of self-preservation. Only yesterday one of them said to me that in case
the Confederates succeeded, of what benefit could it be to him. They tell
me that their money is good for nothing except to gamble with. A year's
pay will not buy them a pair of boots, and it is to the worthlessness of
their money, not the scarcity of food, their high prices must be ascribed.
I judge that they have the necessaries of life sufficient for their purposes.
I learn that where Longstreet has gone, at Rogersville, he will have no
difficulty in supplying his army through the winter from the country. I
regret that Sherman should have returned from Knoxville, until Longstreet
was driven so far into North Carolina that return would be impossible.
I am of opinion that he will rejoin Bragg's army by the road through the
mountains leading from Raleigh, which he will have no difficulty in striking
at Asheville. This will surely be his course if an advance is looked for
from this direction. But we are in no condition to advance, and with the
data in my possession I cannot conjecture when we will be; if no improvement
can be made in our communications, I do not hesitate to say, never. Rely
upon it, our depots must be nearer, and we must have more regular communications
with them. Since our arrival here we have been on but little more than
half supplies, and it is telling fearfully on men and animals. The great
embarrassment lies between Bridgeport and Nashville. The capacity of the
road is insufficient for present wants. The continuation of that road from
Bridgeport to Chattanooga is yet unfinished, and will remain so for weeks
to come. Nothing appears to admit of completion within a reasonable time.
For instance, two months ago, when in Bridgeport, I was told that the bridge
over the Tennessee would be completed in a week, and it is not yet finished.
How can you make calculations and project future operations without a basis?
The road from this to Atlanta is remarkable for its great number of bridges.
All, of <ar55_343> course, will be destroyed as the rebels retire, and
to wait for them to be rebuilt would consume a season. It therefore appears
necessary to leave a force to hold Chattanooga, and with the main army
move upon a line of communication that will facilitate, and not retard,
our progress. It seems to me that Mobile should be taken this winter, and,
if possible, Montgomery. It is the best season of the year for these operations,
and a sufficient force I should think, without knowing,-is available for
the service.
With Montgomery in our possession it might be ventured to move this
army to and beyond Atlanta, and look to that for our future line of communication.
The advantages of this will readily suggest themselves to you. From that
point all that is left of the Confederacy is vulnerable. The enemy would
require an army everywhere, and would have one nowhere. It would require
Lee to abandon Virginia, or the balance of the South to fall into our hands
with a feeble struggle. I should prefer this to canaling or making a railroad
portage around what is called the shoals on the Tennessee. That in my judgment
would be a great improvement on our existing communications, as then, in
our operations with the uninterrupted navigation of the Tennessee, Chattanooga
might be made to hold the same relation to the future movements of this
army that Nashville has to the past. One-half of the men now established
on the line of the railroad for its protection would cover the river. In
view of all considerations, and I have given it a good deal of reflection,
I prefer the former plan, mainly for the reason that I believe it will
lead to a more expeditious and a more certain solution of the vast problem
in which we are engaged. I have before communicated to you my views concerning
the importance of Chattanooga. The advantages its possession give to us
cannot be too highly estimated. With its present defenses a limited force
can hold it. In the foregoing I have only indicated my general ideas in
order to call it to your attention, and in the hope that you will suggest
some wiser ones. At all events it well deserves the study of all. But,
whatever plan may be determined on, we shall require men, and I hope that
our friends in Congress will not relax in their efforts to raise them,
and as speedily as possible. If I mistake not, the spring movements will
be delayed from want of troops. The history of the war has shown more vigor
and activity in providing men and means in the dark days of our adversity
than when they bear a brighter aspect. I fear our friends feel that the
war is nearly over, and that there is no cause for further exertion; besides,
many of them are liable to be allured this winter from their duties to
the country by the great business of president-making. The enemy are evidently
looking forward with intense interest to the time when our three years'
men will be discharged, and it is then they hope to have their ranks full
and to make head against us. I am doing all I can to preserve the veteran
regiments, and hope to save all of them in my command. Eight of Geary's
regiments have declared their willingness to re-enlist for the war, and
the most of them have availed themselves of the thirty days' furlough with
that view. Howard's regiments are following their example. No event of
the war has afforded me more satisfaction than this. It is conclusive evidence
to my mind that our men are here but for one purpose, and that to personally
conquer this rebellion. The announcement of this determination will carry
dismay to the hearts of the rebels. I very much regret that the suggestion
I made in regard to raising negro troops in Kentucky and Tennessee was
not thought <ar55_344> sufficiently well of to be adopted. I mentioned
Butterfield in connection with it only for the reason that I know of no
officer who could accomplish so much in so short a time. His forte is dispatch
and completeness of organization. He will accomplish more in one day than
most men can in ten. Reasons of state may exist for not placing Kentucky
on the same footing with Maryland in recruitment of negro regiments. Of
this I know nothing. Hereafter our armies will be operating on long lines
through populous districts, requiring unusually large forces to defend
them. We should bear in mind that the war is not over, and however repugnant
it may be to the great mass of the people in rebeldom, they are not in
condition to speak or to act so long as they remain under the rule of rebel
authorities. In my judgment we will have to take possession of States now
in rebellion before we can reasonably look for decided action in our favor.
It will be slow even then, but it will be as sure as it is slow. I have
become so sick of the war that I desire nothing so much as its termination.
With a proper effort, one that it is possible for us to make, I believe
that before another winter is upon us the necessity for keeping up these
immense armies may be removed.
It appears to me that our people have it in their hands to make it
of longer or shorter duration. I am glad to see that an effort is being
made to merge the volunteers and regulars. This should have been done at
the beginning of the war. In fact, there is no difference now; it only
exists in theory. I know that I accepted my commission of brigadier-general
in the army reluctantly, and only for the reason that it was tendered me
in compliment for services. I have since had occasion to regret it many
times, for it has only been an instrument of self-degradation to me ever
since. Officers who had no commissions in the regular service have jumped
me, while in the assignment of commands it has never been considered. If
my services in this rebellion do not merit reward, they certainly have
been such as should shield me from punishment. Many of my juniors are in
the exercise of independent commands, while I am here with more rank piled
on top of me than a well man can stand up under, with a corporal's guard,
comparatively, for a command. You cannot wonder, then, at the sincerity
of my desire for the war to be brought to an end irrespective of the country
and the cause. I see that they are pitching into Meade on all sides. I
lost my confidence in him when he allowed Lee to escape. I thought well
of him as a corps commander, and never doubted but that he would do as
well with the responsibilities of an army upon him. He is a small craft,
and carries no ballast. The report of our veteran General-in-Chief reads
well, and, if true, would be a good one. His idea for Burnside to cross
the Rappahannock at the fords is novel. I think he took it from my testimony
before the investigating committee. It is certain he makes no allusion
to it in his, and it was certainly a point of vital importance for the
committee to know in their investigation of that case. Grant swears that
he had no orders to disobey in his campaign of Vicksburg, and I know that
I was sent here, not to protect, but to open communication with Rosecrans'
army. Indeed, the report is full of error. Since I have been in the West
I have made the acquaintance of a glorious soldier, and that is General
Osterhaus. He is going East in a few days, when I hope you will have an
opportunity to see him. He is expecting a sister to arrive in New York
the fore part of next month, and designs visiting Washington before <ar55_345>
his return. If I may except the Prince de Joinville, he is the Best representative
of the European service it has been my fortune to become acquainted with.
He commanded a division on my last campaign, and I speak from a full knowledge
of his admirable mode of governing men and his splendid conduct on the
battle-field. No mistake can be made in making such men major-generals,
nor in un-making many that we have. Osterhaus tells me that the effect
of Frank Blair's vulgar attack on yourself was the transfer of his hitherto
most devoted friends to you. Surprising as it appeared at the time, it
was impossible for me to divest my mind of the admonitions you had given
me, with the greatest kindness, and when to this was added, in your connection,
the name of some injured "female" woman, I felt inclined to inclose some
elegant extracts from certain letters in my possession, with a few additions
of my own, to you. The favorable opportunity, however, appears to have
passed. I inquired of Butterfield if he knew anything of the woman case,
and, as he did not, I concluded that any remarks I might have to make would
be unnecessary. Our Savior was calumniated and reviled while on earth,
and, if people have grown wiser since, I doubt if they are better. With
regard to myself, I had a good character until I fell in command of the
Army of the Potomac, and, so far as I know, have had since, and as I am
not conscious of any change in myself, I conclude that I was mistaken for
the office, and that it was the latter that was committing all these offenses
before high Heaven. In your case, I am certain the cause will not be found
within yourself. This will not reach you until after New Year's; nevertheless
I shall wish you its richest gifts. I desire that you will make my kindest
regards to Mrs. Sprague. I received the polite invitation to be present
at her wedding, and regretted more than I can express the necessity for
my absence. My friends write me that her dress was exquisitely tasteful,
and the bride surpassed herself. I hope that she is as happy and well as
I wish her to be. Butterfield is in New York. I advised him not to go to
Washington lest he should be arrested by order of the General-in-Chief.
That courtesy, however, is reserved for particular friends.
Good-bye.
Your friend,
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.
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