|
|
|
|
|
News |
|
|
|
|
1. George H. Thomas
2. Ulysses S. Grant
3. Joseph Hooker
4. William T. Sherman
5. Peter J.
Osterhaus
6. August Willich
7. Henry W. Halleck
------------
8 Braxton Bragg
9. Patrick R.
Cleburne
10. Alexander
P. Stewart ?
[ar55_568 con't]
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
Bridgeport, Ala., December 19, 1863.
GENERAL: For the first time I am now at leisure to make an official
record of events with which the troops under my command have been connected
during the eventful campaign which has just closed.
During the month of September last, the Fifteenth Army Corps, which
I had the honor to command, lay in camps along the Big Black, about 20
miles east of Vicksburg, Miss. It consisted of four divisions: The First,
commanded by Brig. Gen. P. J. Osterhaus, was composed of two brigades,
led by Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods, and Col. J. A. Williamson, of the Fourth
Iowa; the Second, commanded by Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith, was composed
of two brigades, led by Generals Giles A. Smith and J. A. J. Lightburn;
the Third, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. M. Tuttle, was composed of three
brigades, led by Generals J. A. Mower and R. P. Buckland, and Col. J. J.
Woods, of the Twelfth Iowa; the Fourth, commanded by Brig. Gen. Hugh Ewing,
was composed of three brigades, led by General J. M. Corse, Colonel Loomis,
Twenty-sixth Ilinois, and Col. J. R. Cock-erill, of the Seventieth Ohio.
On the 22d day of September, I received a telegraphic dispatch from
General Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of the Tennessee,
requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march to Vicksburg, there
to embark for Memphis, where it was to form part of an army to be sent
to Chattanooga to re-enforce Genera[ Rosecrans. I designated the First
Division, and at 4 p.m. the same day it marched for Vicksburg and embarked
the next day. <ar55_569>
On the 23d of September, I was summoned to Vicksburg by the general
commanding, who showed me several dispatches from the General-in-Chief,
which led him to suppose he would have to send me and my whole corps to
Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed to prepare for such orders.
It was explained to me that in consequence of the low stage of water
in the Mississippi, boats had arrived irregularly and had brought dispatches
that seemed to conflict in meaning, and that John E. Smith's division,
of McPherson's corps, had been ordered up to Memphis, and that I should
take that division and leave one of my own in its stead to hold the line
of the Big Black. I detailed my Third Division, General Tuttle, to remain
and report to Major-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps,
at Vicksburg, and that of General John E. Smith, already started for Memphis,
was styled the Third Division, though it still belongs to the Seventeenth
Army Corps.
This division is also composed of three brigades, commanded by General
Matthies, Col. G. B. Raum, of the Fifty-sixth Illinois, and Col. J. I.
Alexander, of the Fifty-ninth Indiana.
The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg the moment
I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the 27th of September
I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic for Memphis, followed by a
fleet of boats conveying these two divisions. Our progress was slow on
account of the unprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi and the scarcity
of coal and wood. We were compelled at places to gather fence rails and
to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats, but I reached
Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, and the other boats came
in on the 3d and 4th.
On arrival at Memphis, I saw General Hurlbut and read all the dispatches
and letters of instruction of General Halleck, and therein derived my instructions,
which I construed to be as follows: To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps,
and all other troops which could be spared from the line of the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad, to Athens, Ala., and thence report by letter for
orders to General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at
Chattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward, repairing it
as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies, and in no event to depend
on General Rosecrans for supplies, as the roads to his rear were already
overtaxed to supply his present army.
I learned from General Hurlbut that Osterhaus' division was already
out in front of Corinth, and that John E. Smith was still at Memphis, moving
his troops and matériel out by rail as fast as its limited stock
would carry them. General J. D. Webster was superintendent of the railroad,
and was enjoined to work night and day and expedite the movement as rapidly
as possible, but the capacity of the road was so small that I soon saw
that I could move horses, mules, and wagons faster by land, and therefore
I dispatched the artillery and wagons by the road, under escort, and finally
moved the entire Fourth Division by land. The enemy seems to have had early
notice of this movement, and he endeavored to thwart us from the start.
A considerable force assembled in a threatening attitude at Salem, south
of Saulsbury Station, and General Carr, who commanded at Corinth, felt
compelled to turn back and use a part of my troops that had already reached
Corinth to resist the threatened attack. <ar55_570>
On Sunday, October 11, having put in motion my whole force, I started
myself for Corinth in a special train, with the battalion of the Thirteenth
U.S. Regulars for escort. We reached Collierville Station about noon--just
in time to take part in the defense made of that station by Col. D.C. Anthony,
of the Sixty-sixth Indiana, against an attack made by General Chalmers
with a force of about 3,000 cavalry, with eight pieces of artillery. He
was beaten off, the damage to the road repaired, and we resumed our journey
next day, reaching Corinth at night. I immediately ordered General Blair
forward to Iuka with the First Division, and, as fast I got troops up,
pushed them forward of Bear Creek, the bridge of which was completely destroyed,
and an engineer regiment, under command of Colonel Flad, engaged in its
repair.
Quite a considerable force of the enemy was assembled to our front,
near Tuscumbia, to resist our advance. It was commanded by General Stephen
D. Lee, and composed of Roddey's and Ferguson's brigades, with irregular
cavalry, amounting in the aggregate to about 5,000.
In person I moved from Corinth to Burnsville on the 18th, and to Iuka
on the 19th, of October.
Osterhaus' division was in the advance, constantly skirmishing with
the enemy. He was supported by Morgan L. Smith, both divisions under the
general command of Major-General Blair. General John E. Smith's division
covered the working party engaged in rebuilding the railroad.
Foreseeing difficulty in crossing the Tennessee, I had written to Admiral
Porter at Cairo, asking him to watch the Tennessee and send up some gunboats
the moment the stage of water admitted, and had also requested General
Allen, at St. Louis, to dispatch up to Eastport a steam ferry-boat. The
admiral, ever prompt and ready to assist us, had 2 fine gunboats up at
Eastport, under Captain Phelps, the very day after my arrival at Iuka,
and Captain Phelps had a coal barge decked over, with which to cross over
horses and wagons before the arrival of the ferry-boat.
Still following literally the instructions of General Halleck, I pushed
forward the repairs of the railroad, and ordered General Blair, with the
two leading divisions, to drive the enemy beyond Tuscumbia. This he did
successfully after a pretty severe fight at Cane Creek, occupying Tuscumbia
on the 27th of October.
In the meantime, many important changes in commands had occurred, which
I must note here to a proper understanding of the case.
General Grant had been called from Vicksburg and sent to Chattanooga
to command the three Armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee,
and the Department of the Tennessee had devolved on me, with instructions,
however, to retain command of the army in the field.
At Iuka I made what appeared to me the best disposition of matters
relating to the department, giving General McPherson full powers as to
Mississippi, and General Hurlbut as to West Tennessee, and assigned General
Blair to the command of the Fifteenth Army Corps, and I summoned General
Hurlbut from Memphis and General Dodge from Corinth, and selected out of
the Sixteenth Corps a force of about 8,000 men, which I directed General
Dodge to organize with all expedition, and with it to follow me eastward.
On the 27th of October, when General Blair with two divisions was at <ar55_571>
Tuscumbia, I ordered General Ewing, with the Fourth Division, to cross
the Tennessee by means of the gunboats and the scow as rapidly as possible
at Eastport, and push forward to Florence, which he did, and that same
day a messenger from General Grant floated down the Tennessee, over the
Muscle Shoals, landed at Tuscumbia, and was sent to me at Iuka. He bore
a
short message from the general to the effect: Drop all work on the railroad
east of Bear Creek; push your command toward Bridgeport till you meet orders,
&c. Instantly the order was executed, and the order of march was reversed
and all columns directed to Eastport, the only place where I could cross
the Tennessee.
At first I only had the gunboats and coal barge, but the ferryboat
and two transports arrived on the 31st of October, and the work of crossing
pushed with all the vigor possible. In person I crossed and passed to the
head of column at Florence on the 1st of November, leaving the rear divisions
to be conducted by General Blair, and marched to Rogersville and the Elk
River. This was found impassable. To ferry would have consumed too much
time, and to build a bridge still more, so there was no alternative but
to turn up Elk River by way of Gilbertsborough, Elkton, &c., to the
stone bridge at Fayetteville; there we crossed Elk and proceeded to Winchester
and Decherd.
At Fayetteville I received orders from General Grant to come to Bridgeport
with the Fifteenth Army Corps, and leave General Dodge's command at Pulaski
and along the railroad from Columbia to Decatur.
I instructed General Blair to follow with the Second and First Divisions
by way of New Market, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte, while I conducted the
other two divisions by Decherd, the Fourth Division crossing the mountains
to Stevenson, and the Third by University Place and Sweeden's Cove.
In person I proceeded by Sweeden's Cove and Battle Creek, reaching
Bridgeport at night of November 13.
I immediately telegraphed to the commanding general my arrival and
the position of my several divisions, and was summoned to Chattanooga.
I took the first boat during the night of the 14th for Kelley's, and rode
into Chattanooga on the 15th. I then learned the part assigned me in the
coming drama, was supplied with the necessary maps and information, and
rode during the 16th, in company with Generals Grant, Thomas, William F.
Smith, Brannan, and others to a position on the west bank of the Tennessee,
from which could be seen the camps of the enemy compassing Chattanooga
and the line of Missionary Hills, with its terminus on Chickamauga Creek,
the point that I was expected to take, hold, and fortify.
Pontoons, with a full supply of balks and chesses, had been prepared
for the bridge over the Tennessee, and all things prearranged with a foresight
that elicited my admiration. From the hills we looked down on the amphitheater
of Chattanooga as on a map, and nothing remained but for me to put my troops
in the desired position.
The plan contemplated that, in addition to crossing the Tennessee and
making a lodgment on the terminus of Missionary Ridge, I should demonstrate
against Lookout Mountain, near Trenton, with a part of my command. All
in Chattanooga were impatient for action, rendered almost acute by the
natural apprehension felt for the safety of General Burnside in East Tennessee.
My command <ar55_572> had marched from Memphis, and I had pushed them
as fast as the roads and distance would permit, but I saw enough of the
condition of men and animals in Chattanooga to inspire me with renewed
energy.
I immediately ordered my leading division (Ewing s) to march, via Shellmound,
to Trenton, demonstrate against Lookout Ridge, but to be prepared to turn
quickly and follow me to Chattanooga; and in person I returned to Bridgeport,
rowing a boat down the Tennessee from Kelley's, and, immediately on arrival,
put in motion my divisions in the order they had arrived.
The bridge of boats at Bridgeport was frail, and, though used day and
night, our passage was slow, and the road thence to Chattanooga was dreadfully
cut up and encumbered with the wagons of the other troops stationed along
the road.
I reached General Hooker's headquarters, 4 miles from Chattanooga,
during a rain in the afternoon of the 20th, and met General Grant's orders
for the general attack on the next day. It was simply impossible for me
to fill my part in time. Only one division, General John E. Smith's, was
in position. General Ewing was still at Trenton, and the other two were
toiling along the terrible road from Shellmound to Chattanooga. No troops
ever were or could be in better condition than mine, or who labored harder
to fulfill their part. On a proper representation, General Grant postponed
the attack. On the 21st, I got the Second Division over Brown's Ferry bridge,
and General Ewing got up, but the bridge broke repeatedly, and delays occurred
which no human sagacity could prevent.
All labored night and day, and General Ewing got over on the 23d, but
my rear division was cut off by the broken bridge at Brown's Ferry, and
could not join me; but I offered to go in action with my three divisions,
supported by Brig. Gen. Jef. C. Davis, leaving one of my best divisions
to act with General Hooker against Lookout Mountain. That division has
not joined me yet, but I know and feel that it has served the country well,
and that it has reflected honor on the Fifteenth Army Corps and the Army
of the Tennessee. I leave the record of its history to General Hooker or
whomsoever has had its services during the late memorable events, confident
that all will do it merited honor.
At last, on the 23d of November, my three divisions lay behind the
hills opposite the mouth of Chickamauga. I dispatched the brigade, of Second
Division, commanded by General Giles A. Smith up, under cover of the hills,
to North Chickamauga, to man the boats designed for the pontoon bridge,
with orders at midnight to drop down silently to a point above the mouth
of South Chickamauga, then land two regiments, who were to move along the
river quietly and capture the enemy's river pickets; General Giles A. Smith
then to drop rapidly below the mouth of Chickamauga, disembark the rest
of his brigade, and dispatch the boats across for fresh loads. These orders
were skillfully executed, and every picket but one captured. The balance
of General Morgan L. Smith's division was then rapidly ferried across,
that of General John E. Smith followed, and by daylight of November 24
two divisions, of about 8,000 men, were on the east bank of the Tennessee,
and had thrown up a very respectable rifle-trench as a tête-de-pont.
As soon as the day dawned some of the boats were taken from the use
of ferrying and a pontoon bridge begun, under the immediate direction of
Captain Dresser, the whole planned and supervised by <ar55_573> General
William F. Smith in person. A pontoon bridge was also built at the same
time over Chickamauga Creek, near its mouth, giving communication with
the two regiments left on the north side, and fulfilling a most important
purpose at a later stage of the drama. I will here bear my willing testimony
to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers charged with
the work were present and manifested a skill which I cannot praise too
highly. I have never beheld any work done so quietly, so well, and I doubt
if the history of war can show a bridge of that extent (viz, 1,350 feet)
laid down so noiselessly and well in so short a time. I attribute it to
the genius and intelligence of General William F. Smith.
The steamer Dunbar arrived in the course of the morning, and relieved
General Ewing's division of the labor of rowing across, but by noon the
pontoon bridge was down and my three divisions were across with men, horses,
artillery, and everything. General Jef. C. Davis' division was ready to
take the bridge, and I ordered the columns to form in order to take Missionary
Hills. The movement had been carefully explained to all division commanders
and at 1 p.m. we marched from the river in three columns en échelon,
the left, General Morgan L. Smith, the column of direction, following substantially
Chickamauga Creek; the center, General John E. Smith, in column, doubled
on the center at one-brigade intervals to the right and rear; the right,
General Ewing, in column at the same distance to the right rear, prepared
to deploy to the right on the supposition that we would meet an enemy in
that direction.
Each head of column was covered by a good line of skirmishers with
supports. A light, drizzling rain prevailed, and the clouds hung low, cloaking
our movements from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout. We soon
gained the foot-hills. Our skirmishers crept up the face of the hill, followed
by their supports, and at 3.30 p.m. we gained, with no loss, the desired
point.
A brigade of each division was pushed rapidly to the top of the hill,
and the enemy for the first time seemed to realize the movement, but too
late, for we were in possession. He opened with artillery, but General
Ewing soon got some of Captain Richardson's guns up that steep hill, and
we gave back artillery, and the enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual
dashes at General Light-burn, who had swept around and got a farther hill,
which was the real continuation of the ridge. From studying all the maps,
I had inferred that Missionary Ridge was a continuous hill, but we found
ourselves on two high points, with a deep depression between us and the
one immediately over the tunnel, which was my chief objective point. The
ground we had gained, however, was so important that I could leave nothing
to chance, and ordered it to be fortified during the night. One brigade
of each division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L. Smith's
closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E. Smith's were
drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's right was extended
down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge in a general line facing southeast.
The enemy felt our left flank about 4 p.m., and a pretty smart engagement
with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off, but it cost us dear,
for General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and had to go to the river,
and the command of the brigade then devolved on Colonel Tupper, One hundred
and sixteenth Illinois, who managed it with skill during the rest of the
operations.
At the moment of my crossing the bridge, General Howard appeared, <ar55_574>
having come with three regiments from Chattanooga along the east bank of
the Tennessee, connecting my new position with that of the main army in
Chattanooga. He left the three regiments (which I attached temporarily
to General Ewing's right), and returned to his own corps at Chattanooga.
As night closed I ordered General Jef. C. Davis to keep one of his brigades
at the bridge, one close up to my position, and one intermediate. Thus
we passed the night, heavy details being kept busy at work on the intrenchments
on the hill. During the night the sky cleared away bright and a cold
frost filled the air, and our camp fires revealed to the enemy and to our
friends in Chattanooga our position on Missionary Ridge [boldface mine].
About midnight I received, at the hands of Major Rowley, of General
Grant's staff, orders to attack the enemy at "dawn of day," and notice
that General Thomas would attack in force early in the day. Accordingly,
before day, I was in the saddle, attended by all my staff; rode to the
extreme left of our position, near Chickamauga; thence up the hill held
by General Lightburn, and round to the extreme right of General Ewing,
catching as accurate an idea of the ground as possible by the dim light
of morning. I saw that our line of attack was in the direction of Missionary
Ridge, with wings supporting on either flank.
Quite a valley lay between us and the next hill of the series, and
this hill presented steep sides, the one to the west partially cleared,
but the other covered with the native forest. The crest of the ridge was
narrow and wooded. The farther point of the hill was held by the enemy
with a breastwork of logs and fresh earth, filled with men and two guns.
The enemy was' also seen in great force on a still higher hill beyond the
tunnel, from which he had a fair plunging fire on the hill in dispute.
The gorge between, through which several roads and the railroad tunnel
pass, could not be seen from our position, but formed the natural place
d'armes, where the enemy covered his masses to resist our contemplated
movement of turning his right flank and endangering his communications
with his depot at Chickamauga. As soon as possible the following dispositions
were made:
The brigades of Colonels Cockerill and Alexander and General Lightburn
were to hold our hill as the key point. General Corse, with as much of
his brigade as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack from
our right center. General Lightburn was to dispatch a good regiment from
his position to co-operate with General Corse, and General Morgan L. Smith
was to move along the east base of Missionary Ridge, connecting with General
Corse, and Colonel Loomis in like manner to move along the west base, supported
by the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith.
The sun had hardly risen before General Corse had completed his preparations,
and his bugle sounded the "forward."
The Fortieth Illinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio on our right
center, with the Thirtieth Ohio, Colonel Jones, moved down the face of
our hill and up that held by the enemy.
The line advanced to within about 80 yards of the intrenched position,
where General Corse found a secondary crest, which he gained and held.
To this point he called his reserves and asked for re-enforcements,
which were sent, but the space was narrow and it was not well to crowd
the men, as the enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approach
to his position, giving him great advantage. As <ar55_575> soon as General
Corse had made his preparations he assaulted, and a close, severe contest
ensued, lasting more than an hour, gaining and losing ground, but never
the position first obtained, from which the enemy in vain attempted to
drive him. General Morgan L. Smith kept gaining ground on the left spur
of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and the
railroad embankment on his side, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that
extent relieving the assaulting party on the hill crest.
Callender had four of his guns on General Ewing's hill, and Captain
Wood his Napoleon battery on General Lightburn's, also two guns of Dillon's
battery were with Colonel Alexander's brigade. All directed their fire
as carefully as possible to clear the hill to our front without endangering
our own men. The fight raged furiously about 10 a.m., when General Corse
received a severe wound, and was brought off the field, and the command
of the brigade and of the assault at that key point devolved on that fine,
young, gallant officer, Colonel Walcutt, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who filled
his part manfully. He continued the contest, pressing forward at all points.
Colonel Loomis had made good progress to the right, and about 2. p.m. General
John E. Smith, judging the battle to be most severe on the hill and being
required to support General Ewing, ordered up Colonel Raum's and General
Matthies' brigades across the field to the summit that was being fought
for. They moved up under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry and joined
to Colonel Walcutt, but the crest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied
the west face of the hill. The enemy at the time being massed in great
strength in the tunnel gorge, moved a large force under cover of the ground
and the thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right and rear of this
command. The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men, and, exposed
as they were in the open field, they fell back in some disorder to the
lower edge of the field and reformed.
These two brigades were in the nature of supports and did not constitute
a part of the real attack. The movement, seen from Chattanooga, 5 miles
off, gave rise to the report, which even General Meigs has repeated, that
we were repulsed on the left. Not so: the real attacking columns of General
Corse, Colonel Loomis, and General Smith were not repulsed. They engaged
in a close struggle all day, persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the
two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the
enemy made a show of pursuit, but were caught in flank by the well-directed
fire of one brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought his cover behind
the hill. Thus matters stood about 3 p.m.
The day was bright and clear, and the amphitheater of Chattanooga lay
in beauty at our feet. I had watched for the attack of General Thomas "early
in the day." Column after column of the enemy was streaming toward me.
Gun after gun poured its concentric shot on us from every hill and spur
that gave a view of any part of the ground held by us.
An occasional shot from Fort Wood and Orchard Knob, and some musketry
fire and artillery over about Lookout, was all that I could detect on our
side, but about 3 p.m. I noticed the white line of musketry fire in front
of Orchard Knob, extending farther and farther right and left and on. We
could only hear a faint echo of sound, but enough was seen to satisfy me
that General Thomas was moving on the center. I knew our attack had drawn
vast masses of the <ar55_576> enemy to our flank and felt sure of the
result. Some guns which had been firing at us all day were silent or were
turned in a different direction. The advancing line of musketry fire from
Orchard Knob disappeared (to us) behind a spur of the hill and could no
longer be seen, and it was not until night closed that I knew that the
troops in Chattanooga had swept across Missionary Ridge and broken the
enemy's center. Of course the victory was won, and pursuit was the next
step. I ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel to the tunnel, and it was
found vacant, save by the dead and wounded of our own and the enemy commingled.
The reserve of General Jef. C. Davis was ordered to march at once by the
pontoon bridge across Chickamauga at its mouth, and push forward for the
depot.
General Howard had reported to me in the early part of the day with
the remainder of his army corps (the Eleventh), and had been posted to
connect my left with Chickamauga Creek. He was ordered to repair an old
broken bridge about 2 miles up Chickamauga, and to follow General Davis
at 4 a.m., and the Fifteenth Army Corps to march at daylight. But General
Howard found to repair the badge more of a task than at first supposed,
and we were all compelled to cross Chickamauga on the new pontoon bridge
at its mouth.
By about 11 a.m. General Jef. C. Davis' division appeared at the depot
just in time to see it in flames. He entered with one brigade and found
the enemy occupying two hills, partially intrenched, just beyond the depot.
These he soon drove away. The depot presented a scene of desolation that
war alone exhibits. Corn meal and corn in huge burning piles, broken wagons,
abandoned caissons, two 32-pounder rifled guns with carriages, burned pieces
of pontoons, balks, chesses, &c.--destined doubtless for the famous
invasion of Kentucky--and all manner of things, burning and broken. Still
the enemy kindly left us a good supply of forage for our horses; meal,
beans, &c., for our men.
Pausing but a short while we pressed on, the road lined with broken
wagons and abandoned caissons, till night. Just as the head of column emerged
from a dark, miry swamp, we encountered the rear guard of the retreating
army. The fight was sharp, but the night closed in so dark that we could
not move. General Grant came up to us then, General Davis still leading,
and at daylight we resumed the march, and at Graysville, where a good bridge
spanned the Chickamauga, we found the corps of General Palmer on the south
bank. He informed us that General Hooker was on a road still farther south,
and we could hear his guns near Ringgold.
As the roads were filled with all the troops they could accommodate,
I then turned to the east to fulfill another part of the general plan,
viz, to break up all communication between Bragg and Longstreet.
We had all sorts of rumors as to the latter, but it was manifest that
we should interpose a proper force between these two armies. I therefore
directed General Howard to move to Parker's Gap and thence send rapidly
a competent force to Red Clay, or the Council Ground, and there destroy
a large section of the railroad which connects Dalton and Cleveland. This
work was most successfully and completely accomplished that day. The division
of General Jef. C. Davis was moved up close to Ringgold to assist General
Hooker, if needed, and the Fifteenth Corps held at Graysville for anything
that might turn up. About noon I had a message from General Hooker saying
he had had a pretty hard fight at the mountain pass, just <ar55_577>
beyond Ringgold, and he wanted me to come forward to turn the position.
He was not aware at the time that Howard, by moving through Parker's
Gap toward Red Clay, had already turned it so I rode forward to Ringgold
and found the enemy had already fallen back of Tunnel Hill. He was already
out of the Valley of the Chickamauga and on ground whence the waters flow
to the Coosa. He was out of Tennessee.
I found General Grant at Ringgold, and, after some explanation as to
breaking up the railroad from Ringgold back to the State line, as soon
as some cars loaded with wounded could be pushed back to Chickamauga Depot,
I was ordered to move slowly and leisurely back to Chattanooga.
On the following day the Fifteenth Corps destroyed absolutely and effectually
the railroad from a point half way between Graysville and Ringgold back
to the State line, and General Grant, coming to Graysville, consented that,
instead of returning to Chattanooga, I might send back all my artillery,
wagons, and impediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as the
Hiwassee.
Accordingly, on the morning of November 29, General Howard moved from
Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel's Gap, and
General Blair, with two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, by way of Julien's
Gap, all meeting at Cleveland that night. Here another good break was made
in the Dalton and Cleveland road. On the 30th, the army moved to Charleston,
General Howard approaching so rapidly that the enemy evacuated with haste,
leaving the bridge but partially damaged, and 5 car loads of flour and
provisions on the north bank of the Hiwassee. This was to have been the
limit of our journey. Officers and men had brought no baggage or provisions,
and the weather was bitter cold.
I half hardly reached the town of Charleston when General Wilson arrived
with a letter from General Grant at Chattanooga, informing me that the
latest authentic accounts from Knoxville were to the 27th, at which time
General Burnside was completely invested, and had provisions only to include
the 3d of December; that General Granger had left Chattanooga for Knoxville
by the river road, with a steam-boat following him in the river, but the
general feared Granger could not reach Knoxville in time, and ordered me
to take command of all troops moving for the relief of Knoxville, and hasten
to General Burnside. Seven days before we had left our camps on the other
side of the Tennessee, with two days' rations, without a change of clothing,
stripped for the fight, with but a single blanket or coat per man, from
myself to the privates included. Of course, we then had no provisions save
what we gathered by the road, and were ill-supplied for such a march. But
we learned that 12,000 of our fellow soldiers were beleaguered in the mountain
town of Knoxville, 84 miles distant; that they needed relief, and must
have it in three days. This was enough, and it had to be done.
General Howard that night repaired and planked the railroad bridge,
and at daylight the army passed the Hiwassee and marched to Athens, 15
miles. I had supposed, rightfully, that General Granger was about the mouth
of Hiwassee, and sent him notice of my orders; that the general had sent
me a copy of his written instructions, which were full and complete, and
that he must push for Kingston, near which we would make a junction. But
by the time I reached Athens I had had time to study the geography, and
sent «37 R R--VOL XXXI, PT II» <ar55_578> him orders--which
found him at Decatur--that Kingston was out of our way; that he should
send his boat to Kingston, but with his command strike across to Philadelphia,
and report to me there. I had but a small force of cavalry, which was,
at the time of my receipt of General Grant's orders, scouting over about
Benton and Columbus. I left my aide, Major McCoy, at Charleston to communicate
with this cavalry and hurry it forward. It overtook me in the night at
Athens. On the 2d of December, the army moved rapidly north toward Loudon,
26 miles distant.
About 11 a.m. the cavalry passed to the head of the column and was
ordered to push to Loudon, and, if possible, save a pontoon bridge across
the Tennessee, held by a brigade of the enemy, commanded by General Vaughn.
The cavalry moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket, but the
brigade of Vaughn had artillery in position covered by earth-works, and
displayed a force too respectable to be carried by a cavalry dash, and
darkness closed in before General Howard's infantry got up. The enemy abandoned
the place in the night, destroying the pontoons, running 3 locomotives
and 48 cars into the Tennessee, and abandoning a large quantity of provisions,
four guns, and other matériel, which General Howard took at daylight.
But the bridge was gone, and we were forced to turn east and trust
to General Burnside's bridge at Knoxville. It was all important that General
Burnside should have notice of our coming, and but one day of the time
remained.
Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of the 2d of December,
I sent my aide, Captain Audenried, forward to Colonel Long, commanding
the brigade of cavalry, to explain to him how all-important it was that
General Burnside should have notice within twenty-four hours of our approach,
and ordering him to select the best material of his command to start at
once, ford the Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville, at whatever cost
of life and horse flesh. Captain Audenried was ordered to go along. The
distance to be traveled was about 40 miles, and the road villainous. Before
day they were off, and at daylight the Fifteenth Army Corps was turned
from Philadelphia for the Little Tennessee, at Morganton, where my maps
represented the river as very shallow, but it was found too deep for fording,
and the water freezing cold. Width, 240 yards; depth, from 2 to 5 feet.
Horses could ford, but artillery and men could not. A bridge was indispensable.
General Wilson, who accompanied me, undertook to superintend the bridge,
and I am under many obligations to him, as I was without an engineer, having
sent Captain Jenney back from Graysville to survey our field of battle.
We had our pioneers, but only such tools as axes, picks, and spades. But
General Wilson, working part with crib-work and part with square trestles,
made of the houses of the late town of Morganton, progressed apace, and
by dark of December 4, troops and animals passed on the bridge, and by
daybreak of the 5th, the Fifteenth Corps, General Blair, was over, and
Generals Granger's and Davis' divisions were ready to pass; but the diagonal
bracings were imperfect for want of proper spikes, and the bridge broke,
causing delay. I had ordered General Blair to move out on the Maryville
road 5 miles, there to await notice that General Granger was on a parallel
road abreast of him, and in person I was at a house where the roads parted,
when a messenger rode up bearing me a few words from General Burnside,
dated December 4. Colonel Long had arrived at Knoxville with his <ar55_579>
cavalry, and all was well then. Longstreet still lay before the place,
but there were symptoms of a speedy departure.
I felt that I had accomplished the first great step in the problem
for the relief of General Burnside's army, but still urged on the work.
As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved forward. General
Howard had marched from Loudon and had found a pretty good ford for his
horses and wagons at Davis', 7 miles below Morganton, and had made an ingenious
bridge of the wagons left by General Vaughn at Loudon, on which to pass
his men. He marched by Unitia and Louisville.
On the night of the 5th, all the heads of columns communicated at Maryville,
where I met Major Van Buren, of General Burnside's staff, announcing that
General Longstreet had the night before retreated on the Rutledge, Rogersville,
and Bristol road, leading to Virginia; that General Burnside's cavalry
was on his heels; that the general desired to see me in person as soon
as I could come to Knoxville. I ordered all the troops to halt and rest,
except the two divisions of General Granger, which were ordered to move
forward to Little River, and General Granger to report in person to General
Burnside for orders.
His was the force originally designed to re-enforce General Burnside,
and it was eminently proper that it should join in the chase after Longstreet.
On the morning of December 6, I rode from Maryville into Knoxville
and met General Burnside. General Granger arrived later in the day. We
examined his lines of fortifications, which were a wonderful production
for the short time allowed in their selection of ground and construction
of work. It seemed to me that they were nearly impregnable. We examined
the redoubt, named Sanders, where, on the Sunday previous, three brigades
of the enemy had assaulted and met a bloody repulse. Now, all was peaceful
and quiet; but a few hours before, the deadly bullet sought its victim
all round about that hilly barrier.
The general explained fully and frankly what he had done and what he
proposed to do. He asked of me nothing but General Granger's command, and
suggested, in view of the large force I had brought from Chattanooga, that
I should return with due expedition to the line of the Hiwassee, lest Bragg,
re-enforced, might take advantage of our absence to resume the offensive.
I asked him to reduce this to writing, which he did, and I here introduce
it as part of my report:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, Knoxville, December 7,
1863.
Maj. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, Commanding, &c.:
GENERAL: I desire to express to you and your command
my most hearty thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our
relief during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied your approach
served to raise the siege. The emergency having passed, I do not deem for
the present any other portion of your command but the corps of General
Granger necessary for operations in this section, and, inasmuch as General
Grant has weakened the forces immediately with him in order to relieve
us, thereby rendering the position of General Thomas less secure, I deem
it advisable that all the troops now here, save those commanded by General
Granger, should return at once to within supporting distance of the forces
in front of Bragg's army.
In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank you
and your command for the kindness you have done us.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General, Commanding.
<ar55_580>
Accordingly, having seen General Burnside's forces move out of Knoxville,
in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's move in, I put in motion
my own command to return.
General Howard was ordered to move, via Davis' Ford and Sweet Water,
to Athens, with a guard forward at Charleston, to hold and repair the bridge,
which the enemy had taken after our passage up. General Jef. C. Davis moved
to Columbus, on the Hiwassee, via Madisonville, and the two divisions of
the Fifteenth Corps moved to Tellico Plains, to cover a movement of cavalry
across the mountains into Georgia to overtake a wagon train which had dodged
us on our way up and had escaped by way of Murphy. Subsequently, on a report
from General Howard that the enemy held Charleston, I diverted General
Ewing's division to Athens, and went in person to Tellico with General
Morgan L. Smith's division.
By the 9th, all our troops were in position and we held the rich country
between the Little Tennessee and the Hiwassee. The cavalry under Colonel
Long passed the mountain at Tellico, and proceeded about 17 miles beyond
Murphy, when Colonel Long, deeming his pursuit farther of the wagon train
useless, returned on the 12th to Tellico. I then ordered him and the division
of General Morgan L. Smith to move to Charleston, to which point I had
previously ordered the corps of General Howard.
On the 14th of December, all of my command in the field lay along the
Hiwassee. Having communicated to General Grant the actual state of affairs,
I received orders to leave on the line of the Hiwassee all the cavalry,
and come to Chattanooga with the balance of my command. I left the brigade
of cavalry, commanded by Colonel Long, re-enforced by the Fifth Ohio Cavalry,
Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, the only cavalry properly belonging to the Fifteenth
Army Corps, at Charleston, and with the remainder moved by easy marches,
by Cleveland and Tyner's Depot, into Chattanooga, where I received in person
from General Grant orders to transfer back to their appropriate command
the corps of General Howard and division commanded by General Jef. C. Davis,
and to conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps to its new field of operations.
It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion since our departure
from the Big Black, in Mississippi, until the present moment. I have been
unable to receive, from subordinate commanders the usual full detailed
reports of events, and have therefore been compelled to make up this report
from my own personal memory, but as soon as possible subordinate reports
will be received and duly forwarded.
In reviewing the facts I must do justice to my command for the patience,
cheerfulness, and courage which officers and men have displayed throughout
in battle, on the march, and in camp. For long periods, without regular
rations or supplies of any kind, they have marched through mud and over
rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a murmur. Without a moment's rest,
after a march of over 400 miles, without sleep for three successive nights,
we crossed the Tennessee, fought our part of the battle of Chattanooga,
pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned more than 120 miles
north and compelled Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville, which gave
so much anxiety to the whole country. It is hard to realize the importance
of the events without recalling the memory of the general feeling which
pervaded all minds at Chattanooga, prior to our arrival. I cannot speak
of the Fifteenth Army Corps without a seeming vanity, but, as I am no longer
its commander, I assert there is no <ar55_581> better body of soldiers
in America than it, or who have done more or better service. I wish all
to feel a just pride in its real honors. To General Howard and his command,
to General Jef. C. Davis and his, I am more than usually indebted for the
intelligence of commanders and fidelity of commands. The brigade of Colonel
Buschbeck, belonging to the Eleventh Corps, which was the first to come
out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought at the Tunnel Hill, in connection
with General Ewing's division, and displayed a courage almost amounting
to rashness. Following the enemy almost to the tunnel gorge, it lost many
valuable lives, prominent among them Lieutenant-Colonel Taft, spoken of
as a most gallant soldier. In General Howard throughout, I found a polished
and Christian gentleman exhibiting the highest and most chivalric traits
of the soldier.
General Davis handled his division with artistic skill, more especially
at the moment we encountered the enemy's rear guard, near Graysville, at
nightfall. I must award to this division the credit of the best order during
our marches through East Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity
of foraging to the right and left gave some reasons for disordered ranks.
Inasmuch as exception might be taken to my explanation of the temporary
confusion during the battle of Chattanooga in the two brigades of General
Matthies and Colonel Raum, I will here state that I saw the whole, and
attach no fault to any one. Accidents will happen in battle as elsewhere,
and at the point where they so manfully went to relieve the pressure on
other parts of our assaulting line, they exposed themselves unconsciously
to an enemy vastly superior in force and favored by the shape of the ground.
Had that enemy come out on equal terms, those brigades would have shown
their metal, which has been tried more than once before and stood the test
of fire. They reformed their ranks and were ready to support General Ewing's
division in a very few minutes, and the circumstance would have hardly
called for notice on my part had not others reported for my wing of the
army at a distance of near 5 miles, from which could only be seen the troops
in the open field where this affair occurred.
I now subjoin the best report of casualties I am able to compile from
the records thus far received, viz:
Fifteenth Army Corps:
Command Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total
First.Division 67 364 66 497
Second.Division 10 90 2 102
Third.Division 89 288 122 499
Fourth.Division 72 535 21 628
Total.loss in Fifteenth Army Corps. 238 1,277 211 1,726
Eleventh Army Corps:
Buschbeck's Brigade 37 145 81 263
General Jef. C. Davis has sent in no report of casualties in his division,
but the loss was small.
Among the killed were some of our most valuable officers: Colonels
Putnam, Ninety-third Illinois; O'Meara, Ninetieth Illinois; Torrence, Thirtieth
Iowa: Lieutenant-Colonel Taft, of the Eleventh Corps, and Major Bushnell,
Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers. <ar55_582>
Among the wounded are Brig. Gens. Giles A. Smith, J. M. Corse, and
Matthies, Colonel Raum, Colonel Wangelin, Twelfth Missouri Volunteers;
Lieutenant-Colonel Partridge, Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers; Maj. P. J.
Welsh, Fifty-sixth Illinois Volunteers, and Major McCalla, Tenth Iowa Volunteers.
Among the missing is Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seventeenth Iowa.
My report is already so long that I must forbear mentioning acts of
individual merit. These will be recorded in the reports of division commanders,
which I will cheerfully indorse, but I must say that it is but justice
that colonels of regiments who have so long and so well commanded brigades,
as in the following cases, should be commissioned to the grade which they
have filled with so much usefulness and credit to the public service, viz:
Col. J. R. Cockerill, Seventieth Regiment Ohio Volunteers; Col. J. M. Loomis,.Twenty-sixth
Regiment Illinois Volunteers; Col. C. C. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Regiment
Ohio Volunteers; Col. J. A. Williamson, Fourth Regiment Iowa Volunteers;
Col. G. B. Raum, Fifty-sixth Regiment Illinois Volunteers; Col. J. I. Alexander,
Fifty-ninth Regiment Indiana Volunteers.
My personal staff, as usual, have served their country with fidelity
and credit to themselves throughout these events, and have received my
personal thanks.
Inclosed you will please find a map (*) of that part of the battle-field
of Chattanooga fought on by the troops under my command, surveyed and drawn
by Captain Jenney, of my staff.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding.
Brig. Gen. JOHN A. RAWLINS, Chief of Staff to General Grant.
[Inclosure No. 1.]
Statement of ammunition expended by the Army of the Tennessee during
the engagements of the 24th, 25th, and 27th of November, 1863.
Kind. Caliber. No.
Elongated ball cartridges .58 620,000
Elongated ball cartridges .54 6,000
Rounds assorted ammunition for 24-pounder howitzers
80
Rounds assorted ammunition for 12-pounder howitzers
140
Rounds assorted ammunition for 6-pounder guns 402
Rounds assorted ammunition for 12-pounder guns 80
Rounds assorted ammunition for 10-pounder Parrott
25
Rounds assorted ammunition for 20-pounder Parrott
95
Rounds assorted ammunition for 3-inch Rodman 322
Rounds assorted ammunition for 3.80-inch James 179
Total number of rounds of artillery ammunition expended
1,328
Average number of rounds per man of small-arms ammunition, 41.
Average number of rounds per gun of artillery ammunition, 25.
F. H. PARKER, Chief Ordnance Officer, Department and Army of the Tennessee.
<ar55_583>
[Inclosure No. 2.]
List of captured arms and accouterments collected from that portion
of the battlefield of Chattanooga in front of General Sherman's command.
Articles Caliber No.
Springfield rifle muskets .69 8
Springfield rifle muskets .58 78
Enfield rifles (short) .58 183
Siege rifles (short) . 69 1
Vincennes rifles .69 1
Enfield smooth-bore muskets (Tower) .58 4
Enfield rifle muskets .58 271
United States rifles .54 18
United States smooth-bore muskets .69 58
Austrian rifle muskets . 54 108
Austrian rifles .54 25
Suhl rifle muskets .69 1
Total number of arms collected 756
Enfield bayonets 63
Springfield bayonets 12
Austrian bayonets, quadrangular 34
Total number of bayonets collected 109
Cartridge boxes 334
Cartridge-box plates 120
Cartridge-box belts 43
Waist belts 68
Waist-belt plates 34
Cap pouches 67
Bayonet scabbards (leather) 115
F. H. PARKER, First Lieutenant, and Chief of Ordnance, Department of
the Tennessee.
ADDENDA.
HDQRS. IN THE FIELD, 4TH DIVISION, 15TH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 18, 1863.
Major-General SHERMAN,
Commanding Department and Army:
GENERAL: The head of my column reached here at 10 a.m. I have camped
the rear brigade on the mountain overlooking the town. Cockerill and Corse
in town. We threw a few shell at some cavalry, who retreated down stream.
Distance by the route we came, Gordon's Mills, 23 miles: road, steed and
good. I have sent down to communicate with Hooker's pickets. Should have
been here last night, but waited for rear to close up.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General Commanding Division.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
Bridgeport, November 18, 1863.
Brig. Gen. HUGH EWING,
Comdg. Fourth Division, Fifteenth Army Corps:
DEAR GENERAL: I came down the river last night in a skiff, having missed
the boats at Kelley's Ferry. I stopped at Shellmound, expecting to see
you, but you had passed all right. My telegraphic dispatch will have conveyed
to you the purpose and object of your <ar55_584> move. The enemy occupies
Lookout Mountain and the country beyond. We hold the river and country
beyond, including Chattanooga and the road up to where the river impinges
against Lookout Ridge.
The Fifteenth Corps is destined for Chattanooga for offense, but an
object is gained by threatening Trenton, as though this corps meditated
to attack the enemy on Lookout by ascending at Trenton. But as soon as
the other divisions have passed Whiteside's, I will send you order quietly
to retire and follow the other divisions of the corps. Your train will
be sent to Whiteside's, where you can pick it up. I expect to send you
such an order as soon as the corps has passed Wauhatchie.
In the meantime, act as though you were the head of a strong column,
waiting for the rear to close up. By this device the enemy will strengthen
that flank and weaken the other, of which we propose to take advantage.
Do what you can to accomplish this end, using the head of your column,
but leaving the rear at the head of the mountain, by which you descend
to Trenton, and make plenty of fires on the mountain, as though a heavy
force were collecting behind you. Be ready to reverse your column to move,
via Whiteside's and Wauhatchie, to Chattanooga.
At Brown's Ferry there is a good pontoon bridge, where I will meet
you and explain everything.(*)
Logan is appointed to the command of the Fifteenth Corps, and Blair
will go to Washington. You will command that division. W. S. Smith is chief
of cavalry at Nashville.
Yours,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding.
-----
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 19, 1863--11 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Department and Army:
GENERAL: Your dispatch of yesterday is received. Loomis built extensive
fires on the edge of the mountain last night, which showed well. Corse
camped above town, looking up the valley, and Cockerill below, looking
down. I communicated with General Hooker, my messengers returning this
morning. I gathered in considerable corn and straw, and ground 10,000 rations
of flour. One good road enters the valley from Lookout Mountain, 13 miles
above, called Johnson's Crook Gap, but on our maps Deerhead Cove, running
through Stevens' Gap on the other side to Cassandra and La Fayette. This
is the route on which to make an earnest demonstration. I have sent Corse
to take position at the mouth of this gap, fronting up stream and covering
his communication, to send one regiment to the top of Lookout, to show
its head and send out pickets, build fires, and demonstrate generally,
but with caution; a second regiment to camp half way up.
I have ordered Loomis to descend the Raccoon Mountain this afternoon
at Wimm's Gap, which enters this valley 2 miles above town, and to stretch
out toward Johnson's Crook, camping, with show in fires, &c., 4 or
5 miles above here. Also to build fires at his camp of last <ar55_585>
night, and on the mountain above Wimm's. I have also ordered Corse's last
night's camp to be lit up.
Cockerill this afternoon will move two regiments across Lookout Creek,
and drive what parties he may find up the mountain trails. There are iron-works
here and at Johnson's Crook newly built, one finished, others in process.
Shall I destroy them or not?
Is it not better to march in return straight down the valley to Wauhatchie
than to go by Whiteside's?
I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, &c.,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. IN THE FIELD, 4TH DIV., 15TH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 19, 1863.
Brigadier-General CORSE, Commanding Second Brigade:
GENERAL: You will take position near Johnson's Crook Gap, sending a
detachment to show its head on the top of Lookout Mountain, and a second,
half way up the ascent, both to demonstrate by fires, chopping, &c.,
taking care not to be cut off. Your main force, with the artillery, front
up stream, covering your communications with Trenton and your detachment.
Feel well in all directions with mounted men, and fall back on the First
Brigade, if necessary.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
-----
HDQRS. IN THE FIELD, 4TH DIV., 15TH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 19, 1863.
Colonel LOOMIS, Commanding First Brigade:
COLONEL: You will come down Raccoon Mountain by Wimm's Gap, and stretch
up stream some 4 or 5 miles, leaving a regiment on the mountain to occupy
the head of the gap, with instructions to build extensive camp fires. Occupying
the center, move rapidly to either wing if you hear it strongly assailed,
looking, however, chiefly up stream toward General Corse, at Johnson's
Crook Gap, in the Lookout.
Very respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. IN THE FIELD, 4TH DIV., 15TH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 19, 1863.
Colonel LOOMIS, Commanding First Brigade:
COLONEL: If you hear at any time heavy firing in the direction of General
Corse, move rapidly to his assistance, and go to work at close quarters,
notifying me.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
<ar55_586>
HDQRS. IN THE FIELD, 4TH DIV., 15TH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, November 19, 1863.
Colonel LOOMIS, Commanding First Brigade:
COLONEL: Demonstrate with your command in the morning by sending two
detachments, a regiment each, to reconnoiter the base of Lookout and feel
for passes. Keep them in reach, however.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, FOURTH DIVISION,
Trenton, Ga., November 20, 1863.
Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Deportment and Army:
GENERAL: The brigades of Brown, Liddell, and Cumming, Stevenson's division,
cover about all the troops on Lookout, from one end to the other, as far
as I can learn. Corse has full possession of the top of the mountain at
his end. Do you want it held if they try to recover it in any force? I
will not send up artillery unless ordered.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 20, 1863.
Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Department and Army:
GENERAL: Your dispatch received. The detachments of Corse are ordered
in. The division will move at daylight with all possible dispatch. The
train and rations will be promptly attended to.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 20, 1863.
Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Department and Army:
GENERAL: Our pickets camped on the summit of Lookout at Johnson's Crook
Gap last night, and mounted scouts felt out over the mountain, but as far
as heard from found no enemy. Corse drove a few up the mountain last evening.
Loomis camped 5 miles above Trenton at the iron-works. Cockerill moved
down to the Nickajack trace, a few miles below here, and drove a few cavalry
up the trace. The enemy were watching us all day yesterday from Lookout.
They have a force, said to be two brigades, on the top of <ar55_587>
the Nickajack trace. I am watching my detachments carefully. We have spread
out boldly, and made an impression, I think, with little risk. Deserters
and refugees say that our force "in the valley and back on Raccoon" is
estimated at 30,000.
An impression prevails in Bragg's army and among the inhabitants beyond
Lookout that he is sending back his heavy artillery, and intends falling
back; some think massing toward our right flank. I intended Corse to seize
the pass boldly, but to draw back if attacked in force, and to look carefully
to his detachments. Loomis will move to Corse speedily if he is attacked.
I am making a good demonstration, and of course running some risk, but
I think very little. I have no fear of a serious attack. I am destroying
the iron-works, and hope by morning to see them all "fall to lawless ruin."
I had great lines of fires on Raccoon last night, representing an army
corps at least, and made a fine show in the valley. Yesterday at noon a
party of mounted officers arrived on Lookout opposite town, and spent a
couple of hours examining the situation.
I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. IN THE FIELD, 4TH DIVISION, 15TH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 20, 1863.
Brigadier-General CORSE, Commanding Second Brigade:
GENERAL: If the enemy approach in any force, draw your detachment quickly
down the mountain, and, if followed, fallback on Loomis, who has orders
to move to you if attacked. If threatened in your rear, move rapidly this
way and go to work and hold them for Loomis. Keep a bright lookout in all
directions. Set parties to work at once to undermine and destroy the stocks
and machinery of all iron-works in your vicinity, but do not burn or blow
up--do it without noise. Cassell is coming with tools, but do what you
can.
EWING, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 20, 1863.
General CORSE, Commanding Second Brigade:
GENERAL: As I wrote you this morning, draw your detachment down the
mountain if attacked in any force and be ready and fall back on Loomis
if necessary to avoid a fight of any consequence. Our purpose is not to
bring on an engagement, and if a fight is approaching we must concentrate
here.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
<ar55_588>
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 20, 1863.
Captain CASSELL, Division Engineer, Commanding Pioneers:
CAPTAIN: You will proceed at once to destroy the machinery and stocks
of all iron-works in Lookout Valley, without using fire or powder. Make
the work thorough; also destroy all tanneries and machinery of mills attached
to the iron-works.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 20, 1863.
Colonel COCKERILL, Commanding Third Brigade:
COLONEL: Move your command at 8 o'clock this morning, via Wauhatchie,
to Brown's Ferry, where you will camp to-night, reporting your arrival
to General Sherman.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 20, 1863
Colonel LOOMIS, Commanding First Brigade:
COLONEL: Move with your entire brigade at daybreak to this point. I
will expect you to camp, if possible, beyond Wauhatchie to-night.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. IN THE FIELD, 4TH DIV., 15TH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 21, 1863--12.40 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Department and Army:
GENERAL: Your dispatch received. The detachments of Corse are ordered
in. The division will move at daylight, with all possible dispatch. The
train and rations will be promptly attended to.
Respectfully.
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
SPECIAL ORDERS No. 14.
HDQRS. DEPT. AND ARMY OF THE TENN.,
Near Chattanooga, November 21, 1863.
Every available man fit for duty in the Fifteenth Corps, now present,
will at once be prepared for an important movement. Each man will carry
a blanket or overcoat, three days' cooked rations, <ar55_589> and as
near 100 rounds of ammunition as possible, including that in cartridge
boxes. The camps and transportation will be left in charge of those unfit
for duty. The ambulances will follow their respective divisions as far
as the river, but await further orders before crossing.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER, Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 21, 1863.
Brigadier-General CORSE, Commanding Second Brigade:
GENERAL: Call in your detachments at once, and move with your entire
force at daybreak for this point. I wish you to pass here and make Wauhatchie,
if possible, by night, or as near it as you can.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Trenton, Ga., November 21, 1863.
Colonel O'MEARA, Commanding at White Oak Gap:
COLONEL: Several miles below you on the edge of the mountain the enemy
are signaling across to Lookout by raising and extinguishing, or covering,
a small fire. Send a company, under a sharp officer, to surround and catch
them. Let them go light--move rapidly, but cautiously. They will probably
have a few men stationed toward you in the dark to give notice of your
approach. Let the party, when they draw near the locality, approach them
from the opposite direction, and get them dead or alive.
Respectfully,
HUGH EWING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
-----
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
Near Chattanooga, November 22, 1863.
OPERATIONS FOR MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23.
The Fifteenth Army Corps, re-enforced by one division of the Army of
the Cumberland, is to cross the Tennessee at the mouth of East Chickamauga
Creek, advance and take possession of the end of Missionary Ridge, viz,
from the railroad tunnel to Chickamauga, hold, and fortify. The Army of
the Cumberland and General Hooker's command are to assist by direct attacks
to their front.
Details: One brigade, Second Division, to march to West Chickamauga
Creek to man the boats (120), to have everything ready, and at midnight
to-night, November 22 to 23, to push out and drift down the Tennessee,
until one-half mile above East Chickamauga, where two regiments land and
secure the enemy's picket <ar55_590> at the mouth of Chickamauga. The
remainder of the brigade will drop down and land below the mouth of Chickamauga
and at once prepare a rifle-trench at the summit of the hill. The whole
of the Second Division will then cross to the north of the Chickamauga
and the Third Division to the south, each working smartly to fortify the
ground and to improve the landings.
Both these divisions, each with one good battery, should be across
and well covered by break of day, and a pontoon bridge finished across
the Chickamauga, to connect these two divisions.
The First and Fourth Divisions will approach the Tennessee by separate
ways, one above and the other below the Chickamauga but keep out of observation
of the enemy until the opposite bank is secure and boats ready to receive
them. This will probably be as early as 7 a.m., when they will be rowed
across rapidly and move out. The First Division will cross the Chickamauga
and follow it up to near abreast of Missionary Ridge, and ascend the hill
at its point. The Fourth Division will move out toward Tunnel Hill, keeping
connection up with the left division on Chickamauga Creek, which is the
guiding flank.
The Third Division, John E. Smith, will form the center and march by
column of divisions, ready to deploy forward, direct to the middle hill,
keeping up with the left division.
The Second Division will follow the center division as soon as relieved
by the division of the Army of the Cumberland which will take its place
in line, or act according to circumstances not yet fore seen.
General William F. Smith will give all the detailed arrangements for
crossing over, and the commanding general will explain in person to the
division commanders the ground and maps. The utmost silence, order, and
patience must be displayed. The boats will take their loads from the heads
of columns, and the men will resume their places the moment they reach
the opposite bank of the Tennessee. Very great care must be taken by division
commanders that the routes of march do not cross each other. The First
and Second Divisions crossing above Chickamauga should follow the road
up the valley, where our camps are, and around north of these headquarters;
the Third and Fourth Divisions can take the direct route, by the head of
John E. Smith's camp. Except in case of orders, muskets must not be loaded
until the troops are disembarked on the other side of the Tennessee.
Division commanders of the Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions will
select one battery to accompany the division; the others will be left in
position to cover the crossing, under the direction of the chief of artillery,
who will at once commence to place these batteries, being careful not to
stop roads needed by the movement.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER, Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
SPECIAL ORDERS No. 15.
HDQRS. DEPT. AND ARMY OF THE TENN.,
Near Chattanooga, November 23, 1863.
Owing to the non-arrival of troops expected, the operations of the
Fifteenth Corps, as planned for this morning, are postponed for twenty-four
hours. The instructions issued for this morning will, <ar55_591> therefore,
be carried out to-morrow morning, with this exception, that, in case of
the non-arrival of the First Division in time, the Second Division, in
addition to the part already assigned, will execute the part laid down
for the First Division after crossing.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER, Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,
Sibley's Ford, opposite Boyce's Station,
November 26, 1863--7.40 a.m.
General SHERMAN:
Head of column arrived at 7 a.m., closing up on General Davis' division.
The cavalry has moved on, finding the camp of rebel cavalry evacuated;
said to have moved off at midnight. We now advance in a single column on
the road to Chickamauga Station.
O. O. HOWARD, Major-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,
November 26, 1863--12 m.
Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Army of the Tennessee:
GENERAL: General Davis has possession of Chickamauga Station. Rebels
burned up stores as we approached. A few stragglers have been picked up.
Slight skirmishing by Morgan's brigade. A ridge (Oak Ridge) seems to be
fortified. The enemy make a little show. No artillery opened as yet. General
Davis will develop what is on the hill as soon as his men get some refreshment.
Try to have signals established with ours from the ridge. A foot-bridge
across Chickamauga on railroad will be completed in half an hour. Please
communicate that way. There is little skirmishing beyond town now.
O. O. HOWARD, Major-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Near Graysville, November 26, 1863.
Major-General HOWARD, Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: The column will move at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning, in the
same order as to-day.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER, Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
BROWN'S FERRY,
November 26, 1863--2.45 p.m.
General W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Army of the Tennessee:
GENERAL: The artillery of the Eleventh Corps is now crossing the bridge.
The troops of that corps are lying on the hill by the <ar55_592> ferry,
General Ewing's division being in their rear. I know not what time it will
cross. Owing to repairs, the bridge has not been used for the past hour.
Have you any instructions.
Very respectfully,
J. C. AUDENRIED, U.S. Army.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,
November 27, 1863--11.40 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding:
GENERAL My head of column has passed through Parker's Gap; have met
no force yet. A very large train went on Cleveland and Ringgold road last
night with small escort. Great fears were expressed that, you would cut
them off at Ringgold.
Respectfully,
O. O. HOWARD, Major-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,
November 27, 1863--7.10 p.m.
Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Army of the Tennessee:
GENERAL: One division of my command is established near the junction
of the Ringgold and McDaniel's Gap road. Two small brigades with a section
of a battery are pushed forward to the railroad at Red Clay. They reached
there at sundown, captured 3 men guarding remnants of train, which our
cavalry burned; captured an officer (lieutenant of General Kelly's staff)
and 2 orderlies. A captain with them escaped. This rebel staff officer
reports that his division of cavalry attacked Colonel Long at daylight
this morning at Cleveland, and defeated him, taking from him about 200
prisoners, and Long retreated toward Harrison. He reports also that Kelly's
cavalry is on the way to Dalton. This officer was on his way to Bragg,
had no written dispatches, and what he said about his cavalry may not be
true. Information from different quarters shows that no train has been
from Dalton farther than Red Clay since last Monday. Inhabitants report
that the enemy retreated through Dalton, intending to make a stand below.
My brigade, under Col. O. Smith, found three cars (good ones). He will
effectually destroy the road, burn the cars, and then return here. The
distance from our camp last night to Red Clay is 18 miles.
Respectfully,
O. O. HOWARD, Mayor General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Graysville, Ga., November 27, 1863.
Maj. Gen. F. P. BLAIR, Jr, Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps:
GENERAL: The general commanding has conferred with General Grant to-day
at Ringgold, and has received substantially the following orders:
That the pursuit of the enemy has ceased, and that after the destruction
<ar55_593> of railroads and property liable to be put to hostile use,
the army will return to its camp at or near Chattanooga.
General Hooker's command will destroy the railroad and property near
Ringgold. General Howard's corps a section of the railroad from Dalton
to Cleveland, and yours, that near and at Graysville. You will therefore
cause all the railroad ties and iron, water tanks, station houses, machine
shops, and whatever may be connected with the railroad for a distance of
about 1 mile north and west of Graysville to a point about 3 miles south
of Graysville--say, to about the farm of C. Cartrung, which is about where
it crosses the Calhoun road--to be destroyed. You will also cause to be
destroyed all tanneries, machine shops, mills, dams, and whatever in your
judgment might be converted into hostile uses, giving the parties in possession
a simple statement in writing of the fact that the destruction was made
by the order of the general commanding, and fixing a value when possible.
The general wishes the work done thoroughly. There are two cars at Ringgold
which the surgeon-in-chief proposes to load with wounded at Ringgold and
push to Chattanooga depot. Please send a messenger to Ringgold, notifying
the chief surgeon of General Hooker's command to use dispatch in pushing
the cars by, before some hour, say 9 a.m., when the destruction of the
track will begin.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER, Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HDQRS. DEPT. AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
Graysville, Ga., November 27, 1863.
Brig. Gen. JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Commanding Division :
GENERAL: The general commanding directs that you move your command
leisurely, to-morrow morning, back along the old Alabama road to Parker's
Gap, and there await the return of General Howard's corps. On his return,
or if you communicate with him, notify him that the pursuit of the enemy
has ceased by order of General Grant, and that after destroying the railroad
and other property which might be converted to hostile uses, the whole
army will return to their old camps at or near Chattanooga.
In a map furnished him by the topographical engineer of the Army of
the Cumberland, the general finds a large road laid down from Parker's
Gap to Chickamauga Station, by way of the camp ground, which will avoid,
in a great measure, the bad roads we found in approaching Graysville. The
Fifteenth Corps will remain here until you send notice that General Howard
has returned, when orders will be given you and General Howard to return
leisurely to your former camps at or near Chattanooga, by the route indicated,
provided you find such route in existence.
In anticipation of this movement, and in fear of rain, the general
advises you to send back at once all wagons and artillery not needed to
Chattanooga, and await your coming; also, to send into Ringgold and ascertain
if there be a wagon train there belonging to General Howard's corps, in
which event order it to accompany you to Parker's Gap, there to await General
Howard's return. Please notify the general when General Howard is back,
that he may make the «38 R R--VOL XXXI, PT II» <ar55_594>
movement back to Chattanooga simultaneously by different routes, without
coming into contact.
The Fifteenth Corps will do all the labor of destruction of railroad
required by General Grant to-morrow.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER, Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HDQRS. DEPT. AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
Graysville, Ga., November 27, 1863.
Maj. Gen. O. O. HOWARD, Commanding Eleventh Corps:
GENERAL: General Sherman visited General Grant to-day at Ringgold by
appointment, and the following movements were ordered: After the destruction
of a section of the railroad from Dalton to Cleveland by your corps, and
its return to Parker's Gap, the army will return to its original camps,
at or near Chattanooga, by way of Chickamauga Depot. In anticipation of
your return, the general has ordered General Davis' division, and your
wagon train, to await your coming at or near Parker's Gap.
To-morrow the Fifteenth Corps will destroy railroads and all property
of use to all enemy in this neighborhood, and General Hooker's command
will, in like manner, destroy that in the neighborhood of Ringgold, and
as soon as advised of your arrival at Parker's Gap, the general will make
the necessary orders for the general movement back to Chattanooga. Therefore,
as soon as you reach Parker's Gap, please report what you have done, and
make all preliminary preparations for the return march.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER, Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Graysville, Ga., November 28, 1863--2.10 a.m.
Major-General HOWARD, Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: Your dispatch of 10 p.m. is received. The general desires
that you hold your command at or near Parker's Gap until General Jef. C.
Davis reaches that point from Ringgold. He is ordered to move up this morning
at his leisure, and to bring with him your wagon train.
The pursuit of the enemy will be pushed no farther, and, after the
destruction of railroad, mills, &c., at Ringgold and here, General
Grant intends to move leisurely back toward Chattanooga. You may make all
preliminary arrangements to that end, and cause the road back to Chickamauga
Depot, via camp ground, to be reconnoitered, with a view to avoid returning
either to Ringgold or this point.
Instructions will be given to turn all parties or men and wagons belonging
to your command to you at Parker's Gap, and, as soon as the general learns
officially that your command is assembled at that point, he will send orders
for the general movement, which will not, in all probability, occur until
to-morrow (the 29th). <ar55_595>
To insure the receipt of your wagon train, the general suggests that
you send a staff officer to Ringgold to bring it up to Parker's Gap. Road
from Ringgold to Parker's Gap is comparatively good. Road from Ringgold
to this point is bad and much cut up.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER, Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,
November 28, 1863--6.30 a.m.
Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Army of the Tennessee:
GENERAL: The two brigades sent to Red Clay returned at 12.30 a.m.,
having destroyed the railroad for 2 miles effectually; they burned the
ties and bent the rails. They also burned two cars, destroyed a water-tank
and the depot, which has been a place for storing supplies. The brigades
have marched 26 miles during the day. I shall march to Ringgold, starting
at 7 a.m.
Very respectfully,
O. O. HOWARD, Major-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,
Cleveland, Tenn., November 29, 1863.
General SHERMAN:
I left Parker's Gap with my command at daylight, and marched along
the old Alabama road, communicating with General Davis through the gaps.
Arrived here about sunset. A company of rebels left town a half hour before.
I have sent a brigade to intercept any retreat on the Dalton road, but
this company took a road to the left of the direct road to Dalton and escaped.
My corps is encamped to the front and right of the town.
Respectfully,
O. O. HOWARD, Major-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Cleveland, Tenn., November 29, 1863.
Maj. Gen. O. O. HOWARD, Commanding Eleventh Corps:
GENERAL: The general commanding directs that you please move your command
by the direct road to Charleston, starting between the hours of 8 and 9
to-morrow morning, communicating with General Davis on your left, on approaching
the Hiwassee River. You will please secure all boats and bridges that may
be found at the river. General Blair will destroy the Dalton railroad south
of Cleveland, and follow on your track about 10 a.m.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
R. M. SAWYER, Assistant Adjutant-General.
<ar55_596>
GENERAL ORDERS No. 68.
WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL'S OFFICE
Washington, February 22, 1864.
PUBLIC RESOLUTION, NO. 12.--JOINT RESOLUTION tendering the thanks of
Congress to Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman.
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of Congress and
of the people of the United States are due, and that the same are hereby
tendered, to Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, commander of the Department and Army
of the Tennessee, and the officers and soldiers who served under him, for
their gallant and arduous services in marching to the relief of the Army
of the Cumberland, and for their gallantry and heroism in the battle of
Chattanooga, which contributed in a great degree to the success of our
arms in that glorious victory.
Approved February 19, 1864.
By order of the Secretary of War:
E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General.
|
|
|
|
|
News |
|
|
|
|