1. William S. Rosecrans
2. George H. Thomas
3. Thomas J. Wood
4. Col. John G. Parkhurst, Provost-Marshal.
5. Col. John T. Wilder
6. Charles A. Dana, dispatches
7. Braxton Bragg plus correspondence
8. James Longstreet
9. Leonidas Polk
10. Patrick R. Cleburne

[ar50_47 con't]
[OCTOBER --, 1863.]
THE OCCUPATION OF MIDDLE TENNESSEE AND PASSAGE OVER THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS.
The rebel army, after its expulsion from Middle Tennessee, crossed the Cumberland Mountains by way of the Tantallon and University roads, then moved down Battle Creek, and crossed the Tennessee River on bridges, it is said, near the mouth of Battle Creek and at Kelley's Ferry, and on the railroad bridge at Bridgeport. They destroyed a part of the latter after having passed over it, and retired to Chattanooga and Tyner's Station, leaving guards along the river. On their arrival at Chattanooga, they commenced immediately to throw up some defensive fieldworks at that place and also at each of the crossings of the Tennessee as far up as Blythe's Ferry.
Our troops, having pursued the rebels as far as supplies and the state of the roads rendered it practicable, took position from McMinnville to Winchester, with advances at Pelham and Stevenson. The latter soon after moved to Bridgeport in time to save from total destruction a saw-mill there, but not to prevent the destruction of the railroad bridge.
After the expulsion of Bragg's forces from Middle Tennessee, the next objective point of this army was Chattanooga. It commands the southern entrance into East Tennessee, the most valuable if not the chief sources of supplies of coal for the manufactories and ma-chine-shops of the Southern States and is one of the great gateways through the mountains to the champaign counties of Georgia and Alabama. <ar50_48>
For the better understanding of the campaign, I submit a brief outline of the topography of the country from the barrens of the northwestern base of the Cumberland range to Chattanooga and its vicinity.
The Cumberland range is a lofty mass of rocks, separating the waters which flow into the Cumberland from those which flow into the Tennessee, and extending from beyond the Kentucky line, in a southwesterly direction, nearly to Athens, Ala. Its northwestern slopes are steep and rocky, and scalloped into coves, in which are the heads of numerous streams that water Middle Tennessee. Its top is undulating or rough, covered with timber, soil comparatively barren, and in dry seasons scantily supplied with water. Its southeastern slope, above Chattanooga, for many miles, is precipitous, rough, and difficult all the way up to Kingston. The valley between the foot of this slope and the river seldom exceeds 4 or 5 miles in width, and with the exception of a narrow border along the banks is undulating or hilly.
The Sequatchie Valley is along the river of that name, and is a cañon or deep cut, splitting the Cumberland range parallel to its length. It is only 3 or 4 miles in breadth and 50 miles in length. The sides of this valley are even more precipitous than the great eastern and western slopes of the Cumberland which have just been described. To reach Chattanooga from McMinnville or north of the Tennessee it is necessary to turn the head of this valley by Pikeville and pass down the Valley of the Tennessee, or to cross it by Dunlap or Therman.
That part of the Cumberland range between Sequatchie and the Tennessee, called Walden's Ridge, abuts on the Tennessee in high, rocky bluffs, leaving no practicable space sufficient for a good wagon road along the river. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad crosses that branch of the Cumberland range west of the Sequatchie, through a low gap, by a tunnel, 2 miles east of Cowan, down the gorge of Big Crow Creek to Stevenson at the foot of the mountain, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 3 miles from the Tennessee and 10 miles from Bridgeport.
Between Stevenson and Chattanooga, on the south of the Tennessee, are two ranges of mountains, the Tennessee River separating them from the Cumberland, its channel a great chasm cut through the mountain masses, which in those places abut directly on the river. These two ranges are separated by a narrow valley, through which runs Lookout Creek.
The Sand Mountain is next the Tennessee and its northern extremity is called Raccoon Mountain. Its sides are precipitous and its top barren oak ridges, nearly destitute of water. There are but few, and these very difficult, wagon roads, by which to ascend and descend the slopes of this mountain.
East of Lookout Valley is Lookout Mountain a vast palisade of rocks rising 2,400 feet above the level of the sea, in abrupt, rocky cliffs, from a steep wooded base. Its eastern sides are no less precipitous. Its top varies from 1 to 6 or 7 miles in breadth, is heavily timbered, sparsely settled, and poorly watered. It terminates abruptly upon the Tennessee, 2 miles below Chattanooga, and the only practicable wagon roads across it are one over the nose of the mountain, at this point, one at Johnson's Crook. 26 miles distant, and one at Winston's Gap, 42 miles distant from Chattanooga. <ar50_49>
Between the eastern base of this range and the line of the Chattanooga and Atlanta or Georgia State Railroad are a series of narrow valleys separated by smaller ranges of hills or low mountains, over which there are quite a number of practicable wagon roads running eastward toward the railroad.
The first of these ranges is Missionary Ridge, separating the waters of Chickamauga from Chattanooga Creek.
A higher range with fewer gaps, on the southeast side of the Chickamauga, is Pigeon Mountain, branching from Lookout, near Dougherty's Gap, some 40 miles south from Chattanooga. It extends in a northerly direction, bearing eastward until it is lost in the general level of the country, near the line of the Chattanooga and La Fayette road.
East of these two ranges and of the Chickamauga, starting from Ooltewah and passing by Ringgold to the west of Dalton, is Taylor's Ridge, a rough, rocky range, traversable by wagon roads only through gaps, generally several miles apart.
Missionary Ridge passes about 3 miles east of Chattanooga, ending near the Tennessee at the mouth of the Chickamauga. Taylor's Ridge separates the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad from the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad.
The junction of these roads is at Dalton, in a valley east of Taylor's Ridge and west of the rough mountain region, in which are the sources of the Coosa River. This valley, only about 9 or 10 miles wide, is the natural southern gateway into East Tennessee, while the other valleys just mentioned terminate northwardly on the Tennessee to the west of it, and extend in a southwesterly direction toward the line of the Coosa, the general direction of which, from the crossing of the Atlanta road to Rome and thence to Gadsden, is southwest.
From the position of our army at McMinnville, Tullahoma, Decherd, and Winchester, to reach Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee above it, it was necessary either to pass north of the Sequatchie Valley, by Pikeville or Kingston, or to cross the main Cumberland and the Sequatchie Valley, by Dunlap or Therman and Walden's Ridge, by the routes passing through these places, a distance from 65 to 70 miles, over a country destitute of forage, poorly supplied with water, by narrow and difficult wagon roads.
The main Cumberland range could also have been passed, on an inferior road, by Pelham and Tracy City to Therman.
The most southerly route on which to move troops and transportation to the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, was by Cowan, University, Battle Creek, and Jasper or by Tantallon, Anderson, Stevenson, Bridgeport, and the mouth of Battle Creek, to same point, and thence by Therman or Dunlap and Poe's Tavern, across Walden's Ridge. The University road, though difficult, was the best of these two, that by Cowan, Tantalon, and Stevenson being very rough between Cowan and Anderson and much longer.
There were also three roads across the mountains to the Tennessee River below Stevenson, the best but much the longest by Fayetteville and Athens, a distance of 70 miles.
The next, a very rough wagon road from Winchester, by Salem, to Larkinsville, and an exceedingly rough road by the way of Mount Top, one branch leading thence to Bellefonte and the other to Stevenson.
On these latter routes little or no forage was to be found except at «4 R R--VOL XXX, PT I» <ar50_50> the extremities of the lines, and they were also scarce of water. The one by Athens has both forage and water in abundance.
It is evident from this description of the topography that to reach Chattanooga, or penetrate the country south of it, on the railroad, by crossing the Tennessee below Chattanooga was a difficult task. It was necessary to cross the Cumberland Mountains, with subsistence, ammunition, at least a limited supply of forage, and a bridge train; to cross Sand or Raccoon Mountains into Lookout Valley, then Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges, Missionary Ridge, if we went directly to Chattanooga, or Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylor's Ridge, if we struck the railroad at Dalton or south of it. The Valley of the Tennessee River, though several miles in breadth between the bases of the mountains, below Bridgeport, is not a broad, alluvial farming country, but full of barren oak ridges, sparsely settled, and but a small part of it under cultivation.
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY UNTIL IT REACHED THE TENNESSEE RIVER.
The first step was to repair the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, to bring forward to Tullahoma, McMinnville, Decherd, and Winchester needful forage and subsistence, which it was impossible to transport from Murfreesborough to those points over the horrible roads which we encountered on our advance to Tullahoma. The next was to extend the repairs of the main stem to Stevenson and Bridgeport, and the Tracy City branch, so that we could place supplies in depot at those points, from which to draw after we had crossed the mountains.
Through the zeal and energy of Colonel Innes and his regiment of Michigan Engineers, the main road was open to the Elk River Bridge by the 13th of July, and Elk River Bridge and the main stem to Bridgeport by the 25th, and the branch to Tracy City by the 13th of August.
As soon as the main stem was finished to Stevenson, Sheridan's division was advanced, two brigades to Bridgeport and one to Stevenson, and commissary and quartermaster stores pushed forward to the latter place with all practicable speed. These supplies began to be accumulated at this point in sufficient quantities by the 8th of August, and corps commanders were that day directed to supply their troops, as soon as possible, with rations and forage sufficient for a general movement.
The Tracy City branch, built for bringing coal down the mountains, has such high grades and sharp curves as to require a peculiar engine. The only one we had answering the purpose, having been broken on its way from Nashville, was not repaired until about the 12th of August. It was deemed best, therefore, to delay the movement of the troops until that road was completely available for transporting stores to Tracy City.
THE MOVEMENT OVER THE CUMBERLAND MOUNTAINS
began on the morning of the 16th of August, as follows:
General Crittenden's corps in three columns, General Wood, from Hillsborough, by Pelham, to Therman, in Sequatchie Valley.
General Palmer, from Manchester by the most practicable route to Dunlap.<ar50_51>
General Van Cleve, with two brigades from McMinnville--the third being left in garrison there--by the most practicable route to Pikeville, the head of the Sequatchie Valley.
Colonel Minty's cavalry to move on the left by Sparta, to drive back Dibrell's cavalry toward Kingston, where the enemy's mounted troops, under Forrest, were concentrated, and then, covering the left flank of Van Cleve's column, to proceed to Pikeville.
The Fourteenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas commanding, moved as follows:
General Reynolds, from University, by way of Battle Creek, to take post concealed near its mouth.
General Brannan to follow him.
General Negley to go by Tantallon and halt on Crow Creek, between Anderson and Stevenson.
General Baird to follow him and camp near Anderson.
The Twentieth Corps, Maj. Gen. A. McD. McCook commanding, moved as follows:
General Johnson by Salem and Larkin's Fork to Bellefonte. General Davis by Mount Top and Crow Creek, to near Stevenson.
The three brigades of cavalry by Fayetteville and Athens, to cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesburg up.
On his arrival in the Sequatchie Valley, General Crittenden was to send a brigade of infantry to reconnoiter the Tennessee near Harrison's Landing, and take post at Poe's Cross-Roads. Minty was to reconnoiter from Washington down, and take post at Smith's CrossRoads, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry was to reconnoiter from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga and be supported by a brigade of infantry, which General Crittenden was to send from Therman to the foot of the eastern slope of Walden's Ridge, in front of Chattanooga.
These movements were completed by the evening of the 20th of August. Hazen's brigade made the reconnoissance on Harrison's Landing, and reported the enemy throwing up works there, and took post at Poe's Cross-Roads on the 21st. Wagner, with his brigade, supported Wilder in his reconnaissance on Chattanooga, which they surprised and shelled from across the river, creating no little agitation.
Thus the army passed the first great barrier between it and the objective point, and arrived opposite the enemy on the banks of the Tennessee.
THE CROSSING OF THE RIVER
required that the best points should be chosen, and means provided for the crossing. The river was reconnoitered, the pontoons and trains ordered forward as rapidly as possible, hidden from view in rear of Stevenson and prepared for use. By the time they were ready the places of crossing had been selected and dispositions made to begin the operation.
It was very desirable to conceal to the last moment the points of crossing, but as the mountains on the south side of the Tennessee rise in precipitous rocky bluffs to the height of 800 or 1,000 feet, completely overlooking the whole valley and its coves, this was next to impossible.
Not having pontoons for two bridges across the river, General Sheridan began trestlework for parts of one at Bridgeport, while <ar50_52> General Reynolds' division, seizing Shellmound, captured some boats, and from these and material picked up prepared the means of crossing at that point, and General Brannan prepared rafts for crossing his troops at the mouth of Battle Creek.
The laying of the pontoon bridge at Caperton's Ferry was very handsomely done by the troops of General Davis, under the directions of General McCook, who crossed his advance in pontoons at daylight, driving the enemy's cavalry from the opposite side· The bridge was ready for crossing by 11 a.m. the same day, but in plain view from the rebel signal stations opposite Bridgeport.
The bridge at Bridgeport was finished on the 29th of August, but an accident occurred which delayed its final completion till September 2.
THE MOVEMENT ACROSS THE RIVER
was commenced on the 29th and completed on the 4th of September, leaving the regular brigade in charge of the railroad and depot at Stevenson until relieved by Major-General Granger, who was directed, as soon as practicable, to relieve it and take charge of the rear.
General Thomas' corps was to cross as follows: One division at Caperton's and one at Bridgeport, Reynolds at Shellmound in boats, and one division at Battle Creek on rafts. All were to use the bridge at Bridgeport for such portions of their trains as they might find necessary, and to concentrate near Trenton, and send an advance to seize Frick's or Cooper's and Stevens Gaps on the Lookout Mountain, the only practicable routes leading down the mountains into the valley called McLemore's Cove, which lies at its eastern base and stretches northeastwardly toward Chattanooga.
General McCook's corps was to cross two divisions at Caperton's Ferry, move to Valley Head, and seize Winston's Gap, while Sheridan was to cross at Bridgeport as soon as the bridge was laid and join the rest of his corps near Winston's, by way of Trenton.
General Crittenden's corps was ordered down the Sequatchie, leaving the two advanced brigades, under Hazen and Wagner, with Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted infantry to watch and annoy the enemy. It was to cross the river, following Thomas' corps at all three crossings, and to take post on the Murphy's Hollow road, push an advance brigade to reconnoiter the enemy at the foot of Lookout, and take post at Wauhatchie, communicating from his main body with Thomas on the right up the Trenton Valley and threatening Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout.
The cavalry, crossed at Caperton's and a ford near Island Creek, were to unite in Lookout Valley, take post at Rawlingsville, and reconnoiter boldly toward Rome and Alpine.
These movements were completed by McCook's and Crittenden's corps on the 6th, and by Thomas' corps on the 8th of September. The cavalry for some reason was not pushed with the vigor nor to the extent which orders and the necessities of the campaign required. Its continual movement since that period and the absence of Major-General Stanley, the chief of cavalry, have prevented a report which may throw some light on the subject.
The first barrier south of the Tennessee being crossed, the enemy was found firmly holding the point of Lookout Mountain with infantry and artillery, while our force on the north side of the river <ar50_53> reported the movement of the rebel forces from East Tennessee and their concentration at Chattanooga. To dislodge him from that place it was necessary to carry Lookout Mountain, or so to move as to compel him to quit his position by endangering his line of communication. The latter plan was chosen.
The cavalry was ordered to advance on our extreme right to Summerville, in Broomtown Valley, and General McCook was ordered to support the movement by a division of infantry thrown forward to the vicinity of Alpine, which was executed on the 8th and 9th of September.
General Thomas was ordered to cross his corps by Frick's or Cooper's and Stevens' Gaps and occupy the head of McLemore's Cove.
General Crittenden was ordered to reconnoiter the front of Lookout Mountain, sending a brigade up an almost impracticable path called the Nickajack trace to Summertown, a hamlet on the summit of the mountain overlooking Chattanooga, and holding the main body of his corps either to support these reconnaissances to prevent a sortie of the enemy over the nose of Lookout, or to enter Chattanooga in case the enemy should evacuate it or make but feeble resistance. Simultaneously with this movement, the cavalry was ordered to push by way of Alpine and Broomtown Valley and strike the enemy's railroad communication between Resaca bridge and Dalton.
These movements were promptly begun on the 8th and 9th of September. The reconnaissance of General Crittenden on the 9th developed the fact that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga the day and night previous and his advance took peaceable possession at 1 p.m.
His whole corps, with its trains, passed around the point of Lookout Mountain on the 10th and encamped for the night at Rossville, 5 miles south of Chattanooga.
During these operations, General Thomas pushed his corps over the mountains at the designated points, each division consuming two days in the passage.
The weight of evidence, gathered from all sources, was that Bragg was moving on Rome, and that his movement began on the 6th of September. General Crittenden was therefore directed to hold Chattanooga, with one brigade, calling all the forces on the north side of the Tennessee across, and to follow the enemy's retreat vigorously, anticipating that the main body had retired by Ringgold and Dalton.
Additional information, obtained during the afternoon and the evening of the 10th of September, rendered it certain that his main body had retired by the La Fayette road, but uncertain whether he had gone far. General Crittenden was ordered, at I a.m. on the 11th, to proceed to the front and report, directing his command to advance only as far as Ringgold, and order a reconnaissance to Gordon's Mills. His report, and further evidence, satisfied me that the main body of the rebel army was in the vicinity of La Fayette.
General Crittenden was therefore ordered to move his corps, with all possible dispatch, from Ringgold to Gordon's Mills, and communicate with General Thomas, who had by that time reached the eastern foot of Lookout Mountain. General Crittenden occupied Ringgold during the 11th, pushing Wilder's mounted infantry as far as Tunnel Hill, skirmishing heavily with the enemy's cavalry. Hazen <ar50_54> joined him near Ringgold on the 11th, and the whole corps moved rapidly and successfully across to Gordon's Mills on the 12th. Wilder following, and covering the movement, had a severe fight with the enemy at Leet's Tan-yard.
During the same day the Fourth U.S. Cavalry was ordered to move up the Dry Valley road, to discover if the enemy was in the proximity of that road on Crittenden's right, and open communication with Thomas' command, which, passing over the mountain, was debouching from Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps, and moving on La Fayette through Dug Gap of the Pigeon Mountain.
On the 10th, Negley's division advanced to within a mile of Dug Gap, which he found heavily obstructed, and Baird's division came up to his support on the morning of the 11th. Negley became satisfied that the enemy was advancing upon him, in heavy force, and perceiving that if he accepted battle in that position he would probably be cut off, he fell back after a sharp skirmish, in which General Baird's division participated, skillfully covering and securing their trains, to a strong position in front of Stevens' Gap. On the 12th, Reynolds and Brannan, under orders to move promptly, closed up to the support of these two advanced divisions.
During the same day General McCook had reached the vicinity of Alpine, and, with infantry and cavalry, had reconnoitered the Broomtown Valley to Summerville, and ascertained that the enemy had not retreated on Rome, but was concentrating at La Fayette.
Thus it was ascertained that the enemy was concentrating all his forces, both infantry and cavalry, behind the Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of La Fayette, while the corps of this army were at Gordon's Mills, Bailey's Cross-Roads, at the foot of Stevens' Gap, and at Alpine, a distance of 40 miles, from flank to flank, by the nearest practicable roads, and 57 miles by the route subsequently taken by the Twentieth Army Corps. It had already been ascertained that the main body of Johnston's army had joined Bragg, and an accumulation of evidence showed that the troops from Virginia had reached Atlanta on the 1st of the month, and that re-enforcements were expected soon to arrive from that quarter. It was therefore a matter of life and death to effect the
CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY.
General McCook had already been directed to support General Thomas, but was now ordered to send two brigades to hold Dougherty's Gap, and to join General Thomas with the remainder of his command with the utmost celerity, directing his march over the road on the top of the mountain. He had, with great prudence, already moved his trains back to the rear of Little River, on the mountain, but, unfortunately being ignorant of the mountain road, moved down the mountain at Winston's Gap, down Lookout Valley to Cooper's Gap, up the mountain and down again, closing up with General Thomas on the 17th, and having posted Davis at Brooks', in front of Dug Gap, Johnson at Pond Spring, in front of Catlett's Gap, and Sheridan at the foot of Stevens' Gap.
As soon as General McCook's corps arrived General Thomas moved down the Chickamauga toward Gordon's Mills. Meanwhile, to bring General Crittenden within reach of General Thomas and beyond the danger of separation, he was withdrawn from Gordon's Mills, on the 14th, and ordered to take post on the southern spur of Missionary <ar50_55> Ridge, his right communicating with General Thomas, where he remained until General McCook had effected a junction with General Thomas.
Minty, with his cavalry, reconnoitered the enemy on the 15th and reported him in force at Dalton, Ringgold, and Leet's, and Rock Springs Church. The head of General McCook's column being reported near the same day, General Crittenden was ordered to return to his old position at Gordon's Mills, his line resting along the Chickamauga via Crawfish Spring.
Thus, on the evening of the 17th, the troops were substantially within supporting distance. Orders were given at once to move the whole line northeastwardly down the Chickamauga, with a view to covering the La Fayette road toward Chattanooga, and facing the most practicable route to the enemy's front.
The position of our troops and the narrowness of the roads retarded our movements. During the day while they were in progress, our cavalry, under Colonel Minty, was attacked on the left in the vicinity of Reed's Bridge, and Wilder's mounted infantry were attacked by infantry and driven into the La Fayette road.
It became apparent that the enemy was massing heavily on our left, crossing Reed's and Alexander's Bridges in force while he had threatened Gordon's Mills.
Orders were therefore promptly given to General Thomas to relieve General Crittenden's corps, posting one division near Crawfish Spring, and to move with the remainder of his corps by the Widow Glenn's house to the Rossville and La Fayette road, his left extending obliquely across it near Kelly's house.
General Crittenden was ordered to proceed with Van Cleve's and Palmer's divisions, to drive the enemy from the Rossville road and form on the left of General Wood, then at Gordon's Mills.
General McCook's corps was to close up on General Thomas, occupy the position at Crawfish Spring, and protect General Crittenden's right, while holding his corps mainly in reserve.
The main cavalry force was ordered to close in on General McCook's right, watch the crossing of the Chickamauga, and act under his orders.
The movement for the concentration of the corps more compactly toward Crawfish Spring was begun on the morning of the 18th, under orders to conduct it very secretly, and was executed so slowly that McCook's corps only reached Pond Spring at dark, and bivouacked, resting on their arms during the night Crittenden's corps reached its position on the Rossville road near midnight.
Evidence accumulated during the day of the 18th that the enemy was moving to our left. Minty's cavalry and Wilder's mounted brigade encountered the enemy's cavalry at Reed's and Alexander's Bridges, and toward evening were driven into the Rossville road. At the same time the enemy had been demonstrating for 3 miles up the Chickamauga. Heavy clouds of dust had been observed 3 or 4 miles beyond the Chickamauga, sweeping to the northeast.
In view of all these facts, the necessity became apparent that General Thomas must use all possible dispatch in moving his corps to the position assigned it. He was therefore directed to proceed with all dispatch, and General McCook to close up to Crawfish Spring as soon as Thomas' column was out of the way. Thomas pushed forward uninterruptedly during the night, and at daylight the head of his column had reached Kelly's house on the La Fayette road, where <ar50_56> Baird's division was posted. Brannan followed, and was posted on Baird's left, covering the roads leading to Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.
At this point Colonel McCook, of General Granger's command, who had made a reconnaissance to the Chickamauga the evening before and had burned Reed's Bridge, met General Thomas, and reported that an isolated brigade of the enemy was this side of the Chickamauga, and, the bridge being destroyed, a rapid movement in that direction might result in the capture of the force thus isolated.
General Thomas ordered Brannan with two brigades to reconnoiter in that direction and attack any small force he should meet. The advance brigade, supported by the rest of the division, soon encountered a strong body of the enemy, attacked it vigorously, and drove it back more than half a mile, where a very strong column of the enemy was found, with the evident intention of turning our left and gaining possession of the La Fayette road between us and Chattanooga.
This vigorous movement disconcerted the plans of the enemy to move on our left, and opened the
BATTLE OF THE 19TH SEPTEMBER.
The leading brigade became engaged about 10 a.m. on the 19th, on our extreme left, and extending to the right, where the enemy combined to move in heavy masses. Apprehending this movement, I had ordered General McCook to send Johnson's division to Thomas' assistance. He arrived opportunely.
General Crittenden, with great good sense, had already dispatched Palmer's, reporting the fact to me, and received my approval. The enemy returned our attack, and was driving back Baird's right in disorder, when Johnson struck the attacking column in flank and drove it back more than a half a mile till his own right was overlapped, and in imminent danger of being turned, when Palmer, coming in on Johnson's right, threw his division against the enemy and drove back his advance columns.
Palmer's right was soon overlapped, when Van Cleve's division came to his support, but was beaten back, when Reynolds' division came in and was in turn overpowered. Davis' division came into the fight then, most opportunely, and drove the enemy, who soon, however, developed a superior force against his line and pressed him so heavily that he was giving ground, when Wood's division came and turned the tide of battle the other way.
About 3 p.m. General McCook was ordered to send Sheridan's division to support our line near Wood and Davis, directing Lytle's brigade to hold Gordon's Mills, our extreme right. Sheridan also arrived opportunely to save Wood from disaster, and the rebel tide was thoroughly staid in that quarter.
Meanwhile, the roar of musketry in our center grew louder, and evidently approached headquarters at Widow Glenn's house, until musket balls came near and shells burst about it. Our center was being driven.
Orders were sent to General Negley to move his division from Crawfish Spring and above, where he had been holding the line of the Chickamauga, to Widow Glenn's, to be held in reserve to give succor wherever it might be required. At 4.30 p.m. he reported with his division, and as the indications that our center was being <ar50_57> driven became clearer, he was dispatched in that direction, and soon found the enemy had dislodged Van Cleve from the line, and was forming there even while Thomas was driving their right. Orders were promptly given Negley to attack him, which he soon did, and drove him steadily until night closed the combat.
General Brannan, having repulsed the enemy in our extreme left, was sent by General Thomas to support the center, and at night took a position on the right of Reynolds.
Colonel Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry occupied during the day a position on the La Fayette road, 1 mile north of Gordon's Mills, where he had taken position on the afternoon previous when, contesting the ground step by step, he had been driven by the enemy's advance from Alexander's Bridge.
Minty's cavalry had been ordered from the same position about noon of the 10th, to report to Major-General Granger, at Rossville, which he did at daylight on the 20th, and was posted near Mission Mills, to hold in check the enemy's cavalry on their right, from the direction of Ringgold and Graysville.
The Reserve Corps covered the approaches from the Chickamauga toward Rossville and the extension of our left.
The roar of battle hushed in the darkness of night, and our troops, weary with a night of marching and a day of fighting, rested on their arms, having everywhere maintained their positions, developed the enemy, and gained thorough command of the Rossville and Dry Valley roads to Chattanooga, the great object of the battle of the 19th of September.
The battle had secured us these objects. Our flanks covered the Dry Valley and Rossville roads, while our cavalry covered the Missionary Ridge and the Valley of Chattanooga Creek, into which latter place our spare trains had been sent on Friday, the 18th.
We also had indubitable evidence of the presence of Longstreet's corps and Johnston's forces, by the capture of prisoners from each, and the fact that at the close of the day we had present but two brigades which had not been opportunely and squarely in action, opposed to superior numbers of the enemy, assured us that we were greatly outnumbered, and that the battle the next day must be for the safety of the army and the possession of Chattanooga.
THE BATTLE OF THE 20TH.
During the evening of the 19th the corps commanders were assembled at headquarters at Widow Glenn's house, the reports of the positions and condition of their commands heard, and orders given for the disposition of the troops for the following day.
Thomas' corps, with the troops which had re-enforced him, was to maintain substantially his present line, with Brannan in reserve.
McCook, maintaining his picket line till it was driven in, was to close on Thomas, his right refused, and covering the position at Widow Glenn's, and Crittenden to have two divisions in reserve near the junction of McCook's and Thomas' lines to be able to succor either.
Plans having been explained, written orders given to each and read in the presence of all, the wearied corps commanders returned about midnight to their commands.
No firing took place during the night. The troops had assumed position when day dawned. The sky was red and sultry, the atmosphere <ar50_58> and all the woods enveloped in fog and smoke. As soon as it was sufficiently light I proceeded, accompanied by General Garfield and some aides, to inspect the lines.
I found General McCook's right too far up on the crest, and General Davis in reserve on a wooded hill-side west of and parallel to the Dry Valley road. I mentioned these defects to the general, desiring Davis division to be brought down at once, moved more to the left and placed in close column by division, doubled on the center, in a sheltered position.
I found General Crittenden's two divisions massed at the foot of the same hill in the valley and called his attention to it, desiring them to be moved farther to the left.
General Thomas' troops were in the position indicated, except Palmer's line was to be closed more compactly.
Satisfied that the enemy's first attempt would be on our left, orders were dispatched to General Negley to join General Thomas and to General McCook to relieve Negley. Returning to the right, I found Negley had not moved, nor were McCook's troops coming in to relieve him. Negley was preparing to withdraw his two brigades from the line. He was ordered to send his reserve brigade immediately and follow it with the others only when relieved on the line of battle. General Crittenden, whose troops were nearest, was ordered to fill General Negley's place at once, and General McCook was notified of this order growing out of the necessity of promptly sending Negley to Thomas.
Proceeding to the extreme right I felt the disadvantages of its positions, mentioned them to General McCook, and when I left him enjoined on him that it was an indispensable necessity that we should keep closed to the left, and that we must do so at all hazards.
On my return to the position of General Negley, I found to my astonishment that General Crittenden had not relieved him, Wood's division having reached the position of Negley's reserve. Peremptory orders were given to repair this, and Wood's troops moved into position, but this delay subsequently proved of serious consequence. The battle began on the extreme left at 8.30 a.m., and it was 9.30 o'clock when Negley was relieved.
An aide arriving from General Thomas, requesting that Negley's remaining brigades be sent forward as speedily as possible to succor the left, General Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve, with all possible dispatch, to a position in the rear of Wood, who closed in on Brannan's right. General McCook was ordered to move Davis up to close in on Wood, and fill an opening in the line.
On my return from an examination of the ground in the rear of our left center, I found to my surprise that General Van Cleve was posted in line of battle on a high ridge much too far to the rear to give immediate support to the main line of battle, and General Davis in line of battle in rear of the ridge occupied by Negley's reserve in the morning. General Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve at once down the hill to a better position, and General Davis was also ordered to close up the support of the line near Wood's right.
The battle, in the meanwhile, roared with increasing fury, and approached from the left to the center. Two aides arrived successively within a few minutes, from General Thomas, asking for re-enforcements. The first was directed to say that General Negley had already gone and should be near at hand at that time, and that Brannan's <ar50_59> reserve brigade was available. The other was directed to say that General Van Cleve would at once be sent to his assistance, which was accordingly done.
A message from General Thomas soon followed, that he was heavily pressed, Captain Kellogg, aide-de-camp, the bearer, informing me at the same time that General Brannan was out of line, and General Reynolds' right was exposed. Orders were dispatched to General Wood to close up on Reynolds, and word was sent to General Thomas that he should be supported, even if it took away the whole corps of Crittenden and McCook.
General Davis was ordered to close on General Wood, and General McCook was advised of the state of affairs and ordered to close his whole command to the left with all dispatch.
General Wood, overlooking the direction to" close up "on General Reynolds, supposed he was to support him, by withdrawing from the line and passing to the rear of General Brannan, who, it appears, was not out of line, but was en échelon, and slightly in rear of Reynolds' right. By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advantage, and striking Davis in flank and rear, as well as in front, threw his whole division in confusion.
The same attack shattered the right brigade of Wood before it had cleared the space. The right of Brannan was thrown back, and two of his batteries, then in movement to a new position, were taken in flank and thrown back through two brigades of Van Cleve, then on the march to the left, throwing his division into confusion from which it never recovered until it reached Rossville.
While the enemy poured in through this breach, a long line stretching beyond Sheridan's right was advancing. Laiboldt's brigade shared in the rout of Davis. Sheridan's other two brigades, in movement toward the left, under orders to support Thomas, made a gallant charge against the enemy's advancing column, but were thrown into disorder by the enemy's line advancing on their flank, and were likewise compelled to fall back, rallying on the Dry Valley road, and repulsing the enemy, but they were again compelled to yield to superior numbers and retired westward of the Dry Valley road, and by a circuitous route reached Rossville, from which they advanced by the La Fayette road to support our left.
Thus Davis' two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were driven from the field, and the remainder, consisting of the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, and Wood, two of Negley's brigades and one of Van Cleve s, were left to sustain the conflict against the whole power of the rebel army, which, desisting from pursuit on the right, concentrated their whole efforts to destroy them.
At the moment of the repulse of Davis' division, I was standing in rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of McCook's corps to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve's troops, and the distance Davis' men were falling back, and the tide of battle surging toward us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to intervene became imminent, and I hastened in person to the extreme right, to direct Sheridan's movement on the flank of the advancing rebels. It was too late. The crowd of returning troops rolled back, and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops directions to rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley road, I passed down it accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, Major Bond, and Captain Young, <ar50_60> of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape, canister, and musketry, for 200 or 300 yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support, by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our lines, but found the routed troops far toward the left, and hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, however, I determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga, to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position.
General Garfield dispatched me, from Rossville, that the left and center still held its ground. General Granger had gone to its support. General Sheridan had rallied his division, and was advancing toward the same point, and General Davis was going up the Dry Valley road to our right. General Garfield proceeded to the front, remained there until the close of the fight, and dispatched me the triumphant defense our troops there made against the assaults of the enemy.
THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT,
after 2 p.m., was that of the army. Never, in the history of this war at least, have troops fought with greater energy and determination. Bayonet charges, often heard of but seldom seen, were repeatedly made by brigades and regiments in several of our divisions.
After the yielding and severance of the divisions of the right, the enemy bent all efforts to break the solid portions of our line. Under the pressure of the rebel onset, the flanks of the line were gradually retired until they occupied strong advantageous ground, giving to the whole a flattened crescent shape.
From 1 to half past 3 o'clock, the unequal contest was sustained throughout our line. Then the enemy in overpowering numbers flowed around our right, held by General Brannan, and occupied a low gap in the ridge of our defensive position, which commanded our rear. The moment was critical. Twenty minutes more and our right would have been turned, our position taken in reverse, and probably the army routed.
Fortunately, Major-General Granger, whose troops had been posted to cover our left and rear, with the instinct of a true soldier and a general, hearing the roar of battle on our left, and being beyond the reach of orders from the general commanding, determined to move to its assistance. He advanced and soon encountered the enemy's skirmishers, whom he disregarded, well knowing that, at that stage of the conflict, the battle was not there. Posting Col. Daniel McCook's brigade to take care of anything in the vicinity and beyond the left of our line, he moved the remainder to the scene of action, reporting to General Thomas, who directed him to our suffering right.
Arrived in sight. General Granger discovered at once the peril and the point of danger--the gap. Quick as thought he directed his advance brigade upon the enemy. General Steedman, taking a regimental color, led the column. Swift was the charge and terrible the conflict, but the enemy was broken. A thousand of our brave <ar50_61> men, killed and wounded, paid for its possession, but we held the gap.
Two divisions of Longstreet's corps confronted the position. Determined to take it, they successively came to the assault. A battery of six guns, placed in the gorge, poured death and slaughter into them. They charged to within a few yards of the pieces, but our grape and canister, and the leaden hail of our musketry, delivered in sparing but terrible volleys from cartridges taken in many instances from the boxes of their fallen companions, was too much even for Longstreet's men. About sunset they made their last charge, when our men, being out of ammunition, rushed on them with bayonet, and they gave way to return no more.
The fury of the conflict was nearly as great on the fronts of Brannan and Wood, being less furious toward the left. But a column of the enemy had made its way to near our left and to the right of Colonel McCook's position. Apprised of this, General Thomas directed Reynolds to move his division from its position, and pointing out the rebels told him to go in there.
To save time, the troops of Reynolds were faced by the rear rank and moved with the bayonet at a double-quick, with a shout walked over the rebels, capturing some 500. This closed the battle of the 20th. At nightfall the enemy had been repulsed along the whole line, and sunk into quietude without attempting to renew the combat.
General Thomas, considering the excessive labors of the troops, the scarcity of ammunition, food, and water, and having orders from the general commanding to use his discretion, determined to retire on Rossville, where they arrived in good order, took post before morning, receiving supplies from Chattanooga, and offering the enemy battle during all the next day and repulsing his reconnaissance. On the night of the 21st we withdrew from Rossville, took firm possession of the objective point of our campaign--Chattanooga--and prepared to hold it.
The operations of the cavalry during the battle on the 19th were very important. General Mitchell, with three brigades, covered our right flank along the line of the Chickamauga, above Crawfish Spring, against the combined efforts of the great body of the rebel cavalry, whose attempts to cross the stream they several times repulsed.
Wilder fought, dismounted, near the center, intervening two or three times with mountain howitzers and Spencer rifles very opportunely.
On the 20th Minty covered our left and rear at Missionary Mills, and later in the day on the Ringgold road.
General Mitchell, with his three brigades, covered our extreme right, and with Wilder, after its repulse, extended over Missionary Ridge, held the whole country to the base of Lookout Mountain, and all our trains, artillery, caissons, and spare wagons sent there for greater safety retiring from the field. He was joined by Post's brigade of Davis' division, which had not closed on the army and was not in action.
On the 21st the cavalry still covered our right as securely as before, fighting and holding at bay very superior numbers. The number of cavalry combats during the whole campaign have been numerous, the successes as numerous, but the army could not have dispensed with those of the 19th, 20th, and 21st. <ar50_62>
OUR ARTILLERY
fired fewer shots than at Stone's River, but with even greater effect. I cannot but congratulate the country on the rapid improvement evidenced in this arm of the service. Our loss of pieces is, in part, attributable to the rough, wooded ground in which we fought, and the want of experience in posting artillery, and partly to the unequal nature of the contest, our infantry being heavily outnumbered.
For the details of these actions, the innumerable instances of distinguished bravery, skill, and gallantry displayed by officers of every rank, and, above all, for self-reliant, cool, and steady courage displayed by the soldiers of the army, in all arms, in many instances even shining above that of their officers, I must refer to the accompanying reports of the corps, division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders. The reports of the cavalry command are not in, for the best of all reasons, that they have been out nearly ever since, writing with their sabers on the heads and backs of the enemy.
The signal corps has been growing into usefulness and favor daily for the last four months, and now bids fair to become one of the most esteemed of the staff services. It rendered very important service from the time we reached the Valley of the Tennessee. For its operations, I refer to the report of Capt. Jesse Merrill, chief signal officer.
Our medical corps proved very efficient during the whole campaign, and especially during and subsequent to the battle. A full share of praise is due to Dr. Glover Perin, the medical director of the department, ably assisted by Dr. Gross, medical director of the Fourteenth, Dr. Perkins, Twentieth, and Dr. Phelps, Twenty-first Army Corps.
A very great meed of praise is due Capt. Horace Porter, of the Ordnance, for the wise system of arming each regiment with arms of the same caliber, and having the ammunition wagons properly marked, by which most of the difficulties in supplying ammunition where troops had exhausted it in battle were obviated. From his report will be seen that we expended 2,650,000 rounds of musket cartridges, 7,325 rounds of cannon ammunition; we lost 36 pieces of artillery, 20 caissons, 8,450 stand of small-arms, 5,834 infantry accouterments; being 12,675 rounds less of artillery and 650,000 rounds more of musketry than at Stone's River.
From the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Wiles, provost-marshal-general, it will be seen that we took 2,005 prisoners. We have missing [4,945], of which some 600 have escaped and come in, and probably 700 or 800 are among the killed and wounded; of our wounded about 2,500 fell into the hands of the enemy, swelling the balance of prisoners against us to about 5,500.
It is proper to observe the battle of Chickamauga was absolutely necessary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga. It was fought in a country covered with woods and undergrowth, and wholly unknown to us. Every division came into action opportunely and fought squarely on the 19th. We were largely outnumbered, yet we foiled the enemy's flank movement on our left, and secured our own position on the road to Chattanooga. The battle of the 20th was fought with all the troops we had, and but for the extension and delay in closing in our right, we should probably have driven the enemy, whom we really beat on the field. I am fully satisfied that the enemy's loss largely exceeds ours. <ar50_63>
It is my duty to notice the services of those faithful officers who have none but myself to mention them.
To Major-General Thomas, the true soldier, the prudent and undaunted commander, the modest and incorruptible patriot, the thanks and gratitude of the country are due for his conduct at the battle of Chickamauga.
Major-General Granger, by his promptitude, arrived and carried his troops into action in time to save the day. He deserves the highest praise.
Major-General McCook, for the care of his command, prompt and willing execution of orders, to the best of his ability, deserves this testimonial of my approbation.
I bear testimony likewise to the high-hearted, noble Major-General Crittenden. Prompt in the moving and reporting the position of his troops, always fearless on the field of battle, I return my thanks for the promptness and military good sense with which he sent his divisions toward the noise of battle on the 19th.
To Brig. Gen. James A. Garfield, chief of staff, I am especially indebted for the clear and ready manner in which he seized the points of action and movement, and expressed in orders the ideas of the general commanding.
Col. J. C. McKibbin, aide-de-camp, always efficient, gallant, and untiring, and fearless in battle.
Lieut. Col. A. C. Ducat, brave, prompt, and energetic in action.
Maj. Frank S. Bond, senior aide-de-camp; Capt. J.P. Drouillard, aide-de-camp; and Capt. R. S. Thoms, aide-de-camp, deserve very honorable mention for the faithful and efficient discharge of their appropriate duties always, and especially during the battle.
Col. James Barnett, chief of artillery; Lieut. Col. S. Simmons, chief commissary; Lieut. Col. H. C. Hodges, chief quartermaster; Dr. G. Perin, medical director; Capt. Horace Porter, chief of ordnance; Capt. William E. Merrill, chief topographical engineer, and Brig. Gen. J. St. Clair Morton, were all in the battle and discharged their duties with ability and to my entire satisfaction.
Col. William J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and his command, have rendered very valuable services in keeping open communications and watching the movements of the enemy, which deserve my warmest thanks.
Lieut. Col. W. M. Ward, with the Tenth Ohio, provost and headquarters guard, rendered efficient and valuable services, especially on the 20th, in covering the movement of retiring trains on the Dry Valley road, and stopping the stragglers from the fight. Captain Garner and the escort deserve mention for untiring energy in carrying orders.
Lieut. Col. C. Goddard, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. Col. William M. Wiles, provost-marshal-general; Maj. William McMichael, assistant adjutant-general; Surg. H. H. Seys, medical inspector; Capt. D. G. Swaim, assistant adjutant-general, chief of the secret service; Capt. William Farrar, aide-de-camp; Capt. J. H. Young, chief commissary of musters; Capt. A. S. Burt, acting assistant inspector-general; Capt. Hunter Brooke, acting judge-advocate; Capt. W. C. Margedant, acting topographical engineer; Lieut. George Burroughs, topographical engineer; Lieut. William L. Porter, acting aide-de-camp: Lieut. James K. Reynolds, acting aide-de-camp; Lieut. M. J. Kelly, chief of couriers, and Asst. Surg. D. Bache were <ar50_64> on the field of battle, and there and elsewhere discharged their duties with zeal and ability.
I must not omit Col. J.P. Sanderson, of the regular infantry, who, having lately joined us, on those two days of battle acted as aide-de-camp and carried orders to the hottest portions of the field.
Of those division and brigade commanders whose gallantry, skill, and services were prominent, individual special mentions accompany this report. A list of names of these and others of every grade whose, conduct according to the reports of their commanders, deserves special praise, is also herewith sent.
 W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.

RECAPITULATION.
O Officers. A Aggregate. M Enlisted Men. C Captured or missing

                                                         --Killed-- -Wounded- -----C-----

Command.	O	M	O	M	O	M	A
General.headquarters	....	....	....	2	....	4	6
Fourteenth.Army.Corps	40	625	228	3,333	111	1,777	6,114
Twentieth.Army.Corps	49	374	164	2,535	63	1,172	4,357
Twenty-first.Army.Corps.	31	291	144	2,238	28	671	3,403
Reserve.Corps	16	199	66	910	35	596	1,822
Cavalry.Corps	4	28	7	129	11	289	468
Total.Army.of.the.Cumberland	140	1,517	609	9,147	248	4,509	16,170

[ar50_245 con't]
HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Chattanooga, Tenn., September 30, 1863.
GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of my corps from the 1st September up to date, as follows, viz:
General Brannan's division crossed the Tennessee River at Battle <ar50_246> Creek; General Baird ordered to cross his division at Bridgeport, and to move to Taylor's Store; General Negley's division to cross the river at Caperton's Ferry, and to report at Taylor's Store also.
September 2.--General Baird's division moved to Widow's Creek.
General Negley reports having arrived at Moore's Spring, 1¼ miles from Taylor's Store, and 2 miles from Bridgeport; he was ordered to cross the mountain at that point, it being the most direct route to Trenton, in the vicinity of which place the corps was ordered to concentrate.
September 3.--Headquarters Fourteenth Army Corps moved from Bolivar Springs at 6 a.m. via Caperton's Ferry to Moore's Spring, on the road from Bridgeport to Trenton. Baird's division reached Bridgeport, but could not cross in consequence of damage to the bridge; Negley's division marched to Warren's Mill, on the top of Sand Mountain, on the road to Trenton; Brannan's division reached Graham's Store, on the road from Shellmound to Trenton; Reynolds' division marched 6 miles on the Trenton road from Shellmound.
September 4.--Negley's division camped at Brown's Spring, at the foot of Sand Mountain, in Lookout Valley; Brannan's division at Gordon's Mill, on Sand Mountain; Reynolds' division at foot of Sand Mountain, 2 miles from Trenton; Baird's division crossed the river at Bridgeport, and camped at that point; corps headquarters at Moore's Spring.
September 5.--Baird's division arrived at Moore's Spring; Negley's division still in camp at Brown's Spring. He reports having sent forward a reconnaissance of two regiments of infantry and a section of artillery to scour the country toward Chattanooga, and secure some captured stores near Macon Iron-Works. They captured some Confederate army supplies. No report from Brannan's division; Reynolds' division in camp at Trenton; Brannan somewhere in the neighborhood; corps headquarters at Warren's Mill.
September 6.--Baird's division encamped at Warren's Mill; Negley's division reached Johnson's Crook; Beatty's brigade was sent up the road to seize Stevens' Gap; met the enemy's pickets, and, it being dark, did not proceed farther. The Eighteenth Ohio, of Negley's division, went to the top of Lookout Mountain, beyond Payne's Mill; met the enemy's pickets and dispersed them. The head of Brannan's column reached Lookout Valley, 2 miles below Trenton. Reynolds' division in camp at Trenton. Rumors of the enemy's design to evacuate Chattanooga. Corps headquarters at Brown's Spring.
September 7.--Baird's division closed up with Negley's in the mouth of Johnson's Crook. Negley's gained possession of the top of the mountain, and secured the forks of the road. Brannan's division reached Trenton; Reynolds' remained in camp at that place. Corps headquarters still at Brown's Spring.
September 8.--Baird's division remained in its camp of yesterday, at the junction of Hurricane and Lookout Creeks. Negley's division moved up to the top of Lookout Mountain, at the head of Johnson's Crook, one brigade occupying the pass; another brigade was sent forward and seized Cooper's Gap, sending one regiment to the foot of the gap to occupy and hold it; one regiment was also sent forward to seize Stevens' Gap, which was heavily obstructed with fallen trees. Brannan's division occupied the same position as last night. Reynolds' division headquarters at Trenton, with one brigade <ar50_247> at Payne's Mill, 3 miles south of Trenton. Headquarters of the corps still at Brown's Spring.
September 9.--Baird's division moved across Lookout Mountain to the support of Negley. Negley's division moved across the mountain and took up a position in McLemore's Cove, near Rodgers' farm, throwing out his skirmishers as far as Bailey's Cross-Roads; saw the enemy's cavalry in front, drawn up in line; citizens reported a heavy force concentrated in his front at Dug Gap, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Brannan's division in camp same as yesterday; Reynolds' division also. The Ninety-second Illinois (mounted infantry)sent on a reconnaissance toward Chattanooga, along the ridge of Lookout Mountain. Colonel Atkins, commanding Ninety-second Illinois, reports September 9, 11 a.m., entered Chattanooga as the rear of the enemy's column was evacuating the place; corps headquarters moved from Brown's Spring to Easley's farm, on Trenton and Lebanon road.
September 10.--General Negley's in front of or 1 mile west of Dug Gap, which has been heavily obstructed by the enemy and occupied by a strong picket line. General Baird ordered to move up to-night to Negley's support. General Reynolds to move at daylight to support Baird's left, and General Brannan to move at 8 a.m. to-morrow morning to support Reynolds. Headquarters and General Reynolds' division camped at foot of the mountain; Brannan's division at Easley's.
September 11.--Baird's division closed up on Negley's at Widow Davis' house about 8 a.m. Soon afterward, Negley being satisfied, from his own observations and from the reports of officers sent out to reconnoiter, and also from loyal citizens, that the enemy was advancing on him in very superior force, and that his train was in imminent danger of being cut off if he accepted battle at Davis' Cross-Roads, determined to fall back to a strong position in front of Stevens' Gap. This movement he immediately proceeded to put into execution, and by his untiring energy and skill, and with the prompt co-operation of Baird, succeeded in gaining possession of the hills in front of Stevens' Gap and securing his trains, without losing a single wagon. For a detailed account of this movement, see reports(*) of Generals Negley and Baird, annexed, marked A and B. General Turchin, commanding Third Brigade, Reynolds' division, was pushed forward, by way of Cooper's Gap, to Negley's support, on the left, reaching his position about 10 a.m. Orders were sent to General Brannan to close up as rapidly as possible. Corps headquarters at top of Cooper's Gap.
September 12.--Brannan's division reached Negley's position by 8 a.m., and took post next on the left of Baird. Reynolds' division was posted on the left of Brannan, one brigade covering Cooper's Gap. Reports from citizens go to confirm the impression that a large force of the enemy is concentrated at La Fayette. A report from General McCook confirms that fact. A later dispatch from the same source says it is reported that Bragg's whole army, with Johnston's, is at La Fayette. Generals Brannan and Baird, with parts of their commands, went out on a reconnaissance toward Dug Gap at 1 p.m. to-day. General Brannan reports they advanced 2 miles beyond Davis' Cross-Roads without finding any enemy with the exception of a few mounted men. Corps headquarters encamped at top of Stevens' Gap. <ar50_248>
September 13.--Negley's, Baird's, and Brannan's divisions remained in their camps of yesterday awaiting the arrival of McCook's corps, which had been ordered to close up to the left. Reynolds concentrated his division on the road from Cooper's Gap to Catlett's Gap. Two deserters from Eighteenth Tennessee state that they belong to Buckner's corps. Buckner's corps consists of eight brigades and two batteries of six guns each; were in the fight with Negley. Saw a brigade of Forrest's cavalry, commanded by Forrest in person, pass toward the fight on the 11th. Hill's and Buckner's corps were both engaged. Bragg's army is concentrated at La Fayette. Headquarters moved by way of Cooper's Gap to the foot of the mountain.
September 14.--General Reynolds took up a position at Pond Spring with his two infantry brigades, and was joined by Wilder at that place. Turchin's brigade, of Reynolds' division, made a reconnaissance to the mouth of Catlett's Gap with the Ninety-second Illinois (mounted infantry). Was opposed by rebel mounted pickets from Chickamauga Creek to mouth of Catlett's Gap, at which place he found their reserve drawn up, also a strong line of skirmishers to the right of the road; but having received instructions to avoid bringing on an engagement, he returned to camp with the brigade, leaving two regiments on Chattanooga Valley road, strongly posted on outposts. General Brannan advanced one brigade of his division to Chickamauga Creek, east of Lee's Mill, 1 mile to the right and south of Reynolds' position at Pond Spring. A mounted reconnaissance was also pushed forward to within a mile of Blue Bird Gap without encountering any of the enemy. A negro who had been taken before General Buckner yesterday and released again reports that Buckner and his corps are in Catlett's Gap preparing to defend that place. A negro woman, lately from the neighborhood of Dug Gap, reports a large force of rebels between Dug Gap and La Fayette.
September 16.--Corps headquarters and First and Second Divisions remained camped, as last reported, at foot of Stevens' Gap. Turchin's brigade, of Reynolds' division, made a reconnaissance toward Cat-lett's Gap. The enemy fell back as he advanced, until he came upon a force strongly posted, with two pieces of artillery, in the road. He made a second reconnaissance at 2 p.m. that day with but little further result, as he could advance but a short distance farther, the enemy being in force in his front.
September 17.--First. Second, and Third Divisions changed their positions from their camps of yesterday: Baird's (First) division, with its right resting at Gower's Ford and extending along Chickamauga Creek to Bird's Mill; Negley's (Second) division, with its right at Bird's Mill and its left connecting with Van Cleve's division at Owens' Ford; Brannan's (Third) division on the right of the First, covering four fords between Gower's Ford and Pond Spring. One brigade of the Fourth Division (Reynolds') thrown out in front of Pond Spring, on the Catlett's Gap road, covering the pass through the mountains. Wilder's brigade detached and ordered to report to department headquarters. The left of McCook's corps closed in; connected with our right near Pond Spring.
September 18.--At 4 p.m. the whole corps moved to the left along Chickamauga Creek to Crawfish Spring. On arriving at that place received orders to march on the cross-road leading by Widow Glenn's house to the Chattanooga and La Fayette road, and take up a position near Kelly's farm, on the La Fayette road, connecting with Crittenden on my right at Gordon's Mills. The head of the column <ar50_249> reached Kelly's farm about daylight on the 19th, Baird's division in front, and took up a position at the forks of the road, facing toward Reed's and Alexander's Bridges over the Chickamauga. Colonel Wilder, commanding the mounted brigade of Reynolds' division, informed me that the enemy had crossed the Chickamauga in force at those two bridges the evening before and drove his brigade across the State road, or Chattanooga and La Fayette road, to the heights east of Widow Glenn's house.
Kelly's house is situated in an opening about three-fourths of a mile long and one-fourth of a mile wide, on the east side of the State road, and stretches along that road in a northerly direction, with a small field of perhaps 20 acres on the west side of the road, directly opposite to the house. From thence to the Chickamauga the surface of the country is undulating and covered with original forest timber, interspersed with undergrowth, in many places so dense that it is difficult to see 50 paces ahead. There is a cleared field near Jay's Mill, and cleared land in the vicinity of Reed's and Alexander's Bridges. A narrow field commences at a point about a fourth of a mile south of Kelly's house, on the east side of the State road, and extends, perhaps, for half a mile along the road toward Gordon's Mills. Between the State road and the foot of Missionary Ridge there? a skirt of timber stretching from the vicinity of Widow Glenn's house, south of the forks of the road to McDonald's house, three-fourths of a mile north of Kelly's. The eastern slope of the Missionary Ridge, between Glenn's and McDonald's, is cleared and mostly under cultivation. This position of Baird's threw my right in close proximity to Wilder's brigade; the interval I intended to fill up with the two remaining brigades of Reynolds' division on their arrival. General Brannan, closely following Baird's division, was placed in position on his left, on the two roads leading from the State road to Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.
Col. Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade of the Reserve Corps, met me at General Baird's headquarters, and reported to me that he had been stationed the previous night on the road leading to Reed's Bridge, and that he could discover no force of the enemy except one brigade, which had crossed to the west side of the Chickamauga at Reed's Bridge the day before; and he believed it could be cut off, because, after it had crossed, he had destroyed the bridge, the enemy having retired toward Alexander's Bridge. Upon this information I directed General Brannan to post a brigade, within supporting distance of Baird, on the road to Alexander's Bridge, and with his other two brigades to reconnoiter the road leading to Reed's Bridge to see if he could locate the brigade reported by Colonel McCook, and, if a favorable opportunity occurred, to capture it. His dispositions were made according to instructions by 9 a.m.
General Baird was directed to throw forward his right wing, so as to get more nearly in line with Brannan, but to watch well on his right flank. Soon after this disposition of those two divisions, a portion of Palmer's division, of Crittenden's corps, took position to the right of General Baird's division. About 10 o'clock Croxton's brigade of Brannan's division, posted on the road leading to Alexander's Bridge, became engaged with the enemy, and I rode forward to his position to ascertain the character of the attack. Colonel Croxton reported to me that he had driven the enemy nearly half a mile, but that he was then meeting with obstinate resistance. I then rode back to Baird's position, and directed him to advance to <ar50_250> Croxton's support, which he did with his whole division, Starkweather's brigade in reserve, and drove the enemy steadily before him for some distance, taking many prisoners. Croxton's brigade, which had been heavily engaged for over an hour with greatly superior numbers of the enemy, and being nearly exhausted of ammunition, was then moved to the rear to enable the men to fill up their boxes; and Baird and Brannan, having united their forces, drove the enemy from their immediate front. General Baird then halted for the purpose of readjusting his line; and hearing from prisoners that the enemy were in heavy force on his immediate right, he threw back his right wing in order to be ready for an attack from that quarter.
Before his dispositions could be completed, the enemy, in overwhelming numbers, furiously assaulted Scribner's and King's brigades, and drove them in disorder. Fortunately, at this time Johnson's division, of McCook's corps, and Reynolds' division, of my corps, arrived, and were immediately placed in position. Johnson preceded Reynolds, his left connecting with Baird's right, and Palmer being immediately on Johnson's right, Reynolds was placed on the right of Palmer, with one brigade of his division in reserve. As soon as formed they advanced upon the enemy, attacking him in flank and driving him in great disorder for a mile and a half, while Brannan's troops met him in front as he was pursuing Baird's retiring brigades, driving the head of his column back and retaking the artillery, which had been temporarily lost by Baird's brigades, the Ninth Ohio recovering Battery H, Fifth U.S. Artillery, at the point of the bayonet. The enemy, at this time being hardly pressed by Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds in flank, fell back in confusion upon his reserves, posted in a strong position on the west side of Chickamauga Creek between Reed's and Alexander's Bridges.
Brannan and Baird were then ordered to reorganize their commands and take position on commanding ground on the road from McDonald's to Reed's Bridge, and hold it to the last extremity, as I expected the next effort of the enemy would be to gain that road and our rear. This was about 2 p.m. After a lull of about one hour, a furious attack was made upon Reynolds' right, and he having called upon me for re-enforcements, I directed Brannan's division to move to his support, leaving King's brigade, of Baird's division, to hold the position at which Baird and Brannan had been posted, the balance of Baird's division closing up to the right on Johnson's division. It will be seen by General Reynolds' report, Croxton's brigade, of Brannan's division, reached his right just in time to defeat the enemy's efforts to turn Reynolds' right and rear.
About 5 p.m., my lines being at that time very much extended in pursuing the enemy, I determined to concentrate them on more commanding ground, as I felt confident that we should have a renewal of the battle in the morning. I rode forward to General Johnson's position and designated to him where to place his division; also to General Baird, who was present with Johnson. I then rode back to the cross-roads to locate Palmer and Reynolds on Johnson's right and on the crest of the ridge about 500 yards east of the State road. Soon after Palmer and Reynolds got their positions, and while Brannan was getting his on the ridge to the west of the State road, near Dyer's house, and to the rear and right of Reynolds, where I had ordered him as a reserve, the enemy assaulted first Johnson and then Baird in a most furious manner, producing some <ar50_251> confusion, but order was soon restored, and the enemy repulsed in fine style; after which these two divisions took up the positions assigned them for the night.
Before adjusting the line satisfactorily, I received an order to report to department headquarters immediately, and was absent from my command until near midnight. After my return from department headquarters, about 2 a.m. on the 20th, I received a report from General Baird that the left of his division did not rest on the Reed's Bridge road, as I had intended, and that he could not reach it without weakening his line too much. I immediately addressed a note to the general commanding requesting that General Negley be sent me to take position on Baird's left and rear, and thus secure our left from assault. During the night the troops threw up temporary breastworks of logs, and prepared for the encounter which all anticipated would come off the next day.
Although informed by note, from General Rosecrans' headquarters, that Negley's division would be sent immediately to take post on my left, it had not arrived at 7 a.m. on the 20th, and I sent Captain Willard, of my staff, to General Negley to urge him forward as rapidly as possible, and to point out his position to him. General Negley, in his official report, mentions that he received this order through Captain Willard at 8 a.m. on the 20th, and that he immediately commenced withdrawing his division for that purpose, when the enemy was reported to be massing a heavy force in his front, sharply engaging his skirmishers, and that he was directed by General Rosecrans to hold his position until relieved by some other command. General Beatty's brigade, however, was sent under the guidance of Captain Willard, who took it to its position, and it went into action immediately. The enemy at that time commenced a furious assault on Baird's left, and partially succeeded in gaining his rear. Beatty, meeting with superior numbers, was compelled to fall back until relieved by the fire of several regiments of Palmer's reserve, which I had ordered to the support of the left, being placed in position by General Baird, and which regiments, with the cooperation of Van Derveer's brigade of Brannan's division and a portion of Stanley's brigade of Negley's division, drove the enemy entirely from Baird's left and rear. General Baird being still hardly pressed in front, I ordered General Wood, who had just reported to me in person, to send one of the brigades of his division to General Baird. He replied that his division had been ordered by General Rosecrans to support Reynolds' right, but that if I would take the responsibility exchanging his orders, he would cheerfully obey them, and sent Barnes' brigade, the head of which had just reached my position. General Wood then left me to rejoin the remainder of his division, which was still coming up.
To prevent a repetition of this attack of the enemy on our left I directed Captain Gaw, chief topographical officer on my staff, to go to the commanding officer of the troops on the left and rear of Baird, and direct him to mass as much artillery on the slopes of Missionary Ridge, west of the State road, as he could conveniently spare from his lines, supported strongly by infantry, so as to sweep the ground to the left and rear of Baird's position. This order General Negley, in his official report, mentions having received through Captain Gaw, but from his description of the position he assumed he must have misunderstood my order, and instead of massing the artillery near Baird's left, it was posted on the right of Brannan's division, nearly in <ar50_252> rear of Reynolds' right. At the time that the assault just described was made on Baird, the enemy attacked Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, with equal fierceness, which was continued at least two hours, making assault after assault with fresh troops, which were met by my troops with a most determined coolness and deliberation. The enemy having exhausted his utmost energies to dislodge us, apparently fell back entirely from our front, and we were not disturbed again until near night, after the withdrawal of the troops to Rossville had commenced. Just before the repulse of the enemy on our left, General Beatty came to me for fresh troops, in person, stating that most of those I had sent to him had gone back to the rear and right, and he was anxious to get at least another brigade before they attacked him again. I immediately sent Captain Kellogg to hurry up General Sheridan, whose division I had been informed would be sent to me.
About 2 p.m., very soon after Captain Kellogg left me, hearing heavy firing to my right and rear through the woods, I turned in that direction and was riding to the slope of the hill in my rear to ascertain the cause. Just as I passed out of the woods bordering the State road, I met Captain Kellogg returning, who reported to me that in attempting to reach General Sheridan he had met a large force in an open corn-field to the rear of Reynolds' position, advancing cautiously, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out to their front, and that they had fired on him and forced him to return. He had reported this to Colonel Harker, commanding a brigade of Wood's division, posted on a ridge a short distance to the rear of Reynolds' position, who also saw this force advancing, but, with Captain Kellogg, was of the opinion that they might be Sheridan's troops coming to our assistance. I rode forward to Colonel Harker's position, and told him that, although I was expecting Sheridan from that direction, if those troops fired on him, seeing his flag, he must return their fire and resist their farther advance. He immediately ordered his skirmishers to commence firing, and took up a position with his brigade on the crest of a hill a short distance to his right and rear, placing his right in connection with Brannan's division and portions of Beatty's and Stanley's brigades of Negley's division, which had been retired to that point from the left, as circumstantially narrated in the reports of General John Beatty and Colonel Stanley. I then rode to the crest of the hill referred to above. On my way I met General Wood, who confirmed me in the opinion that the troops advancing upon us were the enemy, although we were not then aware of the disaster to the right and center of our army. I then directed him to place his division on the prolongation of Brannan's, who, I had ascertained from Wood, was on the top of the hill above referred to, and to resist the farther advance of the enemy as long as possible. I sent my aide, Captain Kellogg, to notify General Reynolds that our right had been turned, and that the enemy was in his rear in force.
General Wood barely had time to dispose his troops on the left of Brannan before another of those fierce assaults, similar to those made in the morning on my lines, was made on him and Brannan combined, and kept up by the enemy throwing in fresh troops as fast as those in their front were driven back, until near nightfall. About the time that Wood took up his position, General Gordon Granger appeared on my left flank at the head of Steedman's division of his corps. I immediately dispatched a staff officer, Captain Johnson, Second <ar50_253> Indiana Cavalry, of Negley's division, to him with orders to push forward and take position on Brannan's right, which order was complied with with the greatest promptness and alacrity. Steedman, moving his division into position with almost as much precision as if on drill, and fighting his way to the crest of the hill on Brannan's right, moved forward his artillery and drove the enemy down the southern slope, inflicting on him a most terrible loss in killed and wounded. This opportune arrival of fresh troops revived the flagging spirits of our men on the right, and inspired them with new ardor for the contest. Every assault of the enemy from that time until nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style by the whole line.
By this time the ammunition in the boxes of the men was reduced, on an average, to 2 or 3 rounds per man, and my ammunition trains having been unfortunately ordered to the rear by some unauthorized person, we should have been entirely without ammunition in a very short time had not a small supply come up with General Steedman's command. This, being distributed among the troops, gave them about 10 rounds per man.
General Garfield, chief of staff of General Rosecrans, reached this position about 4 p.m., in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Thruston, of McCook's staff, and Captains Gaw and Barker, of my staff, who had been sent to the rear to bring back the ammunition, if possible. General Garfield gave me the first reliable information that the right and center of our army had been driven, and of its condition at that time. I soon after received a dispatch from General Rosecrans, directing me to assume command of all the forces, and, with Crittenden and McCook, take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, sending the unorganized forces to Chattanooga for reorganization, stating that he would examine the ground at Chattanooga, and then join me; also that he had sent out rations and ammunition to meet me at Rossville.
I determined to hold the position until nightfall, if possible, in the meantime sending Captains Barker and Kellogg to distribute the ammunition, Major Lawrence, my chief of artillery, having been previously sent to notify the different commanders that ammunition would be supplied them shortly. As soon as they reported the distribution of the ammunition, I directed Captain Willard to inform the division commanders to prepare to withdraw their commands as soon as they received orders. At 5.30 p.m. Captain Barker, commanding my escort, was sent to notify General Reynolds to commence the movement, and I left the position behind General Wood's command to meet Reynolds and point out to him the position where I wished him to form line to cover the retirement of the other troops on the left.
In passing through an open woods bordering the State road, and between my last and Reynolds' position, I was cautioned by a couple of soldiers, who had been to hunt water, that there was a large force of the rebels in these woods, drawn up in line and advancing toward me. Just at this time I saw the head of Reynolds' column approaching, and calling to the general himself, directed him to form line perpendicular to the State road, changing the head of his column to the left, with his right resting on that road, and to charge the enemy, who were then in his immediate front. This movement was made with the utmost promptitude, and facing to the right while on the march, Turchin threw his brigade upon the rebel force, routing <ar50_254> them and driving them in utter confusion entirely beyond Baird's left. In this splendid advance more than 200 prisoners were captured and sent to the rear.
Colonel Robinson, commanding the Second Brigade, Reynolds' division, followed closely upon Turchin, and I posted him on the road leading through the ridge to hold the ground while the troops on our right and left passed by. In a few moments General Willich, commanding a brigade of Johnson's division, reported to me that his brigade was in position on a commanding piece of ground to the right of the Ridge road. I directed him to report to General Reynolds, and assist in covering the retirement of the troops. Turchin's brigade, after driving the enemy a mile and a half, was reassembled, and took its position on the Ridge road, with Robinson and Willich.
These dispositions being made, I sent orders to Generals Wood, Brannan, and Granger to withdraw from their positions. Johnson's and Baird's divisions were attacked at the moment of retiring, but, by being prepared, retired without confusion or any serious losses. General Palmer was also attacked while retiring. Grose's brigade was thrown into some confusion, but Cruft's brigade came off in good style, both, however, with little loss. I then proceeded to Rossville, accompanied by Generals Garfield and Gordon Granger, and immediately prepared to place the troops in position at that point. One brigade of Negley's division was posted in the gap, on the Ringgold road, and two brigades on the top of the ridge to the right of the road, adjoining the brigade in the road; Reynolds' division on the right of Negley's and reaching to the Dry Valley road; Brannan's division in the rear of Reynolds right, as a reserve; McCook's corps on the right of the Dry Valley road, and stretching toward the west, his right reaching nearly to Chattanooga Creek; Crittenden's entire corps was posted on the heights to the left of the Ringgold road, with Steedman's division of Granger's corps in reserve behind his left; Baird's division in reserve, and in supporting distance of the brigade in the gap; McCook's brigade of Granger's corps was also posted as a reserve to the brigade of Negley on the top of the ridge, to the right of the road; Minty's brigade of cavalry was on the Ringgold road, about a mile and a half in advance of the gap.
About 10 a.m. of the 21st, receiving a message from Minty that the enemy were advancing on him with a strong force of cavalry and infantry, I directed him to retire through the gap and post his command on our left flank, and throw out strong reconnoitering parties across the ridge to observe and report any movements of the enemy on our left front. From information received from citizens, I was convinced that the position was untenable in the face of the odds we had opposed to us, as the enemy could easily concentrate upon our right flank, which, if driven, would expose our center and left to be entirely cut off from our communications. I therefore advised the commanding general to concentrate the troops at Chattanooga. About the time I made the suggestion to withdraw, the enemy made a demonstration on the direct road, but were soon repulsed. In anticipation of this order to concentrate at Chattanooga, I sent for the corps commanders, and gave such general instructions as would enable them to prepare their commands for making the movement without confusion. All wagons, ambulances, and surplus artillery carnages were sent to the rear before night.
The order for the withdrawal being received about 6 p.m. the <ar50_255> movement commenced at 9 p.m., in the following order: Strong skirmish lines, under the direction of judicious officers, were thrown out to the front of each division to cover this movement, with directions to retire at daylight, deployed and in supporting distance, the whole to be supported by the First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, under the superintendence of Major-General Rousseau, assisted by Minty's brigade of cavalry, which was to follow after the skirmishers. Crittenden's corps was to move from the hill to the left of the road at 9 p.m., followed by Steedman's division. Next Negley's division was to withdraw at 10 p.m.; then Reynolds, McCook's corps, by divisions from left to right, moving within supporting distance one after the other; Brannan's division was posted at 6 p.m. on the road about half way between Rossville and Chattanooga to cover the movement. The troops were withdrawn in a quiet, orderly manner, without the loss of a single man, and by 7 a.m. on the 22d were in their positions in front of Chattanooga, which had been assigned to them previous to their arrival, and which they now occupy, covered by strong intrenchments thrown up on the day of our arrival, and strengthened from day to day until they were considered sufficiently strong for all defensive purposes.
I respectfully refer you to the reports of division, brigade, and regimental commanders for the names of those of their respective commands who distinguished themselves. Among them I am much gratified to find the names of Col. F. Van Derveer, Thirty-fifth Ohio, commanding Third Brigade, and Col. John T. Croxton, Fourth Kentucky, commanding Second Brigade, Brannan's division, both of whom I saw on Saturday, and I can confirm the reports given of them by their division commander. Col. B. F. Scribner, Thirty-eighth Indiana, commanding First Brigade, Baird's division, was on the right of that division on Saturday morning, when it was attacked in flank by an overwhelming force of the enemy and driven back; yet Colonel Scribner was enabled to rally and reorganize it without the least difficulty, as soon as supported by Johnson's division.
All the troops under my immediate command fought most gallantly on both days, and were ably handled by their respective commanders, viz: Major-Generals Palmer and Reynolds, and Brigadier-Generals Brannan, Johnson, and Baird, on Saturday, and on Sunday, in the afternoon, in addition to the above, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger, commanding Reserve Corps, and Brigadier-General Wood, commanding First Division, Twenty-first Army Corps, who, with two brigades of his division, under their brave commanders, Colonels Harker and Buell, most nobly sustained Brannan's left, while Brigadier-General Steedman, commanding a division of the Reserve Corps, as valiantly maintained his right. Col. Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade of the Reserve Corps, and left by General Granger near McDonald's house, in a commanding position, kept a large force of the enemy's cavalry at bay while hovering on Baird's left, and with his battery materially aided Turchin's handsome charge on the enemy, who had closed in on our left. Brigadier-General Willich, commanding a brigade of Johnson's division, on Saturday, in the attack, and especially on Sunday, nobly sustained his reputation as a soldier. Brig. Gen. John Beatty and Col. T. R. Stanley, commanding brigades of Negley's division, bravely supported Baird's left in the morning of Sunday. Colonel Stanley being struck by the fragments of a shell and disabled in the afternoon, the brigade fought with Brannan's division, under the command of Col. W. L. Stoughton, <ar50_256> Eleventh Michigan. Col. J. G. Parkhurst, commanding Ninth Michigan Volunteers, and provost-marshal Fourteenth Army Corps, at the head of his regiment, did most valuable service on the 20th, in arresting stragglers and reorganizing the troops which had been driven from the field. His report is herewith inclosed, and special reference made thereto for particulars.
I also tender my thanks to the members of my staff for the services they rendered me. To Lieut. Col. G. E. Flynt, my assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. Col. A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster; Lieut. Col. J. R. Paul, chief commissary of subsistence, who, although not present on the field of battle, were discharging their duties in their respective departments entirely to my satisfaction. Lieut. Col. A. von Schrader, Seventy-fourth Ohio, assistant inspector-general, who rendered most efficient service as aide-de-camp during the first day's fight, and who was taken prisoner on the afternoon of the 19th while in the discharge of his duty; Maj. W. E. Lawrence, First Ohio Artillery, my chief of artillery; Capts. J.P. Willard and S.C. Kellogg, aides-de-camp; Capt. J. D. Barker, First Ohio Cavalry, commanding my escort: Capt. W. B. Gaw, chief topographical officer Fourteenth Army Corps, as also the signal officers of the corps, who did duty on the field as aides, and were of great assistance in conducting the operations of my command. Surgs. F. H. Gross, medical director, and H. C. Barrell, medical purveyor, were untiring in their efforts to relieve the wants of the wounded. Dr. Gross was wounded early in the engagement Sunday, but continued in the discharge of his duties. Capt. G. C. Moody, Nineteenth U.S. Infantry, commissary of musters, also rendered efficient service as aide-de-camp. Captain Johnson, Second Indiana Cavalry, of General Negley's staff, and Capt. T. C. Williams, Nineteenth U.S. Infantry, of General Baird's staff, having been cut off from their respective commanders, reported to me for duty, and were of great assistance as aides.
I submit herewith annexed a consolidated report of the casualties of the Fourteenth Army Corps.(*)
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEO. H. THOMAS,
 Major-General U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.
 Brig. Gen. JAMES A. GARFIELD,
Chief of Staff, Department of the Cumberland.
ADDENDA.
[CHATTANOOGA, TENN.,
September 30, 1863.]
 General THOMAS:
Your report says you received my dispatch of 12.15 p.m., directing you to retire on Rossville. This is an error in the hour of the dispatch. I did not leave the battle-field until after that hour, nor reach Chattanooga before 3.40 p.m.
Please have the error corrected. The first dispatch to you must have been written as late as 4.15.
 W. S. ROSECRANS.
 <ar50_257>
HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Chattanooga, October 3, 1863.
 Major-General ROSECRANS,
Commanding Department:
GENERAL: Your dispatch just received. I made mention of the time of receiving your dispatch on the battle-field to call attention to the fact, believing it to have been an error. I will make the correction in my forthcoming report, or in my fair copy.(*)
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.
-----
CHATTANOOGA, TENN.,
January 11, 1864--9.30 p.m.
(Received 10.50 a.m., 12th.)
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
The papers are publishing what purports to be my official report of the operations of the Fourteenth Army Corps at the battle of Chickamauga. It is not a full copy of the report which I sent in, to be forwarded to Washington, and, in addition, contains many inaccuracies.
 GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, January 12, 1864.
 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga:
GENERAL: Your telegram in regard to the newspapers publishing an incorrect version of your official report of the battle of Chickamauga is received, and I have telegraphed a brief reply. I deem it my duty to write you some additional facts in relation to the publication complained of.
Before the reports on that battle were received here the Secretary of War, from some suspicion or intimation that copies or extracts would be given clandestinely to the newspapers, directed Colonel Townsend to lock them up as soon as they arrived, and to keep the keys in his own possession till they were called for by Congress.
As no copies or extracts from your report could possibly have been obtained from these headquarters, you will form your own conclusions in regard to how and where they were obtained. It is stated that portions of these reports were telegraphed to the New York newspapers even before the originals were received at the Adjutant-General's Office here.
I will only add that I have never read or seen your report.
Truly, yours,
 H. W. HALLECK.
«17 R R--VOL XXX, PT I» <ar50_258>
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, March 9, 1864.
  Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  Chattanooga, Tenn.:
GENERAL: It is stated by a newspaper correspondent that on the 19th of January you were serenaded by the Ninth Ohio Regiment, and on that occasion declared to some of the officers of the regiment that you had praised them in your official report of the battle of Chickamauga, and then added:
I wanted to do justice to the regiment, and I cannot understand why--I feel sorry--that the War Department saw fit to curtail my report so as to leave this out.
I presume that you are aware that the only copy of your report which has yet been published was the rough draft furnished by you to Major-General Rosecrans, that officer being in great haste to make out his own report. General Rosecrans gave this rough draft which you had sent him to Mr. Villard, the correspondent of the Tribune, and it was published in that paper. The final report which you sent to Washington was, so far as I am aware, never seen by Mr. Villard. I am confident that you have not imputed to the War Department the mutilation of any official documents, but it seems proper that you should be aware of a statement which pretends to be made on the authority of your own language.
I am, general, with great regard, yours, faithfully,
 C. A. DANA.
-----
ITINERARY OF THE FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.(*)
August 1.--Corps headquarters and Second and Third Divisions at Decherd, First Division at Cowan, and Fourth Division at University Place.
August 10.--First Division left Cowan for a point on the railroad between Anderson and Stevenson, Stanley's brigade of Second Division relieving them at Cowan.
August 16.--Second Division entire moved from Decherd to a point a little north of Stevenson.
August 17. --Third and Fourth Divisions were moved to the Sequatchie and Battle Creek Valleys.
Corps headquarters moved on the 18th from Decherd.
The positions of the divisions on the 21st stood as follows, viz: Corps headquarters at Bolivar, Ala., First Division at Anderson Station, Second Division 2 miles north of Stevenson, Third Division at Battle Creek, and Fourth Division at Jasper, operating at and near Shellmound, also in front of Chattanooga and Harrison's, which places were shelled by Colonel Wilder on the 21st.
Preparations made by the whole command to cross the Tennessee River on or about the 1st of September.

[ar50_625 con't]
HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, 21ST ARMY CORPS,
Chattanooga, East Tenn., September 29, 1863.
SIR: At early dawn of the morning of Sunday, the 16th August, I received an order to move with my division from Hillsborough, in Middle Tennessee, by the most practicable and expeditious route across the Cumberland Mountains to Therman, in the Sequatchie Valley. Wednesday evening, the 19th, was the time fixed for the division to arrive at the destination assigned to it. The Second Brigade (Wagner's) had for a month previously occupied Pelham, near the foot of the mountains, and General Wagner had been ordered to repair the road up the mountains known as the Park road. As the order of movement left to my discretion the route by which my division should cross the mountains, I determined to make the ascent by the Park road, thence to Tracy City, thence by Johnson's to Purdons, whence I would fall into the road leading from McMinnville by Altamont to Therman.
Immediately on receiving the order I dispatched instructions to General Wagner to commence the ascent of the mountains, and to insure his being out of the way of the other two brigades, I directed he should continue the work of getting up his train during the night of the 16th. This was done, and early in the morning of the 17th, the road being free, the First and Third Brigades, with their baggage trains and the ammunition and supply trains of the division, began to ascend the mountains. The work was continued unintermittingly through the day and entire night of the 17th, and by 10 o'clock of the 18th the whole was up. Wagner's brigade had advanced to Tracy City Monday morning, the 17th, with orders to move forward as far as the Therman and Anderson road. On Tuesday, the 18th, I allowed the First and Third Brigades (Buell's and Harker's) to rest till 1 p.m., and then moved to Tracy City. Wagner was ordered to advance on the Therman road to Therman Wednesday morning, select a good encampment, and await my arrival there with the other two brigades and heavy trains. The distance from Tracy City to Therman is 28 miles, which had to be accomplished in one day with First and Third Brigades, their batteries, and the trains, to be at the rendezvous assigned me at the designated time.
At 4 a.m. on the 19th the march was commenced, and a little after nightfall the brigades encamped at Therman. The order for the general movement directed me to take with me ten days' subsistence «40R R--VOL XXX, PT I» <ar50_626> for the men and ten days' grain for the animals. I descended into the Sequatchie Valley with twenty-five days subsistence for the men and sixteen days' grain for the animals. I do not mention this fact in a spirit of egotism, but simply to show what can be accomplished by intelligence, good judgment, energy, and a willingness to make some sacrifice of personal comfort by commanders. Every educated and experienced soldier knows that one of the greatest drawbacks on the mobility and activity, and consequently on the offensive power of an army, is to be found in the immense baggage and supply trains which usually accompany its movements; hence, whatever lessens the number of vehicles required for the transportation of baggage and supplies by so much increases the efficiency of the army. I transported all the supplies I took into the Sequatchie Valley in the wagons originally assigned to my division for the transportation of regimental and staff baggage. I was then prepared with my division for a campaign of twenty-five days on full rations, or fifty days on half rations. The additional forage required beyond what I brought with me could have been found in the country. In conformity with the order for the general movement, I dispatched Wagner's brigade early Thursday morning, the 20th, to the eastern slope of Walden's Ridge, to make something of a show of force, and at the same time closely to observe, and if opportunity permitted, to threaten the enemy. With the other two brigades, First and Third, I remained encamped at Therman till the early morning of the 1st of September. I then moved in conformity to orders to Jasper, lower down in the valley.
Late in the afternoon of the 2d I received an order to send one of my brigades to Shellmound to cross the Tennessee River. The First Brigade was immediately put in motion under this order, and under the skillful management of Colonel Buell was thrown across the river rapidly, and without accident, during the night. Early in the morning of the 3d I moved with the Third Brigade, and the ammunition and ambulance trains, to the crossing, and with the energetic and judicious assistance of Colonel Harker had everything passed rapidly across without accident. I remained encamped at Shellmound till Saturday afternoon, the 5th, awaiting orders, the delay being occasioned by the necessity of waiting for the arrival of the supply train, which had been sent to cross the river at Bridgeport.
During the afternoon of the 5th I received an order to move, with the two brigades of my division with me, via Whiteside's and the River road, to the junction of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway with the Trenton and Chattanooga Railroad, for the purpose of observing and threatening the enemy posted on the spur of Lookout Mountain. I advanced as far as Whiteside's Saturday afternoon and evening. Early Sunday morning I continued to advance, Harker's brigade leading. Soon very light parties of the enemy were encountered, but they rapidly fell back before my sturdy, onward movement, though the country through which my line of march led me is most favorable to a prolonged and obstinate resistance by a small force.
Crossing Raccoon Mountain, I descended into Lookout Mountain Valley, and then followed down the valley northward to the junction of the two railways. As I moved down the valley the enemy's signal stations on the crest of Lookout Mountain were in full and perfect view, evidently watching my advance, and actively communicating <ar50_627> the result of their observations to the rear. At the junction of the railways my command was about 2 to 2½ miles from the enemy's advanced works, but the outposts and pickets were much nearer to each other; in fact, in hearing distance. As I was well aware that the enemy had been able to learn from his signal stations with very close approximate correctness the strength of my command, and hence would most probably be disposed to take advantage of my inferiority of force to attempt to crush me by a sudden blow, I immediately made the best possible dispositions to foil such an effort. In making these dispositions I soon became convinced of the utter untenableness of the position at the junction of the railways for an inferior force to receive an attack from a superior one. The position is entirely open, capable of being assailed simultaneously in front, on both flanks, and in the rear. I was well satisfied that I was in the immediate proximity of a very large force of the enemy (which could be still further swelled in very short time). This information I had gained satisfactorily during my advance, and it was strengthened and corroborated during the afternoon and early evening of the 6th. At 2 p.m. I communicated to the corps commander my position, 7 miles from Chattanooga (being at the junction of the railways), informed him of my immediate proximity to the enemy, and attempted to describe briefly the obstacles which barred my farther progress to Chattanooga.
At 4 p.m. I communicated to him the result of further observations and some facts omitted in my note of 2 p.m. In my note of 2 p.m. I suggested that he should move part of the force immediately with him to cover my rear from a reverse attack. This he declined to do on the ground of a want of authority, and indicated that in case I should be attacked by a superior force, I would have to fall back on him; also indicating that if I should have to retreat, I had better do so by the Trenton road. I had already opened communication with him by that road. Not intending to retreat except as a matter of the last and direst extremity, and as the evidences continued to thicken and multiply during the evening that I would be attacked in heavy force early next morning, I determined to shift my command a mile and a half to the rear, to a very strong and highly defensible position, in which I was satisfied I could maintain myself against almost any odds for a long time, and if finally overpowered could draw off my command to the rear. From this position I could maintain my communication by the Trenton road with the force immediately with the corps commander.
The movement was commenced at 10 p.m., the 6th, and made with perfect success, though my pickets were at the time in hearing of the enemy's pickets. My command was thus safely extricated from immediate imminent danger. I learned satisfactorily during the afternoon of the 6th that the spur of Lookout Mountain was held by Cheatham's division, supported immediately in rear by Hindman's (late Withers') division, being the whole of Lieutenant-General Polk's corps. My two small brigades confronted this force.
About 8 a.m. in the morning of the 7th I received a copy of a communication addressed by the commanding general to the corps commander, saying that he thought it would be safe (judging from some indications he had obtained of the movements of the enemy) to threaten the enemy on the spur of Lookout Mountain, with a part of my force. This communication the corps commander appears to have interpreted into an order to make a reconnaissance <ar50_628> in force, and accordingly ordered that I should make such a reconnaissance without loss of time. I accordingly commenced at once to make my preparations for making the reconnaissance, and actually made it at the earliest possible moment compatible with the safety of my command and the assurance of the success of the reconnaissance itself.
As the results of the reconnaissance have hitherto been reported, I will not recapitulate them. After taking the necessary precautions to insure, as far as possible, the safety of the command to be engaged in the reconnaissance and the success of the reconnaissance, I committed the conduct of it to that gallant and accomplished officer, Colonel Harker, commanding the Third Brigade of my division. I instructed him to proceed with the utmost circumspection, but to force his command as near to the enemy's position as he might deem prudent.
This point I was, of course, compelled to submit to his judgment. It affords me the greatest satisfaction to record in a permanent official manner that Colonel Harker conducted the reconnaissance in exact conformity to my wishes and instructions. Securing well his flanks and rear from being assailed without timely notice, he drove his solid line to within some thousand yards of the enemy's batteries (and his line of skirmishers to within some 600 yards), whence twelve guns opened on him, and then drew off his command with the loss of but one man. I know no parallel in military history to this reconnaissance. My command being much jaded and worn by the labors of the several preceding days, I allowed it to rest during the 8th, but I was on the alert to gain information of the movements and designs of the enemy. Near nightfall I obtained some information which led me to suspect the enemy was evacuating Chattanooga, but the indications were by no means positive. With a view to verify, this information, I addressed a note to the corps commander, informing him that I had observed some mysterious indications on the part of the enemy, of which I proposed to compel a development by a reconnaissance in force early next morning. During the night I received a reply to my note, saying the corps commander could not approve the making of the reconnaissance on account of some indications of a general movement of the army, but that he would refer the note to the commanding general. Confidently believing the commanding general would approve my proposition to make the reconnaissance, I held my command in readiness for the movement. In the meantime General Wagner, having with him the Second Brigade of my division, had received information on the north side of the river that the enemy was evacuating Chattanooga. The information having been communicated to the commanding general of the army, an order was dispatched to me to move my command to Chattanooga, prepared for a vigorous pursuit of the enemy.
This agreeable order was joyfully obeyed, and in a very few minutes my command was in rapid motion. Between my late camp in Lookout Mountain Valley and the spur of the mountain my command was overtaken by the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry, commanded by Colonel Atkins, who informed me he had been ordered to press forward to Chattanooga with all haste, to secure any property the enemy might have left behind, and to discover something of his lines of retreat. I allowed his regiment to pass my command, but on the spur of the mountain I overtook the regiment, halted, when the colonel informed me that the enemy's skirmishers <ar50_629> outflanked his, and his farther progress was debarred. I immediately threw forward the Twenty-sixth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Young commanding, to the right and higher up the mountain side than the skirmishers of Colonel Atkins extended, and rapidly drove the enemy's skirmishers from the mountain side. No further opposition was encountered in occupying Chattanooga, and the Ninety-second Illinois pushed rapidly into the town, followed by my First and Third Brigades. The Second Brigade crossed from the north side of the river during the afternoon and evening of the 9th.
The colors of the Ninety-seventh Ohio, of the Second Brigade of my division, were the first planted on the works of Chattanooga, having been brought across the river by a few men in a small boat early in the morning. Thus was this great strategic position, the long-sought goal, gained to us and occupied by our troops. Placing myself as soon as possible after the occupation in communication with the most intelligent and reliable citizens, I learned that a portion of the enemy's troops had retreated by the Cove road, and that the remainder, with the baggage and material of war, had retreated by the Rossville and La Fayette road. I was informed further, that Buckner's command, which had been posted at Tyner's Station on the railway, had retreated by Johnson toward Ringgold, but I subsequently learned he did not go so far eastward as Ringgold, but passed through Graysville and thence to La Fayette. The bulk of these facts I reported to the commander of the corps immediately on his arrival, and by him I am informed they were communicated to the commanding general.
My division remained in Chattanooga till the morning of the 10th. I then received an order to detail one brigade to occupy the town, and move with the other two in pursuit of the enemy by the Rossville and Ringgold road. The Second Brigade was detailed to remain in Chattanooga. At 10 a.m. of the 10th I led the First and Third Brigades out of Chattanooga to commence the pursuit of the enemy. At 2 p.m. of that day I advised the corps commander of the reported presence of a considerable force on my right flank, and at 7 p.m. I further advised him that I had taken a contraband during the late afternoon, who reported the bulk of the rebel army, with General Bragg in person, at Gordon's Mills on the Chickamauga where it is crossed by the Rossville and La Fayette road. I was incredulous of the story, and so expressed myself; but if true, it was so important it should be known that I deemed it my duty to report his narrative. It is due to the humble person who furnished me this invaluable information to record that subsequent developments proved his report to be singularly accurate and correct. Based on my note of 7.30 p.m. of the 10th, a communication was sent me by the commanding general to send a brigade by the way of Rossville to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Gordon's Mills with a view to verifying the truth of the contraband's report. The order was received at early daylight of the morning of the 11th. Colonel Harker's brigade was immediately sent to execute this service. About the time Harker's brigade was moving the corps commander arrived at my camp. I was directed by him to move forward with my remaining brigade 2 miles on the Ringgold road and then to await further orders. The order was obeyed. At 3.30 p.m., while awaiting further instructions, I received an order from the commanding general to move across the country, by the shortest and most expeditious <ar50_630> route, to the Rossville and La Fayette road to support Colonel Harker. Near the same hour I received a note from Colonel Harker, informing me that he had been driving the enemy all day and had arrived within 3 miles of Gordon's Mills.
I immediately sent him an order to press forward to the mills, and informing him that I would make a junction with him during the evening. The junction was made and fortunately, for Harker had been driving his little brigade all day against a vastly superior force, the rear guard of the enemy's great army. A full report of this brilliant and dangerous reconnaissance has been already made, and it is not now necessary that I should say more than that it was superbly made. When I arrived at Gordon's Mills, at 8.30 p.m. of the 11th, the enemy's camp fires could be distinctly seen on the other side of the creek. Their light, reflected over a wide section of the horizon, and, extending upward on the heavens, told that the foe was present in considerable force.
It was my intention to continue the pursuit early next morning, the 12th, but till 8 a.m. the atmosphere was so loaded with haze, fog, and smoke that it was difficult to see a hundred yards in advance. While I was waiting for the atmosphere to became sufficiently clear to continue the pursuit, I received an order to remain at Gordon's Mills till the corps commander arrived there with the other two divisions of the corps. This was done during the afternoon of the 12th. My two brigades remained quiet during the 13th, enjoying much-needed rest.
During the evening of the 13th a copy of a letter of instructions from the commanding general to the corps commander was furnished me by the latter, in which he was directed to leave my command at Gordon's Mills and proceed with the other two divisions to a position on Missionary Ridge, with a view of facilitating the concentration with the other corps of the army. My orders directed me to try stoutly to maintain the position at Gordon's Mills, but if attacked by a superior force, to fallback slowly, resisting stoutly, to Rossville, where it was supposed I would be supported by Major-General Granger's force. In case of extremity, and in case also I should not be supported by General Granger at Rossville, I was directed to select a position guarding the roads leading to Chattanooga and around the point of Lookout Mountain, and hold them at all hazards.
Resolved to make the most stubborn resistance at Gordon's Mills, I took advantage of the creek, a very strong defensible feature in the position, and barricaded my entire front and flanks strongly. So strengthened, I could have successfully resisted a front attack of a vastly superior force. With the exception of an occasional firing on my pickets, the enemy left him undisturbed at Gordon's Mills till between 11 a.m. and 12 m. of Friday, the 18th instant. A rapid advance of his light troops, supported by troops in a solid line, on my right front drove in my pickets as far as the creek, but no effort was made to pass the stream. Such an attempt would have been foiled and cost the enemy dearly.
At about 1 p.m. a force, apparently about a brigade of four regiments, emerged from the wood on the southern side of the creek, nearly opposite the center of my position, apparently with the intention of forcing a passage at the ford near the mills. A few well-directed shots from Bradley's battery soon forced him to relinquish this design and seek the shelter of the woods. The enemy continued <ar50_631> to hover in my front during the whole afternoon, making however no serious attempts, and accordingly I became reasonably satisfied that his demonstrations were only a mask to his real design, that of passing a heavy force across the creek lower down, with a view of turning our left and cutting off our communication with Chattanooga.
I communicated my opinion on this point to the commanding general at his headquarters during the evening of the 18th. It was verified by the opening of a terrific engagement on our left as early as 8.30 a.m. on the 19th. Troops had been moved to our left during the night of the 18th to meet the emergency. The battle continued throughout the forenoon and into the afternoon, but my command was left at Gordon's Mills until 3 p.m.
At this hour, I received a verbal order from the corps commander through one of his staff to move with my command and take position, as well as I now remember, on the right of some part of General Van Cleve's division. Throughout the entire preceding part of the day I had distinctly observed a considerable force in front of my position at Gordon's Mills, and just before I received the order to move into action a contraband came into my lines, from whom I learned that this force was the division of General Bushrod R. Johnson. Knowing it would pass the creek immediately I vacated my position, if it should not be occupied by some other troops, I dispatched one of my aides-de-camp to the commanding general, to inform him of the presence of this force in my front, and to suggest that at least a brigade should be sent to occupy the position as soon as I should vacate it. On his way to the headquarters of the commanding general my aide-de-camp encountered Major-General McCook, to whom he communicated the object of his mission to headquarters. General McCook immediately ordered a brigade from his corps to move into position at Gordon's Mills. My aide-de-camp rode on to headquarters and reported what had been done to the commanding general, who approved the dispositions. No delay, however, had occurred on this account in the movement of my command from Gordon's Mills.
Immediately on the receipt of this order my command was put in rapid motion for the scene of the great conflict.
As already remarked, the order directed me to take position on the right of General Van Cleve's command, but as I was totally ignorant of his position in the battle, and met no one on my arrival on the field to enlighten me, I found myself much embarrassed for the want of information whereby I could bring my command judiciously and effectively into action. It should be borne in mind that many of the troops were engaged in the woods, and that it was next to impossible to gain information by sight of the arrangement of the troops already engaged. This information could only be given by general and staff officers, posted in advance to aid in bringing the troops arriving freshly on the ground into action properly. Fortunately, shortly after my arrival on the field I met General Davis, from whom I received some useful information in regard to the status of the conflict. From him I learned that his left brigade (Heg's) was sorely pressed and needed assistance. While I was in conference with him a staff officer informed him that Colonel Heg reported that he could not maintain his position, and at the same instant I saw a stream of fugitives pouring out of the woods, across the Rossville and La Fayette road and over the field to the west of it. These, I <ar50_632> learned, belonged to Heg's brigade, of Davis' division. It was evident a crisis was at hand. The advance of the enemy, before which these men were retiring, must be checked at once, or the army wou