1. Henry W. Halleck
2. Ulysses S. Grant
3. Don Carlos Buell
4. William T. Sherman
5. G.T. Beauregard
6. Braxton Bragg

[ar10_98 con't]
SAINT Louis, Mo., April 8, 1862.
The enemy attacked our works at Pittsburg, Tenn., yesterday, but were repulsed with heavy loss. No details given.
 H. W. HALLECK,  Major-General
 Hon. E. M. STANTON.
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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Pittsburg, Tenn., April 13, 1862.
SIR: It is the unanimous opinion here that Brig. Gen. W. T. Sherman saved the fortune of the day on the 6th instant, and contributed largely to the glorious victory on the 7th. He was in the thickest of the fight on both days, having three horses killed under him and being wounded twice. I respectfully request that he be made a major-general of volunteers, to date from the 6th instant.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Commanding.
 Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
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WAR DEPARTMENT, April 23, 1862.
The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this Department respecting the late battle at Pittsburg Landing, <ar10_99> and whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday.
 EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
 Major-General HALLECK,  Pittsburg Landing.
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PITTSBURG LANDING, April 24, 1862.
The sad casualties of Sunday, the 6th, were due in part to the bad conduct of officers who were utterly unfit for their places, and in part to the numbers and bravery of the enemy. I prefer to express no opinion in regard to the misconduct of individuals till I receive the reports of commanders of divisions. A great battle cannot be fought or a victory gained without many casualties. In this instance the enemy suffered more than we did.
 H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.
 Hon. E. M. STANTON.
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PITTSBURG LANDING, May 2, 1862.
Reports of the battle of the 6th and 7th are received, and copies forwarded as rapidly as possible. The newspaper accounts that our divisions were surprised are utterly false. Every division had notice of the enemy's approach hours before the battle commenced.
 H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.
 Hon. E. M. STANTON.
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CORINTH, MISS., June 15, 1862.
SIR: I transmit herewith a topographical map(*) of the plain of Shiloh showing the various positions occupied by our troops between Shiloh Church and Pittsburg Landing in the battle of April 6 and 7 last. This map has been made from careful surveys, and the positions of the various divisions are designated in the precise places which they occupied on the ground at the times indicated. It will enable the reader to understand the official reports of the battle which have already been forwarded to the War Department.
It is not my object in this communication to offer any comments on the battle, beyond the remark that the impression which at one time seemed to have been received by the Department that our forces were surprised in the morning of the 6th is entirely erroneous. I am satisfied from a patient and careful inquiry and investigation that all our troops were notified of the enemy's approach some time before the battle commenced.
Again, our loss was overstated in the official reports, very many of those reported missing having subsequently reported for duty. The number taken prisoners by the enemy was also greatly exaggerated. There seems to have been a morbid desire on the part of some of our officers <ar10_100> to make the loss of their particular commands much greater than it really was [boldface mine].
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Commanding.
 Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

[ar10_108 con't]
PITTSBURG, April 7, 1862.
Yesterday the rebels attacked us here with an overwhelming force, driving our troops in from their advanced position to near the Landing. General Wallace was immediately ordered up from Crump's Landing, and in the evening one division of General Buell's army and General Buell in person arrived. During the night one other division arrived, and still another to-day. This morning, at the break of the day, I ordered an attack, which resulted in a fight which continued until late this afternoon, with severe loss on both sides, but a complete repulse of the enemy. I shall follow to-morrow far enough to see that no immediate renewal of an attack is contemplated.
 U.S. GRANT,  Major-General.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Saint Louis, Mo.
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PITTSBURG, TENN. (via SAVANNAH), April 8, 1862.
Enemy badly routed and fleeing towards Corinth. Our cavalry, supported by infantry, are now pursuing him, with instructions to pursue to the swampy grounds near Pea Ridge. I want transports sent here for our wounded.
 U.S. GRANT.
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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, Pittsburg, April 9, 1862.
CAPTAIN: It becomes my duty again to report another battle fought between two great armies, one contending for the maintenance of the <ar10_109> best government ever devised, the other for its destruction. It is pleasant to record the success of the army contending for the former principle.
On Sunday morning our pickets were attacked and driven in by the enemy. Immediately the five divisions stationed at this place were drawn up in line of battle, ready to meet them. The battle soon waxed warm on the left and center, varying at times to all parts of the line. The most continuous firing of musketry and artillery ever heard on this continent was kept up until night-fall, the enemy having forced the entire line to fall back nearly half way from their camps to the Landing [boldface mine].
At a late hour in the afternoon a desperate effort was made by the enemy to turn our left and get possession of the Landing, transports, &c. This point was guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, Captains Gwin and Shirk, U.S. Navy, commanding, four 20-pounder Parrott guns and a battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery or cavalry, and very difficult for infantry, at this point, no troops were stationed here, except the necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for their support. Just at this moment the advance of Major-General Buell's column (a part of the division under General Nelson) arrived, the two generals named both being present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of attack and the enemy soon driven back. In this repulse much is due to the presence of the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, and their able commanders, Captains Gwin and Shirk.
During the night the divisions under Generals Crittenden and McCook arrived. General Lewis Wallace, at Crump's Landing, 6 miles below, was ordered at an early hour in the morning to hold his division in readiness to be moved in any direction to which it might be ordered. At about 11 o'clock the order was delivered to move it up to Pittsburg, but owing to its being led by a circuitous route did not arrive in time to take part in Sunday's action.
During the night all was quiet, and feeling that a great moral advantage would be gained by becoming the attacking party, an advance was ordered as soon as day dawned. The result was a gradual repulse of the enemy at all parts of the line from morning until probably 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when it became evident the enemy was retreating. Before the close of the action the advance of General T. J. Wood's division arrived in time to take part in the action.
My force was too much fatigued from two days' hard fighting and exposure in the open air to a drenching rain during the intervening night to pursue immediately [boldface mine].
Night closed in cloudy and with heavy rain, making the roads impracticable for artillery by the next morning. General Sherman, however, followed the enemy, finding that the main part of the army had retreated in good order.
Hospitals of the enemy's wounded were found all along the road as far as pursuit was made. Dead bodies of the enemy and many graves were also found.
I inclose herewith report of General Sherman, which will explain more fully the result of this pursuit.
Of the part taken by each separate command I cannot take special notice in this report, but will do so more fully when reports of division commanders are handed in.
General Buell, coming on the field with a distinct army long under his command, and which did such efficient service, commanded by himself  <ar10_110> in person on the field, will be much better able to notice those of his command who particularly distinguished themselves than I possibly can.
I feel it a duty, however, to a gallant and able officer, Brig. Gen. W. T. Sherman, to make a special mention. He not only was with his command during the entire two days' action, but displayed great judgment and skill in the management of his men. Although severely wounded in the hand the first day his place was never vacant. He was again wounded, and had three horses killed under him.
In making this mention of a gallant officer no disparagement is intended to the other division commanders, Maj. Gens. John A. McClernand and Lewis Wallace, and Brig. Gens. S. A. Hurlbut, B. M. Prentiss, and W. H. L. Wallace, all of whom maintained their places with credit to themselves and the cause.
General Prentiss was taken prisoner in the first day's action, and General W. H. L. Wallace severely, probably mortally, wounded. His assistant adjutant-general, Capt. William McMichael, is missing; probably taken prisoner.
My personal staff are all deserving of particular mention, they having been engaged during the entire two days in conveying orders to every part of the field. It consists of Col. J. D. Webster, chief of staff; Lieut. Col. J. B. McPherson, chief engineer, assisted by Lieuts. W. L. B. Jenney and William Kossak; Capt. J. A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general; Capts. W. S. Hillyer, W. R. Rowley, and C. B. Lagow, aides-de-camp; Col G. G. Pride, volunteer aide, and Capt. J.P. Hawkins, chief commissary, who accompanied me upon the field.
The medical department, under the direction of Surgeon Hewitt, medical director, showed great energy in providing for the wounded and in getting them from the field regardless of danger.
Colonel Webster was placed in special charge of all the artillery and was constantly upon the field. He displayed, as always heretofore, both skill and bravery. At least in one instance he was the means of placing an entire regiment in a position of doing most valuable service, and where it would not have been but for his exertions.
Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, attached to my staff as chief engineer, deserves more than a passing notice for his activity and courage. All the grounds beyond our camps for miles have been reconnoitered by him, and plats carefully prepared under his supervision give accurate information of the nature of approaches to our lines. During the two days' battle he was constantly in the saddle, leading troops as they arrived to points where their services were required. During the engagement he had one horse shot under him.
The country will have to mourn the loss of many brave men who fell at the battle of Pittsburg, or Shiloh, more properly. The exact loss in killed and wounded will be known in a day or two. At present I can only give it approximately at 1,500 killed and 3,500 wounded.(*)
The loss of artillery was great, many pieces being disabled by the enemy's shots and some losing all their horses and many men. There were probably not less than 200 homes killed.
The loss of the enemy in killed and left upon the field was greater than ours. In wounded the estimate cannot be made, as many of them must have been sent back to Corinth and other points.
The enemy suffered terribly from demoralization and desertion. <ar10_111>
A flag of truce was sent in to-day from General Beauregard. I inclose herewith a copy of the correspondence.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant
 U. S. GRANT, Major-General, Commanding.
 Capt. N.H. McLEAN, A. A. G., Dept. of the Miss., Saint Louis, Mo.
[Inclosures.]
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Monterey, April 8, 1862.
SIR: At the close of the conflict of yesterday, my forces being exhausted by the extraordinary length of time during which they were engaged with yours on that and the preceding day, and it being apparent that you had received and were still receiving re-enforcements, I felt it my duty to withdraw my troops from the immediate scene of conflict.
Under these circumstances, in accordance with usages of war, I shall transmit this under a flag of truce, to ask permission to send a mounted party to the battle-field of Shiloh for the purpose of giving decent interment to my dead.
Certain gentlemen wishing to avail themselves of this opportunity to remove the remains of their sons and friends, I must request for them the privilege of accompanying the burial party, and in this connection I deem it proper to say I am asking only what I have extended to your own countrymen under similar circumstances.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
 G. T. BEAUREGARD, General, Commanding.
 Maj. Gen. U.S. GRANT. U.S.A., Commanding U. S. Forces near Pittsburg, Tenn.
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HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,
Pittsburg, April 9, 1862.
Your dispatch of yesterday is just received. Owing to the warmth of the weather I deemed it advisable to have all the dead of both parties buried immediately. Heavy details were made for this purpose, and now it is accomplished. There cannot, therefore, be any necessity of admitting within our lines the parties you desire to send on the grounds asked.
I shall always be glad to extend any courtesy consistent with duty, and especially so when dictated by humanity.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 U.S. GRANT,  Major-General, Commanding.
 General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. Confederate Army of the Mississippi, Monterey, Tenn.
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GENERAL ORDERS No. 34.
  HDQRS. DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, Pittsburg, April 8, 1862.
The general commanding congratulates the troops who so gallantly maintained, repulsed, and routed a numerically superior force of the enemy, composed of the flower of the Southern Army, commanded by their ablest generals, and fought by them with all the desperation of despair.
In numbers engaged, no such contest ever took place on this continent; <ar10_112>  in importance of results, but few such have taken place in the history of the world.
Whilst congratulating the brave and gallant soldiers, it becomes the duty of the general commanding to make special notice of the bravo wounded and those killed upon the field. Whilst they leave friends and relatives to mourn their loss, they have won a nation's gratitude and undying laurels, not to be forgotten by future generations, who will enjoy the blessings of the best government the sun ever shone upon, preserved by their valor.
By order of Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant:
 JNo. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General.
[ Addenda. ]
Absracts from the field returns of the several divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant commanding.
APRIL 4-5, 1862.
O Officers. A Aggregate. M Men. P Pieces of artillery.

 ----------Present for duty.-------
Command. O M A P Notes by thecompiler.
First Division:     From "statement of effective force" April 5. Pieces of artillery not reported on original.
1st Brigade  125 2,531 2,656 ....
2d Brigade  77 1,769 1,846 ....
3d Brigade  110 2,118 2,228 ....
Unattached  9 289 298 ....
Total First Division. 321 6,707 7,028 ....
Second Division:     Return dated April 5.
1st Brigade  108 1,996 2,104 6
2d Brigade  123 2,603 2,726 6
3d Brigade  180 3,517 3,697 ....
Unattached  8 173 181 12
Total Second Division. 419 8,289 8,708 24
Third Division:     Return dated April 4; the division not in the battle of April 6.
1st Brigade  65 1,933 1,998 ....
2d Brigade  103 2,133 2,236 ....
3d Brigade  111 2,430 2,541 ....
Unattached  35 754 789 12
Total Third Division. 314 7,250 7,564 12
Fourth Division:     Return dated April 5.
1st Brigade 99 2,416 2,515 6
2d Brigade  113 2,698 2,811 4
3d Brigade  87 1,739 1,826 ....
Unattached  7 143 150 ....
Total Fourth Division 306 6,996 7,302 10
Fifth Division:     Return dated April 5.
1st Brigade  79 2,050 2,129 6
2d Brigade  90 1,936 2,026 4
3d Brigade  110 2,331 2,441 ....
4th Brigade  103 2,131 2,234 6
Total Fifth Division 382 8,448 8,830 16
Sixth Division:     Return dated April 5; strength of two regiments and one battery not reported on the original.
1st Brigade  119 2,671 2,790 ....
2d Brigade  85 1,689 1,774 ....
Unattached  41 858 899 ....
Total Sixth Division. 245 5,218 5,463 ....
Grand total 1,987 42,908 44,895 62 Division staff not included in this abstract.
<ar10_113>
APRIL 10-15, 1862.
O Officers. A Aggregate.
M Men.

 ---- Present for duty.---
Command. O M A Notes by thecompiler.
First Division:    From statement April 15 of "effective force."
1st Brigade. 81 1,763 1,844
2d Brigade  55 1,260 1,315
3d Brigade. 75 1,575 1,650
Artillery. 14 230 244
Cavalry. 12 246 258
Total First Division  237 5,074 5,311
Second Division:    Return of April 13.
1st Brigade  42 860 902
2d Brigade  81 1,979 2,060
3d Brigade  100 2,031 2,131
Artillery 18 301 319
Cavalry. 4 186 190
Total Second Division 245 5,357 5,602
Third Division:    Return of April 10: Brigade organization not indicated; casualties noted are 39 killed, 253 wounded, and 1 missing.
Infantry. 226 4,791 5,017
Artillery 11 289 300
Cavalry. 14 263 277
Total Third Division 251 5,343 5,594
Fourth Division:    Return of April 10: The casualties noted are 296 killed, 1,436 wounded,and 144 missing.
1st Brigade. 61 1,715 1,776
2d Brigade  71 1,929 2,000
3d Brigade. 65 1,226 1,291
Artillery. 4 127 131
Cavalry. 36 655 691
Total Fourth Division 237 5,652 5,889
Fifth Division:    Return of Apri110: The casualties noted are 314 killed, 1,242 wounded, and 475 missing.
1st Brigade. 67 1,337 1,404
2d Brigade  74 1,328 1,402
3d Brigade. 66 1,669 1,735
4th Brigade. 82 1,823 1,905
Artillery. 12 303 315
Cavalry. 27 449 476
Total Fifth Division 328 6,909 7,237
Sixth Division:    Return of April 13: the casualties noted are 35 killed, 53 wounded, and 52 missing.
1st Brigade  57 1,666 1,723
2d Brigade  52 1,028 1,080
Unattached  77 1,693 1,770
Total Sixth Division 186 4,387 4,573
Grand total 1,484 32,722 34,206

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, Field of Shiloh, April 15, 1862.
SIR: The rear division of the army under my command, which had been delayed a considerable time in rebuilding the Duck River Bridge, left Columbia on the 3d instant. I left the evening of that day, and arrived at Savannah on the evening of the 5th. General Nelson, with his division, which formed the advance, arrived the same day. The other divisions marched with intervals of about 6 miles. <ar10_292>
On the morning of the 6th the firing of cannon and musketry was heard in the direction of this place. Apprehending that a serious engagement had commenced, I went to General Grant's headquarters to get information as to the best means of reaching the battle-field with the division that had arrived. At the same time orders were dispatched to the divisions in rear to leave their trains and push forward by forced marches. I learned that General Grant had just started, leaving orders for General Nelson to march to the river opposite Pittsburg Landing to be ferried across. On examination of the road up the river I discovered it to be impracticable for artillery, and General Nelson was directed to leave his to be carried forward by steamers.
The impression existed at Savannah that the firing was only an affair of outposts, the same thing having occurred for the two or three previous days; but as it continued I determined to go at once to the scene of action, and accordingly started with my chief of staff, Colonel Fry, on a steamer, which I had ordered to get under steam. As we proceeded up the river groups of soldiers were seen upon the west bank, and it soon became evident that they were stragglers from the army that was engaged. The groups increased in size and frequency, until, as we approached the Landing, they amounted to whole companies, and almost regiments, and at the Landing the banks swarmed with a confused mass of men of various regiments. The number could not have been less than 4,000 or 5,000, and later in the day it became much greater [boldface mine].
Finding General Grant at the Landing I requested him to send steamers to Savannah to bring up General Crittenden's division, which had arrived during the morning, and then went ashore with him.
The throng of disorganized and demoralized troops increased continually by fresh fugitives from the battle, which steadily drew nearer the Landing, and with these were mingled great numbers of teams, all striving to get as near as possible to the river. With few exceptions all efforts to form the troops and move them forward to the fight utterly failed.
In the mean time the enemy had made such progress against our troops that his artillery and musketry began to play into the vital spot of the position, and some persons were killed on the bank at the very Landing. General Nelson arrived with Colonel Ammen's brigade at this opportune moment. It was immediately posted to meet the attack at that point, and, with a battery of artillery which happened to be on the ground and was brought into action, opened fire on the enemy and repulsed him. The action of the gunboats also contributed very much to that result. The attack at that point was not renewed, night having come on, and the firing ceased on both sides.
In the mean time the remainder of General Nelson's division crossed, and General Crittenden's arrived from Savannah by steamers. After examining the ground as well as was possible at night in front of the line on which General Grant's troops had formed and as far to the right as General Sherman's division, I directed Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions to form in front of that line, and move forward as soon as it Was light in the morning. During the night and early the following morning Captain Bartlett's Ohio battery, Captain Mendenhall's regular battery, and Captain Terrill's regular battery, Fifth Artillery, arrived. General McCook arrived at Savannah during the night of the 6th, and reached the field of battle early in the morning of the 7th. I knew that the other divisions could not arrive in time for the action that day. <ar10_293>
The patch of country on which the battles of the 6th and 7th were fought is called Shiloh, from the little church of that name which stands near the center of it. It consists of an undulating table-land, elevated some 80 or 100 feet above the river bottom. Along the Tennessee River to the east it breaks into abrupt ravines, and towards the south, along Lick Creek, which empties into the Tennessee River some 3 miles above Pittsburg Landing, rises into a range of hills of some height, whose slopes are gradual towards the battle-field and somewhat abrupt towards Lick Creek. Owl Creek, rising quite near the source, e of Lick Creek, flows to the northeast around the battle-field into Snake Creek, which empties into the Tennessee River 4 miles below Lick Creek. The drainage is mainly from the Lick Creek Ridge and the table-land into Owl Creek.
Coming from Corinth, the principal road crosses Lick Creek at two points some 12 miles from its mouth, and separates into three or four principal branches, which enter the table-land from the south at a distance of about a mile apart. Generally the face of the country is covered with woods, through which troops can pass without great difficulty, though occasionally the undergrowth is dense. Small farms or cultivated fields of from 20 to 80 acres occur now and then, but as a general thing the country is in forest. My entire ignorance of the various roads and of the character of the country at the time rendered it impossible to anticipate the probable dispositions of the enemy, and the woods were always sufficient to screen his preparatory movements from observation.
Soon after 5 o'clock on the morning of the 7th General Nelson's and General Crittenden's divisions, the only ones yet arrived on the ground, moved promptly forward to meet the enemy. Nelson's division, marching in line of battle, soon came upon his pickets, drove them in, and at about 6 o'clock received the fire of his artillery. The division was here halted and Mendenhall's battery brought into action to reply, while Crittenden's division was being put into position on the right of Nelson's. Bartlett's battery was posted in the center of Crittenden's division in a commanding position, opposite which the enemy was discovered to be formed in force. By this time McCook's division arrived on the ground, and was immediately formed on the right of Crittenden's. Skirmishers were thrown to the front and a strong body of them to guard our left flank, which, though somewhat protected by rough ground, it was supposed the enemy might attempt to turn, and, in fact, did, but was handsomely repulsed, with great loss. Each brigade furnished its own reserve, and in addition Boyle's brigade, from Crittenden's division, though it formed at first in the line, was kept somewhat back when the line advanced, to be used as occasion might require. I found on the ground parts of about two regiments--perhaps 1,000 men--and subsequently a similar fragment came up of General Grant's force. The first I directed to act with General McCook's attack and the second was similarly employed on the left. I saw other straggling troops of General Grant's force immediately on General McCook's right, and some firing had already commenced there. I have no direct knowledge of the disposition of the remainder of General Grant's forces nor is it my province to speak of them. Those that came under my direction in the way I have stated rendered willing and efficient service during the day [boldface mine].
The force under my command occupied a line of about 1½ miles. In front of Nelson's division was an open field, partially screened toward his right by a skirt of woods, which extended beyond the enemy's line, with a thick undergrowth in front of the left brigade of Crittenden's <ar10_294> division; then an open field in front of Crittenden's right and McCook's left, and in front of McCook's right woods again, with a dense undergrowth. The ground, nearly level in front of Nelson, formed a hollow in front of Crittenden, and fell into a small creek or ravine, which empties into Owl Creek, in front of McCook.
What I afterward learned was the Hamburg road (which crosses Lick Creek a mile from its mouth) passed perpendicularly through the line of battle near Nelson's left. On a line slightly oblique to ours, and beyond the open field, the enemy was formed, with a battery in front of Nelson's left, a battery commanding the woods in front of Crittenden's left and flanking the fields in front of Nelson, a battery commanding the same woods and the field in front of Crittenden's right and McCook's left, and a battery in front of McCook's right. A short distance in rear of the enemy's left, on high, open ground, were the encampments of McClernand's and Sherman's divisions, which the enemy held.
While my troops were getting into position on the right the artillery fire was kept up between Mendenhall's battery and the enemy's second battery with some effect. Bartlett's battery was hardly in position before the enemy's third battery opened fire on that part of the line, and when, very soon after our line advanced, with strong bodies of skirmishers in front, the action became general and continued with severity during the greater part of the day and until the enemy was driven from the field.
The obliquity of our line, the left being thrown forward, brought Nelson's division first into action, and it became very hotly engaged at an early hour. A charge of the Nineteenth Brigade from Nelson's right, led by its commander, Colonel Hazen, reached the enemy's second battery, but the brigade sustained a heavy loss from the fire of the enemy's batteries, and was unable to maintain its advantage against the heavy infantry force that came forward to oppose it. The enemy recovered the battery and followed up his momentary advantage by throwing a heavy force of infantry into the woods in front of Crittenden's left.
The left brigade (Col. W. S. Smith) of that division advanced into the woods, repulsed the enemy, and took several prisoners. In the mean time Captain Terrill's battery, Fifth Artillery, which had just landed, reached the field, and was ordered into action near the left, with Nelson's division, which was very heavily pressed by the greater numbers of the enemy. It belonged, properly, to McCook's division. It took position near the Hamburg road, in the open ground in front of the enemy's right, and at once began to act with decided effect upon the tide of battle in that quarter. The enemy's right battery was silenced. Ammen's brigade, which was on the left, advanced in good order upon the enemy's right, but was checked for some time by his endeavor to turn our left flank and by his strong counterattack in front. Captain Terrill, who in the mean time had taken an advanced position, was compelled to retire, leaving one caisson, in which every horse was killed or disabled. It was very soon recovered. Having been re-enforced by a regiment from General Boyle's brigade, Nelson's division again moved forward and forced the enemy to abandon entirely his position. This success flanked the enemy's position at his second and third batteries, from which he was soon driven, with the loss of several pieces of artillery, by the concentrated fire of Terrill's and Mendenhall's batteries and an attack from Crittenden's division in front. The enemy made a second stand some 800 yards in rear of this position and opened fire with his artillery. Mendenhall's battery was thrown <ar10_295> forward, silenced the battery, and it was captured by General Crittenden's division, the enemy retreating from it.
In the mean time the division of General McCook on the right, which became engaged somewhat later in the morning than the divisions on the left, had made steady progress until it drove the enemy's left from the hotly-contested field. The action was commenced in this division by General Rousseau's brigade, which drove the enemy in front of it from his first position and captured a battery. The line of attack of this division caused a considerable widening of the space between it and Crittenden's right. It was also outflanked on its right by the line of the enemy, who made repeated strong attacks on its flanks, but was always gallantly repulsed. The enemy made his last decided stand in front of this division in the woods beyond Sherman's camp.
Two brigades of General Wood's division arrived just at the close of the battle, but only one of them (Colonel Wagner's) in time to participate actively in the pursuit, which it continued for about a mile and until halted by my order. Its skirmishers became engaged for a few minutes with skirmishers (cavalry and infantry) of the enemy's rear guard, which made a momentary stand. It was also fired upon by the enemy's artillery on its right flank, but without effect. It was well-conducted by its commander, and showed great steadiness.
The pursuit was continued no farther that day. I was without cavalry, and the different corps had become a good deal scattered in a pursuit over a country which screened the movements of' the enemy, and the roads of which I knew practically nothing.
In the beginning of the pursuit, thinking it probable the enemy had retired partly by the Hamburg road, I had ordered Nelson's division to follow as far as Lick Creek, on that road, from which, I afterwards learned, the direct Corinth road was separated by a difficult ravine which empties into Lick Creek. I therefore occupied myself with examining the ground and getting the different divisions into position, which was not effected until some time after dark.
The following morning, in pursuance of the directions of General Grant, General Wood was sent forward with two of his brigades and a battery of artillery to discover the position of the enemy, and press him if he should be found in retreat. General Sherman, with about the same force from General Grant's army, was on the same service, and had a spirited skirmish with the enemy's cavalry, driving it back. The main force was found to have retreated beyond Lick Creek, and our troops returned at night.
The loss of the forces under my command is 263 killed, 1,816 wounded, 88 missing; total, 2,167.(*) The trophies are twenty pieces of artillery, a greater number of caissons, and a considerable number of small-arms. Many of the cannon were recaptured from the loss of the previous day. Several stand of colors were also recaptured.
There were no idlers in the battle of the 7th. Every portion of the army did its work. The batteries of Captains Terrill and Mendenhall were splendidly handled and served; that of Captain Bartlett was served with great spirit and gallantry, though with less decisive re-salts.
I specially commend to the favor of the Government, for their distinguished gallantry and good conduct Brig. Gen. A. McD. McCook, commanding Second Division` Brig. Gen. William Nelson, commanding Fourth Division; Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, commanding <ar10_296> Fifth Division; Brig. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau, commanding Fourth Brigade; Brig. Gen. J. T. Boyle, commanding Eleventh Brigade; Col. J. Ammen, Twenty-fourth Ohio, commanding Tenth Brigade; Col. W. S. Smith, Thirteenth Ohio, commanding Fourteenth Brigade; Col. E. N. Kirk, Thirty-fourth Illinois, commanding Fifth Brigade; Col. W.H. Gibson, Forty-ninth Ohio, temporarily commanding Sixth Brigade; Capt. W. R. Terrill, Fifth Artillery; Capt. John Mendenhall, Fourth Artillery; Capt. Joseph Bartlett, Ohio Volunteer Battery. For the many other officers who won honorable distinction I refer to the reports of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders, transmitted herewith, as also for more detailed information of the services of the different corps. I join cordially in the commendations bestowed by those officers on those under their command. The gallantry of many of them came under my personal observation.
The members of my staff, Col. James B. Fry, chief of staff; Capt. J. M. Wright, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. C. L. Fitzhugh, Fourth Artillery, aide-de-camp; Lieut. A. F. Rockwell, New York Chasseurs, aide-de-camp; Lieut. T. J. Bush, Twenty-fourth Kentucky, aide-de-camp; Capt. J. H. Gilman, Nineteenth Infantry, inspector of artillery; Capt. E. Gay, Sixteenth Infantry, inspector of cavalry; Capt. H. C. Bankhead, Fifth Infantry, inspector of infantry; and Capt. Nathaniel Michler, Topographical Engineers, were distinguished for gallant bearing throughout the battle, and rendered valuable service. The gallant deportment of my orderlies, Privates A. J. Williamson, Fourth Cavalry, and N.M. Smith, J. R. Hewitt, J. A. Stevenson, and V. B. Hummel, of the Anderson Troop, also deserves to be mentioned. I am particularly indebted to Colonel Fry, chief of staff, for valuable assistance in the battle, as well as for the ability and industry with which he has at all times performed the important duties of his position. Surgeon Murray, medical director, always assiduous in the discharge of his duties, was actively engaged on the field in taking the best care of the wounded the circumstances admitted of. Capt. A. C. Gillem, assistant quartermaster, is entitled to great credit for his energy and industry in providing transportation for the troops from Savannah. Lieut. Col. James Oakes, Fourth Cavalry, inspector of cavalry, and Capt. C. C. Gilbert, First Infantry, acting inspector-general, who have rendered zealous and valuable service in their positions, were detained at Savannah, and unable to be present in the action.
The troops which did not arrive in time for the battle, General Thomas' and part of General Wood's divisions (a portion of the latter, as I have previously stated, took part in the pursuit, and the remainder arrived in the evening), are entitled to the highest praise for the untiring energy with which they pressed forward night and day to share the dangers of their comrades. One of those divisions (General Thomas') had already under his command made its name honorable by one of the most memorable victories of the war--Mill Springs--on which the tide of success seemed to turn steadily in favor of the Union [boldface mine].
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, D. C. BUELL, Major-General, Commanding.
 Capt. N. H. McLEAN, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Mississippi.
<ar10_297>
O Officers. A Aggregate
M Enlisted Men.

 --Killed-- -Wounded- Missing.

Command.	O	M	O	M	O	M	A
Second	6	87	33	771	....	9	906
Fourth	6	84	33	558	....	58	739
Fifth	9	71	21	396	....	21	518
Sixth	....	....	....	4	....	....	4
Total(*)	21	242	87	1,729	....	88	2,167

-----
GENERAL ORDERS No. 6.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, Field of Shiloh, Tenn., April 8, 1862.
The general congratulates the army under his command on the imperishable honor which they won yesterday on the battle-field of Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing. The alacrity and zeal with which they pressed forward by forced marches to the succor of their comrades of a sister army imperiled by the attack of an overwhelming force; the gallantry with which they assaulted the enemy, and the persevering courage with which they maintained an incessant conflict against superior numbers from 6 o'clock in the morning until evening, when the enemy was driven from the field, are incidents which point to a great service nobly performed.
The general reminds his troops again that such results are not attained by individual prowess alone; that subordination and careful training are essential to the efficiency of every army, and that the success which has given them a brilliant page in history is greatly due to the readiness with which they have seconded the labors of their division, brigade, and regimental commanders, who first disciplined them in camp and then led them judiciously and gallantly in battle [boldface mine].
By command of Major-General Buell:
 JAMES B. FRY, Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.

-----------------------------------------------

4. William T. Sherman
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME X/1 [S# 10] April 6-7, 1862..--Battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, Tenn.
No. 65. -- Report of Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman, U.S. Army, commanding Fifth Division.

[ar10_248 con't]
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, Camp Sinloh, April 10, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor to report that on Friday, the 4th instant, the enemy's cavalry drove in our pickets posted about a mile and a half in advance of my center, on the main Corinth road, capturing 1 first lieutenant and 7 men; that I caused a pursuit by the cavalry of my division, driving them back about 5 miles and killing many.
On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down to our front, yet I did not believe that he designed anything but a strong demonstration.
On Sunday morning early, the 6th instant, the enemy drove our advance guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms my division, and sent word to General McClernand asking him to support my left; to General Prentiss, giving him notice that the enemy was in our front in force, and to General Hurlbut, asking him to support General Prentiss. At that time (7 a.m.) my division was arranged as follows: First Brigade, composed of the Sixth Iowa, Col. J. A. McDowell; Fortieth Illinois, Colonel Hicks; Forty-sixth Ohio, Colonel Worthington, and the Morton Battery, Captain Behr, on the extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl Creek. Second Brigade, composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, Col. D. Stuart; Fifty-fourth Ohio, Col. T. Kilby Smith, and the Seventy-first Ohio, Colonel Mason, on the extreme left, guarding the ford over Lick Creek. Third Brigade, composed of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, Colonel Hildebrand; Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel Appler, and the Fifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Mungen, on the left of the Corinth road, its right resting on Shiloh Meeting-House. Fourth Brigade, composed of the Seventy-second Ohio, Colonel Buck-land; Forty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Sullivan, and Seventieth Ohio, Colonel Cockerill, on the right of the Corinth road, its left resting on Shiloh Meeting-House. Two batteries of artillery (Taylor's and Waterhouse's) <ar10_249> were posted, the former at Shiloh and the latter on a ridge to the left, with a front fire over open ground between Mungen's and Appler's regiments. The cavalry, eight companies of the Fourth Illinois, under Colonel Dickey, was posted in a large open field to the left and rear of Shiloh Meeting-house, which I regarded as the center of my position.
Shortly after 7 a.m., with my entire staff, I rode along a portion of our front, and when in the open field before Appler's regiment the enemy's pickets opened a brisk fire on my party, killing my orderly, Thomas D. Holliday, of Company H, Second Illinois Cavalry. The fire came from the bushes which line a small stream that rises in the field in front of Appler's camp and flows to the north along my whole front. This valley afforded the enemy a partial cover, but our men were so posted as to have a good fire at him as he crossed the valley and ascended the rising ground on our side.
About 8 a.m. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp. All the regiments of my division were then in line of battle at their proper posts. I rode to Colonel Appler and ordered him to hold his ground at all hazards, as he held the left flank of our first line of battle. I informed him that he had a good battery on his right and strong supports to his rear. General McClernand had promptly responded to my request, and had sent me three regiments, which were posted to protect Waterhouse's battery and the left flank of my line. The battle began by the enemy opening a battery in the woods to our front and throwing shells into our camp. Taylor's and Waterhouse's batteries promptly responded, and I then observed heavy battalions of infantry passing obliquely to the left across the open field in Appler's front; also other columns advancing directly upon my division. Our infantry and artillery opened along the whole line and the battle became general. Other heavy masses of the enemy's forces kept passing across the field to our left and directing their course on General Prentiss. I saw at once that the enemy designed to pass my left flank and fall upon Generals McClernand and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the Tennessee River and about 2 miles back from it. Very soon the sound of musketry and artillery announced that General Prentiss was engaged, and about 9 a.m. I judged that he was falling back. About this time Appler's regiment broke in disorder, soon followed by fugitives from Mungen's regiment, and the enemy pressed forward on Waterhouse's battery, thereby exposed.
The three Illinois regiments in immediate support of this battery stood for some time, but the enemy's advance was so vigorous and the fire so severe, that when Colonel Raith, of the Forty-third Illinois, received a severe wound and fell from his horse, his regiment and the others manifested disorder, and the enemy got possession of three guns of this (Waterhouse's) battery. Although our left was thus turned and the enemy was pressing on the whole line, I deemed Shiloh so important that I remained by it, and renewed my orders to Co1onels McDowell and Buckland to hold their ground, and we did hold those positions till about 10 o'clock a.m., when the enemy got his artillery to the rear of our left flank, and some change became absolutely necessary.
Two regiments of Hildebrand's brigade--Appler's and Mungen's---had already disappeared to the rear, and Hildebrand's own regiment was in <ar10_250>  disorder, and therefore I gave directions for Taylor's battery, still at Shiloh, to fall back as far as the Prude and Hamburg road and for McDonnell and Buckled to adopt that road as their new line. I rode across the angle and met Beer’s battery at the cross-roads, and ordered it immediately to unlimber and come into battery, action right. Captain Beer gave the order, but he was almost immediately shot from his home, when the drivers and gunners fled in disorder, carrying off the caissons and abandoning five out of six guns without firing a shot. The enemy pressed on, gaining this battery, and we were again forced to choose a new line of defense. Hildebrand's brigade had substantially disappeared from the field, though he himself bravely remained. McDowell's and Buckland's brigades still retained their organization, and were conducted by my aides so as to join on General McClernand's right, thus abandoning my original camps and line, This was about 10.30 a.m., at which time the enemy had made a furious attack on General McClernand's whole front. Finding him pressed, I moved McDowell's brigade directly against the left flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the men to avail themselves of every cover--trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valley to our right. We held this position for four long hours, sometimes gaining and at other times losing ground General McClernand and myself acting in perfect concert and struggling to maintain this line.
Winlewe were so hardly pressed two Iowa regiments approached from the rear, but could not be brought up to the severe fire that was raging in our front, and General Grant, who visited us on that ground, will remember our situation about 3 p.m.; but about 4 p.m. it was evident that Hurlbut's line had been driven back to the river, and knowing that General Wallace was coming from Crump's Landing with re-enforcements, General McClernand and I, on consultation, selected a new line of defense, with its right covering the bridge by which General Wallace had to approach. We fell back as well as we could, gathering, in addition to our own, such scattered forces as we could find, and formed a new line. During this change the enemy's cavalry charged us, but was handsomely repulsed by an Illinois regiment, whose number I did not learn at that time or since. The Fifth Ohio Battery, which had come up, rendered good service in holding the enemy in check for some time; and Major Taylor also came up with a new battery, and got into position just in time to get a good flanking fire upon the enemy's columns as he pressed on General McClernand's right, checking his advance, when General McClernand's division made a fine charge on the enemy, and drove him back into the ravines to our front and right. I had a clear field about 200 yards wide in my immediate front, and contented myself' with keeping the enemy's infantry at that distance during the rest of the day.
In this position we rested for the night. My command had become decidedly of a mixed character. Buckland's brigade was the only one with me that retained its organization. Colonel Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not. Colonel McDowell had been severely injured by a fall from his horse and had gone to the river, and the three regiments of his brigade were not in line. The Thirteenth Missouri, Col. Crafts J. Wright, had reported to me on the field and fought well, retaining its regimental organization, and it formed a part of my line during Sunday night and all of Monday; other fragments of regiments and companies had also fallen into my division, and acted with it during the remainder of the battle. General Grant and Buell visited me in our bivouac that evening, and from them I learned the <ar10_251> situation of affairs on the other parts of the field. General Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing shortly after dark, and formed his line to my right and rear. It rained hard during the night, but our men were in good spirits and lay on their arms, being satisfied with such bread and meat as could be gathered from the neighboring camps, and determined to redeem on Monday the losses of Sunday.
At daylight on Monday I received General Grant's orders to advance and recapture our original camps. I dispatched several members of my staff to bring up all the men they could find, and especially the brigade of Colonel Stuart, which had been separated from the division all the day before, and at the appointed time the division, or rather what remained of it, with the Thirteenth Missouri and other fragments, marched forward and reoccupied the ground on the extreme right of General McClernand's camp, where we attracted the fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell's former headquarters. Here I remained, patiently waiting for the sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road. About 10 a.m. the heavy firing in that direction and its steady approach satisfied me, and General Wallace being on our right flank with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my column to General McClernand's right, formed line of battle facing south, with Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge and Stuart's brigade on its right in the wood, and thus advanced slowly and steadily, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. Taylor had just got to me from the rear, where he had gone for ammunition, and brought up three guns, which I ordered into position, to advance by hand, firing. These guns belonged to Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, commanded by Lieut. P. P. Wood, and did most excellent service. Under cover of their fire we advanced till we reached the point where the Corinth road crosses the line of McClernand's camps, and here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less-disciplined forces [boldface mine]. Here I saw Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry fire I ever heard, which lasted some twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back. This green point of timber is about 500 yards east of Shiloh Meeting-House, and it was evident that here was to be the struggle. The enemy could also be seen forming his lines to the south, and General McClernand sending to me for artillery, I detached to him the three guns of Lieutenant Wood's battery, and seeing some others to the rear, I sent one of my staff to bring them forward, when, by almost Providential decree, they proved to be two 24-pounder howitzers, belonging to McAllister's battery, served as well as ever guns could be. This was about 2 o'clock p.m.
The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh and another near the Hamburg road, both pouring grape and canister upon any column of troops that advanced toward the green point of water-oaks. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed, and entered this dreaded woods. I ordered my Second Brigade, then commanded by Col. T. Kilby Smith, (Colonel Stuart being wounded), to from on its right, and my Fourth Brigade, Colonel Buckland, on its right, all to advance abreast with this Kentucky brigade before mentioned, which I afterwards found to be Rousseau's brigade of McCook's division. I gave personal direction to (he 24-pounder guns, whose well-directed fire first silenced the <ar10_252> enemy's guns to the left, and afterwards at the Shiloh Meeting-House. Rousseau's brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front, sweeping everything before it, and at 4 p.m. we stood upon the ground of our original front line and the enemy was in full retreat. I directed my several brigades to resume at once their original camps. Several times during the battle cartridges gave out, but General Grant had thoughtfully kept a supply coming from the rear. When I appealed to regiments to stand fast, although out of cartridges, I did so because to retire a regiment for any cause has a bad effect on others. I commend the Fortieth Illinois and Thirteenth Missouri for thus holding their ground under a heavy fire, although their cartridge boxes were empty.
I am ordered by General Grant to give personal credit where it is due and censure where I think it merited. I concede that General McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great central line of this battle. There Beauregard commanded in person, supported by Bragg's, Johnston's, and Breckinridge's divisions. I think Johnston was killed by exposing himself in front of his troops at the time of their attack on Buckland's brigade on Sunday morning, although in this I may be mistaken.
My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, nearly all having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. None of them had ever been under fire or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them as they did on us last Sunday. They knew nothing of the value of combination and organization. When individual fears seized them the first impulse was to get away. To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops would be wrong. My Third Brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where they were during Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. Colonel Hildebrand, its commander, was as cool as any man I ever saw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold men to their places than he did. He kept his own regiment, with individual exceptions, in hand an hour after Appler's and Mungen's regiments had left their proper field of action. Colonel Buckland managed his brigade well. I commend him to your notice as a cool, judicious, intelligent gentleman, needing only confidence and experience to make a good commander. His subordinates, Colonels Sullivan and Cockerill, behaved with great gallantry, the former receiving a severe wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holding his regiment well in hand all day, and on Monday, till his right arm was broken by a shot. Colonel Cockerill held a larger portion of his men than any colonel in my division, and was with me from first to last. Col. J. A. McDowell, commanding the First Brigade, held his ground on Sunday till I ordered him to fall back, which he did in line of battle, and when ordered he conducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style. In falling back to the next position he was thrown from his horse and injured, and his brigade was not in position on Monday morning. His subordinates. Colonels Hicks and Worthington, displayed great personal courage. Colonel Hicks led his regiment in the attack of Sunday, and received a wound which is feared may prove mortal. He is a brave and gallant gentleman, and deserves well of his country. Lieutenant-Colonel Walcutt, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, was wounded on Sunday, and has been disabled ever since.
My Second Brigade, Colonel Stuart, was detached near 2 miles from my headquarters. He had to fight his own battle on Sunday, as the enemy interposed between him and General Prentiss early in the day. <ar10_253>
Colonel Stuart was wounded severely, and yet reported for duty on Monday morning, but was compelled to leave during the day, when the command devolved on Col. T. Kilby Smith, Fifty-fourth Ohio, who was always in the thickest of the fight and led the brigade handsomely. I have not yet received Colonel Stuart's report of the operations of his brigade during the time he was detached, and must therefore forbear to mention names. Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, of the Seventy-first, was mortally wounded on Sunday, but the regiment itself I did not see, as only a small fragment of it was with the brigade when it joined the division on Monday morning. Great credit is due the fragments of men of the disordered regiments who kept in the advance. I observed and noticed them, but until the brigadiers and colonels make their reports I cannot venture to name individuals, but will in due season notice all who kept in our front line, as well as those who preferred to keep back near the steamboat landing.
I will also send a full list of the killed, wounded, and missing, by name, rank, company, and regiment. At present I submit the result in figures :(*)

O Officers. A Aggregate
M Enlisted Men.

 --Killed-- -Wounded- Missing.
Command. O M O M O M A
First Brigade:
40th Illinois 1 42 7 148 .... 2 ....
6th Iowa 2 49 3 117 .... 39 ....
46th Ohio 2 32 3 147 .... 52 ....
Morton Battery 1 .... .... .... .... .... ....
Total First Brigade 6 123 13 412 .... 93 647
Second Brigade
55th Illinois 1 45 8 183 .... 41 ....
54th Ohio 2 22 5 128 .... 32 ....
71st Ohio 1 12 .... 52 1 45 ....
Total Second Brigade 4 79 13 363 1 118 578
Third Brigade
53d Ohio .... 7 .... 39 .... 5 ....
57th Ohio 2 7 .... 82 .... 33 ....
77th Ohio 1 48 7 107 3 53 ....
Total Third Brigade 3 62 7 228 3 91 394
Fourth Brigade
48th Ohio 1 13 3 70 1 45 ....
70th Ohio .... 9 1 53 1 39 ....
72d Ohio 2 13 5 85 .... 49 ....
Total Fourth Brigade 3 35 9 208 2 133 390
Barrett's battery .... 1 .... 5 .... .... 6
Taylor's battery (no report) .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Waterhouse's battery .... 1 3 14 .... .... 18
Orderly .... 1 .... .... .... .... 1
Grand Total 16 302 45 1,230 6 435 2,034
----------
The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday we recovered seven guns---not the identical guns we had lost, but enough in numbers to balance-the account. At the time of recovering our camps our men were so fatigued that we could not follow the retreating <ar10_254> masses of the enemy, but the following day we followed up with Buckland's and Hildebrand's brigades for 6 miles, the result of which I have already reported.(*)
Of my personal staff I can only speak with praise and thanks. I think they smelt as much gunpowder and heard as many cannon-balls and bullets as must satisfy their ambition. Captain Hammond, my chief of staff, though in feeble health, was very active in rallying broken troops, encouraging the steadfast, and aiding to form the lines of defense and attack. I recommend him to your notice. Major Sanger's intelligence, quick perception, and rapid execution were of very great value to me, especially in bringing into line the batteries that co-operated so efficiently in our movements. Captains McCoy and Dayton, aides-de-camp, were with me all the time, and acting with coolness, spirit, and courage. To Surgeon Hartshorn and Dr. L'Homroedieu hundreds of wounded men are indebted for kind and excellent treatment received on the field of battle and in the various temporary hospitals created along the line of our operations. They worked day and night, and did not rest till all the wounded of our own troops, as well as of the enemy, were in safe and comfortable shelter. To Major Taylor, chief of artillery, I feel under deep obligations for his good sense and judgment in managing the batteries, on which so much depended. I inclose his report and indorse his recommendations. The cavalry of my command kept to the rear and took little part in the action, but it would have been madness to have exposed horses to the musketry-fire under which we were compelled to remain from Sunday at 8 a.m. till Monday at 4 p.m. Captain Kossak, of the Engineers, was with me all the time, and was of great assistance. I inclose his sketch of the battle-field,(+) which is the best I have seen, and will enable you to see the various positions occupied by my division, as well as of the others that participated in the battle. I will also send in during the day the detailed reports of my brigadiers and colonels, and will indorse them with such remarks as I deem proper.
I am, with very much respect, your obedient servant,
 W. T. SHERMAN,  Brigadier-General, Commanding Fifth Division.
 Capt. JOHN A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Grant.

[ar10_384 con't]
BATTLE-FIELD OF SHILOH, MISS., April 6,
Via Corinth, Miss., via Chattanooga, Tenn.,  April 7, 1862.
We this morning attacked the enemy in strong position in front of Pittsburg, and after a severe battle of ten hours, thanks be to the Almighty, gained a complete victory, driving the enemy from every position. Loss on both sides heavy, including our commander-in-chief, General A. S. Johnston, who fell gallantly leading his troops into the thickest of the fight.
G. T. BEAUREGARD, General, Commanding.
General S. COOPER,  Assistant Adjutant-General.
<ar10_385>
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Corinth, Miss, April 11, 1862.
GENERAL: On the 2d ultimo, having ascertained conclusively, from the movements of' the enemy on the Tennessee River and from reliable sources of information, that his aim would be to cut off my communications in West Tennessee with the Eastern and Southern States, by operating from the Tennessee River, between Crump's Landing and Eastport, as a base, I determined to foil his designs by concentrating all my available forces at and around Corinth.
Meanwhile, having called on the Governors of the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana to furnish additional troops, some of them (chiefly regiments from Louisiana) soon reached this vicinity, and with two divisions of General Polk's command from Columbus, and a fine corps of troops from Mobile and Pensacola, under Major-General Bragg, constituted the Army of the Mississippi. At the same time General Johnston, being at Murfreesborough, on the march to form a junction of his forces with mine, was called on to send at least a brigade by railroad, so that we might fall on and crush the enemy, should he attempt an advance from under his gunboats.
The call on General Johnston was promptly complied with. His entire force was also hastened in this direction, and by April 1 our united forces were concentrated along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Bethel to Corinth and on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Corinth to Inka.
It was then determined to assume the offensive, and strike a sudden blow at the enemy, in position under General Grant on the west bank of the Tennessee, at Pittsburg, and in the direction of Savannah, before he was re-enforced by the army under General Buell, then known to be advancing for that purpose by rapid marches from Nashville via Columbia. About the same time General Johnston was advised that such an operation conformed to the expectations of the President.
By a rapid and vigorous attack on General Grant it was expected he would be beaten back into his transports and the river, or captured, in time to enable us to profit by the victory, and remove to the rear all the stores and munitions that would fall into our hands in such an event before the arrival of General Buell's army on the scene. It was never contemplated, however, to retain the position thus gained and abandon Corinth, the strategic point of the campaign:
Want of general officers needful for the proper organization of divisions and brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together and other difficulties in the way of an effective organization delayed the movement until the night of the 2d instant, when it was heard, from a reliable quarter, that the junction of the enemy's armies was near at hand. It was then, at a late hour, determined that the attack should be attempted at once, incomplete and imperfect as were our preparations for such a grave and momentous adventure. Accordingly, that night at 1 a.m. the preliminary orders to the commanders of corps were issued for the movement.
On the following morning the detailed orders of movement, a copy of which is herewith, marked A, were issued, and the movement, after some delay, commenced, the troops being in admirable spirits. It was expected we should be able to reach the enemy's lines in time to attack him early on the 5th instant. The men, however, for the most part, were unused to marching, and the roads, narrow and traversing a densely-wooded country, became almost impassable after a severe rainstorm «25 R R— VOL X» <ar10_386> on the night of the 4th, which drenched the troops in bivouac; hence our forces did not reach the intersection of the roads from Pittsburg and Hamburg, in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, until late Saturday afternoon.
It was then decided that the attack should be made on the next morning, at the earliest hour practicable, in accordance with the orders of movement; that is, in three lines of battle, the first and second extending from Owl Creek, on the left, to Lick Creek, on the right, a distance of about 3 miles, supported by the third and the reserve. The first line, under Major-General Hardee, was constituted of his corps, augmented on his right by Gladdens brigade, of Major-General Bragg's corps, deployed in line of battle, with their respective artillery following immediately by the main road to Pittsburg and the cavalry in rear of the wings. The second line, composed of the other troops of Bragg's corps, followed the first at a distance of 500 yards in the same order as the first. The army corps under General Polka followed the second line, at a distance of about 800 yards, in lines of brigades deployed, with their batteries in rear of each brigade, moving by the Pittsburg road, the left wing supported by cavalry. The reserve, under Brigadier-General Breckinridge, followed closely the third line in the same order, its right wing supported by cavalry.
These two corps constituted the reserve, and were to support the front lines of battle, by being deployed, when required, on the right and left of the Pittsburg road, or otherwise act according to the exigencies of the battle.
At 5 a.m. on the 6th instant, a reconnoitering party of the enemy having become engaged with our advance pickets [boldface mine], the commander of the forces gave orders to begin the movement and attack as determined upon, except that Trabue's brigade, of Breckinridge's division, was detached and advanced to support the left of Bragg's corps and line of battle when menaced by the enemy, and the other two brigades were directed to advance by the road to Hamburg to support Bragg's right; and at the same time Maney's regiment, of Polk's corps, was advanced by the same road to re-enforce the regiment of cavalry and battery of four pieces already thrown forward to watch and guard Greer's, Tanner's, and Borland's Fords, on Lick Creek.
At 5.30 a.m. our lines and columns were in motion, all animated, evidently, by a promising spirit. The front line was engaged at once but advanced steadily, followed in due order, with equal resolution and steadiness, by the other lines, which were brought successively into action with rare skill, judgment, and gallantry by the several corps commanders as the enemy made a stand, with his masses rallied for the struggle for his encampments.
Like an Alpine avalanche our troops moved forward, despite the determined resistance of the enemy, until after 6 p.m., when we were in possession of all his encampments between Owl and Lick Creeks but one; nearly all of his field artillery; about 30 flags, colors, and standards; over 3,000 prisoners, including a division commander (General Prentiss), and several brigade commanders; thousands of small-arms; an immense supply of subsistence, forage, and munitions of war, and a large amount of means of transportation— all the substantial fruits of a complete victory, such, indeed, as rarely have followed the most successful battles; for never was an army so well provided as that of our enemy.
The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the shelter of the heavy guns of <ar10_387> his ironclad gunboats, and we remained undisputed masters of his well-selected, admirably-provided cantonments, after ever twelve hours of obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from them and the contiguous covert, but only by a sustained onset of all the men we could bring into action.
Our loss was heavy, as will appear from the accompanying return, marked B. Our commander-in-chief, General A. S. Johnston, fell mortally wounded, and died on the field at 2.30 p.m., after having shown the highest qualities of the commander and a personal intrepidity that inspired all around him and gave resistless impulsion to his columns at critical moments.
The chief command then devolved upon me, though at the time I was greatly prostrated and suffering from the prolonged sickness with which I had been afflicted since early in February. The responsibility was one which in my physical condition I would have gladly avoided, though cast upon me when our forces were successfully pushing the enemy back upon the Tennessee River, and though supported on the immediate field by such corps commanders as Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, and Brigadier-General Breckinridge, commanding the reserve.
It was after 6 p.m., as before said, when the enemy's last position was carried, and his forces finally broke and sought refuge behind a commanding eminence covering the Pittsburg Landing, not more than half a mile distant, and under the guns of the gunboats, which opened on our eager columns a fierce and annoying fire with shot and shell of the heaviest description.
Darkness was close at hand' officers and men were exhausted by a combat of over twelve hours without food, and jaded by the march of the preceding day through mud and water. It was, therefore, impossible to collect the rich and opportune spoils of war scattered broadcast on the field left in our possession, and impracticable to make any effective dispositions for their removal to the rear.
I accordingly established my headquarters at the church of Shiloh, in the enemy's encampments, with Major-General Bragg, and directed our troops to sleep on their arms in such positions in advance and rear as corps commanders should determine, hoping, from news received by a special dispatch, that delays had been encountered by General Buell in his march from Columbia, and that his main force, therefore, could not reach the field of battle in time to save General Grant's shattered fugitive forces from capture or destruction on the following day.
During the night the rain fell in torrents, adding to the discomforts and harassed condition of the men. The enemy, moreover, had broken their rest by a discharge at measured intervals of heavy shells thrown from the gunboats; therefore on the following morning the troops under my command were not in condition to cope with an equal force of fresh troops, armed and equipped like our adversary, in the immediate possession of his depots and sheltered by such an auxiliary as the enemy's gunboats.
About 6 o'clock on the morning of April 7, however, a hot fire of musketry and artillery, opened from the enemy's quarter on our advanced line, assured me of the junction of his forces, and soon the battle raged with a fury which satisfied me I was attacked by a largely superior force. But from the outset our troops, notwithstanding their fatigue and losses from the battle of the day before, exhibited the most cheering, veteran-like steadiness. On the right and center the enemy was repulsed in every attempt he made with his heavy columns in that <ar10_388> quarter of the field. On the left, however, and nearest to the point of arrival of his re-enforcements, he drove forward line after line of his fresh troops, which were met with a resolution and courage of which our country may be proudly hopeful. Again and again our troops were brought to the charge, invariably to win the position in issue, invariably to drive back their foe. But hour by hour, thus opposed to an enemy constantly re-enforced, our ranks were perceptibly thinned under the unceasing, withering fire of the enemy, and by 12 m. eighteen hours of hard fighting had sensibly exhausted a large number.
My last reserves had necessarily been disposed of, and the enemy was evidently receiving fresh re-enforcements after each repulse; accordingly about I p.m. I determined to withdraw from so unequal a conflict, securing such of the results of the victory of the day before as was then practicable.
Officers of my staff were immediately dispatched with the necessary orders to make the best dispositions for a deliberate, orderly withdrawal from the field, and to collect and post a reserve to meet the enemy, should he attempt to push after us.
In this connection I will mention particularly my adjutant-general Colonel Jordan, who was of much assistance to me on this occasion, as he had already been on the field of battle on that and the preceding day.
About 2 p.m. the lines in advance, which had repulsed the enemy in their last fierce assault on our left and center, received the orders to retire. This was done with uncommon steadiness and the enemy made no attempt to follow.
The line of troops established to cover this movement had been disposed on a favorable ridge commanding the ground of Shiloh Church. From this position our artillery played upon the woods beyond for a while, but upon no visible enemy and without reply. Soon satisfied that no serious pursuit would be attempted this last line was withdrawn, and never did troops leave a battle-field in better order; even the stragglers fell into the ranks and marched off with those who had stood more steadily by their colors.
A second strong position was taken up about a mile in rear, where the approach of the enemy was awaited for nearly an hour, but no effort to follow was made, and only a small detachment of horsemen could be seen at a distance from this last position, warily observing our movements.
Arranging through my staff officers for the completion of the movements thus begun, Brigadier-General Breckinridge was left with his command as a rear guard to hold the ground we had occupied the night preceding the first battle, just in front of the intersection of the Pittsburg and Hamburg roads, about 4 miles from the former place, while the rest of the army passed to the rear in excellent order.
On the following day General Breckinridge fell back about 3 miles, to Mickey's, which position we continued to hold, with our cavalry thrown considerably forward in immediate proximity to the battlefield.
Unfortunately, toward night of the 7th instant it began to rain heavily. This continued throughout the night; the roads became almost impassable in many places, and much hardship and suffering now ensued before all the regiments reached their encampments; but, despite the heavy casualties of the two eventful days of April 6 and 7, this army is more confident of ultimate success than before its encounter with the enemy. <ar10_389>
To Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, commanding corps, and to Brigadier-General Breckinridge, commanding the reserve, the country is greatly indebted for the zeal, intelligence, and energy with which all orders were executed; for the foresight and military ability they displayed in the absence of instructions in the many exigencies of the battle on a field so densely wooded and broken, and for their fearless deportment as they repeatedly led their commands personally to the onset upon their powerful adversary. It was under these circumstances that General Bragg had two horses shot under him; that Major-General Hardee was slightly wounded, his coat rent by balls, and his horse disabled, and that Brigadier-General Breckinridge was twice struck by spent balls.
For the services of their gallant subordinate commanders and of other officers, as well as for the details of the battle-field, I must refer to the reports of corps, division, and brigade commanders, which shall be forwarded as soon as received.
To give more in detail the operations of the two battles resulting from the movement on Pittsburg than now attempted must have delayed this report for weeks and interfered materially with the important duties of my position. But I may be permitted to say that not only did the obstinate conflict for twelve hours on Sunday leave the Confederate Army masters of the battle-field and our adversary beaten, but we left that field on the next day only after eight hours' incessant battle with a superior army of fresh troops, whom we had repulsed in every attack on our lines— so repulsed and crippled, indeed, as to leave it unable to take the field for the campaign for which it was collected and equipped at such enormous expense and with such profusion of all the appliances of war.
These successful results were not achieved, however, as before said, without severe loss— -a loss not to be measured by the number of the slain or wounded, but by the high social and personal worth of so large a number of those who were killed or disabled, including the commander of the forces, whose high qualities will be greatly missed in the momentous campaign impending.
I deeply regret to record also the death of the Hon. George W. Johnson, Provisional Governor of Kentucky, who went into action with the Kentucky troops, and continually inspired them by his words and example. Having his horse shot under him on Sunday, he entered the ranks of a Kentucky regiment on Monday, and fell mortally wounded toward the close of the day. Not his State alone, but the whole Confederacy, has sustained a great loss in the death of this brave, upright, and able man.
Another gallant and able soldier and captain was lost to the service of the country when Brigadier-General Gladden, commanding the First Brigade, Withers' division, Second Army Corps, died from a severe wound received on the 6th instant, after having been conspicuous to his whole corps and the army for courage and capacity.
Major-General Cheatham, commanding First Division, First Corps, was slightly wounded and had three horses shot under him.
Brigadier-General Clark, commanding Second Division, of the First Corps, received a severe wound also on the first day, which will deprive the army of his valuable services for some time.
Brigadier-General Hindman, engaged in the outset of the battle, was conspicuous for a cool courage, efficiently employed in leading his men ever in the thickest of the fray, until his horse was shot under him and <ar10_390> he was unfortunately so severely injured by the fall that the army was deprived on the following day of his chivalrous example.
Brig. Gens. B. R. Johnson and Bowen, most meritorious officers, were also severely wounded in the first combat, but it is hoped will soon be able to return to duty with their brigades.
To mention the many field officers who died or were wounded while gallantly leading their commands into action and the many brilliant instances of individual courage displayed by officers and men in the twenty hours of battle is impossible at this time, but their names will be duly made known to their countrymen.
The immediate staff of the lamented commander-in-chief, who accompanied him to the field, rendered efficient service, and, either by his side or in carrying his orders, shared his exposure to the casualties of the well-contested battle-field. I beg to commend their names to the notice of the War Department, namely: Capts. H. P. Brewster and N. Wickliffe, of the adjutant and inspector general's department; Capt. Theodore O'Hara, acting inspector-general; Lieuts. George Baylot and Thomas M. Jack, aides-de-camp. Volunteer aides-de-camp Col. William Preston, Maj. D. M. Hayden, E. W. Munford, and Calhoun Benham. Maj. Alb. J. Smith and Captain Wickham, of the quartermaster's department.
To these gentlemen was assigned the last sad duty of accompanying the remains of their lamented chief from the field, except Captains Brewster and Wickliffe, who remained and rendered valuable services as staff officers on April 7.
Gov. Isham G. Harris, of Tennessee, went upon the field with General Johnston, was by his side when he was shot, aided him from his horse, and received him in his arms when he died. Subsequently the Governor joined my staff and remained with me throughout the next day, except when carrying orders or employed in encouraging the troops of his own State, to whom he gave a conspicuous example of coolness, zeal, and intrepidity.
I am also under many obligations to my own general, personal, and volunteer staff, many of whom have been so long associated with me. I append a list of those present on the field on both days and whose duties carried them constantly under fire, namely: Col. Thomas Jordan, Capt. Clifton II. Smith, and Lieut. John M. Otey, adjutant-general's department; Maj. George W. Brent, acting inspector-general; Col. R. B. Lee, chief of subsistence, whose horse was wounded; Lieut. Col. S. W. Ferguson and Lieut. A. R. Chisolm, aides-de-camp. Volunteer aides-de-camp Col. Jacob Thompson, Majs. Numa Augustin and H. E. Peyton, and Capts. Albert Ferry and B. B. Waddell. Capt. W. W. Porter, of Major-General Crittenden's staff, also reported for duty, and shared the duties of my volunteer staff on Monday. Brigadier-General Trudeau, of Louisiana Volunteers, also for a part of the first day's conflict was with me as a volunteer aide. Capt. E. H. Cummins, signal officer, also was actively employed as staff officer on both days.
Nor must I fail to mention that Private W. E. Goolsby, Eleventh Regiment Virginia Volunteers, orderly to my headquarters since last June, repeatedly employed to carry my verbal orders to the field, discharged the duty with great zeal and intelligence.
Other members of my staff were necessarily absent from the immediate field of battle, intrusted with responsible duties at these headquarters, namely:
Capt. F. H. Jordan, assistant adjutant-general, in charge of general <ar10_391> headquarters; Maj. Eugene E. McLean, chief quartermaster, and Capt. E. Deslonde, quartermaster's department.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ferguson, aide-de-camp, early on Monday was assigned to command and directed the movements of a brigade of the Second Corps.
Lieutenant-Colonel Gilmer, chief engineer, after having performed the important and various duties of his place with distinction to himself and material benefit to the country, was wounded late on Monday. I trust, however, I shall not long be deprived of his essential services.
Captain Lockett Engineer Corps, chief assistant to Colonel Gilmer, after having been employed in the duties of his corps on Sunday, was placed by me on Monday in command of a battalion without field officers.
Captain Fremaux, Provisional Engineers, and Lieutenants Steel and Helm also rendered material and even dangerous service in the line of their duty.
Major-General (now General) Braxton Bragg, in addition to his duties of chief of staff, as has been before stated, commanded his corps—  much the largest in the field— - n both days with signal capacity and soldiership.
Surgeons Foard, medical director; R. L. Brodie and S. Choppin, medical inspectors, and D.W. Yahdell, medical director of the Western Department, with General Johnston, were present in the discharge of their arduous and high duties, which they performed with honor to their profession.
Capt. Tom Saunders, Messrs. Scales and Metcalf, and Mr. Tully, of New Orleans, were of material aid on both days, ready to give news of the enemy's positions and movements regardless of exposure.
While thus partially making mention of some of those who rendered brilliant, gallant, or meritorious service on the field, I have aimed merely to notice those whose position would most probably exclude the record of their services from the reports of corps or subordinate commanders.
From this agreeable duty I turn to one in the highest degree unpleasant; one due, however, to the brave men under me as a contrast to the behavior of most of the army who fought so heroically. I allude to the fact that some officers, non-commissioned officers, and men abandoned their colors early on the first day to pillage the captured encampments; others retired shamefully from the field on both days while the thunder of cannon and the roar and rattle of musketry told them that their brothers were being slaughtered by the fresh legions of the enemy. I have ordered the names of the most conspicuous on this roll of laggards and cowards to be published in orders.
It remains to state that our loss on the two days, in killed outright, was 1,728; wounded, 8,012, and missing, 959; making an aggregate of casualties, 10,699.
This sad list tells in simple language of the stout fight made by our countrymen in front of the rude log chapel of Shiloh, especially when it is known that on Monday, from exhaustion and other causes, not 20,000 men on our side could be brought into action.
Of the losses of the enemy I have no exact knowledge. Their newspapers report it as very heavy. Unquestionably it was greater even in proportion than our own on both days, for it was apparent to all that their dead left on the field outnumbered ours two to one. Their casualties, therefore, cannot have fallen many short of 20,000 in killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing. <ar10_392>
Through information derived from many sources, including the newspapers of the enemy, we engaged on Sunday the divisions of Generals Prentiss, Sherman, Hurlbut, McClernand, and Smith, of 9,000 men each, or, at least, 45000 men. This force was re-enforced Sunday night by the divisions of Generals Nelson, McCook, Crittenden, and Thomas, of Major-General Buell's army, some 25,000 strong, including all arms; also General L. Wallace's division, of General Grant's army, making at least 33,000 fresh troops, which, added to the remnant of General Grant's forces— -on Monday morning amounting to over 20,000— made an aggregate force of some 53,000 men, at least, arrayed against us on that day.
In connection with the results of the battle I should state that most of our men who had inferior arms exchanged them for the improved arms of the enemy; also that most of the property, public and personal, in the camps from which the enemy was driven on Sunday was rendered useless or greatly damaged, except some of the tents.
With this are transmitted certain papers, to wit: Order of movement, marked A; a list of the killed and wounded, marked B; a list of captured flags, marked C, and a map of the field of battle, marked D.(*)
All of which is respectfully submitted through my volunteer aide-de-camp, Col. Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, Who has in charge the flags, standards, and colors captured from the enemy.
I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
 G. T. BEAUREGARD,  General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.
-----
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF S. C., GA., AND FLA., Charleston, S. C., March 20, 1863.
GENERAL: My report of the battle of Shiloh was written without opportunity to consult reports of army corps commanders and of their subordinate officers. These have never been furnished me, except the report and accompanying papers in relation to the operations of the corps under General Braxton Bragg, copies of which were furnished me at this place from your office. I hear that the reports of the corps under Lieutenant-General Polk have been handed in; if so, please have copies sent me as early as practicable; also of the reports of Major-Generals Hardee and Breckinridge, if at your disposition, as these papers are necessary in the preparation of a detailed report, which I find it will be proper for me to prepare and render.
Respectfully, your obedient,
 G. T. BEAUREGARD, General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER, Adjt. and Insp. Gen., Richmond, Va.
[Inclosure A.]
SPECIAL ORDERS No. 8.
HDQRS. ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Corinth, Miss., April 3, 1862.
I. In the impending movement the corps of this army will march, assemble, and take order of battle in the following manner, it being assumed that the enemy is in position about a mile in advance of Shiloh Church, <ar10_393> with his right resting on Owl Creek and his left on Lick Creek.
1st. The Third Corps, under Major-General Hardee, will advance as soon as practicable on the Ridge road from Corinth to what is known as the Bark road, passing about half a mile northward of the workhouse. The head of this column will bivouac, if possible, to night at Mickey's house, at the intersection of the road from Monterey to Savannah. The cavalry, thrown well forward during the march, to reconnoiter and prevent surprise, will halt in front of the Mickey house, on the Bark road.
2d. Major Waddell, aide-de-camp to General Beauregard, with two good guides, will report for service to Major-General Hardee.
3d. At 3 o clock a.m. to-morrow the Third Corps, with the left in front, will continue to advance by the Bark road until within sight of the en-enemy's outposts or advanced positions, when it will be deployed in line of battle, according to the nature of the ground, its left resting on Owl Creek, its right toward Lick Creek, supported on that flank by one-half of its cavalry, the left flank being supported by the other half. The interval between the extreme right of this corps and Lick Creek will be filled by a brigade or division, according to the extent of the ground, from the Second Corps.
These troops during the battle will also be under the command of Major-General Hardee. He will make the proper disposition of the artillery along the line of battle, remembering that the rifled guns are of long ranges and should be placed on any commanding position in rear of the infantry to fire mainly on the reserves and second line of the enemy, but will occasionally be directed on his batteries and heads of columns.
II. The Second Corps, under Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg, will assemble on Monterey, and move thence as early as practicable, the right wing, with left in front, by the road from Monterey to Savannah, the head of column to reach the vicinity of Mickey's house, at the intersection of the Bark road, before sunset. The cavalry with this wing will take position on the road to Savannah, beyond Mickey's as far as Owl Creek, having advanced guards and pickets well to the front.
The left wing of this corps will advance at the same time, also left in front, by the road from Monterey to Purdy, the head of the column to reach by night the intersection of that road with the Bark road. This wing will continue the movement in the morning as soon as the rear of the Third Corps shall have passed the Purdy road, which it will then follow.
The Second Corps will then form the second line of battle about 1,000 yards in rear of the first line. It will be formed, if practicable, with regiments in double columns at half distance, disposed as advantageously as the nature of the ground will admit and with a view to facility of deployment, the artillery placed as may seem best to Major-General Bragg.
III. The First Corps, under Major-General Polk, with the exception of the detached division at Bethel, will take up its line of march by the Ridge road, hence to Pittsburg, half an hour after the rear of the Third Corps shall have passed Corinth, and will bivouac to-night in rear of that corps, and on to-morrow will follow the movements of said corps with the same interval of time as to-day. When its head of column shall reach the vicinity of the Mickey house it will be halted in column or massed on the line of the Bark road, according to the nature of the ground, as a reserve. <ar10_394>
Meantime one regiment of its cavalry will be placed in observation on the road from Johnston's house to Stantonville, with advance guards and pickets thrown out well in advance toward Stantonville. Another regiment or battalion of cavalry will be posted in the same manner in the road from Monterey to Purdy, with its rear resting on or about the intersection of that road with the Bark road, having advanced guards and pickets in the direction of Purdy.
The forces at Bethel and Purdy will defend their positions, as already instructed, if attacked; otherwise they will assemble on Purdy, and thence advance with advanced guards, flankers, and all other prescribed military precautions, by the road thence to Monterey, forming a junction with the next of the First Corps at the intersection of that road with the Bark road leading from Corinth.
IV. The reserve of the forces will be concentrated by the shortest and best routes at Monterey as soon as the rear of the Second Corps shall have moved out of that place. Its commander will take up the best position whence to advance, as required, either in the direction of Mickey's or of Pratt's house, on the direct road to Pittsburg, if that road is found practicable, or in the direction of the Ridge road to Hamburg, throwing all its cavalry on the latter road as far as its intersection with the one to Pittsburg, passing through Guersford, on Lick Creek. This cavalry will throw well forward advanced guards and vedettes toward Guersford and in the direction of Hamburg, and during the impending battle, when called to the field of combat, will move by the Guersford road. A regiment of the infantry reserve will be thrown forward to the intersection of the Gravel Hill road with the Ridge road to Hamburg, as a support to the cavalry.
The reserve will be formed of Breckinridge's, Bowen's, and Statham's brigades as now organized, the whole under command of Brigadier-General Breckinridge.
V. General Bragg will detach the Fifty-first and Fifty-second Regiments Tennessee Volunteers, Blount's Alabama, and Desha's Arkansas battalion, and Bains' battery from his corps, which, with two of Carroll's regiments now en route for these headquarters, will form a garrison for the post and depot of Corinth.
VI. Strong guards will be left at the railroad bridges between Iuka and Corinth, to be furnished in due proportion from the commands at Iuka, Bumsville, and Corinth.
VII. Proper guards will be left at the camps of the several regiments of the forces in the field. Corps commanders will determine the strength of these guards.
VIII. Wharton's regiment of Texas cavalry will be ordered forward at once to scout on the road from Monterey to Savannah between Mickey's and its intersection with the Pittsburg-Purdy road. It will annoy and harass any force of the enemy moving by the latter way to assail Cheatham's division at Purdy.
IX. The chief engineer of the forces will take all due measures and precautions and give all requisite orders for the repair of the bridges, causeways, and roads on which our troops may move in the execution of these orders.
X. The troops, individually so intelligent, and with such great interests involved in the issue, are urgently enjoined to be observant of the orders of their superiors in the hour of battle. Their officers must constantly endeavor to hold them in hand and prevent the waste of ammunition by heedless aimless firing. The fire should be slow, always at <ar10_395> a distinct mark. It is expected that much and effective work will be done with the bayonet.
By command of General A. S. Johnston:
 THOMAS JORDAN, Assistant Adjutant-General.
[Inclosure B.]
List of killed, wounded, and missing.
Command. Killed. Wounded. Missing.
FIRST CORPS.— Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. CHARLES CLARK

First Brigade, Col. R. M. Russell 97 512 ....
Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. A. P. Stewart. 92 421 3

SECOND DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. B. F. CHEATHAM.

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson. 120 607 13
Second Brigade, Col. W. H. Stephens. 75 413 3
Total First Corps  385 1,953 19

SECOND CORPS.— Maj. Gen. BRAXTON BRAGG.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. DANIEL RUGGLES.

First Brigade, Col. R. L. Gibson 97 488 97
Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson  69 313 52
Third Brigade, Col. Preston Pond  89 336 169

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. J. M. WITHERS

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. A. H. Gladden 129 597 103
Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. B. Chalmers  83 343 19
Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. K. Jackson  86 364 194
Total Second Corps  553 2,441 634

THIRD CORPS.— Maj. Gen. WILLIAM. HARDER.

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. T. C. Hindman  109 546 38
Second Brigade, Brig. Gen- P. R. Cleburne  188 790 65
Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. S. A.M. Wood  107 600 38
Total Third Corps  404 1,936 141

RESERVE CORPS.— Maj. Gen. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE.

First (Kentucky) Brigade, Col. R. P. Trabue  151 557 92
Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. J. S. Bowen  98 498 28
Third Brigade. Col. W. S. Statham  137 627 45
Total Reserve Corps  386 1,682 165

Grand total  1,723 8,012 959

 THOMAS JORDAN, Assistant Adjutant-General.
<ar10_396>
[Inclosure C.]
List of flags captured.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Corinth, Miss., April 23, 1862.
5 blue silk regimental colors.
20 Federal flags. 1 garrison flag. 2 guidons.
 THOMAS JORDAN, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
[Inclosure E.]
Field return of the Army of the Mississippi before and after the battle of Shiloh.
A Effective total before battle
B Effective total after battle.

Command. Commander. A.(*) B Remarks.
First Army Corps. Maj. Gen. L. Polk. 9,136 6,779 Casualties in battle of
Second Army Corps. General Braxton Bragg 13,589 9,961   Shiloh: Killed, 1,728;
Third Army Corps. Maj. Gen. W. J. Hardee 6,789 4,609   wounded, 8,012; miss-
Reserve Brig. Gen. J. C. Breckinridge. 6,439 4,206   ing, 959.
Total infantry and artillery.  35,953 25,555
Cavalry Brig. Gen. F. Gardner 4,382 4,081 The battle-field was so
      thickly wooded that
Grand total  40,335 29,636   the cavalry was use-
      less and could not op-
Difference   10,699   erate at all.

Respectfully submitted.
THOMAS JORDAN, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Respectfully submitted and forwarded.
 G. T. BEAUREGARD, General, Commanding Army of the Mississippi.
 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Corinth, Miss., April 21, 1862.
[Addenda A.]
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Corinth, Miss., April 3, 1862.
 Soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi:
I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country. With the resolution and disciplined valor becoming men fighting, as you are, for all worth living or dying for, you can but march to a decisive victory over agrarian mercenaries, sent to subjugate and despoil you of your liberties, property, and honor. Remember the precious stake involved. Remember the dependence of your mothers, <ar10_397> your wives, your sisters, and our children on the result. Remember the fair, broad, abounding land, the happy homes, and ties that will be desolated by your defeat. The eyes and hopes of 8,000,000 of people rest upon you. You are expected to show yourselves worthy of your valor and lineage; worthy of the women of the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never been exceeded in any time. With such incentives to brave deeds and with the trust that God is with us your generals will lead you confidently to the combat, assured of success.
 A. S. JOHNSTON, General, Commanding.
[Addenda B.]
Memorandum for the commanders of the corps and of the reserve.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Corinth, April 3, 1862.
1. As soon as the reserve shall have taken position at Monterey a strong working party will be sent to repair the bridges, causeway, and road across Lick Creek, on the direct road from Monterey to Pittsburg, so that it may be used in any forward movement of the reserve.
2. In the approaching battle every effort should be made to turn the left flank of the enemy so as to cut off his line of retreat to the Tennessee River and throw him back on Owl Creek, where he will be obliged to surrender. Every precaution must also be taken on our part a prevent unnecessary exposure of our men to the enemy's gunboats.
By command of General A. S. Johnston:
 THOMAS JORDAN, Assistant Adjutant-General.
[Addenda C.]
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Corinth, Miss., April 16, 1862.
 Soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi:
You have bravely fought the invaders of your soil for two days in his own position. Fought your superior in numbers, in arms, in all the appliances of war. Your success has been signal. His losses have been immense, outnumbering yours in all save the personal worth of the slain. You drove him from his camps to the shelter of his iron-clad gunboats, which alone saved him from complete disaster. You captured his artillery, more than 25 flags and standards, and took over 3,000 prisoners.
You have done your duty. Your commanding general thanks you. Your countrymen are proud of your deeds on the bloody field of Shiloh; confident in the ultimate results of your valor.
Soldiers, untoward events saved the enemy from annihilation. His insolent presence still pollutes your soil, his hostile flag still flaunts before you. There can be no peace so long as these things are.
Trusting that God is with us, as with our fathers, let us seek to be worthy of His favor, and resolve to be independent or perish in the struggle.
 G. T. BEAUREGARD, General, Commanding.

[ar10_463 con't]
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 2,
Mobile, Ala., July 25, 1862.
SIR: Herewith I have the honor to forward my official report, as commander of the Second Corps, Army of the Mississippi, of the battle of Shiloh. The great delay, somewhat unusual with me in official matters, has resulted from a combination of unavoidable circumstances. Wishing to make it complete, the reports of all subordinates were desired; but at last several are wanting. My own time has been so much occupied, too, that it is not rendered as soon, nor is it as complete, as I could have desired.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
 General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.
[Inclosure. ]
HDQRS. SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Corinth, Miss., April 30, 1862.
GENERAL: In submitting a report of the operations of my command, the Second Army Corps, in the actions of Shiloh, on the 6th and 7th of April, it is proper that the narrative of events on the field be preceded by a sketch of the march from here.
But few regiments of my command had ever made a day's march. A very large proportion of the rank and file had never performed a day's labor. Our organization had been most hasty, with great deficiency in commanders, and was therefore very imperfect. The equipment was lamentably defective for field service, and our transportation, hastily impressed in the country, was deficient in quantity and very inferior in quality. With all these drawbacks the troops marched late <ar10_464> in the afternoon of the 3d, a day later than intended, in high spirits, and eager for the contest.
The road to Monterey (11 miles) was found very bad, requiring us until 11 o'clock on the 4th to concentrate at that place, where one of my brigades joined the column. Moving from there the command bivouacked for the night near the Mickey house, immediately in rear of Major-General Hardee's corps, Major-General Polk's being just in our rear.
Our advanced cavalry had encountered the enemy during the day and captured several prisoners, being compelled, however, to retire. A reconnaissance in some force from the enemy made its appearance during the evening in front of General Hardee's corps, and was promptly driven back.
The commanders of divisions and brigades were assembled at night, the order of battle was read to them, and the topography of the enemy's position was explained, as far as understood by us. Orders were then given for the troops to march at 3 a.m., so as to attack the enemy early on the 5th.
About 2 a.m. a drenching rain-storm commenced, to which the troops were exposed, without tents, and continued until daylight, rendering it so dark and filling the creeks and ravines to such an extent as to make it impracticable to move at night. Orders were immediately sent out to suspend the movement until the first dawn of day. Continued firing by volleys and single shots was kept up all night and until 7 a.m. next morning by the undisciplined troops of our front, in violation of positive orders. Under such circumstances little or no rest could be obtained by our men, and it was? o'clock in the morning before the road was clear so as to put my command in motion, though it had been in ranks and ready from 3 a.m., in the wet and cold, and suffering from inaction.
At this juncture the commanding general arrived at our position. My column, at last fairly in motion, moved on without delay until arriving near where the Pittsburg road leaves the Bark road, when a message from Major-General Hardee announced the enemy in his front and that he had developed his line. As promptly as my troops could be brought up in a narrow road, much encumbered with artillery and baggage wagons, they were formed, according to order of battle, about 800 yards in rear of Hardee's line, my center resting on the Pittsburg road, my right brigade, Gladden's, of Withers' division, thrown forward to the right of the first line, Major-General Hardee's force not being sufficient for the ground to be covered.
In this position we remained, anxiously awaiting the approach of our reserves to advance upon the enemy, now but a short distance in our front. The condition of the roads and other untoward circumstances delayed them until late in the afternoon, rendering it necessary to defer the attack until next morning.
The night was occupied by myself and a portion of my staff in efforts to bring forward provisions for a portion of the troops then surfering from their improvidence. Having been ordered to march with five days' rations, they were found hungry and destitute at the end of three days. This is one of the evils of raw troops, imperfectly organized and badly commanded; a tribute, it seems, we must continue to pay to universal suffrage, the bane of our military organization. In this condition we passed the night, and at dawn of day prepared to move.
The enemy did not give us time to discuss the question of attack, for soon after dawn he commenced a rapid musketry fire on our pickets. <ar10_465> The order was immediately given by the commanding general and our lines advanced. Such was the ardor of our troops that it was with great difficulty they could be restrained from closing up and mingling with the first line. Within less than a mile the enemy was encountered in force at the encampments of his advanced positions, but our first line brushed him away, leaving the rear nothing to do but to press on in pursuit. In about one mile more we encountered him in strong force among almost the entire line. His batteries were posted on eminences, with strong infantry supports.
Finding the first line was now unequal to the work before it, being weakened by extension and necessarily broken by the nature of the ground, I ordered my whole force to move up steadily and promptly to its support. The order was hardly necessary, for subordinate commanders, far beyond the reach of my voice and eye in the broken country occupied by us, had promptly acted on the necessity as it arose, and by the time the order could be conveyed the whole line was developed and actively engaged.
From this time, about 7.30 o'clock, until night the battle raged with little intermission. All parts of our line were not constantly engaged, but there was no time without heavy firing in some portion of it. My position for several hours was opposite my left center Ruggles' division), immediately in rear of Hindman's brigade, Hardee's corps.
In moving over the difficult and broken ground the right brigade of Ruggles' division, Colonel Gibson commanding, bearing to the right, became separated from the two left brigades, leaving a broad interval.
Three regiments of Major-General Polk's command opportunely came up and filled this interval. Finding no superior officer with them, I took the liberty of directing their movements in support of Hindman, then, as before, ardently pressing forward and engaging the enemy at every point.
On the ground which had come under my immediate observation we had already captured three large encampments and three batteries of artillery. It was now about 10.30 o'clock.
Our right flank, according to the order of battle, had pressed forward ardently under the immediate direction of the commanding general and swept all before it:. Batteries, encampments, store-houses, munitions in rich profusion, were ours, and the enemy, fighting hard and causing us to pay dearly for our successes, was falling back rapidly at every point. His left, however, opposite our right, was his strongest ground and position, and was disputed with obstinacy.
It was during this severe struggle that my command suffered an irreparable loss in the fall of Brigadier-General Gladden, commanding First Brigade, Withers' division, mortally, and Col. D. W. Adams, Louisiana Regular Infantry, his successor, severely, wounded. Nothing daunted, however, by these losses, this noble division, under its gallant leader, Withers, pressed on with the other troops in its vicinity and carried all before them. Their progress, however, under the obstinate resistance made was not so rapid as was desired in proportion to that of the left, where the enemy was less strong; so that, instead of driving him, as we intended, down the river leaving the left open for him to pass, we had really enveloped him on all sides and were pressing him back upon the landing at Pittsburg.
Meeting at about 10.30 o'clock upon the left center with Major-General Polk, my senior, I promptly yielded to him the important command «60 R R— VOL X» <ar10_466> at that point, and moved toward the right, in the direction in which Brigadier-General Hindman, of Hardee's line, had just led his division. Here we met the most obstinate resistance of the day, the enemy being strongly posted, with infantry and artillery, on an eminence immediately behind a dense thicket. Hindman's command was gallantly led to the attack, but recoiled under a murderous fire. The noble and gallant leader fell, severely wounded, and was borne from the field he had illustrated with a heroism rarely equaled.
The command soon returned to its work, but was unequal to the heavy task. Leaving them to hold their position, I moved farther to the right, and brought up the First Brigade (Gibson), of Ruggles' division, which was in rear of its true position, and threw them forward to attack this same point. A very heavy fire soon opened, and after a short conflict this command fell back in considerable disorder. Rallying the different regiments, by means of my staff officers and escort, they were twice more moved to the attack, only to be driven back by the enemy's sharpshooters occupying the thick cover. This result was due entirely to want of proper handling. Finding that nothing could be done here, after hours of severe exertion and heavy losses, and learning of the fall of our commander, who was leading in person on the extreme right, the troops were so posted as to hold this position, and leaving a competent staff' officer to direct them in my name, I moved rapidly to the extreme right. Here I found a strong force, consisting of three parts, without a common head— Brigadier-General Breckinridge, with his reserve division, pressing the enemy; Brigadier-General Withers, with his splendid division, greatly exhausted and taking a temporary rest, and Major-General Cheatham, with his division, of Major-General Polk's corps, to their left and rear. These troops were soon put in motion, responding with great alacrity to the command of "Forward! let every order be forward."
It was now probably past 4 o'clock, the descending sun warning us to press our advantage and finish the work before night should compel us to desist. Fairly in motion, these commands again, with a common head and a common purpose, swept all before them. Neither battery nor battalion could withstand their onslaught. Passing through camp after camp, rich in military spoils of every kind, the enemy was driven headlong from every position and thrown in confused masses upon the river bank, behind his heavy artillery and under cover of his gunboats at the Landing. He had left nearly the whole of his light artillery in our hands and some 3,000 or more prisoners, who were cut off from their retreat by the closing in of our troops on the left under Major-General Polk, with a portion of his reserve corps, and Brigadier-General Ruggles, with Anderson's and Pond's brigades of his division.
The prisoners were dispatched to the rear under a proper guard, all else being left upon the field that we might press our advantage. The enemy had fallen back in much confusion and was crowded in unorganized masses on the river bank, vainly striving to cross. They were covered by a battery of heavy guns, well served, and their two gunboats, which now poured a heavy fire upon our supposed positions, for we were entirely hid by the forest. Their fire, though terrific in sound and producing some consternation at first, did us no damage, as the shells all passed over and exploded far beyond our positions.
As soon as our troops could be again formed and put in motion the order was given to move forward at all points and sweep the enemy from the field. The sun was about disappearing, so that little time was left us to finish the glorious work of the day, a day unsurpassed <ar10_467> in the history of warfare for its daring deeds, brilliant achievements, and heavy sacrifices.
Our troops, greatly exhausted by twelve hours' incessant fighting, without food, mostly responded to the order with alacrity, and the movement commenced with every prospect of success, though a heavy battery in our front and the gunboats on our right seemed determined to dispute every inch of ground.
Just at this time an order was received from the commanding general to withdraw the forces beyond the enemy's fire. As this was communicated, in many instances, direct to brigade commanders, the troops were soon in motion, and the action ceased. The different commands, mixed and scattered, bivouacked at points most convenient to their positions and beyond the range of the enemy's guns. All firing, except a half-hour shot from the gunboats, ceased, and the whole night was passed by our exhausted men in quiet. Such as had not sought shelter in the camps of the enemy were again drenched before morning by one of those heavy rain-storms which seemed to be our portion for this expedition.
Such was the nature of the ground over which we had fought, and the heavy resistance we had met, that the commands of the whole army were very much shattered. In a dark and stormy night commanders found it impossible to find or assemble their troops, each body or regiment bivouacking where night overtook them.
In this condition morning found us, confronting a large and fresh army, which had arrived during the night, and for the first time the enemy advanced to meet us. He was received by our whole line with a firm and bold front, and the battle again raged.
From this hour until 2 p.m. the action continued with great obstinacy and varying success. Our troops, exhausted by days of incessant fatigue, hunger, and want of rest, and ranks thinned by killed, wounded, and stragglers, mounting in the whole to nearly half our force, fought bravely, but with the want of that animation and spirit which characterized them the preceding day. Many instances of daring and desperate valor, deserving of better success, failed for want of numbers.
My personal services were confined during this day to the extreme left of our line, where my whole time was incessantly occupied. The troops in my front consisted of Ruggles' division, Colonel Trabue's brigade, of Breckinridge's reserve, and other detachments of different corps, all operating to the left of Shiloh Church.
This force advanced in the early morning and pressed the enemy back for nearly a mile, securing for our left flank an eminence in an open field near Owl Creek, which we held until near the close of the conflict against every effort the enemy could make. For this gallant and obstinate defense of our left flank, which the enemy constantly endeavored to force, we were indebted to Colonel Trabue's small brigade, in support of Captain Byrne's battery.
Against overwhelming numbers this gallant command maintained its position from the commencement of the action until about 12 o'clock, when, our forces on the right falling backlit was left, entirely without support, far in front of our whole army. Safety required it to retire.
During this time the right and center were actively engaged. Withers' division, in conjunction with portions of Hardee's and Breckinridge's commands, obstinately disputed every effort of the enemy. But his overwhelming numbers, a very large portion being perfectly fresh troops, the prostration of our men, and the exhaustion of our ammunition, not a battalion being supplied, rendered our position most perilous, and the <ar10_468> commanding general ordered a retrograde movement, to commence on the right. This was gradually extended to the left, now held by Ketchum's battery. The troops fell back generally in perfect order and formed line of battle on a ridge about half a mile in the rear, Ketchum retiring slowly as the rear guard of the whole army. The enemy evinced no disposition to pursue.
After some half hour our troops were again put in motion and moved about a mile farther, where line was formed and final arrangements made for the march to our camp at Corinth, the enemy not making the slightest demonstration upon us. This orderly movement, under the circumstances, was as creditable to the troops as any part of the brilliant advance they had made.
A field return of the force carried into action, marked A;(*) a return of killed, wounded, and missing, marked B, and the reports of division commanders, marked C and D,(+) accompanied by those of subordinate commanders, are herewith forwarded.
Of the missing, a few were ascertained to have fallen into the hands of the enemy, mostly wounded. The others were no doubt left dead on the field. The heavy loss sustained by the command will best indicate the obstinacy of the resistance met and the determination with which it was overcome.
For the part performed by the different portions of the corps reference is made to the reports of subordinate commanders.
The division of Brig. Gen. J. M. Withers was gallantly led by that officer from the first gun to the close of the action, and performed service rarely surpassed by any troops on any field.
Brig. Gen. A. H. Gladden, First Brigade of this division, fell early in the action, mortally wounded, while gallantly leading his command in a successful charge. No better soldier lived. No truer man or nobler patriot ever shed his blood in a just cause.
Later in the day Col. D. W. Adams, Louisiana infantry, who had succeeded to this splendid brigade, was desperately wounded while gallantly leading it, and later still Col. Z. C. Deas, Twenty-second Alabama Volunteers, fell pierced by several balls.
Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers, at the head of his gallant Mississippians filled— he could not have exceeded— the measure of my expectations. Never were troops and commander more worthy of each other and of their State.
Brig' Gen. J, K. Jackson did good service with his Alabama Brigade on the first day, but, becoming much broken, it was not unitedly in action thereafter. The excellent regiment of Col. Joseph Wheeler, however, joined and did noble service with Gladden's brigade.
Brig. Gen. D. Ruggles, commanding Second Division, was conspicuous throughout both days for the gallantry with which he led his troops. Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson, commanding a brigade of this division, was also among the foremost where, the fighting was hardest, and never failed to overcome whatever resistance was opposed to him. With a brigade composed almost entirely of raw troops his personal gallantry and soldierly bearing supplied the place of instruction and discipline.
It would be a pleasing duty to record the deeds of many other noble soldiers of inferior grade, but as subordinate commanders have done so it, their reports a repetition is unnecessary. I shall be pardoned for making an exception in case of Capt. R. W. Smith, commanding a <ar10_469> company of Alabama cavalry, which served as my personal escort during the action. For personal gallantry and intelligent execution of orders, frequently under the heaviest fire, his example has rarely been equaled. To him, his officers, and his men I feel a deep personal as well as official obligation.
By the officers of my staff I was most faithfully, laboriously, and gallantly served throughout both days, as well as on the marches before and after the action. A record of their names is an acknowledgment but justly due:
Maj. George G. Garner, assistant adjutant-general (horse wounded on Sunday); Capt. H. W. Walter, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. G. B. Cooke, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieut. Towson Ellis, regular aide: First Lieut. F.S. Parker, regular aide: Lieut. Col. F. Gardner, C. S. Army; Lieut. Col. W. K. Beard, Florida Volunteers, acting inspector-general (wounded on Monday); Maj. J. H. Hallon-quist, Provisional Army, chief of artillery; Capt. W. O. Williams, Provisional Army, assistant to chief of artillery; Capt. S. H. Lockerr, C. S. Engineers; Capt. H. Oladowski, C. S. Army, chief of ordnance; Maj. J. J. Walker, Provisional Army, chief of subsistence; Maj. L. F. Johnston, Provisional Army, chief quartermaster; Maj. O. P. Chaffee, Provisional Army, assistant quartermaster; Surg. A. J. Foard, C. S. Army, medical director; Surg. J. C. Nott, Provisional Army, medical inspector; Dr. Robert O. Butler, of Louisiana, volunteer for the occasion, rendered excellent service in our field hospitals. Lieut. Col. David Urquhart, aide to the Governor of Louisiana, served me with great intelligence and efficiency as volunteer aide.
Several other officers during the engagement, temporarily separated from their own commands, did me the favor to act on my staff and served me efficiently.
Privates H. Montague and M. Shehan, Louisiana infantry, and Private John Williams, Tenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, orderlies in attendance on myself and staff, though humble in position, rendered services so useful and gallant, that their names are fully entitled to a mention in this report. They encountered the same dangers, and when necessary performed nearly the same duties, as officers of my staff, without the same incentives. In rallying troops, bringing up stragglers, and enforcing orders against refugees they were especially active, energetic, and efficient.
It may not be amiss to refer briefly to the causes it is believed operated to prevent the complete overthrow of the enemy, which we were so near accomplishing, and which would have changed the entire complexion of the war.
The want of proper organization and discipline, and the inferiority in many cases of our officers to the men they were expected to command, left us often without system or order; and the large proportion of stragglers resulting weakened our forces and kept the superior and staff officers constantly engaged in the duties of file-closers. Especially was this the case after the occupancy of each of the enemy's camps, the spoils of which served to delay and greatly to demoralize our men. But no one cause probably contributed so largely to our loss of time—  which was the loss of success— as the fall of the commanding general. At the moment of this irreparable disaster the plan of battle was being rapidly and successfully executed under his immediate eye and lead on the right.
For want of a common superior to the different commands on that part of the field great delay occurred after this misfortune, and that <ar10_470> delay prevented the consummation of the work so gallantly and successfully begun and carried on until the approach of night induced our new commander to recall the exhausted troops for rest and recuperation before a crowning effort on the next morning.
The arrival during the night of a large and fresh army to re-enforce the enemy, equal in numbers at least to our own, frustrated all his well-grounded expectations, and, after a long and bloody contest with superior forces, compelled us to retire from the field, leaving our killed, many of our wounded, and nearly all of the trophies of the previous day's victories.
In this result we have a valuable lesson, by which we should profit— -never on a battle-field to lose a moment's time, but leaving the killed, wounded, and spoils to those whose special business it is to care for them, to press on with every available man, giving a panic-stricken and retreating foe no time to rally, and reaping all the benefits of a success never complete until every enemy is killed, wounded, or captured. No course so certain as this to afford succor to the wounded and security to the trophies.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 BRAXTON BRAGG,
 General, Commanding.
 Brig. Gen. THOMAS JORDAN,
 Chief of Staff.
P. S.— The transmission of this report has been delayed from time to time, that those from subordinate commanders, with a complete and perfect list of killed, wounded, and missing, might accompany it. In this hope I am yet disappointed to a certain extent.
[Inclosure B. ]
Field return, showing the number of killed, wounded, and missing, and the aggregate strength of each division of the Second Corps, Army of the Mississippi, April 6,1862.
Divisions. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Aggregate. Aggregate strength on April 6, 1862.
Wither's division 293 1,334 253 1,880 6,482
Ruggle's division 240 1,103 269 1,612 6,484
Grand total 533 2,437 522 4,492 12,966
[Actual total--Ed}    3,492